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Taking the Islamist Movement Seriously: Social Movement Theory and the Islamist Movement

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Citation

Meijer, R. (2005). Taking the Islamist Movement Seriously: Social Movement Theory and the Islamist Movement. *International Review Of Social History*, 50, 279-291. Retrieved from <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/9795>

Version: Not Applicable (or Unknown)
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Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).



12-605-70-279-291

naam onderzoeker Meijer, R.

titel publicatie "Taking the Islamist Movement Seriously: Social Movement Theory and the
Islamist Movement,"

jaartal 2005

titelpagina

beginpagina

279

eindpagina

291

Bestandsnaam: 12 _ 605 _ 70

REVIEW ESSAY

Taking the Islamist Movement Seriously: Social Movement Theory and the Islamist Movement

ROEL MEIJER

Few subjects have attracted as much attention as the Islamist movement but have been so little understood. Is it a reactionary movement in revolt against “modernity”, because it “is desperate to hold out and turn back the hands of time”, as Brigadier-General Mark Kimmitt, spokesman for the American troops in Iraq, recently remarked on the resistance in Falluja?¹ Or is it a movement that takes the sources of the Islam literally, as Orientalists believe? Or is it, as some sociologists argue, the result of relative deprivation? Common to these explanations is their stress on crisis and the irrational character of the movement. Although there have been several brilliant insights into the dynamics of the Islamist movement during past years,² and there are several precursors of social movement theory (SMT),³ as well as many studies that have borrowed from SMT,⁴ four new studies make a coordinated attempt to open the way for a more systematic way of applying SMT to the Islamist movement.⁵ Based on the long

1. *The Guardian*, 1 April 2004. See also Roel Meijer, “Defending our Honour: Authenticity and the Framing of Resistance in the Iraqi Town of Falluja”, *Etnofoor*, (forthcoming)

2. Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* (London, 2002), and Olivier Roy, *L’islam mondialisé* (Paris, 2002).

3. See for instance, the insightful and stimulating work by Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence* (New York, 2000), and Asef Bayat, *Street Politics: Poor People’s Movements in Iran* (New York, 1997). The contribution to Quintan Wiktorowicz (ed.), *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach* (Bloomington, IN, 2004), by Glenn E. Robinson, “Hamas as Social Movement”, pp. 112–139, has the same approach.

4. For instance, this is the case for Miriem Vièrgès, “Genesis of Mobilization: The Young Activists of Algeria’s Islamic Salvation Front”, in Joel Beinin and Joe Stork (eds), *Political Islam: Essays from Middle East Report* (Berkeley, CA, 1997), pp. 292–305; and Beverley Milton-Edwards, *Islamic Politics in Palestine* (London [etc.], 1996), and, more recently, Judith Palmer Harik, *Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism* (London, 2004).

5. I will review the anthology *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, which includes several contributions of the most prominent researchers on the subject. The other three studies are: Carry Rosefsky Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political*

tradition of SMT in the United States and Europe, founded by, among others, Charles Tilly, Doug McAdam, and Sidney Tarrow, and brought to Europe by Hans-Peter Kriesi and Bert Klandermans, these studies have taken up the challenge of applying the enriching insights of SMT to a non-Western context and to one of the most important contemporary social movements.⁶ The question is, how successful are they? In answering this question, I will first give an outline of their programme, review their more extensive studies, and then compare them with other studies on the subject.

MANIFESTO

The anthology, *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, should be read as a manifesto. The editor of the study, Quintan Wiktorowicz, presents the SMT programme as "a unifying framework and agenda that can provide effective modes of inquiry to further boundaries of research on Islamic activism" (p. 4). He states that most studies on the Islamist movement have been inadequate because they were based on psychological causes of mass mobilization and concentrated on "structural strains" that produce "social anomie", "despair", and "anxiety". These "illnesses" were deemed to be the result of rapid socio-economic transformations, rural-urban migration, and the subsequent clash between the traditional values of the village and the anonymity of the modern city. Another version of strain theory ascribes the rise of the Islamist movement to the growing influence of an aggressive Western culture in the Middle East, while a third source of alienation and social frustration is attributed to lack of democracy.

The curt answer to these theories, following Doug McAdam, is that grievances are ubiquitous but social movements are not. To be sure, most of the upholders of social movement theory recognize that psychological and political strains and frustration play a role in the rise of the Islamist movement. But they argue that these factors in themselves are unable to explain the emergence and dynamics of the Islamist movement. These are based on factors such as the successful mobilization and organization of a following. To underscore their point, Wiktorowicz and others point out that most members of Islamist social movements are not "dysfunctional" individuals who are "seeking psychological comfort". In fact, in most cases

Change in Egypt (New York, 2002); Quintan Wiktorowicz, *The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan* (Albany, NY, 2001); and Mohammed M. Hafez, *Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World* (Boulder, CO [etc.], 2003).

6. For an overview of the results of four decades of social movement theory see, Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement* (2nd edn, Cambridge, 1998), and Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention* (Cambridge, 2001).

they are well-educated, highly motivated individuals who act in their own interests (p. 9).

It is in the analysis of the dynamics of the movement that SMT provides its most promising prospects. The major advantage of SMT is that it is one of the few theoretical constructs that takes the Islamist movement seriously. Influenced by rational choice theory – although not everyone is happy with it, on account of its focus on the individual instead of the group,⁷ and self-interest instead of persuasion⁸ – SMT emphasizes the rational character of the Islamist movement. One of its major tasks is to demonstrate that the Islamist movement takes strategic decisions and adapts its programme and ideology to changing circumstances.

Advocates of SMT argue that it does this in three ways. Firstly, basing their argument on resource mobilization theory (RMT), the contributors to the anthology argue that the Islamist movement, like all other social movements, organizes the mobilization of resources through communication channels, the division of labour, and the financing of the movement. It initiates these activities with the goal of "maximiz[ing] its impact and efficaciousness" (p. 10). Three fields of resource mobilization structure are in theory available to the Islamist movement: (1) the formal political mobilizing structure of political parties and legal institutions; (2) the legal environment of civil society in the form of NGOs, medical clinics, charity societies, schools, and especially professional organizations; and (3) the informal sector of social networks and personal ties.

Which of these fields of resource mobilization are mobilized depends to a great extent on their ability to take advantage of the existing opportunity structures and their overcoming of constraints, the second concept the authors have adopted from SMT. Like RMT, this concept emphasizes the logical and rational character of the movement by contextualizing it and regarding it as an active agent that makes strategic choices based on the opportunities it encounters and creates and the constraints it comes up against and overcomes. As Wiktorowicz argues, the Islamist movement does not operate in a vacuum, but belongs to "a broader social milieu and context characterized by shifting and fluid configurations of enablements and constraints that structure movements dynamics" (p. 13). Its success depends on the "political space" it creates, which in turn depends on its level of access to political institutions and decision-making, the degree of receptivity of the established elite to challenger groups, the capacity of the movement to find allies, and the level of state repression.

From the collected evidence, "access" appears to be much more difficult in the Middle East than the West, on which the model of social movement theory is based. The crucial difference from Western social movements,

7. Robinson, " Hamas as Social Movement", pp. 114–115.

8. Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam*, p. 206.

which the manifesto stresses, is that Islamist movements are not only confronted by repressive authoritarian or semi-authoritarian states, they are usually also opposed by a unified and closed elite that does not allow movements to organize themselves as political parties or be overtly active in civil society. For this reason, Islamist movements in general mostly operate on the periphery and semi-periphery of society, finding first of all refuge in the informal sector, to a lesser extent in civil society, and rarely in the "centre" – parliamentary politics.

Framing is the third theoretical notion derived from SMT that figures prominently in the manifesto. This is not surprising, as the Islamist movement is considered a "new social movement", that primarily focuses on creating meaning and identity. Following Robert Benford and David Snow,⁹ frames are defined as "schemata that offer a language and cognitive tools for making sense of experiences and events in the world 'out there'" (p. 15). Frames diagnose a condition, provide solutions to problems, and motivate and support collective action. They are successful when they achieve "frame resonance", i.e. find sufficient response that will transform mobilization potential into actual mobilization. Thus, in accordance with their constructivist approach, social movement theorists argue that ideas and frames are not rigid God-given principles, even if they are based on sacred scripture. Rather, they are flexible and adaptable to changing political and socioeconomic circumstances. How they are formed, adjusted and achieve "frame resonance", Wiktorowicz argues, does not only depend on their relation with indigenous cultural symbols, language, and identities but also on the reputation of the individual or group responsible for articulating the frame. The authority of the spokesperson uttering the words is as important as the content. Ideology must therefore always be balanced by factors such as the political and cultural environment and resource mobilization and leadership.

APPLICATION

The authors of the four studies have worked with these theoretical constructs in different ways and applied them to different subjects. Carry Rosefsky Wickham has focused on the peaceful "Islamic outreach" to the educated lower middle classes in Egypt. She is also one of the most careful researchers in trying to find a balance between the three elements of SMT: resource mobilization theory, opportunities and constraints, and frames. In general, she is successful in avoiding the traps of subsuming one to the other and reductionism.

Her main contention concerning the political environment in Egypt is

9. Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment", *Annual Review of Sociology*, 26 (2000), pp. 611–639.

that the reform of the authoritarian state during the regimes of Presidents Sadat (1970–1981) and Mubarak (1981–now) failed in the attempt to establish new ways of relating to its citizens. Whereas “restricted pluralism”, the blocking of political access, alienated the lower middle classes politically, the incapacity of the regime to create jobs led to economic deprivation. Alienation was therefore, as Rosefsky Wickham argues, not the result of a reaction to “‘modernity’ writ large”, as strain analysts would have it, but the result of specific political developments and situations (p. 75). The major achievement of the Islamist movement was to turn these disadvantages of “opportunities and constraints” to its favour.

Rosefsky Wickham describes how economic liberalization, the inflow of Gulf money, and Mubarak’s partial political accommodation of the non-violent Islamist movement during the first half of the 1980s, allowed it to create enough political and social space to find new niches in which it could mobilize its following. Due to its flexibility and decentralized nature (p. 105), the state could do little but acquiesce in the establishment of an independent “Islamic parallel sector” in the form of Islamic banking and establishment of schools, social services, and personal networks centred on the mosques. Meanwhile, its leaders and members settled in the new neighbourhoods on the fringes of Cairo. It was precisely the lack of well-established institutions of communal self-help that allowed the Islamists to put down roots in these neighbourhoods. Once established on the margins of society, the movement was able to mobilize its following to capture the “semi-periphery”, i.e. civil society, by winning the elections of the professional associations at the beginning of the 1990s. At this point the state stepped in. Afraid that the next step would be that it lost control of the “centre”, the state clamped down on the Muslim Brotherhood and arrested its “middle generation” during the elections of 1995.

Rosefsky Wickham’s analysis of the mobilization of the Islamist movement on the periphery and its assault from there on the semi-periphery constitutes the crux of her research and is its most fascinating and challenging part. It is here that SMT makes a difference and provides new instruments to tackle the question of why and how the Islamist movement emerged and has been so successful. Her answer is that success was predicted on the achievement of the leadership in finding “frame resonance”. Criticizing deprivation theorists, she argues that “Islamist mobilizers in Egypt did not simply exploit the frustrations of unemployed and underemployed youth. The key to understanding their success is to realize that they engaged in a massive ideological project to capture the hearts and minds of potential recruits” (p. 120). She argues convincingly that a new ethic of “civic obligation”, promoting participation in the public sphere, regardless of its benefits and costs, was at the heart of Islamist success in mobilizing its following. In accordance with the constructivist nature of framing, she argues that the established cultural traditions and

Islamic doctrines were adapted to new purposes by shifting the outreach to ordinary Muslims (instead of non-Muslims) and giving them a new activist interpretation of proper Muslim conduct.

A central element in the new doctrine was the reinterpretation of the practice of the *da'wa*, "call", or outreach, as a *fard 'ayn*, a duty incumbent on every Muslim to participate in the Islamic reform of society. "Indeed," she argues,

[...] with its emphasis on collective adherence to a God-given moral code and collective responsibility for the public welfare, the *da'wa* projected a vision of Islamic rule that stood out as a striking reverse image of the status quo. Against the perceived reality of state elites preoccupied with self-enrichment and removed from popular needs and concerns, the *da'wa* conveyed the image of a leadership animated by its religious duty to safeguard the well-being of the Islamic *umma*. (p. 160)

Elaborating on the method of *da'wa*, Rosefsky Wickham states that Islamic outreach was a peaceful and personal, gradualist means of establishing an Islamic society. *Da'wa fardiyya* (personal *da'wa*), she argues, was first propagated among relatives, neighbours, and peers before it was directed to strangers through general *da'wa* (*da'wa 'amma*), which was accomplished through lectures, lessons, and the media: books, newspapers, and tapes. Rosefsky Wickham is, however, careful not to ascribe the success of the movement to ideology as such. It hinged, she states, on conditions external to the message itself.

Pulling all the strings of her analysis together at the end of her study, she states that success depended on: (1) its close "fit" with the life experiences and beliefs of those graduates targeted for recruitment; (2) the credibility and effectiveness of its agents and modes of transmission; and (3) its reinforcement through intensive small-group solidarity. "Frame resonance" is therefore predicted on the special linkages which leaders forged and sustained with potential recruits. It was their incorporation into personal networks and the gradual evolution of individual members from lower-risk forms of activism to higher-risk forms that accounted for the movement's success. The frame of moral obligation supported this trend. She argues convincingly that the "crisis of morals" perceived to be at the root of the country's malaise was also at the basis of the moral regeneration programme of the Islamist frame (p. 159).

Quinton Wiktorowicz's monograph, *The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan* further elaborates on the specific opportunity structure in Jordan. Interestingly, in contrast to the enthusiastic and optimistic researchers of the civil-society school who greeted the liberal reforms in Jordan in the early 1990s with enthusiasm, Wiktorowicz is much more pessimistic, and argues that the "democratization from above" has further enhanced state

control of social movement organizations (SMOs). Rather than enhancing the participation of Jordanians in politics it has led to widespread depoliticization.

In order to achieve this goal, the state has developed a "series of bureaucratic techniques to observe, register, record, and monitor all forms of collective action in the kingdom", leading to a bureaucratic "management of collective action" that "channels movements in particular directions by setting boundaries for permissible actions" (p. 13). Accordingly, all Islamic forms of space in Jordan are controlled and regulated, including mosques, NGOs, and Friday sermons (*khutba's*), with the purpose of preventing them from criticizing the government and mobilizing an opposition. To implement this policy, which Wiktorowicz compares to Foucaultian "surveillance", imams are government trained, appointed, and monitored; Zakat committees are considered a "cover for government control"; while Ramadan is "ritualized and personalized" (p. 20). As it is possible to exercise control to a far greater degree in a relatively small country such as Jordan than in Egypt, not only is access to the parliamentary "centre", as a forum for the social movement to develop, blocked to a greater degree but the restrictions on civil society are also far greater.

Although the Moslem Brotherhood is usually regarded as the main oppositional power, the Salafi movement is, according to Wiktorowicz, the real embodiment of the Jordanian social movement. Based on its oppositional literalist Islamic programme that rejects the legitimacy of the state because it accepts innovation (*bid'a*), it is the only movement that refuses to be trapped in the government system of regulation and surveillance. As one Salafi scholar stated it: "Organized work is frightening because it often means you give up some principles" (p. 132). Instead of betraying its programme by accepting the government's control, the Salafi movement mobilizes its following through informal "personal, face-to-face interactions where they communicate, recruit, educate, and facilitate the movement's goals of transforming society through religious education" (p. 133). Banned from official mosques, Salafis gather in houses, while decentralization and lack of a single leadership in the movement makes it more difficult for the government to control it.

Mohammed Hafez's book on rebellious Muslims, *Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World* complements the other three studies by focusing on the violent movement and its mechanisms. Hafez's motivation for writing the book is the complaint that "what is missing is a sustained theoretical treatment of Islamist rebellion and an attempt at explanation of it, in a comparative perspective" (p. 3). He uses a political-process approach and argues that researchers should not ask *why* a movement rises up in revolt, but that they should pose the more appropriate question "*how is the process?*" by which a movement becomes rebellious (p. 21). In accordance with general SMT, he holds that it is the

researchers' task to focus on the ways that "individuals will have to mobilize resources, recruit committed activists, and establish organizational structures that can withstand repression" (p. 17), all of which are ignored by socioeconomic and psychological "strain-theory" approaches.

Hafez's main – and perhaps most controversial – contention is that political exclusionary states are solely responsible for the bloodshed that has taken place in the Islamic world during the past decades: "The key to explaining their militancy [of the members of the Islamist movement] is not economic stagnation or excessive secularization, but the lack of meaningful access to state institutions" (p. 18). It is state repression that is at the root of Islamist rebellions. This approach is reflected in the organization of the book.

In the first chapter the author analyses the political environment of political exclusion and lack of system accessibility that has led to the emergence of rebellious Islamist movements. In the next chapter, he analyses the results of repression, arguing that "[I]slamist rebellions are often defensive reactions to overly repressive regimes that misapply their repression in ways that radicalize, rather than deter movement activists and supporters" (p. 71). Here, he convincingly argues that timing and targeting of repression by the state are crucial elements that determine if a movement will rise up in revolt. Whereas, on the one hand, pre-emptive repression, according to Hafez, is effective because it does not allow a movement to organize itself, mobilize its resources, and acquire a coherent frame, on the other hand, reactive repression provokes movements to revolt because their members have been allowed to organize themselves, and have in the meantime built an infrastructure that they are not willing to lose. Another crucial determinant is the nature of repression. Selective repression, which distinguishes between moderate and radicals, is much more effective than indiscriminate repression. The last form of repression leaves no other option but to revolt, and will alienate broad sections of the population which are loosely associated with the movement.

In the two examples he has studied in depth, Algeria and Egypt, reactive repression in combination with indiscriminate repression has led to the emergence of the most violent forms of organizations that are exclusive, uniform, and isolated, and which uphold the most extreme ideologies that support "protracted" struggles. The ensuing vicious circle of violence tends to deepen the social and ideological isolation of the group further, leading to what Donatella Della Porta, a specialist in the history of the Red Brigades in Italy in the 1970s, calls "spirals of encapsulation" (p. 111). During this process, group members lose touch with reality as "[g]roup pressures are especially magnified for the underground group, so that the group is the only source of confirmation, and, in the face of external danger and pursuit, the only source of reality" (p. 112).

As the "anti-system ideological frames" of rebellious movements permit

"moral disengagement", they lead to denial of the neutrality of citizens. As a result, all confrontations are regarded as part of a cosmic struggle in which reform and reconciliation is ruled out and there is no option but to wage an all-out war against the rulers and the corrupt system. In the Islamist case, the anti-system frame adopts the form of accusing the other of being infidel (*takfir*), which is expressed in slogans as those of GIA: "No dialogue, no ceasefire, no reconciliation, and no security and guarantee with the apostate regime" (p. 169). Hafez's contribution on Algeria to the anthology *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Approach*, and the contribution with Wiktorowicz on Egyptian Islamist violence further elaborates on these issues.¹⁰

CONTRIBUTION

The introduction of social movement theory to the Middle East, and its application to the Islamist movement, undoubtedly represents a positive development in that it represents one of the most consistent attempts to devise a more neutral, objective set of theoretical tools to analyse the movement as a dynamic movement without focusing on Islam as the determinant factor. It thus avoids the pitfalls of stereotyping and essentializing that so often mars research on the Islamist movement.¹¹

These advantages are especially underlined if SMT is compared with civil society theories, the predominant theoretical construct let loose on the Middle East in the 1980s. By providing a programme of systematic comparative analysis with other social movements in the world it avoids the sterile, ahistorical debate on civil society and the implied potential for democracy in the region.¹² Not only have researchers who apply civil society theory ignored the largest and most important existent social movement, because it was, according to them, not sufficiently committed to "democracy", and did not uphold the basic tenets of "civility", but they also neglected it because the informal sector in which it was primarily active was regarded as irrelevant. The informal sector was assumed not to be able to contribute to the enhancement of the formal structure of civil

10. Mohammed M. Hafez, "From Marginalization to Massacres: A Political Process Explanation of GIA Violence in Algeria", in Wiktorowicz, *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, pp. 37–60, and *idem*, with Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement", in *ibid.*, pp. 61–88.

11. See also the insightful contribution made by Charles Kurzman in the "Conclusion" to Wiktorowicz, *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, on the late adoption of social movement theory by researchers working on the Islamist movement.

12. See for the most extensive collection of articles on the concept of civil society, Augustus Richard Norton (ed.), *Civil Society in the Middle East*, vol. 1 (Leiden, 1995), with contributions by Augustus Richard Norton "Introduction", pp. 1–26; Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Civil Society and Prospects for Democratization in the Arab World", pp. 27–54; and Mustapha Kamil al-Sayyid, "A Civil Society in Egypt?", pp. 269–293.

society and the struggle against the authoritarian state. The basic flaw of civil society theory was that it never seemed to solve the paradox that a real civil society must both be independent of the state while at the same time needing the state to provide the legal environment in which its institutions can flourish.¹³ In hindsight, it appears that civil society theory was based on a far too optimistic assumption. Researchers' focus on the concept of civil society was as much based on the hope that state power would be curbed and controlled by civil society in the 1980s than by the actual emergence and power of this mediating layer of independent institutions.

SMT does not rule out the emergence of democracy in the Middle East, but it focuses on the organizational mechanisms of how Islamist movements react to authoritarian regimes. Whether the movement is democratic or not is intrinsically irrelevant. In this sense SMT, although a research programme that also derives from the West, is far less morally committed to a certain political model, and is politically unbiased and therefore more open and flexible than civil society theories, which are imbued with Western liberal political values and goals. By looking again at social and personal networks, as other contributors have done in the SMT, such as Diane Singerman,¹⁴ Janine Clark,¹⁵ Benjamin Smith,¹⁶ and Jillian Schwedler,¹⁷ the anthology *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Approach* has refocused attention on crucial social relations. Its stress on the informal nature of the social movements makes an important contribution to international research on social movements, as the research on Western social movements is usually more focused on formal social movement organizations (SMOs).

By taking the Islamist movement seriously and considering it a rational movement, SMT also moves away from the facile conclusions that (mostly) French researchers have drawn. Against their mantra that the Islamist movement has "failed" to achieve its goals because it does not have a political programme,¹⁸ Rosefsky Wickham and others, like Salwa

13. Michael Walzer, "The Concept of Civil Society", in *idem* (ed.) *Toward a Global Civil Society* (Providence, RI [etc.], 1995), pp. 7–27.

14. See for instance Diane Singerman, "The Networked World of Islamist Social Movements", in Wiktorowicz, *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, pp. 143–163, and *idem*, *Avenues of Participation: Family, Politics, and Networks in Urban Quarters of Cairo* (cv Princeton, NJ, 1995).

15. Janine A. Clark, "Islamist Women in Yemen: Informal Nodes of Activism", in Wiktorowicz, *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, pp. 164–184.

16. Benjamin Smith, "Action with and without Islam: Mobilizing the Bazaar in Iran", in Wiktorowicz, *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, pp. 185–204.

17. Jillian Schwedler, "The Islah Party in Yemen: Political Opportunities and Coalition Building in a Transitional Polity", in Wiktorowicz, *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, pp. 205–228.

18. Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam* (tr. Carol Volk) (Cambridge, MA, 1994); and Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*.

Ismail,¹⁹ argue convincingly that the programme of "civic obligation" that the Islamist movement upholds is in fact a hidden political agenda. That it is not overt is not simply due to a lack of political content in the ideology of the movement, but must be ascribed to the repressive political climate in which the movement operates. The spread of the notion of "collective responsibility for public welfare" is a rational response in a depoliticized repressive environment. Only after gaining political access can more direct political issues be addressed.

CRITIQUE

However, besides distinct advantages, SMT also evokes critique. Although, in general, SMT does give its three constituent factors enough room, and especially allows enough space to analyse ideas through the concept of framing, it can lead to a form of functionalism by looking at ideas only insofar they have a bearing on the social movement. In this manner, all those ideas and ideological constructs that do not directly impinge on the movement or are not immediately reflected in its frames are deemed irrelevant. One will therefore look in vain for a genealogy of the concept of *jihad*, because it is regarded as a constructivist concept that is contextually formed and bounded. This leads to strange results. For instance, in the work of Hafez, anti-system ideas like *takfir* are extensively analysed, but in the end they are deemed irrelevant to explanations of the rebellions of Islamist movements, for although they might have anti-system content this is not the reason for Islamist uprisings. Rather, it is the repression of the state that activates these anti-system frames. Although it is certainly true that Middle Eastern states are authoritarian and repressive, and Hafez gives an interesting explanation of the form and depth of recent rebellions in especially Egypt and Algeria, one wonders if the Islamist movement only acts upon its violent doctrines once it has been repressed. This puts the blame too much on the political system and gives too little credit to the independent influence of the violent content of the ideology.²⁰

On another level, the critique by SMT of incorporating an analysis of the social backgrounds of the members of social movements raises questions. Here again the critique of the prevailing analyses of strain theories as describing social movements as the result of an "illness" is relevant, but one wonders if SMT has not gone too far. Shifting the question from *how* Islamist movements organize themselves to *why* they

19. Salwa Ismail, "The Paradox of Islamist Politics", *Middle East Report*, 221 (Winter 2001), pp. 34–39.

20. Excellent examples demonstrating the flexible and adaptability of ideologies and "frames" are analysed in Robinson, " Hamas as Social Movement"; and Mishal and Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence*, as well as Harik, *Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism*.

emerge is an interesting change in perspective. It, however, still leaves the question of why they rebelled and especially *who* they are, unanswered. Clearly if one has less to lose, one is more inclined towards rebellion, although, as the social movement theorists correctly state, this does not answer the question of why economic deprivation does not lead to revolt more often.

To be sure, this neglect of social background is not always strictly adhered to, as is the case in Rosefsky Wickham's study, when she analyses the plight of the lower middle classes. She does not, however, incorporate in her analyses social tensions that might exist between different sections of the moderate Islamist movement, as for instance between the "middle generation" of Islamic activists, who have become successful and wealthy doctors and engineers belonging to the upper middle classes, and the lower middle classes whom they lead. Similarly, Wiktorowicz points out the differences in social background between the moderate non-violent Salafis and the violent *jihadi* Salafis, but he does not further elaborate on the consequences (p. 127). His claim that "[T]hese more socially conscious members are the potential recruits of the Salafi movement" (p. 136), remains therefore unclear. In this respect, Gilles Kepel's work, though perhaps too schematic, has a more convincing perspective because he analyses the internal differences within the Islamist movement and puts the blame for its failure to attain power there. It is not just the repressive nature of the state, which in general is too schematically regarded as an monolithic opponent by the upholders of SMT, that is at fault.²¹

Finally, there is also another important element lacking in SMT, which is the neglect of such pervasive social phenomena in the Middle East as the patronage system and its manifestations, patriarchy and clientalism.²² If SMT correctly stresses the importance of informal personal networks, it seems strange that in the Middle East, where patronage and its vertical relations of dependency and patron-client relationship have been such conspicuous aspects of society, they are largely ignored in the application of SMT to Islamist movements. The two elements do not necessary exclude each other, and when combined can explain many of the aspects of social movements that now remain unclear. The emergence of exclusivist and isolated organizations, for instance, that Hafez describes as the outcome of repression, could very well be the result of the ubiquitous patron-client relations that the oppositional groups have also adopted. Why should the opposition not mirror the political culture in the rest of society? Similarly, the vertical and segmented patronage system might also explain Wiktorowicz's divisions within the Salafi movement. It is more

21. Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*.

22. For a recent overview, see Sami Zubaida, "Islam and the Politics of Community and Citizenship", *Middle East Report*, 221 (Winter 2001), pp. 20-27.

likely that they are the result of patron-client relations than the inability to establish formal organizations. As with so many other stimulating and innovative theoretical constructs, social movement theory as applied to the Islamist movement is at times unnecessarily radical in its rejection of its precursors.

naam onderzoeker Meijer, R.

titel publicatie "The 'Cycle of Contention' and the Limits of Terrorism in Saudi Arabia,"

jaartal 2005

titelpagina 7A-TINN.opl

beginpagina 271

eindpagina 311

Bestandsnaam: 12 _ 605 _ 71



12-605-71-271-311

PAUL AARTS
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editors

Saudi Arabia in the Balance

Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs

HURST & COMPANY, LONDON

First published in the United Kingdom by
C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd,
41 Great Russell Street, London WC1B 3PL
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A catalogue record for this volume is available
from the British Library.

ISBNs
1-85065-802-1 *casebound*
1-85065-803-X *paperback*

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THE 'CYCLE OF CONTENTION' AND THE LIMITS OF TERRORISM IN SAUDI ARABIA

Roel Meijer

This chapter analyses the events and the men involved in the bomb attacks and shootouts that have taken place in Saudi Arabia since May 2003. It concentrates on the political, organisational and biographical background of those held responsible for the attacks, members of *Al-Qa'ida on the Arabian Peninsula* (QAP). Social movement theory (SMT), especially the notion of cycle of contention, has been used to analyse these events. First follows a brief overview of the main concepts of this theory, then an outline of the cycle of contention as it emerged in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s until the winter of 2004.

Social Movements, Cycles of Contention and Violence

In *Power in Movement: Social Movement and Contentious Politics*, Sidney Tarrow gives an outline of the results of research of contentious social movements during the previous two decades. A social movement is based on collective action and 'becomes contentious when it is used by people who lack regular access to institutions, who act in the name of new or unaccepted claims, and who behave in ways that fundamentally challenge others or the authorities'.¹ The central concepts of 'contentious action' would seem to be highly relevant to the Saudi case. One key concept is that of 'framing', because a movement must

¹ Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, Cambridge University Press, 1998, 2nd edn, p. 3.

create meaning and an identity, defining 'us' and 'them', based on a problem that it claims it can solve. Creating identities, furthermore, is a precondition for consensus building and 'frame resonance'.² Another concept is that of 'political opportunity structure', which is defined as 'dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action [...]'. Political opportunities, such as the fall of the communist regimes in 1989, allow social movements and challengers to emerge and make their claims. To put the authorities under pressure, challengers adopt a 'repertoire of contention', which, depending on the political circumstances and the cultural background, can take the form of petitions, strikes, marches, disruption, or violence.³ Depending on the opportunity structure, social movements can take advantage of the weakness of the authorities, gain access to political and participation power, achieve shifts in ruling alignments, and in extreme cases, split the ruling elite. Cycles of contention occur when opportunities widen and information spreads down and ordinary people 'begin to test the limits of social control'. During such periods of diffusion, characterised by heightened information flows and rapid mobilisation, the opportunities created by 'early risers' provide incentives for the formation of new alliances and the experimentation with new forms of contention.⁴ As the cycle widens and becomes more powerful, movements create opportunities for elites to join or support the movement. The result of this phase of mobilisation, if it is successful, will be reform or a revolution.

Two additional remarks should be made. The first is related to the state, which in modern history has become the focus of contentious politics.⁵ The state has three options in dealing with the contenders: *facilitation, accommodation, or repression*. The outcome of the conflict depends on the strength of the state. If a ruling elite is split and weak and the movement is strong, as was the case in Iran in 1979, the outcome will be the destruction of the former. On the other hand, if the state is strong, the ruling elite united, and the challengers divided and weak, as was the case in the struggle between the Syrian state and the Muslim Brotherhood in 1982, the contentious movement

² *Ibid.*, pp. 18–19.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 58–63.

will be destroyed. If the ruling elite is smart, it will opt for a combined policy of repression, accommodation and facilitation.⁶ In this manner it will split the moderates from radicals and integrate the moderates into the system, or hold them at bay, while at the same time repressing the radicals. For, 'movements not only create opportunities for themselves and their allies; they also create opportunities for their opponents.'⁷ For instance, this happened in Egypt in the 1990s when the state split the Islamist movement.⁸ It also spelled the end of the phase of mobilisation and the beginning of the phase of demobilisation.

The second remark is related to the issue of violence. Tarrow and others, like Della Porta and Diani,⁹ believe that the *threat* of violence can be effective, but that *actual* violence raises the 'costs' to the participants in collective action and eventually undermines the goals of the social movement. Violence is often used when the movement is either being repressed or has exhausted itself. In these situations, 'physical violence and exaggerated rhetoric are used to reinvigorate flagging militants, attract new supporters and retain the notice of the state.'¹⁰ The result is mostly negative, unless the state has collapsed, or the struggle is an ethnic, religious or national conflict, as in the case of the Sunni resistance in Iraq.¹¹ Tarrow argues that '[violence] has a polarising effect on conflict and alliance systems, transforming relations between challengers and authorities from a confused, many sided game of allies, enemies, and bystanders into a bipolar one in which people are forced to choose sides, allies defect, and the state's repressive apparatus swings into gear.'¹² Thus, in general, radical contenders 'chill the blood of the bystanders, give pause to prospective allies and cause many who joined the movement in its enthusiastic early phase to defect.'¹³ When that happens 'organisers are trapped in

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 147–50.

⁷ *Ibid.* (1994 edn), p. 97.

⁸ Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*, London: I. B. Tauris, 2000, pp. 276–98.

⁹ Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, *Social Movements: An Introduction*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1999, pp. 188–90.

¹⁰ Tarrow, *The Power in Movement* (1994), p. 112.

¹¹ Roel Meijer, "Defending our Honor": Authenticity and the Framing of Resistance in the Iraqi Sunni Town of Falluja', *Etnofoor*, 2005 (forthcoming).

¹² Tarrow, *The Power in Movement* (1994), p. 104.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

a military confrontation with the authorities that is virtually impossible for them to win.¹⁴ As Hafez and others point out, the exclusive organisations that emerge from this struggle lead to protracted violence, a development that took place in Algeria and Egypt in the 1990s.¹⁵

The Saudi Cycle of Contention

From non-violent to violent opposition

Many of the above-mentioned characteristics of social movements and the cycle of contention apply to Saudi Arabia since the 1990s. The first phase of mobilisation and diffusion of the cycle of contention dates from the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1990. Allowing US troops to launch their attack on the Iraqi troops from Saudi Arabia, caused significant difficulty for the Kingdom's rulers. This decision in itself provided an important structure of opportunity for the opposition to launch its contentious politics. Having been based since its foundation on the coalition between the ruling House of Sa'ud and the *ulama*, who upheld the conservative (Salafi) Wahhabi doctrine of Islam, the monarchy was now arguably exposed as hypocritical as it was revealed to be highly dependent on the 'infidel' United States. What made matters worse, was that the state had for decades supported the most radical Jihadi Salafi groups as long as they exported the *jihad* to countries Saudi Arabia attempted to control.¹⁶

Initially, peaceful petition was the main repertoire of contention adopted by the non-violent opposition. Saudi liberal businessmen and intellectuals were the first to submit a petition calling for greater

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 105. Aside from the many studies on the role of violence in social movements, Tarrow and Della Porta draw their conclusions from their own work on the radicalisation of the Italian Left in the 1970s.

¹⁵ Mohammed M. Hafez, *Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003, pp. 109–13; Mohammed H. Hafez, 'From Marginalization to Massacres: A Political Process Explanation of GIA Violence in Algeria' in Quintan Wiktorowicz (ed.), *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2003, pp. 37–60; and Mohammed H. Hafez and Quintan Wiktorowicz, 'Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement' in Wiktorowicz, *Islamic Activism*, pp. 61–88.

¹⁶ Kepel, *The Trail of Political Islam*, pp. 61–80.

democratic openness in 1990,¹⁷ but this form of contention of the 'early risers' was quickly defused, and petitions were drawn up by the religious radical opposition that were far more important and threatening. In May 1991 the 'Letter of Demands' (*khitab al-matalib*), signed by 400 ulama, judges, university professors and other leading scholars, was submitted to the King. It was followed a year later by a clarification that was harsher in tone, the Memorandum of Advice (*mudhakkirat al-nasiha*). In contrast to the liberal petition, these two petitions demanded a more rigorous application of religious norms (council for the conformity of *shari'a*) and the building up of a strong army that would guarantee Saudi Arabia's independence and its championing of Muslim causes. They also accused the royal family of nepotism, corruption and moral decadence.¹⁸ Formulated in a master frame, the radical opposition stated their grievance in general terms that citizens of the state should withdraw their allegiance from rulers as long as they did not abide by the *shari'a*. For the first time the theme of *takfir*, the proclamation of unbelief of one's opponent, was used as a means of de-legitimizing the ruling family of Sa'ud. The second theme, which was to become part and parcel of oppositional rhetoric, was the condemnation of the United States as the embodiment of evil, decadence, and the spearhead of the Western, Christian 'war on Islam'.¹⁹

Relations with the state entered the second phase of the cycle of contention—that of demobilisation—when the state temporarily arrested the signatories of the petitions.²⁰ Having recovered from the initial shock of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the boldness of the internal opposition, the ruling family announced that it would not accept criticism outside the limited boundaries of 'consultation'

¹⁷ Joshua Teitelbaum, *Holier than Thou: Saudi Arabia's Islamic Opposition*, Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000, p. 31.

¹⁸ Daryl Champion, *The Paradoxical Kingdom: Saudi Arabia and the Momentum of Reform*, London: Hurst Company, pp. 219–29; Teitelbaum, *Holier than Thou*, pp. 25–47; Mamoun Fandy, *Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent*, New York: Palgrave, 1999, pp. 48–60; International Crisis Group, *Saudi Arabia Backgrounder: Who are the Islamists?*, Amman/Riyadh/Brussels: ICG, Middle East Report, no. 31, 21 September 2004.

¹⁹ Teitelbaum, *Holier than Thou*, pp. 35–8.

²⁰ Madawi al-Rasheed, *A History of Saudi Arabia*, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 175.

(*shura*). In the words of King Fahd, 'I hope that efforts will be confined to giving advice for the sake of God. If, however, someone has things to say, then he can always come to those in charge and speak to them in any region, in any place. As advice, this is wanted and desired.'²¹ During the subsequent years the regime opted for a combination of accommodation and repression, with the emphasis on repression. For instance, the leaders of the Committee for Defence of Legitimate Rights (CDLR), an Islamic human rights organisation that had sprung up during the phase of mobilisation and hoped to mobilise Western support for democratic reform in Saudi Arabia, were forced to flee the country and establish themselves in London in 1994, from where they launched their attacks on the royal family. (Note that the word 'legitimate' in the English name for the organisation is in fact used to represent the Arabic *shar'i*, strictly meaning 'according to the *shari'a*').²² Those that remained had the option of spending their lives in jail or cooperating with the authorities. Two of the most forceful members of a new generation of radical opposition shaikhs, Safar al-Hawali and Salman al-Awda, called the 'shaikhs of the Awakening' (*shuyukh al-sahwa*), who had signed the Memorandum of Advice, chose the second option. They were arrested in 1994 but later succumbed to pressure from the state and toned down their radical rhetoric.²³ As a result, by the second half of the 1990s the non-violent opposition was either suppressed, exiled, incorporated, or allowed to voice their ideas as long as they remained within the strict limits the state had laid down.

The repression and control of the non-violent opposition opened the way for a violent phase of the cycle contention, which was launched by a bomb attack on an American building in Riyadh on 13 November 1995, killing five Americans and two Indians. In the declarations of the three Salafi jihadi organisations that claimed responsibility for the attack the familiar threats and arguments of the master frame of contention were repeated. One stated that unless the 'Crusader forces' leave Saudi Arabia, foreigners as well as Saudi forces and members of the royal family would become 'legitimate targets'. They regarded the bomb attack as part of a jihad against both

²¹ Teitelbaum, *Holier than Thou*, p. 40.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 49–71; Fandy, *The Politics of Dissent*, pp. 115–47.

²³ ICG, *Saudi Arabia Backgrounder*, p. 7.

the rulers and the Americans. Three of the four men arrested for their role in the bomb attack were 'Saudi Afghans', veterans of the Afghan war against the Soviet Union.²⁴ Their ideas coincided with the non-violent opposition: the ruling family was *kufir* (infidel) because it did not apply the *shari'a* and was aligned with non-Muslim countries.²⁵ The violent phase was underscored by an attack on the American Khobar Towers complex in Dhahran on 25 June 1996, although the Shi'ite opposition seems to have been responsible for this attack.²⁶ After 2000 violence in Saudi Arabia was for a while characterised by a series of minor attacks on individual foreigners in which six persons were killed.

That it would take until after 9/11 for the violent phase of the cycle of contention to reach a new height was due to the tactics of the man who would become if not the actual at least the symbolic leader of the terrorist phase of the struggle, Usama bin Ladin. Usama bin Ladin shared many of the ideas of the 'shaikhs of the Awakening', establishing an oppositional organisation in London in 1994, the Advice and Reformation Committee (ARC).²⁷ Their arrest in that year further deepened his dislike of the regime.²⁸ Nevertheless, his innovative tactical step was to focus first on defeating the 'greater' or 'external enemy' (the United States) and then the 'lesser' or 'internal enemy' (the Saudi monarchy). His arrival in Afghanistan in 1996, where he was welcomed by the Taliban regime and could benefit from the training camps that had been operative after the defeat of the Soviets, allowed him to wage this war first against the external enemy.²⁹

However, even during this phase of waging jihad against the external enemy and the 'Crusader-Zionist' alliance, Usama bin Ladin constantly castigated the Saudi regime. His first communiqué, issued in Afghanistan on 23 August 1996, entitled 'A Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of Two Holy Places', was characteristically also directed against the ruling Saudi family, which

²⁴ Jason Burke, *Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror*, London: I. B. Tauris, 2003, p. 140.

²⁵ Teitelbaum, *Holier than Thou*, p. 76.

²⁶ Burke, *Al-Qaeda*, p. 140.

²⁷ Fandy, *The Politics of Dissent*, pp. 177–94.

²⁸ Burke, *Al-Qaeda*, p. 126.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 151.

was accused of tyranny (*zulm*), imposing unjust rule and deviating from the true Islamic path. As the government had not implemented the *shari'a*, resistance against it was regarded as an individual duty (*fard 'ayn*) on every Muslim: 'It is the duty of every tribe in the Arab peninsula to fight the jihad and cleanse the land from these occupiers.'³⁰ Foreshadowing the later terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia, Usama bin Ladin in subsequent announcements called for 'fast-moving light forces that work under complete secrecy' and will 'hit the aggressor with an iron fist.' The youth of Saudi Arabia would constitute the 'vanguard' of this movement that would martyr itself for the cause.³¹

Whether it was Usama bin Ladin's decision to target Saudi Arabia in May 2003, and refocus the jihad from the 'external enemy' to the 'internal enemy', remains unclear.³² However, given the virulent verbal attacks on the regime voiced during the previous decade by the non-violent Salafi opposition and the way this was moulded into its master frame of contention, it cannot have been a difficult step. The real difficulty with this new tactic is that it encounters all the problems that a social movement faces once it needs to build and mobilise a following. Whereas Al-Qa'ida could suffice by playing on the worldwide resentment against the last world power during its transnational jihad against the United States, once the struggle became localised, its branch, Al-Qa'ida on the Arabian Peninsula (QAP), had to take into consideration a novel type of logistics necessary to topple a regime. This is a much more complex operation.

Mobilisation and destabilising the state

The vicious war between QAP and the state that ravaged Saudi Arabia from May 2003 should be regarded as part of the violent phase within the larger cycle of contention that began in 1990.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 147.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 147–8.

³² Only on 17 December 2004, after the attack on the American Consulate in Jeddah on 6 December, did Usama bin Ladin announce his support for the jihad in Saudi Arabia. Although it is not certain that the voice on the audio tape is that of Bin Ladin, most experts agree this is the case. The accusations against the Saudi royal family were the usual: 'violating God's rules' and alignment with the 'infidel' United States. Sources: *CBC News*, 19 December 2004 and *Dar al-Hayat*, 16 December 2004.

In line with Tarrow's cycle of violent contention, both sides had to do their utmost to win the struggle. It was a matter of life or death. From its side, QAP had to destabilise the political system, gain access to the authorities, split the elite, and succeed in mobilising and recruiting a larger following of sympathisers and allies by maintaining the credibility of the Salafi movement's master frame that held that its opponents were unbelievers (*kuffar*). The US-led Coalition's invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and the Saudi support must have convinced QAP that the time to launch its campaign was ripe. Damaging the vulnerable oil economy of the country by targeting foreigners or its infrastructure would be one of QAP's most effective weapons to bring down the regime.³³ In its defence, the state had to appeal to the rationality and trust of the population, demonstrate its efficacy by destroying QAP as quickly as possible, and isolate and marginalise the radicals from the moderates by demonstrating that they were un-Islamic and therefore 'deviants from Islam', 'fanatics' and 'terrorists'. Symbolically, the struggle between the two sides was represented by the capacity of the authorities to arrest or kill the members of the two lists of 'terrorists' it published during the year 2003, whereas the contenders had to remain at large. As in the larger cycle of contention, the violent sub-cycle consists of two phases: one of upswing and potential mass mobilisation and severe shock to the state, and one of downturn, of the phase of demobilisation and the crushing of violent contention.

The clash began when on 18 March 2003 a bomb accidentally exploded in an apartment in al-Jazira, a neighbourhood of Riyadh, killing one of the members of what later appeared to be a cell of QAP. During the following month the police were able to trace the group to an apartment in another neighbourhood of Riyadh, Ishbiliya, where it found considerable stockpiles of weapons and explosives. Although here and in other safe houses the militants had escaped by the time the police arrived, the police found enough evidence to identify the members of the 'Ishbiliya cell'. On 7 May the Minister of Interior made the unprecedented step to publish the by now famous list of nineteen names and photographs of the most wanted

³³ Anthony Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid, *Saudi Petroleum Security: Energy Infrastructure Security Improving, Threats Loom from al-Qaeda, Shiite Population*, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004.

'terrorists' for which a reward had been set (Appendix I).³⁴ By taking this step the state had for the first time declared war on the Salafi Jihadi movement.

That its members were indeed dangerous, was underlined on May 12 when virtually simultaneous bomb explosions went off at three different suburban compounds in Riyadh, one of them belonging to the US military subcontractor Vinnell. The explosions killed thirty-five people, among them seven Americans, in addition to sixteen members of the suicide commando. In June a list of twelve of the suicide bombers in the Riyadh 'operation' (*'amaliyya*) was published (Appendix II).³⁵ The high number of 'martyrs' in this operation and its subsequent wide publicity in videos indicates that the bomb explosions were not just a means of targeting both the American and Saudi enemy and undermining the economy and the legitimacy of the state, but were also part of a repertoire of contention that is typical of Al-Qa'ida's cosmic struggle between the forces of good and evil.³⁶

However, it is doubtful whether the action succeeded in attracting wide support. The shock to the Saudi public concerning the high level of violence would not be confined to the Riyadh bombing. With growing concern, Saudis discovered that during the next months, with two exceptions, none of the members of the Ishbiliya cell were willing to allow themselves to be arrested. In most of the cases they fought themselves to death, an action called 'indirect suicide' (*intihar ghayr muwashir*) or 'the method of suicidal resistance' (*uslub al-muqawama al-intihari*) by one commentator.³⁷ Although, for instance, Yusuf al-Ayiri (no. 10), the leader of QAP at the time, was killed near the town of Turba in the province of Ha'il when he resisted his arrest on 31 May 2003 while his companion survived,³⁸ the raid on the group of Turki al-Dandani (no. 1) was more typical. Despite several attempts

³⁴ *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 6 May 2004. The following abbreviations will be used hereafter: *al-Sharq al-Awsat*—SA; *al-Hayat*—HA; *Jaridat al-Riyadh al-Yaumiyya*—JRY; *IslamToday* (website)—IT; *al-'Arabiyya* website—A; *Sawt al-Jihad*—SJ; *IslamOnline*—IO; and *sahat.fares.net*—SF.

³⁵ In October another two of the Riyadh suicide bombers were identified when a video of the testaments was released by their own group (SA, 17 November 2003). The identities of the last two remain unknown.

³⁶ Burke, *Al-Qaeda*, pp. 26, 37, 87.

³⁷ SA, 5 and 10 July 2003.

³⁸ SA, 4 June and 30 July 2003.

by the security police to persuade him to hand himself over, he detonated a bomb on 3 July 2003 in a mosque in the town of Suwayr in the province of Jawf, ending his own life and that of three of his companions—among them Abd al-Rahman Jabara (no. 18).³⁹ Similar violent clashes occurred in July at a date farm in the province of Qasim, where two members of the List of 19 (no. 14 and no. 13) died.⁴⁰ A month earlier, they had managed to escape from an apartment in Mecca, Khalidiyya (hence, the 'Khalidiyya cell'), during which five members died and twelve were arrested (Appendix IV).⁴¹

Finally, the violent, suicidal character of the movement was confirmed when in September another member of the List of 19 (no. 16) was killed together with two other members of his group, during a shoot out with security forces in a building adjacent to the hospital in the town of Jazan.⁴² Other violent confrontations took place in November with a group that had taken refuge in a flat in the neighbourhood of Shara'i' in Mecca, subsequently called the 'al-Shara'i' cell' (Appendix VIII)⁴³ and in al-Suwaidi, a neighbourhood in Riyadh.⁴⁴ As usual, in all these cases the quantity of weaponry and explosives found by the police and subsequently put on display for the press was impressive.

However, measuring the impact of the 'operations' and subsequent suicide actions should not be confined to their effect on the general public: just as important is the effect of the violence on 'sympathisers'. These fall into three broad categories. First, the larger list of 'wanted persons' (*matlubin*), who form the inner circle around QAP, and whose names are only very rarely disclosed by the authorities. They are part of its network, some of them in sleeper cells. These *matlubin* must primarily be sought among the 5,000 to 15,000 'Arab-Afghans', mostly of Saudi nationality. A second group consists of members of some of the NGOs supporting the jihad in Chechnya, Tajikistan, or before in Algeria and Bosnia. Together, these first two groups make up the main sympathizers of QAP.⁴⁵ Between

³⁹ SA, 7–10 July 2004.

⁴⁰ SA, 29–30 July 2003 and 3–8 August 2003.

⁴¹ IT, 15 June 2003.

⁴² SA, 29–30 July 2003 and 25 September 2003.

⁴³ IT, 3 November 2003; SA, 10 November 2003.

⁴⁴ IT, 6 November 2003.

⁴⁵ Speculation on the number of 'Saudi Afghans' differs from one author to another.

the two, a division of labour exists. While the *matlubin*, who were less conspicuous than the hardcore QAP members, organised safe houses, rented cars, provided other logistics such as opening bank accounts, and formed a potential reservoir of fighters, the more distant sympathisers followed closely the websites of QAP and spread its ideas. The third group of potential supporters consists of the reformists, the followers of the 'shaikhs of the Awakening', who dominated the first, non-violent cycle of contention, and whose ideas hardly differ from the Jihadi Salafi movement. That the sympathisers were indeed active can be gleaned from the clashes with the security forces. The months after the Riyadh bombing were marked by numerous announcements about shoot-outs and arrests in Riyadh and the provinces of Qasim, Sharqiyya and Jazan between security forces and members of radical groups whose identity remained unclear, but who probably belonged to the *matlubin* or the larger group of sympathisers and potential supporters.⁴⁶ Nowhere, however, does the opposition appear to have been coordinated or strong.

One of the reasons for the limited response of the sympathisers of QAP was the success of the security police in hunting down the members of the original group of the List of 19 and the *matlubin* during the first months after the Riyadh bombing.⁴⁷ By September five of the List of 19 had died in the bomb attack on Riyadh, six had died in shoot outs, and only six would survive the year 2003. The remaining two (no. 2 and no. 12) would be taken into custody; one of them, Ali al-Faq'asi al-Ghamidi, handed himself over through the

According to Champion there are 15,000 'Saudi Afghans' (Champion, *The Paradoxical Kingdom*, p. 217); according to Teitelbaum around 5,000 (Teitelbaum, *Holier than Thou*, p. 75). The difference can be solved. According to Gwen Okruhlik 12,000 Saudi men went to Afghanistan, but actually only 5,000 were trained and saw combat ('Understanding Political Dissent in Saudi Arabia', *Middle East Report Online*, 24 October 2001, www.merip.org). The issue of numbers is debatable for other reasons of interest. For instance, Burke makes a distinction between: a 'hard core', a small group willing to die for Bin Ladin's cause; the 'Saudi Afghans', which constitute the 'network of networks'; and finally those who were not close to him but regarded him an inspirational force and a 'godfather'. The first and second group partially overlap, as by definition members of the 'hard core' are 'Afghan Arabs'. The third group would form a broad movement (Burke, *Al-Qaeda*, pp. 127, 155, 194).

⁴⁶ JRY, 14 July 2003, 8 December 2003, 9 December 2003 and 21 May 2004.

⁴⁷ JRY, 2 October 2003.

mediation of the 'awakening shaikh', Safar al-Hawali—an indication of how the non-violent and violent opposition were connected.⁴⁸ This high rate of success convinced the Saudi security forces that they had disabled the 'Ishbiliya cell' (or the List of 19). Their optimism was reflected in the appeals by family members of the activists to hand themselves over to the authorities in the newspaper *Jaridat Riyadh al-Yaumiyya*. The amnesty announced in October was intended to stimulate them to take this step.⁴⁹

Demobilisation and hunting down the terrorists

Official optimism vanished temporarily with the bomb explosion on 8 November 2003 at the Muhaya residence compound in Riyadh. In the blast eighteen people were killed while more than 122 people were wounded, but only two suicide bombers died in the operation (two survived and managed to escape). Yet, although the operation jolted the authorities, it was not a success for QAP in terms of enhancing the organisation's reputation. Its major flaw was that all the victims were Arabs and most of them were Muslims. To underline its determination to stamp out QAP, the Ministry of Interior reacted swiftly by publishing on 6 December a new list of twenty-six of the most wanted terrorists. This list was much more accurate and therefore more intimidating than the previous one—and therefore discouraging to potential supporters—ranking those listed according to their hierarchy within QAP. Six of the List of 26 had also appeared on the List of 19; these appeared to be the oldest, the most experienced, and by far the most dangerous: Khalid Hajj (no. 3/26), had become leader of QAP after the death of Yusuf al-Ayiri (no. 10/19) in May 2003; Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin (no. 1/26) would succeed Khalid Hajj after his death in March 2004, while Salih al-Awfi (no. 5/26) would succeed Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin when the latter was killed on 18 June 2004⁵⁰. Although by June 2004 the authorities would be successful in hunting down most of the members of the List of 26, in the meantime tremendous damage was done to the reputation of the government and its national credibility and international standing.⁵¹ The

⁴⁸ SA, 26–8 June 2003 and IT, 26–9 June 2003.

⁴⁹ SA, 2 October 2003.

⁵⁰ This succession remains unclear: it later appeared that al-Muqrin had in fact designated Sa'ud al-Utaibi as his successor.

⁵¹ According to Faris bin Hazzam, the Saudi journalist who provided most of the

violent onslaught the regime was confronted with led some commentators to believe its fate hung in the balance and that it might succumb to internal divisions.⁵²

The first success for the authorities came on 8 December when the security police killed one of the members of the List of 26 (no. 6) on the streets in al-Suwaidi in Riyadh; on 30 December another member (no. 14) handed himself over to the authorities, and subsequently probably informed on his comrades. Some success also came in the ideological battle. To the dismay of the radicals, in December 2003, during interviews with A'idh al-Qarni on Saudi state television, the Jihadi Salafi shaikhs, Ali al-Khudair and his two colleagues, who had been arrested in June, recanted their own former *takfiri* ideas and the whole Jihadi Salafi master frame in public. In the course of the following year the state would succeed in co-opting and mobilising to its side many other former oppositional shaikhs, including Muhsin al-Awja and Safar al-Hawali, thereby weakening the force of the *takfiri* oppositional frame of contention.

In hindsight the biggest logistical success was achieved on the morning of 29 January 2004, when Khalid Hamud al-Farraj was arrested. Although he was not on the List of 26 (but probably a *matlub*, and in any case an Arab-Afghan), Khalid al-Farraj was close to the core of the cell of Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin and Faisal al-Dakhil (no. 11), the two most dangerous members of the List of 26. Their hide-out was located in his house in al-Fayha', a neighbourhood of Riyadh. When he and his father were led there by the police they were attacked by his own group, who were probably informed by Farraj's wife. Among the six killed was Khalid al-Farraj's father, who was mistaken for a member of the security police. Called the 'treasure chest of information' (*khazinat al-ma'lumat*), Khalid al-Farraj seems subsequently to have cooperated with the police out of anger of the killing of his father, representing a major breach in security of the organisation. The incident is also interesting for the insight it provides into the *jihadi* culture of the group Khalid al-Farraj was

information on the lists for *al-Sharq al-Ausat*, the list of (remaining) '*matlubin*' in June 2004 was around a hundred names, most of whom were not involved in operations, but provided facilities for those who were (*al-'Arabiyya* website, 24 June 2004).

⁵² Michael Scott Doran, 'The Saudi Paradox', *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2004, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org>.

part of. It appears that he was married to a sister of one of the two *matlubin* who were killed by the police on Id al-Fitr (25 November 2003) in Riyadh. Moreover, the other three brothers of his wife had died in the jihad outside Saudi Arabia, while Khalid al-Farraj himself was a cousin of an important *matlub*.⁵³

Another success for the authorities was announced at the beginning of February, when the police were informed that two members of the group had died as a result of the wounds they had received during the shoot out on 6 November in al-Suwaidi.⁵⁴ On 15 March the security police were able to track down the leader of QAP, Khalid Hajj, who was killed in Riyadh. At the end of April the police surprised five members of the List of 26 in Jeddah, all of whom were killed. It now seemed clear that the police was on the heels of the main leaders of the group of Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin.

Yet the police proved unable to hunt down the rest of the QAP members in time to prevent further damage being done to its own prestige and the national economy. On 12 April the security police surrounded one of the main hide-outs in Riyadh of the group of Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin which included Faisal al-Dakhil, Rakan al-Sikhan (no. 2/26) and Nasir al-Rashid (no. 19/26). One of the group, the *matlub* Khalid al-Subait, was able to hold off the police, allowing his companions to escape⁵⁵ and kill four highway patrolmen the next day during the escape to Buraida.⁵⁶ These escapes—besides discrediting the regime's claim to efficiency and providing security, an important factor in upholding its legitimacy—formed the background for a series of setbacks that would dominate the attention of the Saudi and international public over the following months. On 21 April 2004 Abd al-Aziz al-Madihish drove a car full of explosives to the traffic police/security police building in Riyadh in a suicide mission. The attack, claimed by the Battalions of the Two Holy Places, one of the cells of QAP, killed six and wounded 144, leaving the security building in shambles (earlier the group had

⁵³ See the following articles: SA, 30–1 January 2004 and 10–15 February 2004; and SJ, 16, p. 10 and 23, p. 20. Much confusion surrounds the incident, but the full story was revealed by Saudi journalist Faris bin Hazzam in *al-Sharq al-Awsat* on 10 and 15 February 2004. He has subsequently been arrested.

⁵⁴ SA, 23 February 2004 and 7 June 2004.

⁵⁵ SA, 12 May 2004; HA, 3 July 2004.

⁵⁶ SA, 14 April 2004 and 21 May 2004.

tried to assassinate the third most important police authority in Riyadh, Abd al-Aziz al-Huwairina).⁵⁷

If this attack, for the first time directly targeting state institutions, was an attempt to compensate for the backlash from the Muhaya complex operation, subsequent attacks on foreigners resumed the tactic of targeting one of the main sources of 'corruption' in society and the economic props to the regime. On 30 April four men from the al-Ansari clan went on a rampage for four hours through the streets of the important oil town of Yanbu on the Red Sea coast killing five foreign engineers and one Saudi and wounding another twenty Saudis in the Swiss-Swedish company office of ABB.⁵⁸ The leader of the group, Mustafa Abd al-Qadir al-Ansari, had been an internationally wanted *mujahid*.⁵⁹ Even more damaging for the authorities was the attack on Khobar on 29 May. For more than 24 hours a group of terrorists was not only able to kill any foreigner it found in its way and take a number of foreigners hostage (twenty-two people were killed in all), three of its members, among them the leader, Turki bin Fahid al-Mutairi, were able to escape and later tell their full story in their bi-weekly, *Sawt al-Jihad*.⁶⁰ In the following weeks the reputation of the Saudi government was further damaged as several foreigners were killed in Riyadh, most notoriously the beheading of the American military technician Paul Johnson. As a result of these actions many expatriates who had their families in Saudi Arabia announced that they would leave.

It was not until June 2004 that the authorities definitively turned the tables on QAP and caught up with those responsible for the assaults of the previous months. A crippling blow was dealt to the Salafi Jihadi opposition when Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin and Faisal al-Dakhil were killed on 18 June.⁶¹ Turki bin Fahid al-Mutairi, the leader of the so-called al-Quds Squadron (*al-Sarriya al-Quds*), who had led the Khobar massacre three weeks earlier, was also killed. During the next few weeks the police were able to mop up most of the rest of the group during raids in the Malik Fahd and al-Wurud neighbour-

⁵⁷ *JO*, 22 April 2004.

⁵⁸ *SA*, 1 and 4 May 2004.

⁵⁹ *SA*, 5 May 2004.

⁶⁰ 'Commander of the Khobar Terrorist Squad Tells the Story of the Operation', MEMRI Special Dispatches Series, no. 731, 15 June 2004.

⁶¹ *SA*, 19 June 2004.

hoods in Riyadh, killing a number of *matlubin* or others thought responsible for some of the killings of foreigners, although Salih al-Awfi, leaving his wife and children in the hands of the security forces, escaped.⁶² On 2 July the authorities announced that Rakan al-Sikhan (no. 2) and Nasir al-Rashid (no. 19) had probably both died of their wounds after the assault on the safe house in April.⁶³ On 22 July Isa Awshan (no. 15) was killed together with another member of his group,⁶⁴ while on 5 August one of the most important of the 'theoreticians' of the List of 26, Faris al-Zahrani (no. 12), was arrested while he was preparing a bomb attack on a cultural centre in the town of Abha, in the south of the Kingdom.⁶⁵

Nevertheless, the last stretch of tracing the members of the List of 26 would prove difficult, even if it was clear that most QAP actions were now desperate counter-attacks in retaliation for crippling government raids. Throughout the next half year, until April 2005, when Salih al-Awfi was one of the two last members of the List of 26 at large, heavy fighting was regularly reported throughout the whole country, but mostly in Jeddah, Riyadh and in the conservative region of Qasim, one of the main bases of QAP, where it made its last stand. In Jeddah, the base of Salih al-Awfi, three major clashes took place in November and December 2004 and March 2005. In retaliation, on 6 December the American consulate was attacked during which all four fighters and a number of Saudi guards died, but no American personnel was injured. In Riyadh several shoot-outs occurred at the end of December 2004 in which Sultan bin Jad al-Utaibi (no. 9) and Bandar al-Dakhil (no. 20) died, among several '*matlubin*'. This clash was followed by a bomb attack on the Ministry of Interior and an office of the Security Forces on 29 December. On 6 April 2005 Abd al-Rahman al-Yaziji (no. 25) was killed during a raid of his house in the neighbourhood of Khalidiyya in Riyadh.⁶⁶ Finally, heavy fighting occurred in the region of Qasim. The clash in Buraida and Aniza on 3 November lasted eighteen hours, while that clash in Ras, the third-largest town of Qasim, lasted sixty hours from

⁶² SA, 2 July 2004; HA, 3 July 2004; SA, 18 March 2005.

⁶³ SA, 3 July 2004; SJ, 20, 7 July 2004.

⁶⁴ SA, 25 August 2004; SJ, 22, 2004.

⁶⁵ SA, 7 August 2004.

⁶⁶ SA, 7 April 2005.

April 3 to 5. During the latter, between an unprecedented large concentration of QAP members (twenty) and security forces, fifteen members of the group died, among them one of the most sought after international terrorists, the Moroccan Karim al-Tuhami al-Majati (no. 4) and the probable leader of QAP, and one of its ideologues, Sa'ud al-Utaibi (no. 7).⁶⁷ Other members of the List of 26, Abd al-Majid al-Muni' (no. 18), had died on 12 October in a security raid,⁶⁸ while the Moroccan Husayn al-Hasaki was arrested in Belgium in July 2004.⁶⁹ In March 2005 *al-Sharq al-Awsat* announced that the last leading ideologue of QAP, Abdullah al-Rashud (no. 24) had probably been liquidated in June by Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin and his assistant Faisal al-Dakhil because he had questioned the legitimacy of attacking Saudi targets under the leadership of al-Muqrin, especially the attack on the Muhaya compound.⁷⁰ These last clashes made clear that besides the members of QAP on the List of 26, many 'matlubin' were also active in the fighting. Around fifty of them died in the period between 18 June and the end of April 2005 alone. Many of them were as prominent as those on the List of 26: one of those killed on 28 December 2004, Ibrahim Ahmad al-Rimi, was a Yemeni believed to have been one of the leaders of QAP.⁷¹ The state announced on March 7 that it had 700 'matlubin' in detention.⁷²

Although at the time of writing QAP had not been completely destroyed, it was clear that it had not succeeded in any of its goals: It had not vitally damaged the economy, destabilised the regime, split its elite or made inroads into its security forces; and it had proved unable to mobilise its sympathisers or the following of the *Sahwa* shaikhs, let alone the larger public. As Prince Turki al-Faisal, the former intelligence chief and present ambassador to Great Britain, pointed out, the group did not succeed in expanding its following and therefore the security forces could concentrate on eliminating the members of the two lists one by one.⁷³ Symbolically, this slow but systematic elimination of QAP members from the List of 26,

⁶⁷ SA, 7–10 April 2005.

⁶⁸ SA, 13 and 14 October 2004.

⁶⁹ SA, 27 October 2004.

⁷⁰ SA, 15 March 2005.

⁷¹ SA, 30 and 31 December 2004.

⁷² SA, 8 March 2005.

⁷³ SA, 9 September 2004.

splashed over the front pages of the newspapers, was a dramatic counter-propagandistic move by the state. Although QAP tried to present its casualties, especially the death of Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin, as martyrs for the cause against the *kuffār*, the death cult of QAP did not mobilise concrete support. Later attacks, like the one on the American consulate on 6 December 2004, have not turned this situation around.⁷⁴

Members and Structure of QAP

There were additional factors that undermined QAP's means of breaking through its isolation and aligning itself with the larger social movement of Salafi contention. These relate to the geographical origins, age, career patterns, type and level of education of the members of QAP. Their experience in the Jihadi Salafi movement, especially Afghanistan, and the organisational structure of QAP, are also relevant.

The available biographical information for the most important individuals concerned—sixty-four in all—is analysed below. The data include: the members of the List of 19 (Appendix I); the List of the 16 suicide bombers (Appendix II) (only nine additional individuals: 14 who have been identified, minus five who are already included in the List of 19); and the List of 26 (Appendix III) (six of whom are already on the List of 19). In addition, the twelve members of the 'Khalidiyya cell' are included, as well as four of the most important individual leaders not included in the lists, but who belonged to the *matlubin* (the information on the forty-eight persons on the three official lists, plus the suicide bombers, is more extensive than that for the others, and is represented more fully in the appendixes).

Location and urbanisation

One of the strong points of QAP is the geographical, tribal, social and locational diversity of its members. Of the members of the List of 19, six originally came from the south, three from the Hijaz, three from the east and two from Riyadh (the regional origin of five is

⁷⁴ *The Economist*, 11–17 December 2004, p. 37.

unknown). Although determining their residence before the 'operations' is difficult—as most of them moved around constantly—four of them had lived in Riyadh prior to the May 2003 bomb attack there.

The social background of the List of 19 is harder to trace. We only know for certain that the fathers of nos 6, 7 and 9 were, respectively, a dentist,⁷⁵ a high police officer in the Ministry of Interior,⁷⁶ and a high civil servant in the Ministry of Commerce in the province of Sharqiyya.⁷⁷ Information on the others is inconclusive. Remarkably for the activist profession they chose, at least four were married, but it is quite possible that the number is higher.

Of the additional nine identified individuals from the List of 16, five had lived in Riyadh, one in Medina and one in Jazan. Very little is known of their social background. The fathers of nos 3 and 8 were low-ranking police officers.⁷⁸ Four of the suicide bombers were married.

More is known about the members of the List of 26. We know for sure that five of the group were born in Riyadh and that twelve lived in Riyadh at the time of the bombings, nine of them in the neighbourhood of al-Suwaidi alone, including the leader of QAP, Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin. It is this densely populated neighbourhood and other sha'bi neighbourhoods in southern Riyadh (such as Khalidiyya) with a strong conservative religious character, where a host of militant preachers preach in local mosques, that is the hotbed of Jihadi Salafi resistance in Saudi Arabia.⁷⁹ This neighbourhood is probably also linked to the Imam Muhammad Sa'ud Islamic University, where seven of the List of 26 studied. Other populous neighbourhoods in Mecca (*Khalidiyya*), Medina and Jedda (the Univeristy district), and the region of Qasim with the towns of Buraida, Aniza and Ras, were also centres for resistance, although quite a number of the List of 26 also come from the south.⁸⁰

⁷⁵ SA, 28 May 2003.

⁷⁶ SA, 17 November 2003.

⁷⁷ SA, 8 December 2003.

⁷⁸ SA, 17 November 2003.

⁷⁹ For more information on this social and urban environment of the militant groups, see SA, 9 December 2003 and 7 June 2004; also HA, 5 July 2004. See SA, 31 December 2004 for an overview of the different neighbourhoods in Riyadh where attacks took place.

⁸⁰ SA, 21 May 2004, 10 November 2004, 18 November 2004, 5 April 2005.

Age

An important indicator of the nature of the movement and its more sectarian character is the age of its members. The information on the members of QAP confirms the trend that the average age of Al-Qa'ida members and members of other radical movements had declined in the 1980s and 1990s to become the 'young urban poor' who form the dynamite of the Islamist movement.⁸¹ The average age of the List of 19 (for whom we have all the data) is 28; that of the additional known nine on the List of 16 is 26; and the average age of those 19 on the List of 26 for whom the information is available is 27. Yet the average age is deceptive as it is pushed up by older members such as Uthman al-Umari (no. 21), an arms dealer who had been caught up in the events, who was 35. Three of the List of 19 were only 23 years old, and two of the List of 26 were 22 years old, while one was 23 years old. With an average of 19 years, the members of the 'Khalidiyya cell' were even younger. Five out of the twelve arrested were 17 and younger.

The leadership of both the Lists of 19 and 26 (plus the List of 16) belonged to the oldest members. The first three leaders, Yusuf al-Ayiri, Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin, Khalid Hajj, were 30 years old, while the fourth, Salih al-Awfi, was 38. Other potential leaders who died in shoot-outs or the blast in Riyadh in May 2003, like Turki al-Dandani (no. 1) and Khalid al-Jahani (no. 5), were 29 years old. For the four other *matlubin* we have no precise age, but they must have been around 30 and belonged to the same generation as they were well-acquainted with the leaders and had the same biographical itinerary.

Education and careers

If the youthful character of the movement is not exceptional for Al-Qa'ida and other violent Islamist networks and movements, the

⁸¹ Saad Eddin Ibrahim, 'Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Groups: Methodological Notes and Preliminary Findings' in Saad Eddin Ibrahim, *Egypt, Islam and Democracy: Twelve Critical Essays*, Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1996, pp. 1-33; Saad Eddin Ibrahim, 'The Changing Face of Egypt's Islamic Activism' in Ibrahim, *Egypt, Islam and Democracy*, pp. 69-79; Luis Martinez, *La guerre civile en Algérie*, Paris: Karthala, 1998; Séverine Labat, *Les islamistes algériens. Entre les urnes et le maquis*, Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1995; Kepel, *The Trail of Political Islam*; Hafez, *Why Muslims Rebel*; Burke, *Al-Qaeda*, pp. 71, 155. Most of the information on the age of members of the lists is obtained from *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 13 November 2003 and *al-'Arabiyya* (website), 22 July 2004.

educational background of the Saudi Al-Qa'ida group is.⁸² While one often finds that members of radical Islamist movements have a background in technical and natural sciences or medicine,⁸³ and almost none of them are specialised in religious studies, in Saudi Arabia it is quite the opposite. Only one member of the List of 19, Turki al-Dandani (no. 1), attended the Faculty of Science. He had intended to become a doctor, but had broken off his studies to go to Afghanistan. Hamad al-Shamari (no. 14/19), who worked for Aramco for a while, probably had a technical background as well.⁸⁴ Two of the List of 19 (nos 13 and 2) had a religious higher education and had studied at the Faculty of Shari'a of the Imam Muhammad bin Sa'ud Islamic University in Riyadh. Of the List of 16, two (nos 5 and 7) had studied for some time at a university, although it is not known in which field and where; three (nos 2, 3 and 8) had graduated (they are also on the List of 19).

The specialisation in religious studies is more pronounced with the List of 26. Nine of the list studied at the Imam Muhammad bin Sa'ud Islamic University. In fact, a distinction is made between 'intellectuals', called 'shari'a theoreticians' (*munazzarin shari'iyyin*) and the rest, who are called 'foot soldiers' (*muqatilin maydaniyyin*).⁸⁵ In contrast to the foot soldiers, the intellectuals also seemed to be more integrated into society, although due to their alliance to their Salafi ideas they did get into trouble with the authorities. At the peak of the intellectual hierarchy in religious knowledge are the five graduates who were also members of the shari'a committee of the organisation: Abdullah al-Rashud (no. 24), followed by Faris al-Zahrani (no. 12), Sultan al-Utaibi (no. 9), Isa al-Awshan (no. 15) and Abd al-Majid al-Muni (no. 18). The role of these 'theoreticians' has been

⁸² Most of the information on the education of the members of the lists is obtained from *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 17 November 2003, *al-'Arabiyya* (website), 22 July 2004, and *Jaridat al-Riyadh al-Yaumiyya*, 8 December 2003, unless otherwise indicated. The preponderance of ulama in the Saudi opposition, in contrast to the usual make-up of the Islamic movement has been noticed by Teitelbaum (*Holier than Thou*, p. 3).

⁸³ Ibrahim, 'Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Groups'; Valerie Hoffman, 'Muslim Fundamentalists: Psychosocial Profiles' in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds), *Fundamentalisms Comprehended*, University of Chicago Press, 1995, pp. 199–230.

⁸⁴ *SA*, 8 December 2003.

⁸⁵ *HA*, 5 July 2004.

important for the rest of the members, for their stature in giving religious opinions has provided legitimacy for the actions of the movement. It is here that their organ *Sawt al-Jihad* has played a crucial role. Not only did it inform its sympathisers, but it also provided them with information and held their own group together. Without this QAP would have been much less successful in projecting their ideas to a general public, although its message of jihad, both as a means to an end and as a goal in itself, does not seem to have attracted a substantial number of followers. One explanation for the difference between the 'theoreticians' and the 'foot soldiers' is that QAP is a coalition between Arab Afghans and a new generation of local radical Salafi 'intellectuals', although the two categories overlap.⁸⁶

On the whole, the Saudi movement also differs from other movements in its level of education.⁸⁷ While in most countries, the Islamist movement is a typical student movement,⁸⁸ this is not the case in Saudi Arabia. Of those forty-eight members for whom detailed information could be obtained, only nineteen attended university courses for a certain period and only eleven actually obtained a degree. Remarkably, none of the four leaders of the movement had finished their secondary school, most of them having gone off to Afghanistan during their teens. This does not of course mean they were 'illiterate'; yet it does indicate that many obtained much of their intellectual baggage from informal religious and highly ideological and narrow education on the spot, enhancing their isolation from society. Yusuf al-Ayiri, for instance, serviced his own website and publication, *al-Bitar*, and had published several books, all of them available on the internet.⁸⁹ Nevertheless, a lack of formal education does seem a common phenomenon. Aside from the four who had a higher education, four of the List of 19 (nos 5, 6, 10 and 19) had only a pri-

⁸⁶ For an interesting analysis of QAP along these lines, see SA, 6 April 2005. Faris al-Zahrani is also known under his pen-name Abu Jind al-Azdi. Many of his works are available on the main Jihadi Salafi website, www.tawhed.ws.

⁸⁷ The low level of education of the Afghan-Arabs in the 1990s has been noticed by Burke, *Al-Qaeda*, p. 155. My information largely corroborates his. This would contrast with the largely middle-class background of the followers of the non-violent Islamic opposition (Teitelbaum, *Holier than Thou*, pp. 3, 7).

⁸⁸ Ibrahim, 'Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Groups'; Martinez, *La guerre civile en Algérie*; Labat, *Les islamistes algériens. Entre les urnes et le maquis*.

⁸⁹ See www.tawhed.ws.

mary school certificate, four had only obtained a secondary degree (nos 3, 4, 11 and 16) and two had acquired a degree as secondary teachers (nos 9 and 17). The level of education of the five others is unknown. The List of 16 suicide bombers (minus those on the List of 19) confirms the information of the List of 19. Three had not finished secondary school (nos 10, 11 and 14), two had left university early (nos 5 and 7), and only one had graduated from university (no. 3), although it is not known what field he was specialised in. Unfortunately, we do not know what schooling the four others had.

The List of 26 is a bit of an exception. As mentioned, nine of its members had attended university courses, five actually graduated. Three of the List of 26 (nos 8, 14 and 22) did not obtain a secondary school degree, one of them (no. 22) leaving school early and joining a radical group in Mecca after his brother was killed in Afghanistan in 1998. Another member (no. 20) had only had a secondary school education. For six members we do not know their educational background, but it is unlikely that it is high (except for the two Moroccans), otherwise they would have been included with the intellectuals who wrote in *Sawt al-Jihad*. Remarkable are the professional connections with the security police. For instance, Ahmad Saqr al-Fadli (no. 8), who did not finish his secondary education, attended technical training, after which he first joined the army and then the police. Al-Salih Awfi (no. 4/19) also had connections with the security police.

Not surprisingly, the group had erratic careers. With the exception of the fourth leader, Salih al-Awfi (no. 4/19), who had a long if undistinguished career as a policeman and security officer, most of the members of the List of 19 had become professional insurgents at an early age, most of them breaking off their education and their relations with their families or leaving their jobs to join the jihad. The older members of the List of 16 had working experience, such as Muhammad al-Shahri (no. 7), who had worked in a grocery shop. Of the List of 26, Ahmad al-Fadli (no. 8) was a policeman in Mecca, Faris al-Zahrani (no. 12) was a judge, Khalid al-Qurashi (no. 13) was in the army, Isa Awshan (no. 15) was a judge/imam, as was Amir al-Shahri (no. 23), while Abdullah al-Rashud (no. 24) was a teacher. Several were still students, as was the case with Mansur Faqih (no. 14). Some were unemployed, like Abd al-Majid al-Muni (no. 18). Most had become professional terrorists.

Afghanistan and the international jihad

Undoubtedly the most decisive common feature of these members is their experience in Afghanistan and their connection with Al-Qa'ida. While this is not unusual for radical Islamist movements,⁹⁰ the fact that, for the QAP members, Afghanistan has remained important even after 9/11, does stand out. In total at least half of the forty-eight persons of the three lists researched had been to Afghanistan, many of them even having participated in the war of the Taliban against the Americans. Some had also been to Bosnia (3), Chechnya (4), Tajikistan (1), Somalia (1), Algeria (1) and Kashmir (2). These figures are on the conservative side as we do not have the relevant information on four members of the List of 19 and thirteen of the List of 26, while there are only eight for whom we know for certain that they did *not* go. It seems likely, therefore, that many more than half of the forty-eight went to Afghanistan and to other jihadi theatres of war.

The three original leaders had been there when they were extremely young and subsequently became professional *mujahids*. Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin, 'Abu Hajir', had gone to Afghanistan when he was seventeen, subsequently going back and forth in the period 1990–4, being trained in the al-Wal camp. He took part in the battle of Khost with other Arab-Afghans. Later he became a trainer himself and left Afghanistan to fight in Algeria, Bosnia and Somalia. On returning to Saudi Arabia he was arrested and detained for two and half years before going again to Afghanistan. During this period, just before the American invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, he met the younger generation of the List of 19. When he returned to Saudi Arabia, he visited his family and disappeared again, training the group in the hills around Mecca and Medina.⁹¹ Yusuf al-Ayiri had the same experience. At an early age he went to Afghanistan, where he was trained in 1992 in al-Faruq camp, later himself becoming a trainer. He was for a while the personal guard of Bin Ladin after he had left Afghanistan.⁹² Khalid Hajj, Abu Hazim al-Sha'ir', had probably been to Afghanistan at a later date, and trained there. He too

⁹⁰ Barnett R. Rubin, 'Arab Islamists in Afghanistan' in John L. Esposito (ed.), *Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or Reform?*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997, pp. 179–206; Kepel, *The Trail of Political Islam*, pp. 136–58.

⁹¹ SA, 10 December 2003.

⁹² SA, 4 June 2003 and 30 July 2003.

had been a personal guard of Bin Ladin, probably at a later date than Yusuf al-Ayiri.⁹³

Of the independent individuals we know that Khalid al-Subayt, who provided the safe house in Riyadh for Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin, had a similar experience to that of the leaders. Like Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin, he had left for Afghanistan when he was seventeen years old. After he was severely wounded in his foot, he returned to Saudi Arabia for treatment, later joining the jihad in Tajikistan and Chechnya, where he married a Chechnyan woman. When he was wounded again and returned, unable to participate in the jihad, he set up a NGO to support the war in the Caucasus.⁹⁴ The leader of the Yanbu operation, Mustafa Abd al-Qadir Abid al-Ansari, also had extensive experience in international jihad. He fought in Bosnia and the Ogaden, before staying in London for two and half years, where he worked with the Sa'd al-Faqih of the Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia (MIRA), a split-off from CDRL. After leaving London in 1997, he travelled to Afghanistan—where he fought in 2001 in Tora Bora—and Yemen where he was arrested and released before returning to Saudi Arabia.⁹⁵ The same applies to Turki al-Mutairi, the leader of the Khobar operation, who went to Afghanistan a year before 9/11 and was almost on one of the planes that flew into the World Trade Center. Having missed his opportunity for martyrdom, he was able to celebrate the event with Usama bin Ladin. Like the others, he fought the Americans with the Taliban.⁹⁶ The same applies to Khalid al-Farraj.⁹⁷

Remarkably, the younger members of the three Lists had had their Afghan experience at the end of the 1990s and even right up till the American battle against the Taliban. Among those on the List of 19, Turki al-Dandani (no. 1) had gone to Afghanistan six months before 9/11, where he visited al-Faruq camp, and participated in the war against the Americans. Ali Abd al-Rahman al-Faq'asi al-Ghamidi (no. 2) had stayed five years in Afghanistan, before fighting side by side with Usama bin Ladin in the caves of Tora Bora. This also applies to Khalid al-Jahani (no. 3), who the Americans believe had

⁹³ SA, 23 February 2003.

⁹⁴ SA, 12 May 2004; SJ, 16, 2004.

⁹⁵ SA, 5 May 2004.

⁹⁶ SJ, 22, 2004.

⁹⁷ JRY, 22 September 2004.

been assigned to lead Al-Qa'ida in Saudi-Arabia with Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin and Ali Hajj. Also Salih al-Awfi (no. 4) was in Afghanistan for the first time in 1993-4 and is believed to have met both Bin Ladin and Mullah Omar before returning to Saudi Arabia with Khalid al-Jahani after the Taliban had been defeated. The recent connection with Afghanistan is confirmed by itineraries of the other five members of the List of 19 (nos 8, 9, 13, 14 and 15), all of whom had fought with the Taliban regime against the Americans. Even members as young as Hani Abd al-Karim al-Ghamidi (no. 7), who was 23 years old, had been to Afghanistan.

The pattern is much the same with the other lists. Nine of the List of 16 (five when the members of the List of 19 are subtracted) had direct Afghan experience, while six of the suicide bombers had not been to Afghanistan. The List of 26 is less conclusive. We know that at least four members of the twenty not appearing on the List of 19 (nine if one counts all 26) did go to Afghanistan. For only six members can we be certain that they did not; on ten we have no information one way or the other, but there seems no reason to assume that the pattern would have deviated much from the other lists.

Although most of the members of the lists were Saudis, this gives the wrong impression of QAP. Given the transnational character of the movement and the strong links with Afghanistan and Chechnya, it is not surprising to find many other nationalities among the group. Among the seven who were killed or arrested together with Turki al-Dandani, one of the leaders of the List of 19, in May 2003, one was Syrian and two were from Kuwait.⁹⁸ Al-Faq'asi was married to a Moroccan woman, Khalid al-Subayt to a woman from Chechnya. The leadership of the lists was disproportionately represented by non-Saudis, which even gave rise to some problems as it is thought that some within Al-Qa'ida believed that foreign leadership in the Arabian Peninsula would not be acceptable with the population. The best example is Khalid Hajj, a Yemeni who was the *de facto* leader for a while until he was killed on 15 March 2004, while Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin was presented as the real leader even at that time.⁹⁹ The suspicion that Yemenis were in fact running QAP was renewed after the shoot outs in Riyadh on 28-9 December 2004, when the

⁹⁸ SA, 7-10 July 2004.

⁹⁹ SA, 23 February 2004.

Yemeni Ibrahim Ahmad al-Rimi was killed. According to some insiders it was he instead of Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin who had succeeded Khalid Hajj after his death, because Usama bin Ladin trusted the Yemenis more than the Saudis.¹⁰⁰

Organisation and tactics

One of the most difficult aspects to unravel is the actual organisation of QAP. Although it is quite possible that on the international level Al-Qa'ida works like a 'loose network of networks',¹⁰¹ forming a 'loose coalition',¹⁰² and must be considered 'less an organisation than an ideology',¹⁰³ evidence in the Saudi Arabian case forces one to conclude that QAP was a structured and hierarchical organisation. It had a permanent leadership, which, when one of its leaders was killed, was replaced. In addition, there was a council of advisers with several committees, for Islamic law, military affairs, propaganda and finance. Under command of the military committee was the section of 'operations', which controlled the cells. Among these were probably the 'al-Quds Squadron', 'the Battalions of the Two Holy Places'. How tight this organisation was, is not clear. For instance, the Yanbu 'operation' was probably an independent initiative. But its secret, exclusive form indicates that it was well-organised and maintained strict discipline. QAP only began to crack and break into separate parts after the List of 19 was published and the security forces began their hunt. This is confirmed by the information that is available on recruitment and discipline. Characteristically, members of a cell were recruited when they were young, were held in complete isolation from society and were forbidden to read newspapers.¹⁰⁴

It is against the background of this constant crisis that the change of tactics must be analysed. As part of a larger social movement whose goal is to mobilise the population against a regime it regarded

¹⁰⁰ SA, 31 December 2004.

¹⁰¹ Burke, *Al-Qaeda*, p. 16.

¹⁰² Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, New York: Berkley, 2002, p. 76.

¹⁰³ Jason Burke, 'Think Again: Al Qaeda', *Foreign Policy*, May/June 2004, www.foreignpolicy.com.

¹⁰⁴ Interview with Khalid al-Farraj and Abd al-Rahman al-Rashud on Saudi Television Channel 1 on 21 September 2004, published the next day in *Jaridat al-Riyadh al-Yaumiyya*.

as un-Islamic, QAP tried constantly to adapt its tactics to public opinion. It started out with the tactic of massive suicide attacks against foreign residential compounds in the hope of mobilising public opinion against foreigners just after the invasion of Iraq. The number of casualties—including important figures (e.g. Khalid al-Jahani)—however, must have been considerable. The second attack on the Muhaya compound was a propaganda disaster, as the only casualties were Muslims or other Arabs. Afterwards QAP tried to regain sympathy by attacking government buildings in Riyadh for the first time, in April 2004. But the explosion did not seriously affect the government's infrastructure; by then QAP's resources and stockpiles of weapons were quite probably being discovered so it was no longer able to launch spectacular attacks. Therefore the attacks with automatic weapons on foreigners in Yanbu and Khobar were probably the result of weakness rather than strength. The death of al-Muqrin and most of his consorts confirms this picture.

Conclusion: The Limits of QAP

After two years of upheaval, QAP proved unable to break through its isolation and take the cycle of contention with the state to a new level. Although it did thoroughly jolt the ruling family and the foreign community, as well as the countries aligned with Saudi Arabia, it did not succeed in destabilising the regime or crippling its economy, nor in mobilising the population. One of the main reasons lies in the weakness of terrorism in general, as a tool. As Tarrow concluded, terrorist violence will 'chill the blood of the bystanders, give pause to prospective allies and cause many who joined the movement in its enthusiastic early phase to defect.'¹⁰⁵ Once state repression swung into gear the risks became too high for others to join, although martyrdom was adopted as part of the repertoire of contention of QAP. Violence and repression were able to prevent QAP from finding allies among the groups that formed part of the larger reformist cycle of contention that had emerged in the 1990s. Insofar as they did find allies among the *matlubin*, and sympathisers, many of these were arrested, killed or were intimidated enough to prevent them from actively supporting QAP. To make matters worse for

¹⁰⁵ Tarrow, *The Power in Movement* (1994), p. 104.

QAP, the regime regained some of its previous resources as the economy boomed on the back of high oil prices. Indeed, the state appeared to feel emboldened to retreat somewhat from its promises on reform, and resort to its traditional politics of repression and co-opting of the reformists.¹⁰⁶

Besides the larger strategic weakness of violence when applied in a specific country, which has been demonstrated in the case of Egypt during the failed struggle of the *Gama'at al-Islamiyya* in the 1990s and the GIA in Algeria, QAP suffered from a specific weakness, which lay in the background of its members, and its organisation isolated them further from the larger Salafi social reform movement. It is true that the diversity of their location, social background and tribal affiliation should be regarded as important potential assets, and that their publication *Sawt al-Jihad* allowed them to retain contact with their 'sympathisers' and even beyond with the curious public. But the isolation they found themselves in once they had decided to use violence against the state, was only further enhanced by the youthful age of its members, their even earlier recruitment into the movement, the low level of their education (religious or otherwise), their early, often traumatic and decisive experience in Afghanistan (no doubt partly responsible for the turn to violence), in addition to the hierarchical and closed-cell structure of the movement.

¹⁰⁶ *The Economist*, 12–19 December 2004; Faiza Saleh Ambah, 'Moves Toward Reform Wane in Saudi Arabia', *The Christian Science Monitor*, 4 October 2004, www.csmonitor.com.

APPENDIX I

LIST OF 19, ISSUED 7 MAY 2003

	Age	Nat.	Alq.	List of 26	Died*	Edu.	Born	Profession**
1	29	Saudi	yes	----	3-7-03 Suwair/ Jawf	univ. grad.	Skakaka/ Jawf	student
2	27	Saudi	yes	----	26-6-03 arrested	univ. grad. ^{oo}	Raghiban/ al-Baha	student
3	28	Saudi	yes	----	12-5-03 Riyadh	sec. school	?	
4	38	Saudi	yes	no. 5	----	sec. school	Medina	security/ merchant
5	30	Saudi	yes	no. 1	18-6-04 Riyadh	prim. school	Riyadh	
6	35	Saudi	yes	----	12-5-03 Riyadh	prim. school	?	NGO worker
7	26	Saudi	yes	----	12-5-03 Riyadh	univ. grad.	?	teacher
8	25	Saudi	yes	----	12-5-03 Riyadh	univ. grad.	Nimas/ Asir	

Table continued

Table continued

9	Rakan Muhsin Muhammad al-Sikhan	26	Saudi	yes	no. 2	29-1-04 Riyadh	univ. left	Riyadh	teacher
10	Yusuf Salih Fahd al-Ayiri ^o	30	Saudi	?	----	31-5-03 Turba/ Ha'il	prim. school	Damam	
11	Uthman Hadi Maqbul Al Mardi al-Umari	36	Saudi	no	no. 21	26-6-04 gave up	sec. school	Shabariq/ Nimas	weapons merchant
12	Bandar Abd al-Rahman al-Ghamidi	28	Saudi	?	----	4-9-03 arrested	?	?	
13	Ahmad Nasir Abdullah al-Dakhil ^o	26	Saudi	yes	----	28-7-03 Qasim	univ. grad. ^{oo}	Dir'iyya	
14	Hamad Fahd Abdullah al-Aslami al-Shamari	26	Saudi	yes	----	28-7-03 Qasim	?	al-Khafagi	
15	Faisal Abd al-Rahman Abdullah al-Dakhil	25	Saudi	yes	no. 11	18-6-04 Riyadh	?	?	
16	Sultan Jabran Sultan al-Qahtani	27	Saudi	?	----	23-9-03 Jazan	sec. school	Asir	
17	Jabran Ali Hakami Khibrani	27	Saudi	?	----	12-5-03 Riyadh	teach. college	?	teacher
18	Abd al-Rahman Mansur Jabara	30	Kuw. Can.	?	----	3-7-03 Suwai/ Jawf	?	Kuwait	
19	Khalid Ali bin Ali Hajj	30	Yem.	yes	no. 3	15-3-03 Riyadh	prim. school	Jeddah	

* unless otherwise stated

★★ where known and where the individual did not become a full-time mujahid directly after his education

^o ideologue

00 religious studies

APPENDIX II LIST OF 12 (14) SUICIDE BOMBERS KILLED IN RIYADH ON 12 MAY 2003

List of twelve of the suicide bombers of Riyadh bombing of May 12 (issued on 7 June 2003). Added to the list are two names identified in October (SA, 17 November 2003). In total sixteen persons participated in the attack, but two remain unidentified.

Note: not all the middle names have been found.

	Age	Alq.	List of 19	Edu.	Born	Profession
1	28	yes	no. 3	sec. school	?	
2	25	yes	no. 8	univ. grad.	Nimas	
3	23	yes	no. 7	univ. grad.	?	teacher
4	27	?	no. 17	teach. college	?	
5	29	yes	---	univ. left	?	
6	26	yes	---	?	?	
7	25	?	---	univ. left	Nimas (province)	employee
8	35	yes	---	univ. grad.	?	NGO worker
9	27	no	---	?	?	
10	23	?	---	prim. school	?	
11	35	yes	no. 6	prim. school	?	
12	23	?	---	?	?	mosque employee
13	28	yes	---	?	?	
14	23	yes	---	prim. school	Medina	

APPENDIX III

LIST OF 26, ISSUED ON 6 DECEMBER 2003

	Age	Nat.	Alg.	List of 19	Died*	Edu.	Born	Profession
1 Abd al-Aziz Isa Abd al-Muhsin al-Muqrin	30	Saudi	yes	no, 5	18-6-04 Riyadh	prim. school	Riyadh	
2 Rakan Muhsan Muhammad al-Sikhan	26	Saudi	yes	no, 9	12-4-04 Riyadh	univ. left	Riyadh	teacher
3 Khalid Ali bin Ali Hajji	30	Yem.	yes	no, 19	15-3-04 Riyadh	prim. school	Jeddah	
4 Karim al-Tuhami al-Majidi	?	Mor.	yes	---	5-4-05 Qasim	sec. school	Morocco	
5 Salih Muhammad Awwadallah al-Alawi al-Awfi	38	Saudi	yes	no, 4	---	sec. school	Medina	security/merchant
6 Ibrahim Muhammad Abdallah al-Rayyis	?	Saudi	?	---	8-12-03 Riyadh	?	?	
7 Sa'ud Hamud Abdilahi-Qataimi al-Utaibi ^o	33	Saudi	yes	---	5-4-05 Qasim	?	?	
8 Ahmad Abd al-Rahman Saqr al-Fadli	27	Saudi	?	---	23-4-04 Jeddah	prim. school	Mecca	police
9 Sultan Bijad Sa'dun al-Utaibi	?	Saudi	no	---	28-12-04 Riyadh	univ. grad.**	?	
10 Abdullah Sa'ud Abunriyan al-Siba'i ^o	22	Saudi	no	---	---	univ. left**	?	

Table continued

Table continued

11	Faisal Abd al-Rahman Abdallah al-Dakhil	25	Saudi	yes	no. 15	18-6-04 Riyadh	?	Buraida	
12	Faris Ahmad Jama'an Al Shuwail al-Zahrani	27	Saudi	yes	---	5-8-04 arrested	univ. grad **	Jawfa' (Zahrani)	judge
13	Khalid Mubarak Habiballah al-Qurashi	27	Saudi	no	---	22-4-04 Jeddah	sec. school	Mecca	student
14	Mansur Muhammad Ahmad Faqih	22	Saudi	no	---	30-12-03 gave up	prim. school	Utaibiya	
15	Isa Sa'd bin Muhammad bin Awshan ^o	26	Saudi	?	---	22-7-04 Riyadh	univ. grad **	?	judge/imam
16	Talib Sa'ud Abdallah Al Talib	26	Saudi	no	---	22-4-04 Jeddah	univ. left**	Buraida/Qasim	
17	Mustafa Ibrahim Muhammad Mubarak	25	Saudi	?	---	22-4-04 Jeddah	?	?	
18	Abd al-Majid Muhammad Abdallah al-Muni ^o	25	Saudi	yes	---	12-10-04 Riyadh	univ. grad **	Riyadh	
19	Nasir Rashid Nasir al-Rashid	?	Saudi	?	---	12-4-04 Riyadh	univ. left**	Riyadh	
20	Bandar Abd al-Rahman Abdallah al-Dakhil	23	Saudi	?	---	29-12-04 Riyadh	sec. school	Buraida	
21	Uthman Hadi Al Maqbul al-Umari	36	Saudi	no	no. 11	26-6-04 arrested	sec. school	Shabariq	
22	Talal Anbar Ahmad Anbari	?	Saudi	?	---	22-4-04 Jeddah	prim. school	?	

Table continued

Table continued

23	Amir Mushin Maryaf Al Zaidan al-Shabri	22	Saudi	yes	---	23-12-03 Riyadh	univ. left**	Riyadh	-
24	Abdallah Muhammad Rashid al-Rushud ^o	30	Saudi	no	---	June 04? Riyadh?	univ. grad.**	Aflakh/ province?	-
25	Abd al-Rahman Muhammad Muhammad Yaziji	26	Saudi	?	---	6-4-05 Riyadh	?	Jazan/ Jazan	-
26	Husayn Muhammad al-Hasaki	?	Mor.	?	---	July 04 Belgium	?	Morocco	-

* unless stated otherwise

** religious study

^o ideologue

APPENDIX IV

NAMES OF THE 'KHALIDIYYA CELL' IN MECCA ASSAULTED ON 14 JUNE 2003

Those who died

1. Ibrahim Abdullah al-Fanisa (Saudi)
2. Abd al-Hamid Tarawari (Mali)
3. Adnan
4. Khalid
5. unknown

source: al-shaha.fares.net/shahat/, June 2004

Those arrested

1. Ahmad Abd al-Rahman Harun (Chaadi). 15 years.
2. Ahmad Khalid Muhammad al-Hisan (Saudi). 17 years.
3. Musa'id Abd al-Rahman al-Kharisi (Saudi). 17 years.
4. Khalid Ali Tahir Muhammad Ali (Chaadi). 17 years.
5. Amin Muhammad Abdullah Al Uqqal? al-Ghamidi (Saudi). 18 years.
6. Bashir Muhammad Harun (Chaadi). 18 years.
7. 'Isam Khilf Muhammad al-Ghamidi (Saudi). 19 years.
8. Muhammad Fathi Abd al-Ati al-Sayyid (Egyptian). 20 years.
9. Rashid Abdullah Rashid al-Khithlan (no nationality given). 21 years.
10. Amir Abd al-Hamid Sa'ud al-Sa'adi (Saudi?). 24 years.
11. Majid Ibrahim al-Mughaynim? (Saudi). 25 years.
12. Abi Dhar' 'Ibrahim' (nationality unknown). 25 years.

Average age of this group of twelve is nineteen years. (SA, 13 November 2003). 17 June, Ministry announces the names of twelve terrorists, and of the five killed in al-Khalidiyya, seven of them were younger than eighteen years old, among them three from Chad, one from Egypt and one from Mali.

Additional information from al-saha.fares.net/shahat/, documents begin March.

APPENDIX V
GROUP OF AL-DANDANI AT AL-JAWF,
3 JULY 2003

Arrested

1. Muhammad Sulayman al-Sab'abi (Saudi)
2. Nasir Farhan al-Ruwaili? (Saudi)
3. Muhammad Badr Hazbar (Syrian)

Those who died

1. Turki Nasir Mish'al al-Dandani (Saudi)
2. Rajih Hasan al-bin Hasan al-Ajami (Kuwaiti)
3. Abd al-Rahman Jabara (Kuwaiti)
4. Umash? al-Siba'i (Saudi)

Source: fares.net (it is not totally clear whether the people were arrested there; said that five had been arrested).

APPENDIX VI

GROUP OF AHMAD AL-DAKHIL IN
QASIM, 28 JULY 2003

This group had fled from Mecca and were living in the Khalidiyya appartment. It is the most multi-national group.

Those killed:

1. Ahmad bin Nasir Abdullah al-Dakhil (Saudi)
2. al-Farid al-Harbi (Saudi)
3. Sa' ud Amir Sulayman al-Qurshi (Saudi)
4. Muhammad Ghazi Salim al-Wafi (Saudi, but according to SA, 6 May 2004 he is Chaadi.)
5. Isa Kamal Yusuf Tahir/Khatir (Chaadi)
6. Isa Salih Ali Ahmad (Chaadi)

One member was arrested: Ali Ibrahim bin Abdullah khilf al-Harbi
Source: fares.net and SA, 6 May 2004 and 21 May 2004.

APPENDIX VII

GROUP OF SULTAN AL-QAHTANI AT
AL-JAZAN, 23 SEPTEMBER 2003

Two (unknown members) handed themselves over, three were killed

1. Sultan Jabran bin Muhammad Al Isman al-Qahtani
2. Turki bin Sa'id bin Muhammad Al Thiqfan? al-Qahtani
3. Khalid bin Muhammad bin Ali Al Isa al-Shahri

APPENDIX VIII

LIST OF NAMES OF THE SHARA'T' CELL IN MECCA, 3 NOVEMBER 2003

1. Muhammad al-Harqan. 25 years
2. Ta' 'Ayn 'Ayn. [letter abbreviation only identification] 25 years
3. Muhammad Sulayman al-Jahani. 25 years.
4. Hamid al-Sa'adi. 25 years
5. Mut'ab al-Muhyani. 26 years
6. Sami al-Lahibi al-Harbi. 27 years
7. S.Q. 27 years.
8. Muqayyim Tshadi. 33 years.

Of this group two were killed and two committed suicide, but just who is unknown (S4, 13 November 2003).