

“BROUGHT UNDER THE LAW OF THE LAND”

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“BROUGHT UNDER THE LAW OF THE LAND”

The History, Demography and Geography of Crossculturalism
in Early Modern Izmir, and the Köprülü Project of 1678

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To Claudia,
in loving gratitude

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Acknowledgements

Some twenty years have passed since, in the third year of my education as a Turkologist, my dissatisfaction with the historiography of late 19th-century Ottoman foreign policy took hold. As I began to examine what part the local dynamics of Ottoman centers of international trade played in the empire's international relations and why this dimension had been overlooked, my questions took me back from the Tanzimat, to Selim III, to the Ottoman modernizations of the 17th century – the fascinating yet underinvestigated Ottoman century on the barely lit fields of which I ended up pitching my academic tent. This work, twelve years in the making, presents the spoils I have collected over that time and the vistas I have attempted to assemble from them.

The debts I have incurred during my travel and absence are enormous; academically, professionally, and privately. I am quite sure I will never be able to settle them. The most I can do is to express my gratitude and hope this work is deemed worthy of the investments.

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As I have already suggested, everything we say in these subjects is challengeable, not just in the sense in which knowledge in the sciences is challengeable by bringing in new information or revealing flaws in the logic of the original reasoning, but challengeable by bringing to bear another idiom, another context, another emphasis, another perspective, another sensibility. And these are always matters of judgement, albeit of disciplined and experienced judgement rather than merely subjective or arbitrary judgement. The greater persuasiveness of the new account cannot be demonstrated conclusively: it can only attempt to plug itself into our understanding at a greater number of points, to build more plausibility and more illumination into a rearrangement of what is already in some sense partly known.

Stefan Collini (2012)*

And some people, passing among the scattered pieces of that great overturned jigsaw puzzle, start to pick up a piece here, a piece there, with a vague yet irresistible notion that perhaps something might be done about putting the thing back together again. ... Two difficulties with this latter scheme at once present themselves. First of all, we have only ever glimpsed, as if through half-closed lids, the picture on the lid of the jigsaw puzzle box. Second, no matter how diligent we have been about picking up pieces along the way, we will never have anywhere near enough of them to finish the job. The most we can hope to accomplish with our handful of salvaged bits—the bittersweet harvest of observation and experience—is to build a little world of our own. A scale model of that mysterious original, unbroken, half—remembered. Of course the worlds we build out of our store of fragments can be only approximations, partial and inaccurate. As representations of the vanished whole that haunts us, they must be accounted failures. And yet in that very failure, in their gaps and inaccuracies, they may yet be faithful maps, accurate scale models, of this beautiful and broken world. ... That is the paradoxical power of the scale model; a child holding a globe has a more direct, more intuitive grasp of the earth's scope and variety, of its local vastness and its cosmic tininess, than a man who spends a year in circumnavigation.

Michael Chabon (2013)†

* “The Character of the Humanities”, *What are Universities for?* (London & New York: Penguin, 2012), 79.

† “The Film Worlds of Wes Anderson”, *The New York Review of Books* 60/4 (2013): 23.

To constitute a full urban community a settlement must display a relative predominance of trade-commercial relations with the settlement as a whole displaying the following features: 1. a fortification; 2. a market; 3. a court of its own and at least partially autonomous law; 4. a related form of association; and 5. at least partial autonomy and autocephaly, thus also an administration by authorities in the election of whom the burghers participated.

Max Weber (1921)¹

The absence of the government house from the list of the indispensable characteristics of a town would suggest at first blush that the Muslim town is perhaps not to be understood as a body politic at all. In any event, it is not (what the polis was) an autonomous association of citizens. A given town may at a given moment enjoy independence or self-government, in the sense that it is not subjected to an outside power of whose territory it forms but one part. Sovereignty and freedom may fall to it accidentally, as it were; self-government with executive officials designated by the full citizens there never could be, for the city constituted not a closed corporation, a share in which defines the citizen, but merely a functionally unified, administrative entity with a more or less stable complement of settlers or inhabitants. To such cities Plato's characterization of certain states as 'merely aggregations of men dwelling in cities who are the subjects and servants of a part of their own state' could fittingly be applied. There were no qualifications to be met to obtain admission to citizenship in the Muslim town for the simple reason that there was no body of town dwellers in whom political or civic authority was seen to reside.

Gustave Edmund von Grunebaum (1955)²

As to [the pre-eminence of the 'central' area over the periphery], concentrated in the city's 'central' area (often coterminous with the physical center, but not necessarily so) are the most prominent governmental and religious edifices and usually the main market. The chief public buildings either crowd around an open square, or plaza, onto which converge a number of streets ... or stand along, or at the end of, a broad, straight thoroughfare ... The plazas or main streets serve as meeting places and ceremonial sites for the populace ... Subdivisions along ethnic and/or occupational lines are manifested in the preindustrial city in the numerous wards or quarters, well-defined neighborhoods with relatively homogeneous populations that develop special forms of social organization.

Gideon Sjöberg (1960)³

Seventeenth-century Izmir strikingly resembles Braudel's vision of the early-modern European city. He writes of "autonomous worlds" of "unparalleled freedom" that had "outwitted the territorial state" and pursued "an economic policy of their own." He proclaims that they ruled "their fields autocratically, regarding them as positive colonial worlds before there were such things," and asserts that they were "capable of breaking down obstacles and creating or recreating protective privileges." The new city of Izmir conformed to this path first trodden by the European city; other nonwestern ports were to follow.

Daniel Goffman (1990)⁴

¹ Max Weber, *The City* (New York: Free Press, 1966), 80-81.

² G. E. von Grunebaum, "The Structure of the Muslim Town", in *id.*, *Islam: Essays in the Nature and Growth of a Cultural Tradition* (London: Routledge, 1961), 141-42.

³ Gideon Sjöberg, *The Preindustrial City: Past and Present* (New York: Free Press, 1960), 96, 100.

Introduction

Between them, the four quotations above roughly indicate how Ottoman Izmir has been approached by modern historians. They have not been reproduced here because they capture current debates on historical urbanism in the Islamic world, but because they reflect the attitudes prevalent in most European travelers' accounts and diplomatic and mercantile correspondence from the city, as well as informing the analytical frameworks of modern historiography on it. The city's Ottoman past and its meanings have always been, and are still, reconstructed and reinterpreted overwhelmingly from precisely these two categories of sources. The problem is not that historians of Izmir wish to neglect local Ottoman sources, but that they are hard-pressed to find ones suited for the task. This has two causes, the first being the repeated loss to earthquakes and fires (in 1688, 1743 and 1922) of most quantitative (or readily quantifiable) Ottoman local records, and the second being the experimental quality of the city's fiscal and administrative role within wider Ottoman administration – which meant that significant reforms in the administration of the Ottoman realm, as prompted by regional and world historical developments, were invariably tested and then quickly introduced in Izmir – the most valuable Ottoman nexus where these developments interacted. This has significant consequences for the consistency of Ottoman records from and on the city. Therefore, although a sprinkling of Ottoman records (always the same few) is often applied, it invariably fails to shake the city's historiography from its European foundations and framework and to reconstruct it as the Ottoman city that it was, with a history that is at once Ottoman and European.

The history with which we *are* left is in essence external: with one or two notable exceptions (though not for the 17th century), it speaks of Europe in Izmir and the world, not of Ottomans in Izmir and the world, nor even of Izmir in the Ottoman Empire. But most surprisingly, it does not really speak of Izmir as a city with its own history and culture, demography and geography. Forced to take most of its cue from contemporary European sources that display a – perhaps dissembled, but all the same – marked disinterest in the workings of their Ottoman surroundings, it reduces Ottoman Izmir to life and trade along the European thoroughfare Frank Street. And assisted by the problematic and increasingly abandoned paradigm of the Islamic city, it treats the rest of the city as an uncivic and loose collective ruled haphazardly

⁴ Daniel Goffman, *Izmir and the Levantine World, 1550-1650* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1990), 145-46, citing Fernand Braudel, *Capitalism and Material Life, 1400-1800* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973), 396.

and arbitrarily by a representative from the imperial center. The levers and buttons of this dark and somewhat cumbersome urban machine (often along with the region and the empire of which it was part), then, are operated at will by the Europeans to dispense and absorb goods as they required. Their capability to do so is supposed to have started from the second half of the 16th century and to have subsequently drawn in so much of the wider Ottoman economy that it became irreversible, i.e. the West all-powerful, by the 1670s, after which followed a golden age for cosmopolitan Izmir, but a long and dark one indeed for the Ottoman Empire. Even the occasional historian who does attempt to treat Izmir as a city in its own right and restore some agency to it, is in the end forced by the sources and a succession of paradigms at least partly predicated on them, to regard the urbanization of Izmir as a European phenomenon.

Given the fact that the European quarter of 17th-century Izmir took up a tiny fraction of the urban area, that a more balanced and skeptic reading of diplomatic and mercantile correspondence reveals their narrativity and suggests a far less uneven distribution of power in mercantile relations, and that it seems unlikely that crosscultural trade would have thrived in a context so thoroughly segregated and skewed, we are left to ask what can be done about this predicament. Given the available sources and scholarship, is it possible to attain a more realistic representation and understanding of how 17th-century Izmir's Turkish, Greek, Armenian, Jewish and European communities, inhabitants and visitors related to each other; of the degree to which they were and were not interdependent; of the role played in this by an urban history and culture particular to Izmir; of how this history and culture was reproduced because and despite of that intercultural dynamic; of how Ottoman administration regarded it; and of the consequences of this?

An answer to these questions clearly has relevance beyond Izmir's history. An overdue analytical shift away from national-communal historiography and the interaction of economic systems, to crosscultural contact and such relations of power as we can manage to identify within them, will enable us to question the near-absence of everyday crosscultural relations in European sources and the historiography which has sprung from this absence. What's more, since the problematic nature of the pertinent primary sources has all too often left outdated historiography and paradigms to stand in for new research in approaching early modern Izmir (and through it western Anatolia and the Ottoman Empire), a reconstruction of this history from the ground up might in itself pose a wider challenge to the large body of scholarship in which our one-sided understanding of the transformation of Izmir plays a significant part.

What is needed to achieve such a shift is a comparative analysis of cultural, social and political-administrative relations as presented in the ubiquitous

diplomatic correspondence on the one hand; and the cultural, social and political-administrative realities buried beneath these same narratives – but shining through in times of crisis – on the other. The strategy through which this comparison might be achieved, and its wider meaning interpreted, is one that brings together the hidden references to European crosscultural contact in that correspondence with a broad reconstruction of early modern (specifically, late-17th-century) developments in European and Ottoman history to show how their interaction played out in Izmir. With any luck, the resulting image will differ sufficiently from previous presentations to cast doubt on the appropriateness of the cultural and economic paradigms that have so dominated the historiography of Izmir and its uses.

Therefore, we will attempt to formulate our answer to the question of power in these crosscultural relations by relegating economic power and its deficient indicators to the background and focusing our attention on such other indicators of that power as we might be able to identify – i.e. legal, fiscal and administrative developments, and the history of urban demography and geography.

To this end, a number of previously unused and new sources will be tapped in addition to the archival series (European diplomatic archives and the Ottoman registers for land-lease, foreign affairs, and imperial orders), historical travel accounts (Tavernier, Spon, Tournefort, e.a.) and learned works (Ottoman, European and world histories, economic or otherwise) that are commonly used for studying historical Izmir and its place in the world. Most notable among these are scores of Ottoman fiscal miscellanea (*Maliye'den müdevver defterler*) and a crucial Ottoman endowment deed (*vakfiye*) from the Köprülü and Süleymaniye libraries detailing a major overhaul of Izmir's infrastructure, as well as many recent historical, legal, anthropological, sociological and demographical studies.

Our primary hypothesis will be that Izmir's culture and political economy were purposefully manipulated by the Ottoman and European centers and their various representatives in their quest for dominance, but that these found themselves consistently resisted and thwarted by Izmir's cultural and institutional dynamic. We will posit that this distinctly crosscultural urban culture had its own political economy, with its own logic and trajectory.

From this primary hypothesis immediately follows another – which holds that the image of Izmir as a segregated and administratively neglected 'city' was a façade. Willfully constructed by the Ottoman and European centers and their local representatives, it was maintained to hide from view a world of crosscultural compromise and mutual dependencies. This hidden 'middle ground' and the urban culture it fostered, differed significantly enough from that in other Ottoman places of crosscultural trade to effectively constitute a distinct urban culture.

We will have succeeded if, by the end of this text, the existence of such a specific urban culture and politics – not always understood in Istanbul and the European capitals but prevalent within Izmir’s society and institutions – can carry your conviction. And if it does not seem at all farfetched to claim that this specific society and its institutions absorbed, internalized and transformed the systemic shocks delivered to it instead of simply giving way to them.

The Ottoman City

In the half century before Timur despoiled the town in 1402, İzmir's Turkish population had confined itself to Kadifekale, the castle on the hill, and its immediate surroundings because of the Christian menace ensconced in Aşağıkale, the castle guarding the divided settlement's inner harbor. As the site became repopulated during the pax ottomanica following Timur's decisive victory, the Turks gradually drifted down the hill from the quarter (mahalle) of Faikpaşa, to Mescid-i Selâtinzâde, Han Bey (Paazar), and Liman-i İzmir until by 1528-29 a solid band of Muslim settlement extended from castle to castle and obliterated the ancient partition between Crusader and Turk ... While these four quarters formed the heart of the renaissance town, this downward movement did not develop its other two quarters, Boynuzseküsü and Cemaat-i Gebran. The first was a largely autonomous village near İzmir and linked only administratively to it. The second, a 'community of Christians' (cemaat-i gebran), constituted a Greek Orthodox enclave adjoining the harbor. Its twenty-nine households, whose members rebuilt their quarter in the decade after Timur's onslaught, comprised approximately 14 percent of the town's inhabitants.

Daniel Goffman (1990)⁵

History

At first glance, the paradigm of the Islamic city seems particularly well suited to İzmir. Although its formation and development was by no means typical for the Islamic or the Ottoman world; it would be difficult to find a city with a history better suited to the typification of Islamic cities as “agglomerates of densely inhabited components”.⁶ In fact, the İzmir of 1678 was the result of the gradual fusion of what originally had been two opposing frontier towns, one Muslim and one Christian. Nevertheless, the city's history had already commenced millennia before the advent of Islam.⁷

⁵ Goffman, *İzmir and the Levantine World*, 11-12.

⁶ Richard van Leeuwen, *Waqfs and Urban Structures: The Case of Ottoman Damascus* (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 15.

⁷ See generally Mübahat S. Kütükoğlu, *XV ve XVI. asırlarda İzmir kazasının sosyal ve iktisâdî yapısı* (İzmir: İzmir Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür Yayını, 2000); Necmi Ülker, *The Rise of İzmir, 1688-1740* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1975); Besim Darkot, “İzmir”, *İslam Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1988-...), 1239-51; Constantin Iconomos, *Étude sur Smyrne* (İzmir: Tatikian, 1868); Kate Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman State: The Merchants of Genoa and Turkey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Kenneth M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant, 1204-1571*, vol. 1: *The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries* (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1976); Cl. Cahen, “Alp Arslan”, *EI2* (Leiden: Brill, 2003), i: 420a-21b; C. E. Bosworth, “Saldjūkids, III.5: The Saldjūks of Rūm”, *EI2*, ii: 948a-50a; G. Leiser, “Sulaymān b. Kutulmīsh”, *EI2*, ix: 825b-26a; S. Soucek, “Milāha, 2: In the Later Mediaeval and Early Modern Periods”, *EI2*, vii: 46a-50b; I. Mélikoff, “Ayduñ-oghlu”, *EI2*, i: 783a-b; Beatrice F. Manz, “Timūr Lang”, *EI2*, x: 510b-12b; Halil İnalçık, “Bāyezīd I”, *EI2*, i: 1117b-19a; I. Mélikoff, “Djunayd”, *EI2*, ii: 598b-600a; Halil İnalçık, “Mehemmed I”, *EI2*, vi: 973b-8a; J. H. Kramers, “Murād II”, *EI2*, vii: 594a-5b; L. de Blois, and R. J. van der

Greek and Roman İzmir

The part of the city which will be considered Ottoman was largely constructed on top of – and with materials from – Ancient İzmir, or, as it was originally called, Smyrna. Archaeological evidence indicates settlement dating back to the third millennium BC, with signs of Greek habitation from about 1000 BC. According to Herodotus, the city was originally founded by the Aeolians, but later conquered by the Ionians. The, by that time, stately city on the site of what is now Bayraklı, boasting extensive fortifications and blocks of two-storied houses, was captured and demolished by the Lydian king Alyattes in 575 BC, its surviving inhabitants fleeing the site for the area between modern Naldöken and Buca. In 541 BC, what remained of Smyrna went over into Persian hands and remained there until Alexander the Great extended the theatre of his war against the Persians to Ephesus in 344 BC. In the course of the war, Alexander is reported to have entrenched himself on Mount Pagus and, realizing the suitability of the location, to have designated it as a site for future habitation. The project of refounding Smyrna on this new site was subsequently taken on by Alexander's successors Antigonos I Monophthalmus (d. 301 BC) and his enemy and successor Lysimachus (d. 281 BC), when it re-emerged as one of the chief cities of Asia Minor. By now, the acropolis on Mount Pagus was proving too small to accommodate the urban sprawl, and the city started descending the hillside to the coast.

In the first quarter of the third century BC, Seleucus I Nicator (d. 281 BC) took Smyrna from Lysimachus and added it to the dominions of the Seleucid kingdom. Practically until the city's addition to the Roman Middle Republic (from 264 to 133 BC), it remained in possession of the Seleucids. During this period, it was respectively governed by Seleucus I's son Antiochus I Soter (d. 262/261 BC), his son Antiochus II Theos (d. 246 BC) – when it was used as a base in the war with Ptolemy II Philadelphus of Egypt (d. 246 BC) – and his son Seleucus II Callinicus (d. 225 BC), who lost it to Attalus II Philadelphus of Pergamum (d. 138 BC). Antiochus III (d. 187 BC) afterwards attempted to regain Smyrna through diplomacy, but failed when the Smyrniotes called Rome to its defense. In 190 BC, a Roman fleet under admiral Gaius Livius ushered in Smyrna's Roman age.

Spek, Een kennismaking met de oude wereld (Bussum: Coutinho, 2001); 95-142; and *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, deluxe CD edition (Chicago: 2003; 2004), s.v. "İzmir", "Ionia", "Ionian", "Aeolis", "Antigonos I Monophthalmus", "Lysimachus", "Alyattes", "Seleucid kingdom", "Seleucus I Nicator", "Antiochus I Soter", "Antiochus II Theos", "Seleucus II Callinicus", "Pergamum", "Attalus II Philadelphus", "Antiochus III", "Hadrian", "Marcus Aurelius", "Theme", "Nicephorus II Phocas", "Byzantine Empire", "Manzikert, Battle of", "Alp-Arslan", "Anatolia", "Alexius I Comnenus", "Crusade", "Baldwin P", "John III Ducaz Vataztes", "Michael VIII Palaeologus", "Andronicus II Palaeologus", "Zaccaria, Benedetto", "Aydin Dynasty", "Clement VI", "Knights of Malta", "Timur", "Bayezid I" and "Mehmed II".

As a Roman city, Smyrna, by now extending from the fortified district on Mount Pagus (see Map 1) down to the seashore, gained prominence as the center of a civil diocese in the province of Asia. It was on equal footing with Ephesus and Pergamum and became celebrated for its riches, beauty and learning. However, Caesar's death (44 BC) and the succeeding struggle for power spelled ruin for the city. It languished away in war and commercial decline until Hadrian (r. 117-138) actively sought to restore it to its former power. He constructed a temple, a gymnasium and a market in the area between Mount Pagus and the seashore, and exempted the city from imperial taxation. Shortly after its restoration, in the year 178, a severe earthquake hit the city, killing many inhabitants, destroying its temple and filling its inner harbor with debris. It was quickly rebuilt under Marcus Aurelius (r. 161-180).

Byzantine and Seljukid İzmir

As part of the Eastern Roman, or Byzantine, empire, Smyrna's fortune again proved fickle. Although it withstood an Arab siege in 627, the city went into decline under Nicephorus II Phocas (r. 963-969); perhaps its commerce suffered from that emperor's relentless campaigns against the Arabs. If so, its becoming capital of the maritime province (*theme*) of Samos was a bad omen indeed. The *theme*-system was not designed to promote commerce but to help marshal Byzantine resources to withstand the mounting threat of Turkish invasions and this no doubt forced the city to turn its back on the profitable sea and brace itself for the onslaught from the Anatolian interior. Turkish settlers had already been trickling in before that time, prompting many Greeks to leave for the islands or the still securely Byzantine Balkans. Following the Byzantine defeat at the hand of the Muslim Seljuks under Alp Arslan (d. 1073) at the Battle of Manzikert (modern Malazgirt, 1071), their numbers increased dramatically.

In 1081, lower Smyrna was seized by Süleyman bin Kutulmuş (d. 1086), founder of the Anatolian branch of the Seljuks (the Seljuk sultanate of Rum). After his death, the lower city (by now also known by its Turkish name; İzmir) was governed by Seljuk prince Çaka Bey, who used its inner harbor as a base for the naval expeditions that added Lesbos, Chios, Samos and Rhodes to his territories along the coast from Çanakkale (on the Asian side of the Dardanelles) to Kuşadası (Levantine: Scalanuova). After Çaka's death as a result of the pact concluded against this increasingly powerful rival by Seljuk sultan Kılıç Arslan (d. 1107) and Byzantine emperor Alexius I Comnenus (r. 1081-1118), Yalvaç Bey ruled there until 1096. The first Crusade (1096-1099) and the consequent Seljuk retreat from Iznik (Byzantine Nicaea) to Konya (Iconium) in 1097 resulted in the city being re-conquered by the Byzantines.

What happened to the city until 1261 is not entirely clear, but it appears to have largely remained under Byzantine suzerainty, notwithstanding continuing Muslim habitation. Constantinople's falling to the Venetian-dominated Fourth Crusade in 1203 brought about a period of prolonged

chaos. On 16 May 1204, the crusaders proclaimed the Latin empire of Constantinople. They were to be challenged by three Byzantine provincial centers, Trebizond (Trabzon), Árta and Nicaea (Izник) – all aspiring to the Byzantine crown. Eventually, the latter was to gain the advantage and its ruler Theodore I Lascaris (d. 1222) was crowned the new (Nicaean) Byzantine emperor in 1208. The turmoil of the Nicaean period blurred the boundaries of authority in the Aegean and along its coast considerably. The vacuum left by the Byzantine retreat was mainly filled by the Genoese. As Venice's greatest rival to commercial empire, Genoa proved an invaluable ally to the Nicaean emperors and became a crucial factor in the resurgence of Byzantine power.

Latin and Aydınođlu İzmir

When Constantinople was restored to the Byzantine empire in 1261, Michael VIII Palaeologus (r. 1259-1282) was faced with a continuing Venetian and Genoese presence in the Aegean. Lacking the power to oust them, he awarded the battling Venetians and Genoese extensive commercial privileges (capitulations), which at least maintained his nominal suzerainty. Thus, it happened that a number of Venetian and Genoese families seized the commercial and military initiative in the region. In the opening years of the 14th century, the Genoese Zaccaria-family, operating from its alum-rich fief at Phocaea (Foça, just north of İzmir), expanded its control to Chios. In 1304, Andronicus II Palaeologus (r. 1282-1328) extended the Genoese privilege to trade through İzmir and expressly permitted them to settle there as well.⁸ Shortly after, the Zaccarias, who were already in command of the harbor castle built by John III Ducas Vatatzes (r. 1222-1254) and, through it, of the lower city, also managed to gain control of the castle that same emperor had constructed on Mount Pagus.

⁸ "1304 März – Privilegium aurea bulla munitum (text): nach verhandlungen mit dem genuesischen gesandten Guido Embriaco und Acurso Ferrari erhalten die Genuesen folgende privilegien: 1. ein quartier in Galata, von einem graben und einer gebäudefreien zone von 60 ellen breite umgeben und von der mauer der befestigung von Galata längs deren mauer durch eine gebäudefreie zone getrennt; eine befestigungsmauer für ihre quartier sollen sie indessen nicht aufführen dürfen, dagegen wohnungen und alle beliebigen befestigungsbauten innerhalb ihres gebietes; 2. dort erhalten sie einen fleischmarkt, einen getreidemarkt, eine loggia, ein bad, kirchen, lateinische priester, waage und genuesische wägebeamte (doch muß bei den wägungen ein schreiber und ein anderer abgesandter des kaiserlichen zollamtes anwesend sein); für die wägung ihrer eigenen waren haben sie nichts zu entrichten, aber für die übrigen waren ist das vorgeschriebene wäregeld an das kaiserliche zollamt zu bezahlen; 3. die drei griechischen kirchen des gebietes bleiben dem ptr. von Kpl. Unterstellt; 4. jeder Genuese, oder wer rechtens dafür gilt, verbleibt unter der kontrolle der genuesischer verwaltung, auch wenn er sich zu einer andere nation überführen läßt, und nimmt nicht an den privilegien der Genuesen teil; 5. die Genuesen erhalten ein quartier in Smyrna mit loggia, bad, bäckerei, kirche und anderem wie in Galata", Franz Dölger, *Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des Oströmischen Reiches von 565-1453*, vol. 4: *Regesten von 1282-1341* (München: Oldenbourg, 1960), 41-42.

However, the Venetians and the Genoese were not the only ones taking an interest in the Byzantine possessions; in the wake of their struggle, several Turkish emirates – among them the Ottomans – also started extending their influence at the emperors' cost. In 1317, Aydınöđlu Mehmed Bey, founder of the emirate of Aydın (in existence from 1308 to 1425), pried the upper castle, now called Kadifekale, from the Zaccarias' control. Upon Mehmed Bey's death in 1334, his son and successor Umur Bey (r. 1334-1348) immediately started a campaign to oust the Genoese from the castle protecting İzmir's harbor. After a siege of two-and-a-half years the defenders fell back on Chios and the Aydınöđlus became the sole masters of the city. Again, İzmir's harbor was used as a launching pad for Muslim expeditions to the Archipelago and this time – unlike under Çaka Bey – also to the Greek mainland and the Black Sea coast. In time, the depredations of the Turkish emirates, and particularly those of the Ottomans and the Aydınöđlus, became such a threat to Byzantines, Venetians, Genoese and crusader kingdoms alike, that Pope Clement VI successfully preached a crusade to halt their advance.

And so it happened, that a combined fleet of the Republics of Venice and Genoa, the Kingdom of Cyprus, the Knights Hospitallers (based on Rhodes since 1308) and the Duchy of Naxos destroyed Umur Bey's fleet and took the lower castle in October 1344. It was subsequently handed over to the care of the Knights Hospitallers, who added fortifications and renamed it the castle of Saint Peter. Through this advance position the knights were able to dominate the lower city while the emirate clung on to Kadifekale. Despite several attempts by both sides to gain complete control of the city, it was to host a very active frontier between Crusader and Turk, Christianity and Islam, for a good half century.

Aydınöđlu and Early Ottoman İzmir

By the end of the 14th century, the Ottomans had supplanted most of the Western Anatolian emirates. Under Bayezid I Yıldırım (r. 1389-1403) they wrested Kadifekale from the Aydınöđlus, but failed to oust the knights from the castle of Saint Peter; that task was left to Mongol conqueror Tamerlane (Timur Lenk, r. 1370-1405). After defeating and capturing Bayezid in the Battle of Ankara on 20 July 1402, he marched on to the Aegean and in December captured İzmir in its entirety after a siege of less than two weeks. Apparently having sufficiently punished the Ottomans for encroaching upon Anatolian territories that were still nominally his, Timur restored the remains of the emirates and returned to Samarkand in 1403. İzmir became the territory of Cüneyd Bey (r. 1405-1425), grandson of Mehmed Bey and nephew of Umur Bey, and the center of a vigorously renascent emirate of Aydın.

Meanwhile, the reshuffling of power that had been the result of Timur's campaign had far from ended the rivalry between the emirates. After a long series of intrigues, implicating Cüneyd on various sides in the desperate struggle for the Ottoman succession raging between Bayezid's three sons,

the victorious new Ottoman sultan Mehmed I (b. 1386/87, r. 1413-1421) laid siege to Cüneyd's İzmir in 1415. He captured it after ten days and left his former adversary in control of the region on the condition that he would recognize Ottoman suzerainty. Within a year, however, Mehmed had appointed Cüneyd governor of Nicopolis (Nikópolis) and entrusted the province of Aydın to his Bulgarian vassals. After yet another adventure against Mehmed and several years in Byzantine captivity, Cüneyd managed to return to İzmir in 1422 and started to reconquer his former territories from there.

Mehmed I's successor Murad II (r. 1421-1444, 1446-1451) initially merely attempted to contain Cüneyd. He appointed a new governor of Aydın, one Halil Yakışi, to keep him in check. In the end, the Aydınöglü prince proved so intransigent, even kidnapping and killing Yakışi's sister, that the sultan was left with no other option than to try and dispel him from İzmir completely. In 1424, the Ottoman governor-general of Anatolia, Oruç, definitively added the city to the Ottoman lands. From his refuge in the fortress of Ipsili (on the coast opposite Samos), Cüneyd desperately and repeatedly tried to obtain assistance from Venice and the emir of Karaman, but to no avail. In 1425, Oruç's successor Hamza defeated an army commanded by Cüneyd's son in the plain of Akhisar, while Ipsili was attacked from the sea with Genoese assistance. Cüneyd surrendered on the promise that his and his relatives' lives would be spared, but could not escape Yakışi's revenge; the victor had all that was left of the Aydınöglü line put to death.

The City as a Frontier

The most striking feature of İzmir's history up to this point is the city's seemingly perpetual oscillation between East and West, between Asia Minor and the Aegean, even to the point of literally being torn apart. It would be an exaggeration to claim that the Aeolian, Macedonian, middle Roman, middle and late Byzantine, Latin and late Aydınöglü polities represented "the West" or the Aegean; and that the Ionian, Lydian, Persian, Seleucid, Attalid, early Byzantine, Seljukid, early Aydınöglü, Timurid and Ottoman polities represented "the East" or Asia Minor. If such a polarity existed it was never that absolute. Nevertheless, if the geography and orientations of these polities are considered, a pattern can certainly be discerned.

İzmir's repeated switching of overlords not only changed its political configuration time and again, it also altered the composition and distribution of its population. As new rulers imposed themselves on the city, they brought in kinsmen and loyal followers to help administer their new territory. These would in turn depend on ethnically or culturally related sections of the population, bringing certain sections of it to prominence at the cost of others. They did so not just politically, but also in terms of geographical location and social status as they moved into the city's central areas and appropriated its

military, commercial, legal, religious, administrative and political infrastructures, reconfiguring them in the process.⁹

It would be a mistake, however, to think of these processes of appropriation and reconfiguration as tidal waves washing over the entire city. In the course of Izmir's history, the frontier was not only repeatedly carried over the city and back again by the ebb and flow of the city's consecutive masters; it repeatedly ran aground halfway. At several moments in the city's history it ran East of Kadifekale, directly beneath its western walls, along the foot of the western slope of Mount Pagus, straight through the middle of the city from southwest to northeast, along the landward side of the ramparts of the castle of St. Peter, along its seaward side and the city's beach, through the Gulf of Izmir and beyond it. What's more, it did not just move back and forth between East and West, it also rotated. For instance, the 11th century

⁹ See Sjoberg, *Preindustrial City*. Sjoberg formulated his theory of the pre-industrial city as a critique of the then-dominant concentric zonal, or Chicago School of urban sociology, model of Ernest W. Burgess (which describes a "positive correlation between the socioeconomic status of residential areas and their distance from the central business district: the most affluent urban residents live in the outer suburbs, a finding which Burgess's followers generalized from Chicago to all American cities (see Schnore, 1965). Growth within the city was propelled from the centre through the process of invasion and succession whereby new immigrants occupied the lowest quality homes in the zone in transition and pressed longer-established groups to migrate outwards towards the suburbs", "Zonal Model" (2009), *Geodx: The Earth Encyclopedia*, <http://www.geodz.com/eng/d/zonal-model/zonal-model.htm> (accessed 4 July 2011). Sjoberg's model, which still goes largely unchallenged and serves as a widely used alternative to Chicago School-variations indeed seems more pertinent to pre-industrial Izmir. There (as will become apparent throughout the remainder of this text), economic and ethnic zones were seemingly randomly clustered around a center occupied by a non-commercial ruling class, with commercial zones located near the centre (but not in it) and non-Muslim populations (especially Greeks and Europeans, but also to a lesser degree Jews and Armenians) around it. Sjoberg asserts that "power is consolidated by the ruling class through its residential location in the city centre, the most protected and most accessible district. Here, residents forge a social solidarity based on their literacy, access to the surplus (which is stored in the central area of the city), and shared upper-class culture that includes distinctive manners and patterns of speech. Elite clustering in the city centre is reinforced by the lack of rapid transportation. The privileged central district is surrounded by haphazardly arranged neighborhoods housing the lower class. Households in these areas are sorted by occupation/income (merchants near the centre, followed by minor bureaucrats, artisans and, finally, the unskilled), ethnic origin and extended family networks. Merchants are generally not accorded elite status, since power is achieved through religious and military control while trade is viewed with suspicion. The model is less clear on the residential placement of outcaste groups (typically slaves and other conquered peoples): some of these perform service roles and are intermingled with the rest of the urban population, while others live at the extreme periphery of the city and frequently beyond its walls", "Sjoberg Model" (2009), *Geodx: The Earth Encyclopedia*, <http://www.geodz.com/eng/d/sjoberg-model/sjoberg-model.htm> (accessed 4 July 2011); and Ernest W. Burgess, "The Growth of the City: An Introduction to a Research Project", in *The City Reader*, eds. Richard T. LeGates and Frederic Stout (New York: Routledge, 2009), 150-57. See also Mike Savage, Alan Warde and Kevin Warde, *Urban Sociology, Capitalism and Modernity* (New York: Palgrave, 2003), 70-74.

saw a Turkified lower Izmir and a Byzantine upper city, while the 14th witnessed a fully reversed situation.

Such a volatile frontier must have had a profound impact on both the physical city and on the interaction between its inhabitants on either side – with, one suspects, consequences for the physical and social heritage the Ottomans would work to incorporate later on. What should interest us particularly in investigating the degree of autonomy and incorporation of Izmir and its several communities is the question how deep and hard the division between Izmir's parts actually was during the pre-Ottoman period: were they constantly at odds or only incidentally, were they so across all social strata or only among particular ones, and did this (temporality and modality) change over time?

A dearth of sources shedding light on the demography and topography of pre-Ottoman Izmir precludes firm answers to these questions. But a number of contemporary narratives as well as modern studies do shed light on the strategic situation of Izmir and on the general attitudes and objectives of the parties involved in the struggle for the town and the region. These can yield some tentative answers.

The most obvious source to study for added context on pre-Ottoman Izmir as a frontier is without a doubt *The Alexiad*.¹⁰ Written around the year 1148, Anna Komnene's chronicle of the reign of her father, emperor Alexius I, details the vicissitudes of their Komnenian dynasty and the struggling empire it headed as, between the years 1081 and 1118, it attempted to remain afloat amidst a veritable deluge of imperial contenders, Normans, Scythians, Manicheans, crusaders, and Cumanid and Seljukid Turks. Izmir, by then at the southeastern edge of what remained of the unbroken Byzantine possessions in Anatolia, figures prominently in *The Alexiad* as the last Byzantine bulwark stopping Seljuk emir Çaka Bey and his newly constructed fleet from strangling what remained of Byzantine Anatolia from the sea.

If Anna Komnene's description of the several campaigns, truces, negotiations, alliances and concessions over Izmir make one thing abundantly clear, it is that when faced with such protracted periods of military-strategic unrest and repeated reversals as befell all parties engaged in Izmir, none of them (be they Byzantines, Turks, or Latins) stood to gain much from a rapid and forced full incorporation of the town's estates and population. The degree of violence and disruption such repeated appropriation under truce or peace would add to the damages already inflicted by armed conflict must have been generally understood to be detrimental to all parties' future interests in the town and the region – notwithstanding the complaint in *The Alexiad* that

¹⁰ Anna Komnene, *The Alexiad* (London: Penguin, 2009).

petty Muslim rulers who had installed themselves on the Aegean coast and islands treated the Christian inhabitants *like* slaves and ravaged the region.¹¹

Although western Anatolia was surely no exception to the general rule that war enslaves and ravages, we should bear in mind that in our context such statements tend to reflect fiscal and territorial concerns more than purely ethical or moral ones (if the distinction will have made much sense to contemporaries to begin with). In fact, even the evolution of both the actual Byzantine and Islamic institutions of slavery (significantly different from ancient and modern variants) shows that they developed and adjusted in response to fiscal problems primarily, with moral considerations figuring as but one dimension of divinely sanctioned fiscal rule.¹²

Similarly, we should consider that indignant Byzantine references to the virtual enslavement and overall devastation wreaked by Turkish competitors could in reality very well be little more than morally dressed allusions to the not quite so bloody Islamic fiscal practice of levying a poll-tax from non-Muslim subjects (as a mark of subordination) and of permanently lowering the overall tax burden immediately after a takeover. If there was much devastation to the region it will have been in the fiscal sense first and foremost; through a lax regime that preemptively undermined any future Byzantine attempts at regaining its lost territories since no amount of tried and tested Byzantine propaganda would suffice to regain the sympathy and support of populations now used to the much lighter hand of Islamic governance.¹³

Nevertheless, both *The Alexiad* and many other chronicles and letters do testify to occasional heavy disruptions of life and trade. Anna Komnene repeatedly refers to the ravaging of Western Anatolia's rural districts in the seemingly perpetual to and fro between Byzantines and Turks, to the razing of one city (Adramyttium, modern Edremit, opposite the island of Lesbos) by Çaka's first Turkish navy, as well as to the gruesome treatment twice meted out to defeated Turkish troops in Phrygia and Philadelphia (modern Alaşehir).¹⁴

Still, if the destruction of Adramyttium and the brutal elimination of Turkish units in Izmir's deeper hinterlands merit such specific mention while the city itself (a hundred miles and more to the south, west and southwest of those battle sites) lies at the heart of so much of *The Alexiad's* action, we may safely assume that that city and its general population were spared such gruesome fates – a noteworthy conclusion considering that the unceasing strife

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 309 (emphasis added).

¹² See generally Youval Rotman, *Byzantine Slavery and the Mediterranean World* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009).

¹³ Cf. Edward N. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), 201-5 (“The Muslim Conquest and Tax Reduction”).

¹⁴ See Komnene, *Alexiad*, 397-400 and throughout.

between Alexios' and Çaka (and his successor Yalvaç) centered on Izmir and was in fact the first acute manifestation of a long-lasting Greco-Turkish demographical competition in the Byzantine core territories. Apparently, that competition and the military confrontations that arose from it, did not affect the town's general population to the degree of destroying or dispersing it. In any case, not in the one-and-a-quarter century leading up to the Byzantines' regaining full control of Izmir after the Seljuks had been beaten back to Konya by the First Crusade, nor in the remaining years leading up to the Venetian proclamation of the Latin empire of Constantinople.

Surprisingly perhaps, even the years of Byzantine breakdown, reconstruction and rehabilitation (from 1204 to 1222 to 1261) were not all that troublesome for Izmir. Lightly governed by the struggling (Nicaean) Byzantine empire with Genoese backing, its ethnically diverse Greek, Latin and Turkish population appears to have survived without much disruption.¹⁵ The recapture of the upper castle by the Turks in 1317, this time under the banner of Aydınöglu Umur Bey, will have heightened tensions between upper and lower Izmir. Yet, there is no evidence to suggest that depopulation and destruction was the result.

The first major disruption of crosscultural contact that did occur in Izmir was not of Levantine making. Whereas Byzantines and Turks had stood with and against each other in a strength-sapping yet strangely sustaining embrace, either unwilling or incapable to force a victory that sacrificed the main prize to matters of principle, it was the "Smyrniote crusade" (1344-1346) that chose a fight to the death over a draw. The alliance of Venice, Cyprus and Knights Hospitallers that descended on Izmir in 1344 under the papal banner to salvage Venetian interests in the name of Christianity managed to take the lower city, but never dislodged the Turks from the upper city.

Whatever communication and cohabitation had existed between the city's parts under Byzantine rule was apparently ruined by the crusaders' winner-takes-all attitude. What remained was a "labyrinth of deserted houses ... between the Turks on the height and the Christians below", a veritable "no-man's-land between the harbor fortress and the Turkish-held acropolis", with a fledgling "Venetian suburb" below hugging the walls of the harbor castle in which "the crusaders lived in an atmosphere of almost daily crises" because of continuous mangonel bombardments by the Turks.¹⁶ After some years of failures and successes (resulting in the deaths of both sides' commanders) the unsustainable policy of radical animosity was abandoned, giv-

¹⁵ See the privilege reproduced by Dölger, *Regesten* 4, 41-42.

¹⁶ See Setton, *Papacy and the Levant* 1, 192.

ing way to negotiations for a sustainable cohabitation between the papacy and the Aydınoğlus in 1348.¹⁷

In the course of the following three quarters of a century that would pass until Izmir was brought securely under Ottoman rule in 1424, the more or less peaceful cohabitation between the city's populations that had endured for much of the preceding centuries would be tested once more, this time by Timur's indiscriminately devastating invasion of 1402. The ensuing *pax Ottomanica* (which ended with the Allied Greek occupation of 1919 and the destruction of the city in 1922) was heavily disrupted on only one occasion, in 1472, when much of the town was purposefully burnt by a withdrawing Venetian naval raiding party.¹⁸

The admittedly somewhat indirect evidence for relatively peaceful coexistence between general populations of different ethnic backgrounds and religious persuasions across most of Izmir's history seems to be confirmed by a number of excellent recent studies on the Byzantine empire. Youval Rotman's *Byzantine Slavery and the Mediterranean World*, John F. Haldon in Ian Moriss and Walter Scheidel's *The Dynamics of Ancient Empires: State Power from Assyria to Byzantium*, and Edward N. Luttwak's *The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire*, while not specifically concerned with Izmir and while studying Byzantine polity and society from widely diverging angles (resp. social-fiscally, structural-politically, military-strategically), all track the evolution of a Byzantine system that became optimally geared to maintaining a guarded Christian-Muslim coexistence, preferably within the confines of the Byzantine state, but also between it and the outside world.¹⁹ That image corresponds with that from our evidence on Izmir.

These studies also testify to the incomprehension and disgust Byzantine policies of flexibility and peripheral softness elicited from Western contemporaries and moderns alike. In Haldon's words:

In 1869, the historian William Lecky wrote: «Of that Byzantine empire, the universal verdict of history is that it constitutes, without a single exception, the most thoroughly base and despicable form that civilisation has yet assumed. There has been no other enduring civilisation so absolutely destitute of all forms and elements of greatness, and none to which the epithet mean may be so emphatically applied ... The history of the empire is a monotonous story of the intrigues of priests, eunuchs, and women, of poisonings, of conspiracies, of uniform ingratitude.» This image, which nicely reflects the morality and prejudices of the mid-

¹⁷ See *ibid.*, 195-223.

¹⁸ See Kenneth M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant, 1204-1571*, vol. 2: *The Fifteenth Century* (Philadelphia: Independence Square, 1978), 317.

¹⁹ Rotman, *Byzantine Slavery*; Luttwak, *Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire*; and John F. Haldon, "The Byzantine Empire", in *The Dynamics of Ancient Empires: State Power from Assyria to Byzantium*, eds. Ian Moriss and Walter Scheidel (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 205-54.

Victorian world, has been remarkably resilient. Indeed, it lives on in some popular ideas about the Byzantine world, a combination of Victorian moralizing and Crusaders' prejudices, and in the use of the adjective "Byzantine" in a pejorative sense. And there are some modern writers – for the most part, not professional historians – who have, consciously or not, transferred these prejudices to the world of contemporary scholarship, if not with respect to the "corrupt" Byzantine court, then in terms of a romantic, "Orientalist" image of Byzantium that merely contributes to the continued obfuscation of the nature of Byzantine society and civilization. In the light of the evidence in the written sources, the Byzantine court was certainly no more venal, corrupt, or conspiracy ridden than any other medieval court in West or East. But it has taken a long time to deconstruct these attitudes. Historians working within the western European tradition in particular have been victims, in this respect, of the nationalist and Eurocentric propaganda that arose in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and afterward and in the context of the evolving nationalist and rationalist attitudes of the age, by which northern and western European culture was credited with an integrity, sense of honor, and straightforwardness that the corrupt "orientalized" medieval Byzantine world (and also the Islamic world, consigned to the same fate) had lost.²⁰

In view of that analysis it is hardly surprising that all major disruptions of Izmir's delicate equilibrium of guarded cohabitation had one thing in common; they invariably came from beyond the Levant, from the Franks to the West and the Mongols to the East.


So, although Byzantine-Turkish antagonism was certainly no fiction in the military and political arenas, it was certainly never continuous and radical in the social and economic spheres.²¹ To understand why this was so, it might think help to think of the city as a complex organism, recognized as such by its major beneficiaries: if it is to continue to fulfill its internal and external functions, a rigid fission is simply out of the question. For Izmir to continue to function in any socially, economically and strategically viable way for its inhabitants, its region, and its imperial stakeholders, it was crucial that the arterial roads between the seaport at its heart, the wider body of the city itself and the milieu of its hinterland remained intact (see Map 1).²²

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 210-11.

²¹ See generally Molly Greene, *A Shared World: Christians and Muslims in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); and Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade*.

²² Organic metaphors are now regarded as suspect because of the risks involved in using them as analytical tools (they invite naturalistic interpretations and over-functionalism, and have a history of being abused for nefarious purposes). Nevertheless, there is no denying they are useful in stimulating one to imagine how geography and commercial and social processes meet and interact within a defined and specialized area such as a city (if only one remembers that a metaphor in itself holds no causal value). It is no coincidence that the authors of an excellent and recent work on *Divided Cities*, in trying to distil a generic "divided city" from their five cases (Belfast, Beirut, Jerusalem, Mostar, and Nicosia), use an inverted variant of our organic metaphor: "Rarely a senseless and spontaneous convulsion, urban partitioning may be like a fever: the unhappy but strategic response of an organism to a threat encountered within

MAP 1: GENERAL TOPOGRAPHY OF IZMIR AND ENVIRONS, PRE-16TH CENTURY



Based on Thomas Graves, “The City of Ismir or Smyrna” [map] (London: Hydrographic Office, 1844); with additional detail taken from Richard Copeland, “Smyrna Harbour” [map] (London: Hydrographic Office, 1844).

Logically, the prerequisite of a smooth flow of commerce across military or cultural barriers became more imperative as the city grew and the volume of trade going through it increased. The general scarcity and shortness of absolute antagonism, and the importance attached to the flow of commerce in countless ceasefire agreements and peace treaties, establish beyond a doubt that from at least the eleventh century onwards Izmir’s inhabitants and overlords were very attentive to this imperative and the advantage they would

its own body. Still, a fever is not productively sustained for long; our systematic exploration of five divided cities suggests that partition is not an effective long-term reply to discrimination and violence”, Jon Calame and Esther Charlesworth, *Divided Cities: Belfast, Beirut, Jerusalem, Mostar, and Nicosia* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), xi.

stand to gain by continuing to heed it. Dealings between Izmir's rival powers and populations were above all pragmatic.²³

A diverse urban population that managed to live and work together under such conditions without too much upheaval must have reached a quite sophisticated and stable *modus vivendi*. The question, then, is how this *modus vivendi* was organized socially and spatially: did this particular urban society resemble the compartmentalized, dissociated and uncivic type described by Von Grunebaum, or could it have been more akin to Frederick Jackson Turner's nuclearized, self-sufficient and freedom-loving *frontier society*, later transposed to the Ottoman case by McNeill, and afterwards applied most effectively to the early Ottoman state by Cemal Kafadar:

*Indeed, if anything characterized medieval Anatolian frontiers, and possibly all frontiers, it was mobility and fluidity. The Ottoman success was due to the fact that they harnessed that mobility to their own ends while shaping and taming it to conform to their stability-seeking, centralizing vision. Of course there were limits on both set by natural and social parameters, but still one could move from place to place, allegiance to allegiance, and identity with an ease and acceptability hard to even imagine in more-settled societies. People not only crossed from one side of the frontier to the other but also moved from one faith to another and from one ethnic identity (which usually also meant from one name) to another with frequency. ... The sociopolitical order created by these frontier conditions developed a general reluctance to recognize an aristocracy, a freezing of inheritable distinction in specific lineages, even after settling down.*²⁴

In the first case, the response to the circumstances described above would have been increasing segregation as different segments of the population tried to keep their belligerents at bay by walling themselves in even further in

²³ Cf. Halil İnalçık, "İmtiyâzât, ii: The Ottoman Empire", *EI2*, iii: 1179a-89b. E.g., Dölger, *Regesten* 4; Hans Theunissen, *Ottoman-Venetian Diplomatics: The 'Abd-names: The Historical Background and the Development of a Category of Political-Commercial Instruments Together with an Annotated Edition of a Corpus of Relevant Documents* (Utrecht: Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht, 1991); and various other collections of treaties. For the Ottoman-Genoese case specifically, see Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade*, 4-12 and 156-74.

²⁴ Cemal Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 140-41. See Von Grunebaum, "Structure of the Muslim Town", 141-42; and Frederick Jackson Turner, *The Frontier in American History* (Mineola: Dover Publications, 1996), throughout, and esp. 30: "But the most important effect of the frontier has been in the promotion of democracy here and in Europe. As has been indicated, the frontier is productive of idealism. Complex society is precipitated by the wilderness into a kind of primitive organization based on the family. The tendency is anti-social. It produces antipathy to control, and particularly to any direct control. The tax-gatherer is viewed as a representative of oppression". See generally William Hardy McNeill, *Europe's Steppe Frontier, 1500-1800* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964).

their ethno-religiously homogenous quarters.²⁵ In the second, the frontier would have evolved into a society of its own – a precarious balancing act that must eventually end with the forces of state centralization and incorporation pressing heavier than any local dynamic towards crosscultural exchange and cohabitation.²⁶ Ideally, the distinguishing trait of such a *frontier society* would – in the words of Cemal Kafadar – be that “the two sides of the frontier ... over the centuries molded overlapping planes of social and cultural interaction and lived, in certain respects, in more proximity to one another than to certain elements within their ‘own’ societies.”²⁷ Less ideally, and at the very least, it would mean that antagonisms between political centers were not automatically replicated in all spheres of contact on the local level, i.e. in daily life.

That Izmir’s overall growth continued irrespective of formal divisions, and that this growth was at least partly facilitated by rulers who were at the same time competing for total control of the city, certainly seems to point towards a society of the frontier type. If the following chapters indeed confirm it to have been such, it would suggest that the city and its society developed in response to their own historical experience, geographical position and social, economic and political needs – instead of according to some pre-ordained and typical civilizational scheme (as in the paradigm of the Islamic city/society). This would in turn make it very difficult to deny Izmir any and all autonomously developed overarching civic spirit, even if it existed in a guise barely recognizable to western commentators. It would also mean that the mode and pace in which that city was incorporated into the Ottoman Empire was determined not only by persons and policies in the Ottoman capital, but just as much by local power-brokers and institutions that worked together to protect local interests against those of the center.

²⁵ The circumstances and process through which this might happen are meticulously documented in Calame and Charlesworth, *Divided Cities*. The authors emphatically (and, to my mind, rightly) argue that these processes and their outcome of division are historically and geographically universal.

²⁶ As in the case of Almohad, Nasrid and Castilian Granada in its frontier phase, before the closing of the Granada frontier and the city’s full incorporation into the new Castilian order towards 1600, see generally David Coleman, *Creating Christian Granada: Society and Religious Culture in an Old-World Frontier City, 1492-1600* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003). Coleman makes it very clear that Granada’s history of cohabitation was a rather rough ride, yet, if anything, this demonstrates perfectly the enduring social, economic and spatial instinct towards urban integration can be.

²⁷ Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds*, 84. Here, Kafadar also warns us that “Accommodation and symbiosis were possible and occurred much more often than historians have so far recognized; identities changed, inclusivism was common, and heterogeneity was not frowned upon. Still, hostilities and exclusions were, or could be, part of the same environment, and one should be careful not to romanticize, whatever the weight of inclusivism in frontier realities or narratives.” The societal impact of fluid frontiers and intensive mobility across them is discussed throughout the work, but particularly on pages 140-41.

Explicitly considering Izmir's incorporation into the *pax Ottomanica* a two-way street forces the realization that there was an interplay at work there in which the interests of central and local factions sometimes overlapped to the detriment of other central and local factions, but in which there was much more occasion for central interests to be diametrically opposed to local ones. The question then becomes what kind of marks this multifaceted tug between autonomy and conformity, relative independence and full incorporation, left on 17th-century Ottoman Izmir. Or, for that matter, on the Ottoman policies of that age.

With these considerations on Izmir's social configuration in mind, let us now turn to the practicalities of that city's integration into the *pax ottomanica*.

Izmir as an Ottoman Port

After the Ottomans had definitively brought the town under their rule in 1424, upper and lower Izmir were literally and figuratively glued together by continuous growth, and specifically, throughout the 17th century, by a series of influxes of Armenian²⁸ and Jewish²⁹ migrants (also see Map 10). In the

²⁸ "In the early seventeenth century, when Shah 'Abbas succeeded in regaining the town of Nakhchewan from the Ottomans, he had it destroyed because in his perspective, the resident elite had traitorously supported his major enemy. Furthermore, in order to prevent the rapid reconstruction of Nakhchewan, he also deported the local traders' commercial partners, namely the Armenians of Djulfa, to a far-away site in the vicinity of Isfahan. There the latter constructed the famous merchant diaspora which handled Iranian silk exports throughout the seventeenth century, as well as English and Indian goods. Armenian merchants formed part of a major commercial diaspora, which on the one hand linked the residents of New Djulfa near Isfahan to India and even Tibet, and on the other hand, to Izmir, Aleppo, Amsterdam and, at least temporarily, Marseilles. ... All this activity must have resulted in more or less extended residences of Armenians based in New Djulfa in the major Ottoman centres of commerce. Moreover, some of their counterparts domiciled in Amsterdam also traded with the Empire and thus visited Ottoman ports, especially Izmir. Most of the principal merchants of the Armenian diaspora lived permanently in Iran and merely sent their junior partners, often younger relatives, on commercial trips. But there existed colonies of resident Armenian merchants in Ottoman cities as well. Thus from the eighteenth century onwards Roman Catholic Armenian immigrants from Iran were established in Izmir where some of the wealthier members of the group soon came to intermarry with French merchants", Suraiya Faroqi, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It* (Tauris: London, 2006), 139.

²⁹ Very recently, David B. Ruderman patterned "Jewish migration to Italy and the Ottoman Empire" as follows: "Jewish migrations long preceded the end of the fifteenth century in both western and eastern Europe. From as early as 1348, large numbers of Jews moved eastward to Poland and Lithuania and southward to Italy. They arrived in Italy and primarily settled in the regions of Piedmont and the Veneto. They were followed by Jewish immigrants from Southern France at the end of the fourteenth century, by Italian Jews moving into central and northern Italian cities from the South, and eventually by the exiles from Spain and Portugal, from the papal territories in 1569 and from the duchy of Milan in 1597. ... Jewish settlement in the Ottoman Empire came in surges. The first Jewish immigrants came from Romanian and Karaite communities who settled in pre-Ottoman communities in Anatolia and the Balkans. They were followed by Ashkenazic Jews travelling from central Europe. With the

course of that same century, the distinctly Ottoman cocktail of Greeks, Turks, Latins, Armenians and Jews was topped off with a sizeable Western European component as French, English and Dutch merchants flocked to the city in search of trade. So, instead of becoming more ethnically uniform under continued Ottoman suzerainty, the city's diversity increased even further. This was not the only continuity between the pre-Ottoman and Ottoman periods; although the city would remain Ottoman until 1923, the oscillating movement continued even in the interim, albeit in different guises.

In correlation with these migratory patterns, changes occurred in Izmir's economy. When the Ottomans took the city, it had been a Genoese commercial center for more than a century. Its institutions and economy had been geared to generate profit from the supply and demand of the horizontal axis of Mediterranean trade (which carried luxury goods from the East to the West). Its orientation, therefore, was westward. Afterwards, as the city's economy was increasingly integrated into the economy of the expanding Ottoman state, this orientation changed. In 1453 Mehmed II the Conqueror (r. 1444-1446, 1451-1481) annihilated the Byzantine empire by seizing the dwindling city of Constantinople and establishing it as the new Ottoman capital, Istanbul. To support the ensuing policy of repopulation of the new political center – which within a mere fifty years would develop into the largest city in Europe – and the imperial ambitions directed from it, the Ottoman economic system had to undergo fundamental restructuring. From that moment onwards, the prime objective of the Ottoman economic enterprise would be to guarantee the feeding of the capital. In the *provisioning economy* that was the result, Izmir's function was – like that of Ottoman Alexandria – that of a staging point for the collection of surplus regional produce and its redirection to the imperial center (along the vertical axis of Mediterranean trade).³⁰ Competing for the acquisition and marketing of that surplus,

conquest of Constantinople in 1453, Sultan Mehmet II turned his new capital Istanbul into a newly rebuilt and repopulated city, among them Jews from Greece, Macedonia, Albania and Bulgaria, as well as other regions in Turkey. Sephardic Jews and later conversos came to Istanbul, Salonika, Aleppo, Safed, and Jerusalem beginning in the mid-fifteenth century, but larger waves of immigrants followed after the expulsions of 1492 and 1497. Some came through North Africa, others through Italy and Sicily. Later flows arrived from Portugal after 1506 and again after 1536. ... The one Ottoman Jewish community whose trajectory of development was different from the rest was Izmir. Jews migrated to the city in the early seventeenth century not as a refuge from persecution and expulsion but because of its economic vitality", David B. Ruderman, *Early Modern Jewry: A New Cultural History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 26-27 and 29.

³⁰ In his 2008 doctorate thesis İsmail Hakkı Kadı provides an excellent summary of the Ottoman economic mindset (which comprised three leading principles: provisionism, traditionalism and fiscalism). Kadı also offers a welcome reinterpretation of that mindset in light of Ottoman-Dutch commercial relations as they played out in Izmir, Ankara and Amsterdam in the 17th and 18th century: İsmail Hakkı Kadı, "Natives and Interlopers: Competition Between

however, were a number of increasingly powerful Ottoman and European merchant communities that in the course of centuries managed to reorient the region's economy to the west, in the end solidly integrating it into the western world economy.

Except for in economic orientation, the oscillating movement between Asia Minor and the Aegean also continued in another area: that of administration. Following its annexation by the Ottomans, Izmir was attached to the province (*eyalet*) of Anatolia as a *kaza* (the jurisdiction of a *kadi*, or judge) in the provincial district (*sancak*) of Aydın-Saruhan.³¹ However, during a tax survey (*tabiri*) of the district in the year 1573, Izmir and three other jurisdictions were reassigned to the neighboring province Cezayir-i Bahr-ı Sefid (the Islands of the White Sea; the “white sea” meaning the Mediterranean and “the islands” those of the Aegean Sea).³² Like in Byzantine times, when it had been capital of the *theme* of Samos, Izmir again became part of a maritime province. In this new division the *kaza* came under the *sancak* of Sığla, which had its capital in Urla. Sığla was governed by a *derya beyi* (a governor of a maritime *sancak*), who was required to contribute two fully outfitted galleys a year to the fleet of his governor-general (*beylerbeyi*) the Lord high admiral (*kapudan paşa*), instead of the previous *sancak beyi*'s requirement to contribute a certain number of cavalry (*sipahi*) to the Ottoman army.³³ Around 1678, the pendulum swung back once more as the *kaza* was reattached to the district of Aydın and thereby to the great province of Anatolia.³⁴

Ottoman and Dutch Merchants in the 18th Century” (PhD diss., Universiteit Leiden, 2008), 12-14 and throughout.

³¹ See Katib Çelebi, *Kıtab-ı Cibannüma* (Kostantiniye [Istanbul]: Darul-tibaat-ul Amire, 1065; 1145 [1654; 1732]), 669-70.

³² See Mübahat S. Kütükoğlu, *XV. ve XVI. asırlarda İzmir kazasının sosyal ve iktisâdî yapısı* (Izmir: İzmir Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür Yayını, 2000), 57.

³³ See Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, vol. 9: *Anadolu, Suriye, Hicaz (1671-1672)*, ed. Ahmet Cevdet (Istanbul: İkdâm Matbaası, 1935), 88-100; and İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı devletinin merkez ve bahriye teşkilâtı* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınevi, 1948), 427-28.

³⁴ When Evliya visited Izmir in 1671, Izmir still resorted under the *kapudan's* *eyalet* (Evliya, *Seyahatname* 9, 89). In the absence of definitive documentary proof, scholarship has agreed that the transfer to Anatolia took place somewhere in the closing decades of the 17th or the opening decades of the 18th century. Although I have also not been able to locate any Ottoman archival evidence roundly declaring the transfer of Izmir and/or environs to the province of Anatolia, it in fact must have coincided with (or directly followed) the comprehensive censuses (*tabirîs*) of Cezayir-i Bahr-ı Sefid of AH 1087 (AD 1676/77) and Anatolia of AH 1099 (AD 1678/78); see *infra*, also for more context on the following. This estimation is based on the following facts and circumstances: (1) the administrative reassignment of districts of Izmir's importance in the 17th century (especially with the *timar* system still in use and not yet fully succeeded by an alternative fiscal structure) still required an amount of fiscal/administrative planning that required some sort of complete central administrative accounting of its fiscal and military assets; (2) from the mid-16th century onwards – when *tabirîs* were no longer

In conjunction with military-administrative responsibility for the *kaşa* of Izmir moving back and forth between Anatolia and the Aegean, a similar movement can be discerned with regard to the allocation of its tax revenues. Almost as soon as the Ottomans were in full control of the city and its countryside, these were excluded from the feudal tax base of the military (the *sipahis*, *sancak beyis* and *beylerbeyis*). In recognition of the region's high agricultural and commercial yield and of its importance to Istanbul's food supply, it was converted to crown land (*bass-ı hümayun*); a status reserved for the most productive and profitable Ottoman lands.³⁵ When Izmir was appended to Sığla, its income was also reappointed. It remained crown land, but the revenue it generated now accrued to the second Lord of the Admiralty (*tersane-i amire kethüdası*), the grand admiral's second-in-command.³⁶ A good century later, when Izmir was reattached to Aydın, its revenue reverted to the sultan, who subsequently awarded it to the sultan-mother (*valide sultan*) as an appanage (*arpalık*). She governed it through a substitute governor (*mütesellim*) based in the provincial capital of Manisa, leaving the local *kadi* in charge of local administration.³⁷

In the three-tiered *Annales*-approach to historical change that distinguishes between *histoire structurelle* (or, the *longue durée*), *histoire conjoncturelle* and *histoire événementielle*, the cyclical trend described above would be registered on the clock of medium, "conjunctural", time; that of the "slow but perceptible

conducted after fixed intervals – they were organized in response to specific administrative/political problems and needs of major importance; it is surely no coincidence that the two major *tabrirs* carried out in the second half of the 17th century pertained to the two provinces involved in the transfer; (3) the *tabrirs* (and the relating transfer of Izmir from Cezayir to Anatolia) followed the Ottoman victory in the maritime Cretan War (1669) and Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa's taking over the reins of executive power from his brother (1676), and coincided with the new grand vizier's redirection of all available Ottoman forces towards the land wars on the empire's northern fronts (against Russia, 1676-1681, and against the Habsburgs, 1683-1698); that the reassignment of Izmir's capital, manpower and military resources from maritime towards land-based warfare in fact took place just before or in the course of 1678 (when the new grand vizier, coincidentally, was also heavily invested in the city's commercial infrastructure and operations) appears to be confirmed by orders going out to the *kadis* of the (Anatolian) districts of Manisa, Izmir, Tire, Kuşadası, Sakız (Chios), Rodosçuk (Tekridağ), Kilitbahır, Çortak, Sultanıye and Kocaeli to have prayers recited for the outgoing troops. Istanbul, BBA A.DVN.MHM 96 (AH 1089-90 / AD 1678-79), command 292.

³⁵ See Cengiz Orhonlu, "*Khāss*", *EI2*, iv: 1094b.

³⁶ See Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı devletinin ... teşkilâtı*, 420-21 and 427-28.

³⁷ See my "Towards Classifying Avaniās: A Study of Two Cases Involving the English and Dutch Nations in Seventeenth-Century Izmir", in: *Friends and Rivals in the East: Studies in Anglo-Dutch Relations in the Levant from the Seventeenth to the Early Nineteenth Century*, eds. Alastair Hamilton, Alexander Hendrik de Groot, Maurits H. van den Boogert (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 166. Cf. Elena Frangakis-Syrett, *The Commerce of Smyrna in the Eighteenth Century (1700-1820)* (Athens: Centre for Asia Minor Studies, 1992), 37; and Yuzo Nagata, *Tarihçe âyanlar: Karaosmanoğulları üzerinde bir inceleme* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1997), 23.

rhythms” of “economic systems, states, societies and civilizations”.³⁸ On this clock, and relatively close to “structural” time, Izmir’s history was above all else that of a frontier between two regions that more often than not represented two worlds. Its challenge; to continue to successfully bridge the chasm between them.

Demography

Most observations on Ottoman cities – from contemporary travelers’ accounts and histories to more recent attempts to apply the paradigm of the Islamic city to the Ottoman case – have their origin in a number of strong assumptions about the status of non-Muslims in Islamic societies. Since the history and historiography of that status derived from a specific set of Islamic legal rules and principles to which we will regularly refer throughout the remainder of the text, it is important that we are first clear on what these entailed exactly.

The Status of the Non-Muslim Communities

Central to Islam’s relations with non-Muslim peoples and states was the legal distinction between *dar üil-Islam* and *dar üil-harb*, “the land of Islam” and “the land of war” respectively. The former may be defined as “the whole territory in which the law of Islam prevails”, the latter as that territory where it does not. Non-Muslim inhabitants of the land of war, and the states to which they belonged, were in principle branded as *harbis*, enemies. That is, unless they had become tributaries to the land of Islam and qualified as subjects of *dar üil-ahd*, “the land of the covenant” (essentially an extension of *dar üil-Islam*).³⁹

Of course, no community or state can function normally if it considers every outsider not just a potential enemy, but also a real one. For one, there was always the necessity of diplomatic and commercial contact with the outside world, which called for an alternative to *harbi*-status, or at least for the possibility of suspending it temporarily (we will return to this *müstemin*-status later on). More importantly, however, allowance had to be made for the non-Muslim inhabitants of territories that came under Islam, particularly because the rapid expansion of Islamic lands meant that Muslims were almost without exception numerically inferior to the Jews, Christians and Persians whose lands they had conquered. The Islamic legal institution through which the

³⁸ Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (London: Collins, 1972), 20-21. *Histoire structurelle* encompasses “the time of ‘geohistory’ the relation between humans and their environment, ‘a history whose passage is almost imperceptible ... a history of constant repetition, ever-recurring cycles’”; *histoire événementielle* encompasses “the fast-moving time of events and individuals, the subject of traditional narrative history”, Peter Burke, *History and Social Theory* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 151-53.

³⁹ See Halil İnalcık, “Dār al-‘Ahd”, *EI2*, ii: 116a-b. Also see A. Abel, “Dār al-Islām”, *EI2*, ii: 127b-8a; and A. Abel, “Dār al-Harb”, *EI2*, ii: 126a-b.

members of the other revealed, or monotheistic, religions were accorded hospitality and protection in the lands of Islam on condition of their submission, was called *dhimma*, or – in Turkish – *zîmmet*.⁴⁰ Persons to whom *zîmmet* applied, were *zîmmis*.

In the Ottoman context, the legal institution of *zîmmet* is best known through its evolution into the Ottoman administrative institution commonly known as the *millet*-system.⁴¹ The term *millet* had several interrelated meanings in Ottoman Turkish. It indicated “religion”, “confession” or “rite”, “religious community” and “part of a people” or “(sovereign) nation”. However, when speaking about the fully developed *millet*-system of the 19th century, it should be understood as a semi-autonomous and semi-extraterritorial ethno-religious community.⁴² The original and most important *millets* of the Ottoman Empire were the Greek Orthodox, the Armenian and the Jewish, representing the largest non-Muslim communities of the early Ottoman state

Although there existed considerable differences between their internal organizations, the *millets* had similar functions within Ottoman administration. Representing their coreligionists at the Sublime Porte (the Ottoman government) were their religious leaders (the Greek and Armenian patriarchs and the Jewish chief rabbi), nominated by a council of their peers and confirmed by the sultan. Their obvious religious and representational functions aside, these leaders also headed the communities’ legal and administrative affairs; prerogatives that were also delegated to religious subordinates on the local level. This partial autonomy notwithstanding, they remained accountable to the sultan in all affairs, in effect functioning as non-territorial Ottoman delegates. Their most crucial responsibility was that of guaranteeing the payment of tribute to the Ottomans as a sign of their *zîmmi*-communities’ submission to the ruler of Islam, the sultan. Known as *cizye* in Islamic law, Ottoman administration commonly also referred to this yearly poll-tax as *baraç* – the name of a land tax eventually completely converted into *cizye* by the Ottomans and, crucially, the general term for “tribute”.⁴³

The accelerating power and extent of the *millets* would eventually become an important factor in the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire by its European allies and adversaries, but the system’s 19th-century manifestation should not be confused with that of earlier periods. Certainly, the foundations of the Ottoman *millet*-system were laid in the decade after the conquest

⁴⁰ See Cl. Cahen, “Dhimma”, *EI2*, ii: 227a-31a.

⁴¹ See M. O. H. Ursinus, “Millet”, *EI2*, vii: 61b-4a.

⁴² Cf. Kemal H. Karpat, “Millets and Nationality: the Roots of the Incongruity of Nation and State in the Post-Ottoman Era”, in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, vol. 1: *The Central Lands*, eds. Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1982), 142.

⁴³ See *id.*, 150; and Halil İnalçık, “Djizya, ii: Ottoman”, *EI2*, ii: 562b.

of Constantinople, when Mehmed II the Conqueror embedded the three religious leaders in the Ottoman central administration by recognizing them as *millet başs* (ethnarchs); heads and representatives of their communities.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, at that time, and certainly still in the 17th century, the rigid compartmentalization and partial extraterritorialization of society normally associated with the *millet*-system, was still a good century and a half off.

At the time of its inception in the 1450s, the *millet*-system was above all a theoretical legal construct, the actual administrative application of which centered on Istanbul and was not empire-wide. The system provided the framework for a coherent organization and administration of the repopulated capital, but the authority the *millet başs*' exerted over their communities in the rest of the empire was often symbolical. Empire-wide *millet*-uniformity was only approached in internal affairs concerning religion (the *millet başı* as the ecclesiastical head of his religious sect) and internal justice (the *millet başı*'s function of chief justice of his *millet*), and even there not attained. As long as it did not go contrary to the fundamental precepts of *zımmet* and Ottoman law, the actual functioning of local *zımmi*-communities, internally as well as in relation to Ottoman authorities, would be left to local circumstances, peculiarities and wishes.⁴⁵

The process through which the *millet*-system developed from a theoretical legal construct into a more uniform and all-pervasive societal reality – “milletization”, if you like – is complicated and still hotly debated. It involves all aspects of life (religious, social, economic, political and so on) of a number of communities within a vast and changing territorial expanse (the Ottoman Empire) over several centuries – from the taking of Constantinople in 1453 up until its legal dismantlement with the proclamation of the Ottoman Law on Nationality of January 19, 1869) and the abolishment of its last remnants with the Treaty of Lausanne.⁴⁶ In addition, the process also captured the empire's foreign relations and destiny to the degree of becoming its major driver, which makes it all the more complicated to attempt the kind of detached history the subject begs.⁴⁷ One can easily see how difficult it would be to adequately position the 17th century on this scale, let alone to pinpoint the situation in Izmir in 1678.

⁴⁴ See *ibid.*, 238a-42a.

⁴⁵ Cf. Benjamin Braude, “Foundation Myths of the Millet System”, in *Christians and Jews* 1.

⁴⁶ See Sections II (Nationality) and III (Protection of Minorities) of Turkey, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Roumania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, “Treaty of Peace with Turkey Signed at Lausanne”, 24 July 1923. E.g., Roderic H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 262-63; and Karpat, “Millets and Nationality”, 162-67, on the Ottoman Law on Nationality and Naturalization.

⁴⁷ See generally Braude and Lewis, *Christians and Jews*; and, e.g., Davison, *Reform*, 114-35, 262-64 and throughout on the structure and functioning of the *millets* as conduits of foreign intervention.

Still, the wording of Ottoman official documents in referring to *millet*s or their constituent communities can be used as a rough indicator of where the process of milletization stood in the 17th century. Most striking in this respect is that...

*the term millet, in the meaning of 'non-Muslim religious community (in the Ottoman Empire)', was by no means used exclusively or at all consistently before the 19th century. This turns out to be true even in documents where the notion occurs more or less regularly. So far, this regular use can only be demonstrated in some central organisations in the Ottoman Empire, but not in provincial or local administrations, tā'ife, for example, being a frequently used alternative in the latter. Occasionally, millet and tā'ife are found in the same document next to one another with the same meaning, or also in combination ... It rather looks as if the individual religious communities, which, on the local level, had to live under conditions which were varying according to place and time, in the perspective of the central government were seen as parts of religious and juridical communities which, under the leadership of their (ecclesiastical) heads, ideally had an empire-wide dimension.*⁴⁸

The prevalence of the term *taiife* (meaning “a group, party, company of men”) in pre-19th-century Ottoman official documents (including all those from the 17th century reviewed for this study) instead of *millet* is instructive. *Taiife* was not only used to designate what would later be referred to as *millet*s, but also a whole range of other groupings, such as religious denominations and sects, ethnic and professional groups, military units and so on. It was, in fact, remarkably similar to the contemporary, now obsolete, European use of “nation”.⁴⁹

I propose that the slight but significant semantic difference between the two terms and their use over time reflects underlying administrative attitudes. The reflection, to be witnessed in folder upon folder of Ottoman and Euro-

⁴⁸ Ursinus, “Millet”, 63b.

⁴⁹ See, e.g., Istanbul, BBA A.DVN.DVE 22/1 (AH 1091-1278 / AD 1680-1862), command 23: *Berat* (patent) appointing Christoffel Capoen Dutch vice-consul in Kuşadası (Scalanuova), 1-10 Şevval AH [10]91 (between 25 October and 3 November 1680). In this command of modest length we can discern various slightly differing uses of the word: *Nederlanda ve ana tabi olan bazarğan taiifesi* (the Dutch and other merchant communities thereunto belonging; a national and professional group), *Felemenk gemileri bayrağı altında yürüyen tüccar taiifesi* (the merchants shipping merchandise under the Dutch flag; a certain segment of a professional group), *ümema taiifesi* (all Ottoman tax-collectors and superintendents; all professional groups engaged in a certain field), and *Nederlanda taiifesi* (the Dutch nation; a nationality). See also the contemporary dragoman’s dictionary of Franciscus à Mesgnien Meniński, *Thesaurus linguarum Orientalium Turcicae-Arabicae-Persicae: Lexicon Turcico-Arabico-Persicum* (Istanbul: Simurg, 2000), ii: 3080-81 and iii: 4883, where, resp.: “*taiifet, taiife, vulg. taiifa, ... Pars rei, pec. noctis, & turba hominum, populous, quidam. Gol. Gens, comitarus. Ein Haussen / Volck / Leut. Truppa, gente, natione, popolo, brigata, compagnia, seguito, famiglia, seruitù. Trouppe, gens, people, nation, compagnie, suite ...*” and “*millet, ... Lex quam quis sequitur, religio, etiam usit. populus, gens, natio. Glaub / Religion / und Volck / Geschlecht / Nation. Religione, & gente, popolo, nazione. Religion, & people, nation ...*”.

pean official correspondence and records, shows the substitution of *taife* by *millet* (as the preferred designation for Ottoman non-Muslim community in Ottoman and European parlance) to have gone hand-in-hand with those communities' organizational consolidation and politicization under European "protection". Those later beholding the process of milletization in its advanced stages or near-completion most often proved either unable or unwilling to look back to before the 19th century and describe the non-Muslim communities of earlier times as anything other than *millets*, perhaps slumbering; waiting to be kissed awake by Europe. This is not to say that the process of milletization, the shift from inclusion to exclusion, had not also begun to take place earlier on; it just did not materialize as early and suddenly as they maintained.⁵⁰

That being said, the second half of the 17th century did witness the first major European project to acquire the mass-protection of Ottoman Christians – as France's "most Christian Majesty" Louis XIV labored to gain both the loyalty of the empire's Catholics and Ottoman recognition of his partial suzerainty over them.⁵¹ While this attempt to extraterritorialize entire *millets* failed dramatically, the attempt was a sign of things to come, and other attempts would meet with more success in the centuries that followed.⁵²

What contemporary documents in fact show is that Ottoman administration for the time still preferred the use of the imprecise catch-all category *taife* to any other single term that might serve to set the collective in question firmly apart from the larger fiscal or social whole. Although ethno-religious adjectives (Armenian, Jewish, and so on) would precede the term to qualify it further, the implication nevertheless is that to early modern Ottoman admin-

⁵⁰ For further clues as to the timing of "milletization" in Izmir, also see Frangakis-Syrett, *Commerce of Smyrna*, 34-37 and throughout.

⁵¹ As his instructions to his ambassadors to the Ottoman court illustrate, Louis XIV's project – particularly after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 – also involved attempts to bring back to the fold of the Roman Catholic Church, and under French suzerainty, those who had fallen from the Catholic faith (Protestants in particular) or had otherwise broken with Rome (the Eastern churches). In other words, French protection was to be extended to all Ottoman Christians. As French ambassador Denis de La Haye-Vantelet's 1665 instructions read: "le premier soing donc que ledit sieur ambassadeur doit avoir sera de protéger et assister la chrestienté et les catholiques de Levant" and "Après l'article des religieux de Hiérusalem il faut mettre: que tous réligieux de quelque ordre ou nation qu'ils soient, allans et venans en Hiérusalem, Betheléems et autres lieux dans les Estats du Grand Seigneur, seront sous la protection et juridiction particulière de l'ambassadeur de France, qui pourra leur refuser l'entrée et mesme les renvoyer et les faire sortir des Estats de Grand Seigneur toutes les fois que bon luy sembla." Pierre Duparc, *Recueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France depuis les traités de Westphalie jusqu'à la Révolution française*, vol. 29: *Turquie* (Paris: CNRS, 1969), 14 and 38.

⁵² On the project in general and its failure in particular, see *infra*; Albert Vandal, *L'odyssée d'un ambassadeur: les voyages du Marquis de Nointel, 1670-1680* (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1900); and Duparc, *Recueil des instructions* 29.

istrators the empire's minorities were not *hors catégorie* or even of another category than the other kinds of *taifes* under their jurisdiction, at least for purposes of everyday administration.

Of course there existed Ottoman towns and villages where non-Muslims were ostracized economically, socially, legally and politically, but there certainly also existed many places where their otherness was primarily and perhaps even uniquely determined by their nominal liability to *haraç*, i.e. by their fiscal relationship with the state, and even that liability was often suspended if governance so required.⁵³ As Kemal Karpat has argued:

*Consequently, it is extremely difficult to claim that the mere fact of being non-Muslim conferred automatically a dhimmi status upon an individual. It is probably more accurate to claim that it was rather the administrative role of the individual which determined his tax status which, in turn, determined his social status both in Ottoman society and his own millet. ... The implications of this basic principle is vital to understanding the evolution of the millets. It meant that since service to the state, and not religion, was basic in determining the payment of taxes and certain social ranking, changes in the functions of the pri-mates were bound to affect their relations with the government and their status and function in their respective community regardless of religion.*⁵⁴

So, more often than not formal and informal inequalities proved subject to a given individual's value to the state, to his resulting status, and to his ability to leverage those to win more fiscal, economic, social, legal or political concessions and advantages.

If the *millets* of the 17th century were still abstract collections of coreligionist communities that left ample room for individuals and local groups to (re)negotiate their own boundaries with their particular Ottoman contexts, it follows that the conditions in which the members of these communities lived and worked must have varied considerably from place to place. One of the ways in which people's social conditions manifested themselves most clearly to the administration and to foreign observers was through sumptuary spending and behavior, i.e. through choices of consumption, attire, conduct

⁵³ On *haraç*-exemption in general, see Karpat, "Millets and Nationality", 148-52; accord e.g. Ronald C. Jennings, "Zimmis (non-Muslims) in early 17th-century Ottoman judicial records: the sharia court records of Anatolian Kayseri", *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 21/3 (1978), 232-40 for Kayseri; Abraham Marcus, *The Middle East on the Eve of Modernity: Aleppo in the Eighteenth Century* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 41-42 for Aleppo; Antoine Galland, *Le voyage à Smyrne: un manuscrit d'Antoine Galland (1678)* (Paris: Chandeigne, 2000), 123, 136, 140 and 173 for various forms of exemption and mitigation in Izmir (through community and individual lump sum payments and waivers because of special administrative statuses or services rendered); and also *infra* for Izmir.

⁵⁴ Karpat, "Millets and Nationality", 150.

and choices regarding company and venues. Such choices were by no means free in the Ottoman Empire.

Laws restricting consumption and its social and physical settings to people having a particular status, occupation, religion or sex were a regular fixture of pre-modern and early modern societies, and became increasingly prominent throughout the 17th and 18th centuries as state elites attempted to protect social order and the markers of their social status from the encroachments of conspicuously consuming upwardly mobile subject classes, of their own and even of other religions. This desire to demarcate sections of society through restricting consumption was not limited to the ruling classes of the sovereign community however. Minority leaders also often promulgated, enforced and upheld the very same sumptuary or even stricter distinctions to stimulate cohesion and social order within the minority group. Individuals often freely submitted to them because (appearing) to do so afforded them a measure of legal, social and even commercial security and protection. But many at times did not.

Over the course of the 17th and 18th century Ottoman sumptuary laws were endlessly reaffirmed, and with increasing frequency, not merely as a tool for age-old social conservatism but as a focal point of the severe reactionary backlash that gripped the empire in the wake of accelerating territorial losses and economic hardship.⁵⁵ The sheer frequency of their reaffirmation confirms that they were not able to stem the tide of people choosing their own social destinies: court records and travelers' accounts time after time bear witness to sumptuary behavior that was clearly transgressive, as they do to local administrative and public acceptance thereof.

The most remarkable accepted transgressions against sumptuary laws occurred in Ottoman centers of international commerce. There, ethnoreligiously diverse populations engaged in economic pursuits in which they were highly dependent on one another for success, and where such success made available the capital required for conspicuous consumption, while in the process also holding up sumptuary examples from other communities to emulate. Thus, Muslims *and* non-Muslims were officiously permitted to ride horses (in Kayseri, Aleppo and Izmir); to dress as Turks, share the same public baths and city quarters, and own, lease and let the same commercial and private real estate (in Aleppo and Izmir); and even to wear arms, drink alcohol and mingle with other sexes and faiths in taverns and theatres (Izmir).

⁵⁵ See also Dror Ze'evi, *Producing Desire: Changing Sexual Discourse in the Ottoman Middle East, 1500-1900* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 87 and throughout for the impact of religious reaction on sexual discourse and the resulting readjustment of acceptable norms of sumptuary behavior.

Such flexibility was probably common in many other Ottoman jurisdictions and administrative spheres (although certainly not in all) and was not limited to sumptuary practice. In Izmir and Kayseri, for example, the testimony of non-Muslims was regularly accepted in cases against Muslims.⁵⁶ Similar cases of local consensus flying in the face of the Ottoman socio-legal order abound. As a matter of fact – and this is something to ponder when considering the separation of communities that is supposed to have been of structural importance to early modern and modern Ottoman social order – there existed no Ottoman law against the regular joining of people of varying ethnicities or faiths in the workplace and in the all-important associations governing it.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Jennings, “Zimmis (non-Muslims)”, 250-76 on Kayseri; *infra* on Izmir – I will not go into more detail here since the justice and injustice to which Ottoman non-Muslims were submitted figure prominently in all contemporary and modern descriptions and analyses of Ottoman state and society, and the discussion is therefore too unwieldy to treat in detail on these pages (although my position will become very clear *infra*). Even among modern scholars views on the topic still vary widely depending on the beholder’s religious, ethnic, national, political and ideological background and his or her preferred sources. Compare, for instance, the revisionist positive (or, I would suggest, fact-based) arguments with regard to the institution of *dhimma/zimmet* put forward in Braude and Lewis, *Christians and Jews*, to the classically alarmist (ideologically motivated) reinterpretation of Karl Binswanger, *Untersuchungen zum Status der Nichtmuslime im Osmanischen Reich des 16. Jahrhunderts: mit einer Neudefinition des Begriffes “Dhimma”* (München: R. Trofenik, 1977), whose convictions and analyses appear to have made a comeback since the rise of Balkan nationalisms, Samuel Huntington’s *Clash of Civilizations* and 9/11.

⁵⁷ See, e.g., Ulinka Rublack, *Dressing Up: Cultural Identity in Renaissance Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), throughout, on sumptuary law in general. See Shirine Hamadeh, “Public spaces and the garden culture of Istanbul in the eighteenth century”, in *The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire*, eds. Virginia H. Aksan and Daniel Goffman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 277-312; Daniel Goffman, *The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 9; and Suraiya Faroqhi, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It* (London: Tauris, 2006), 157 on sumptuary law in the Ottoman Empire. See Jacob R. Marcus, *The Jew in the Medieval World: A Source Book, 315-1791* (Cincinnati: The Sinai Press, 1938), 219-23 on sumptuary law in Jewish communities throughout Europe. See Cornelis de Bruyn, *Reizen door de vermaardste delen van Klein Asia ...* (Delft: Hendrik van Kroonevelt, 1698), 34-36, 131-33, 140-41 and 153-55 on prevailing manners of dress in Izmir, on the generally benign treatment of Izmir’s non-Muslims, and on the (correspondingly lax) enforcement of transgressions against dress codes. And see Marcus, *Middle East on the Eve of Modernity*, 41-42 and 98-99; Maurits H. van den Boogert, *The capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System: Qadis, Consuls, and Beraths in the 18th Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 141-42; Edhem Eldem, Daniel Goffman, and Bruce Alan Masters, *The Ottoman City Between East and West: Aleppo, Izmir, and Istanbul* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 58-59 on somewhat more combative Aleppan attitudes. On mixed quarters, the use and ownership of property, and mixed professions and guilds, see, e.g., Jennings, “Zimmis (non-Muslims)”, 276-86 for Kayseri; Marcus, *Middle East on the Eve of Modernity*, 157-62 and 315-22 for Aleppo; Robert Mantran, “Foreign Merchants and the Minorities in Istanbul during the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries”, in *Christians and Jews* 1, throughout; and Goffman, *Ottoman Empire*, 90-91 for Istanbul; and *infra* on Izmir.

Looking at what has been handed down to us about concrete sumptuary behaviors – or, in other words, about the public behavior of specific members of specific *taifes* in specific places at specific times – it seems safe to conclude that there existed an Ottoman scale of permissibility in which centers of international commerce left the rest of the empire far behind. Considering the apparent and logical correlation between successful ethno-religious economic interdependence and social tolerance, we might conclude that Ottoman laws concerning non-Muslims and their *millet*s constituted an ideal that was never meant to be attained. Ottoman economic and social success in fact depended on it. To return to Karpat:

*Thus, while the basic millet was universal and anational, the small community had distinctive local, ethnic and linguistic peculiarities. The millet system therefore produced, simultaneously, religious universality and local parochialism. The balance between religious universalism and ethnic-cultural localism could be maintained as long as the economic and social organization remained intact, social mobility was low and the central government remained strong enough to maintain the status quo.*⁵⁸

The observation that uniform legal and administrative principles, when confronted with reality on the ground, generated (and, indeed, might have been meant to generate) widely divergent outcomes clearly has profound implications for the paradigm of the Islamic city. As the following will show, the history of our booming port city of Izmir defies and undermines such categorizations. Considering the city's long history as a frontier crossing point and most successful international trade center, it is far more likely that the city's Muslims and non-Muslims consistently shared more than they divided. If Izmir's long pre-Ottoman history tells us anything it is that strict separations between populations were highly impractical in this specific geographic-economic setting and could never be sustained for long. The city's history as a frontier, combined with the history of its meteoric rise in early modern times, seems to preclude the contract between Muslim, non-Muslim and the state being non-negotiable.

But before discussing 17th-century Izmir's Ottoman and European communities and their interaction any further to test this hypothesis, a last word should be said here about the composition of these two categories and about the spatial relation between them. The part of the city that will here be called "Ottoman" comprised all communities that were internal to the Ottoman legal system, that is; Turks, Arabs, Persians, Greeks, Jews and Armenians. They cannot properly be called subject-communities (*reaya*) since in Ottoman terminology that would exclude the tax-free soldiery and clergy, but they

⁵⁸ Karpat, "Millets and Nationality", 147.

were *reaya*-communities insofar as the majority of their members had *reaya*-status.

On the other hand, the part of the city we will call “European” comprises the communities that the Ottoman legal system considered foreign, notwithstanding the fact that many members of these communities spent their entire lives in the Ottoman Empire. Naturally, this includes the French, English and Dutch, but also – less obviously – the Venetians and Genoese. Although the history of these communities went back at least as far as that of the city’s Turkish element, they never ceased being considered subjects of their city-states and remained protected foreigners.⁵⁹

It is of course misleading to speak about a European Izmir; after the city was definitively conquered by the Ottomans there remained only an Ottoman city. Nevertheless, Izmir’s European quarter might be regarded as a prolonged and condensed version of the Byzantine-Genoese city that had once retreated to the protection of the guns of the Genoese and Knights Hospitallers’ harbor castle. The designation “European Izmir”, then, refers to historical character, not to actual status.

Family Multipliers

Accurate demographical data are not available for the bulk of Ottoman territories prior to the first modern Ottoman censuses of the 19th century. This has posed considerable problems for socio-economic historiography, but these have been partially overcome by the creative use of Ottoman tax registers (*tahrir defters*). Unfortunately, the inventory of the *tapu tahrir*-series (abbreviated as TT) in the Ottoman archives lists few such registers for the 17th century. Izmir, for example, has only one, from AH 1105 (AD 1693/94), the other three dating from AH 929, 935 and 983 (AD 1522/23, 1528/29 and 1575/76 respectively).⁶⁰

The near-absence of post-16th-century material in the series has led many to conclude that the Ottoman administrative practice of regularly surveying a certain area (at least every thirty to forty years, but more often depending on the intensity of that area’s demographical change) was abandoned at the close of the 16th century.⁶¹ In addition, it has been suggested that the majori-

⁵⁹ This “foreign” status was confirmed in the capitulations granted to these communities by the Ottoman sultans, which, in this respect as in many others, continued Byzantine law and practice (see, e.g., the fragment of the Genoese capitulation of 1304 in Dölger, *Regesten* 4, 41-42).

⁶⁰ Istanbul, BBA TT 842 (AH 1105 / AD 1693/94); Istanbul, BBA TT 166 (AH 929 / AD 1522/53); Istanbul, BBA TT 148 (AD 935 / AH 1528/59); and Istanbul, BBA TT 537 (AH 983 / AD 1575/76).

⁶¹ “Our study, however, does not deal with the sixteenth but with the seventeenth century, during which the situation was entirely different. Periodic, detailed population surveys were no longer compiled, and the surviving sources are scanty and of inferior quality”, Haim Gerber, *Economy and Society in an Ottoman City: Bursa, 1600-1700* (Jerusalem: The Hebrew

ty of the few registers that were compiled, were lost for posterity because Ottoman bureaucrats “had forgotten how to file”.⁶² It is undeniably true that the regularity and frequency with which *tabrihs* were conducted diminished overall and that the resulting registers are for the most part not to be found in the most appropriate archival series (the TT). Nonetheless, other, less likely, archival series reveal traces of a number of quite extensive surveys not listed in the TT-inventory.⁶³

One wonders, could our archival predicament be only partially due to Ottoman institutional failure or upheavals, such as the loss of considerable archives before Vienna in 1683, or the abrupt reorganizations and policy shifts that would typically follow other such dynastic or executive reversals?

University, 1988), 5. Accord. “It is of interest to provide some discussion of the types of sources available for the study of Ottoman demography in the seventeenth century. The period is considered a dark age. The preceding century was characterized by a great profusion of tax and population surveys conducted by the Ottoman empire in its provinces. ... In any event, the great tax and population surveys come abruptly to an end at the end of the sixteenth century, for a reason that still eludes us”, *id.*, “Anthropology and Family History: The Ottoman and Turkish Families”, *Journal of Family History*, 14/4 (1989), 410.

⁶² J.C. Hurewitz, “Ottoman Diplomacy and the European State System”, *Middle East Journal*, 15/2 (1961), 148: “The correspondence reaching the Sublime Porte was assiduously collected; but the archivists – unlike their predecessors of the sixteenth century – had forgotten how to file, so that it became impossible to keep track of commitments, negotiations and intelligence.” This cursory statement by a great scholar of Ottoman diplomacies and history has proven influential. Not only was it reproduced in Turkey by *Belleten*, 5/97-100 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1961) and very recently in a prominent international handbook on diplomatic history Christer Jönsson, *Diplomacy* (London: Sage, 2004), 2: 311, this conjectural line of thought echoes through in most modern scholarly contributions on the topic of Ottoman administrative breakdown and innovation. But compare, generally, with the narrative of the history of Ottoman bureaucratic specialization and professionalization in Carter Vaughn Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); *id.*, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); and with Faroqhi’s careful qualifying statements as reproduced in note 63.

⁶³ Cf. Suraiya Faroqhi, who has repeatedly toned down categorical claims that 17th-century surveys are virtually non-existent: “Tax registers were no longer compiled in coherent series after the reign of Murâd III. [r. AH 982-1003 (AD 1574-1595)]. However, individual registers were occasionally prepared both in the 11th/17th and 12th/18th centuries, and a whole group of Anatolian *tabrihs* survives from the 1040s/1630s”, Suraiya Faroqhi, “Tahrîr”, *EIJ*, x: 112b); “With the increase of tax-farming at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the expensive and labour-consuming compilation of *tabrir* registers was largely dropped ... Occasionally, registers of taxpayers were compiled for one district or another even in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries ... But comprehensive information on large regions was no longer available”, Suraiya Faroqhi, *Approaching Ottoman History: An Introduction to the Sources* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 92-93. Discussing this problem for Izmir, she notes that “After the tax register of 1575-6, no further count of the Izmir taxpayers survives and thus the population of the city can only be estimated. However a number of surveys was executed about 1070/1659-60, the results of which have as yet been located only as fragments”, Suraiya Faroqhi, *Towns and Townsmen of Ottoman Anatolia: Trade, Crafts, and Food Production in an Urban Setting, 1520-1650* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 116.

Might it not also be a consequence of our own limited understanding of such events and how Ottoman administration worked to absorb them without being completely derailed? When documents you would normally expect in such and such an archive, series or folder are not to be found there that does of course not mean they do not exist. Historical circumstances might just have conspired to disperse and hide them from view. Whether we fully understand its particulars or not, there was always some bureaucratic logic at work. In the case of the drying up of centrally compiled and kept tax registers of entire provinces, for instance, it is clear that the fast-growing farming of taxes made centrally kept registers obsolete (after all, it would be the tax farmer's task to administer and collect). But that is not to say that the information that used to be contained in central registers was no longer collected – it was just not centrally collected and uniformly presented anymore.

Most interesting as a source for miscellaneous registers are the *Maliye'den müdevver defterler* (abbreviated as MAD): a series of up to 26,000 miscellaneous Ottoman financial *defters* covering a period of five centuries (1427-1927) that was transferred from the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Turkey to the Ottoman Section of the Prime Ministerial Archives in 1945. The four MAD-inventories for the years 1625-1700 consulted for this study – among account-books for practically every conceivable Ottoman fiscal unit and financial institution – list a great many non-continuous *defters* that offer a reworking or summarizing (*icmal*) of the data of recent surveys (*tabrîr-i cedid*) to aid in the collection of specific taxes from individuals and particular communities.⁶⁴ Several of these contain rare and otherwise unobtainable data, such as a *defter-i cizye-i gebran* covering the years AH 1070-1072 (AD 1660-1662), which not only counts, but also lists, creed by creed, the names of all Izmir's non-Muslim inhabitants liable to *cizye*, as gathered during a *tabrîr* newly conducted by Vizier İsmail Paşa.⁶⁵

Apart from truly miscellaneous documents like this, the MAD-inventories also yield a number of large near-continuous series of such *icmal defters*. Two of these are of particular interest to us and will be returned to: the first is a series of around a hundred *cizye-i gebran defters* from AH 1087 (AD 1676/77) based on a new *tabrîr* of *Cezâyir-i Babr-ı Sefid* conducted by one Mustafa; the second a series of a few hundred *cizye-i gebran defters* from AH 1099 (AD

⁶⁴ Istanbul, BBA Katalog 124 (AH 1035-65 / AD 1625-55); Istanbul, BBA Katalog 125 (AH 1064-87 / AD 1653-77); Istanbul, BBA Katalog 126 (AH 1087-1101 / AD 1676-90); Istanbul, BBA Katalog 127 (AH 1101-11 / AD 1689-1700).

⁶⁵ Istanbul, BBA MAD 14672 (AH 1070-72 / AD 1660-62): a detailed survey of the non-Muslim population of Kuşadası, Manisa and Izmir. This particular *defter* is an exception in that it lists not only added totals, but also all individuals and, thus, should not properly be considered an *icmal*. We will return to the results of the survey *infra*.

1687/88) based on a new *tahrir* of Anatolia.⁶⁶ Beyond the specific information these documents contain, they are also useful in demonstrating that the once well-oiled Ottoman survey machinery did not suddenly grind to a near halt at the turn of the 16th century. On the contrary, they show that the demographical explosion that took place in Izmir in the second half of the 17th century was recorded in at least three surveys (shortly prior to AH 1070, 1087 and 1099; AD 1659/60, 1676/77 and 1687/88); an image that is mirrored in the documents on Istanbul, with surveys shortly prior to AH 1067, 1084 and 1100 (AD 1656/57, 1673/74 and 1688/89).

These surveys inevitably coincide with key developments in Ottoman (political) history, respectively: the end of the “Time of Troubles” and the restoration of order under grand vizier Köprülü Mehmed Paşa (1656-1661); his successor and son Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s territorial restoration, his preparations for the endowment of key parts of his territorial and political inheritance, and his gradual succession by his adopted brother Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa (1675-1676); and, lastly, Ottoman losses following the latter’s failure to take Vienna (1683), culminating in the loss of Hungary in the Battle of Mohacs (1687) and in sultan Mehmed IV’s deposition after a reign of 39 years (1687). If anything, such “coincidences” demonstrate that surveys could by the mid and late 17th century still be significant instruments of statecraft, at least if those managing the empire’s affairs were interested in, and capable of, serving the empire’s longer-term interests in tandem with their own.

Even though surveys were still intermittently conducted in the 17th century and bits of their contents are still available through the MAD archival series, the problem remains that these sources are not contiguous and most often abridged. This is to say they are not really fit for use as base material and should be treated with great caution in drawing comparisons. This shortage of the modern historian’s favorite socio-economic sources is one of the reasons that Ottomanist scholarship has largely shunned the age. Unchallenged by hard quantifiable data divulging contrary trends and turning points, it seems to have regarded the age as a rather uninteresting stage between the oft-studied 16th and 18th centuries. Unjustly so, for the remarkable transition from that “classical” to that “early modern” Ottoman age of course took place in the century between the two.

⁶⁶ Istanbul, BBA MAD 15157 (AH 1087 / AD 1676/77): a survey of the poll-tax payable by the non-Muslim population of Patmos (BBA Kat. 125/5096). In the inventory, this *defter* (no. 5096) is immediately followed by the rest in the series (nos. 5907-); and Istanbul, BBA MAD 14888 (AH 11 Rebi’ I 1099 / AD 15 January 1688): a summary survey of the poll-tax payable by the non-Muslim population of Izmir and environs (BBA Kat. 126/6746). The rest of the series spans the entire inventory, but particularly nos. 6707-6804 and 6808-6865.

The work of Haim Gerber – especially his studies on the court records of the city of Bursa – constitutes one of the most notable exceptions to the lack of interest in the 17th century. Out of frustration with the continuing absence of statistical data and with the resultant projection of figures from earlier and later periods on this “dark age”, he has sought ways to put the court records to innovative uses.⁶⁷ One of these is to identify social and demographical indicators, equivalent to those that would normally be extracted from Ottoman tax and population registers, so that court records might be used in cases where *tabrirs* are not available, or as a supplement to them. Regrettably, not only comprehensive *tabrirs* are lacking for Izmir after the 16th century; repeated earthquakes and fires have also destroyed its court records. Although it is therefore impossible to replicate Gerber’s research for Izmir, his most important findings might still be put to good use – even in our case.

The most basic demographic indicator is population size, but even for times and places where complete *tabrirs* are still available, coming up with a reliable figure is not easy. The problem is that Ottoman tax registers – depending on the particular taxes they were meant to assess – list either tax units (one or multiple households per unit) or taxpaying subjects. In some cases the tax-exempt were also listed (though almost never exhaustively) and in others they were omitted entirely. Despite the fact that the names and/or numbers of tax-exempt male adults (soldiers, clergymen, foreign protégés and those engaged in various state-controlled professions such as mining and the guarding of roads and bridges) can often be retraced in various other registers, this invariably leaves one without any indication of the number of women, underage children and sometimes even non-productive males. To overcome this obstacle, a means is needed to translate the number of taxpaying male adults or households in the surveys into a number representing the larger population taxed through a smaller slice of individuals representing it. If a more or less stable ratio between the two, or, in other words an average household or family size, could be identified, such a fixed multiplier would make coming up with a reliable number for a near-total population a relatively straightforward task. “Near-total”, since tax-exempt and foreign households would never be included, as aren’t slaves – a sizeable and silenced slice of the population of every Ottoman city that is all too often forgotten.

When the Ottoman *tabrirs* were opened up in the late 1930s, an average family size of “five plus” (married men times five, plus the number of single men) was considered reasonable for the Ottoman territories, but coefficients of six and upwards were also used.⁶⁸ More than anything else, such figures

⁶⁷ See Gerber, “Anthropology and Family History”, 410 and throughout.

⁶⁸ The figure five – in fact the first one applied to *tabrir*-data – was proposed by Barkan. He added (and this has often been forgotten) that it was something of an educated guess not fit to be applied to units significantly smaller than the total Ottoman population), Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “Essai sur les données statistiques des registres de recensement dans l’Empire

reflect now outdated anthropological notions about the great incidence of “extended family patterns” throughout the Middle East, as well as a once universal belief in the unchangeability of Islamic society. Numbers drawn from one geographical area and time were regularly and unscrupulously applied to subjects hundreds of miles and years removed. But since Fernand Braudel alerted scholarship to the exceptional population increase of the 16th century (in 1949 and – to a wider, non-Francophone audience – in 1972), it has become increasingly clear that coefficients that high have little validity beyond that century, certainly in Western and Northern Anatolia.⁶⁹ Comparison with the age pyramids of other historical populations (by calculating the approximate percentage of adult males in the population and taking that to represent the percentage of taxpayers registered in *tabrirs*) have suggested that further downward adjustment to a minimum of three and a maximum of four are called for. Currently, even the high multipliers used for the 16th century are under discussion, since that century’s dramatic increase in taxpayers is considered too high to be entirely attributed to increased fertility and decreased infant mortality. A doubling of the population within a century, without revolutionary nutritional and medical advances, is unlikely. If increased state control (the registration and settling of nomads) and immigration (particularly of Jews from Europe and Armenians from Persia) are taken into account, the conclusion must be that a considerable part of the increase in taxpaying population is not attributable to natural growth. This in turn means that a considerable part of that growth was not the result of increased family size and should not be factored into a higher multiplier.⁷⁰

If the well-documented 16th century still poses such problems, where does that leave us with the 17th century, let alone 17th-century Izmir? What kind of multiplier should be applied to the fragments of tax surveys at our disposal and how do the results measure up to travelers’ estimates? Although comparison with similar historical populations might be useful in arriving at relatively reliable estimates for large segments of the Ottoman population, it is very risky business applying those to a local population for which little social evidence is at hand: the smaller the taxpaying population to which an extraneous multiplier is applied, the larger the risk that the impact of excep-

Ottoman aux XVe et XVIe siècles”, *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 1/1 (1957), 21.

⁶⁹ See generally Fernand Braudel, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II* (Paris: Colin, 1949). Braudel revised and augmented his work specifically for international publication, which first led to a revised and augmented French edition: *id.*, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II* (Paris: Colin, 1966). The translation of this second French edition became the first English-language edition: *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*. The most fundamental revisions were made to include the results of Barkan’s work on the Ottoman *tabrir defters*.

⁷⁰ Cf. Faroqhi, *Approaching Ottoman History*, 88-92.

tional local circumstances – such as social and economic trends, or the ethnic background of population segments – on average family size is underestimated.

Gerber's (abovementioned) article may offer a way out of this dilemma. On the basis of 2,300 estate inventories from the 17th century in the court records of Bursa (and some further corroborating evidence), he has concluded that not large "extended" families, but small "nuclear" families were the norm, even in the rural areas surrounding the city. He arrives at "an average family size of 3.65 in the city of Bursa and 4.9 in its rural environs – well below what we find in the modern Middle East or in other civilizations."⁷¹ After offering some explanations for these unexpectedly low averages (a high mortality rate due to bubonic plague, the in fact common experience of sons leaving their fathers' family to establish their own, the abundance of free land in the Ottoman Empire), Gerber proceeds to the pivotal question: "how geographically dispersed was the pattern we have discovered in Bursa?"⁷² A tentative answer to this question is gathered from data available on the ownership and size of houses in 16th-century Istanbul, which appears to mirror the Bursa-pattern of small nuclear families. Gerber concludes that the typical family form must, by implication, have been nuclear in "the central areas of the Ottoman Empire prior to the 19th century".⁷³ In support of this generalization, he argues that the conditions of security and rule-of-law – which were most strongly felt in the heart of the empire (i.e. in the geographical or temporal vicinity of its capital, like Edirne, Bursa, or Izmir) – are generally known to have a tempering effect on family size: "such regions had fewer

⁷¹ Gerber, "Anthropology and Family History", 413. Gerber himself had still advocated a multiplier of five shortly before the appearance of this article: compare with Gerber, *Economy and Society*, 9. Coefficients of 7 and 8 are, nevertheless, still considered reasonable for the Arab-Ottoman lands: Marcus, *Middle East on the Eve of Modernity*, 341. It is interesting to note that the difference between early modern average family size in the Ottoman central lands (Anatolia, the Balkans and the Aegean) and the Ottoman Arab lands (current Syria and further to the South) has parallels in our time: the current average Saudi family size is about 7 on average, but reaches "twenty in the eastern regions where the oil industry and affluent families are concentrated". The Saudi "total fertility rate was 7.3, compared to the Middle East average of 5.7 and the average of 1.8 in the world's high-income countries in 1990", Mohamad Riad el-Ghonemy, *Affluence and poverty in the Middle East* (London: Routledge, 1998), 143. By comparison, Turkey has a much lower total fertility rate of 2.5-2.6 and an average family size of around 4: *Family Planning: World Fertility Rates 1973 to 1997* (20 June 2009), by Rotarian Fellowship for Population Development, <http://www.rifpd.org/Resources/FamilyPlanning.shtml> (accessed 12 October 2011); V. M. Zlidar, R. Gardner, S. O. Rutstein, L. Morris, H. Goldberg, and K. Johnson, "New Survey Findings: The Reproductive Revolution Continues" (Spring 2003), *Population Reports*, <http://www.k4health.org/pr/m17/index.shtml> (accessed 12 October 2011); Thomas M. McDevitt, "World Population Profile: 1998" (February 1999), *U.S. Bureau of the Census*, <http://www.census.gov/population/international/files/wp98.pdf> (accessed 12 October 2011), A-40.

⁷² Gerber, "Anthropology and Family History", 416.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 417.

security problems than outlying areas and may also have possessed other traits – such as urban society and an active government – supporting family nuclearization.”⁷⁴

Size and Composition of the Taxpaying Population in 1657/58

The applicability of the Bursa-pattern to all Ottoman central lands prior to the 19th century (fortunately) need not concern us here. For our purposes, it is sufficient to consider whether and how Gerber’s multipliers can be applied to 17th-century Izmir. Although there is too little demographic data available to arrive at a firm base estimate, some indications of the size of Izmir’s population can be gathered from travelers’ accounts. At least six 17th-century travelers have left estimates; five of these are European and one is Ottoman. Four more European accounts, running up to 1739, may serve as additional context (see Table 1).

TABLE 1: TRAVELERS’ ESTIMATES OF IZMIR’S POPULATION (1631-1739)

	Turks	Greeks	Armenians	Jews	Europeans	Given total
Tavernier (1631)	≈60 p.	≈15 p.	≈8 p.	6-7 p.	very few	90 p.
Evliya (1657/58-1671)	-	-	-	-	-	10.3 f.
Spon (1675)	>30 p.	9-10 p.	-	12-15 p.	-	55 p.
De Bruyn (1678)	majority	<Turks	<Greeks	<Greeks	fewest	≤80 p.
Galland (1678)	15-16 f.	0.8 f.	0.13 f.	0.15 f.	217 p.	-
French consular report on earthquake (1688)						15-16 p.
De la Motraye (1699)	-	-	-	-	-	24 p.
Tournefort (1702)	15 p.	10 p.	0.2 p.	1.8 p.	0.2 p.	27.2 p.
Lucas (1714)	100 p.	20 p.	8 p.	-	-	128 p.
Tollot (1731)	≈50 p.	≈12 p.	≈7 p.	6-7 p.	few	78 p.
Pockocke (1739)	84 p.	7-8 p.	2 p.	5-6 p.	-	≤100 p.
(p. = persons * 1,000; f. = families * 1,000)						

Based on Iconomos, *Étude sur Smyrne*, 138-39; Evliya, *Seyahatname* 9, 93; Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 105-27; Ülker, *Rise of Izmir*, 41-42.

Without a doubt, the most interesting of these sources is Evliya Çelebi. A teller of tall tales, particularly about the world beyond Ottoman borders, his

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 419. Some further support for Gerber’s extrapolating interpretation is provided by Jennings, “Zimmis (non-Muslims)”, 226. Jennings, who has studied the 17th-century Ottoman court records of Kayseri – a South-Central Anatolian city with a population approaching that of Bursa at the end of the 16th century – extensively, uses a coefficient of 3 to 3.5 for the taxpaying adult male population to arrive at an estimated total population of this heartland city. Incidentally, the average Istanbul household (or *hane*), although slightly larger than during the previous centuries, was still relatively small and nuclear at the turn of the 19th century with 3.90 persons per household in 1885 and 4.21 in 1907: Alan Duben, “Understanding Muslim Households and Families in Late Ottoman Istanbul”, *Journal of Family History*, 15/1 (1990), 72-73.

Seyahatname (*Book of Travels*) nevertheless contains a wealth of information on Ottoman social history. The most revealing part of his description of Izmir, runs as follows:

Some two thousand of the city's houses [hanes] cling to the skirts of the upper castle. They lie among airy vineyards, mansions [sarays] with gardens, and mosques. Most of the public buildings [imaristans], however, lie on the plain below and along the seashore. In the year 1068 [AD 1657/58] Ismail Paşa compiled a register of this city, according to which this city altogether counts ten Muslim quarters, ten limited to non-Muslims, ten Frankish and Jewish quarters, two Armenian quarters and one Gypsy quarter. These said quarters [mahalles] altogether contain ten thousand and three hundred richly adorned, perfect, flourishing and embellished brick buildings [kargir binas]. The mansions [sarays] are exquisite and the other houses [hanes] are beautiful. With its red tiled roofs and tulip beds it is an exemplary city, and conspicuously flourishing.⁷⁵

Evliya then goes on to list, and occasionally describe, 310 places of worship (mosques and prayer houses; *camis* and *mescids*), 40 seminars (*medreses*), 11 bathhouses (*hamams*), 600 baths in private houses, 82 inns (*hans* and *kervansaray*s), 3 Koran schools (*dar ül-kurans*), 40 primary schools (*mekteb-i sıbyans*), 1 soup kitchen (*imaret*), 70 fountains (*çeşmes*; which were, he stresses, too few for a city this size), 17 fountains founded as charitable endowments (*sebilhanes*), 3,060 shops (*dükkan*s; being the number from which the market inspector collected taxes), 'exactly' 300 merchant warehouses (*mahzæn*s), 40 coffeehouses (*kahvehanes*), 70 soap factories (*sabunhanes*), 200 wine shops and taverns (*meyhanes*), 20 *boza* breweries (*bozahanes*), 20 dye-houses (*boyahanes*), 1 saddle and leather market (*saraçhane*), 1 candle factory (*sem'hane*) and 1 customs shed (*gümriükhane*).⁷⁶

The information offered in the *Seyahatname* has been taken at face value too often. Yet, Daniel Goffman's assesment that the account of Izmir is "brazenly hyperbolic" and will entice "historians into grave miscomprehensions about the size and influence of the town" to my mind squanders too much of what little, and therefore valuable, evidence we have.⁷⁷ There is no harm in being suspicious of Evliya's enthusiastic tone or the numbers he gives. However, if they explicitly refer to census evidence, they merit more

⁷⁵ *Bu şehrin iki bin mikdari haneleri yukarı kal'a bayırlarına yapılmıştır Havadar bağ ve bahçeli saraylar ve camiler vaki olmuştur Amma imaristanının çoğu aşağı düzde ve lebi deryada vaki olmuştur Sene 1068 tarihinde Ismail Paşa bu şehri tabir ettiği sicillâta masturdur Ol minvali meşruh üzere bu şehir cümle on müsliman mahallesi ve on kefere sınırı ve on Firenk ve Yahudi mahallesi ve iki Ermeni mahallesi ve bir Kıbtı mahallesi vardır Ve bu mezâkir mahalleler cümle on bin üçyüz mükellef ve mükemmel ve mamur ve müzeyyen kârgir bina sarayı ra'nalar ve sayır haneî zibalar ile kırmızı kiremitle lâlazar misal bir şehri ruşen âbâddır; Evliya, *Seyahatname* 9, 92-93. Accord Eldem et al., *Ottoman City*, 79; and Nuran Tezcan, *Manisa nach Evliya Çelebi: aus dem neunten Band des Seyahat-nâme* (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 46-47.*

⁷⁶ Evliya, *Seyahatname* 9, 93 and 96. Accord Tezcan, *Manisa nach Evliya Çelebi*, 46-47.

⁷⁷ Eldem et al., *Ottoman City*, 79.

careful consideration. In giving the number of 2,000 homes (or *hanes*), for upper Izmir and 10,300 buildings (or *binas*) for the entire city, Evliya explicitly refers to his source: a *tahrir* compiled by one İsmail Paşa a decade and a half earlier. Far from being invention, this survey actually existed, as is evidenced by the derived register mentioned earlier.⁷⁸ Naturally, numbers given in *tahrirs* are open to interpretation, but when it is certain that the one Evliya refers to indeed existed, we at least have an estimate firmly rooted in administrative reality.

Still, the narrative poses serious problems. These have to do mainly with the text's terminology and the time-lag between İsmail Paşa's survey and Evliya's description. We may wonder what is meant exactly by *hanes* and *binas*, and whether there is a possibility that Evliya tinkered with the terminology of his source to better fit what he witnessed in 1671 – a good decade later; a considerable timespan in the life of a boomtown. So, what can we do to arrive at a feasible estimate for Izmir's population in 1657/58?

For our purposes, the central passage in the text is “These said quarters [*mahalles*] altogether contain ten thousand and three hundred richly adorned, perfect, flourishing and embellished brick buildings [*kargir binas*]. The mansions [*sarays*] are exquisite and the other houses [*hanes*] are beautiful.” The passage is not entirely clear on whether the number refers to the total number of buildings, which Evliya will have us believe were all brick (which we know for certain they were not from countless travelers' testimonies to the contrary), or to the number of brick buildings with an unspecified ratio to wooden structures. One might also wonder about the combined structures (brick ground floor and wooden stories) so typical in the region. It is also uncertain whether his “brick buildings” include private residences, public buildings, or both. In any case, the proud assertion that Izmir was a grand town is not so much conveyed by the number from the *tahrir* (“ten thousand and three hundred”) as by the traveler's definition of it (“richly adorned, perfect, flourishing and embellished brick buildings”).

Considering how Evliya's European contemporaries regularly described the structure and state of Izmir's residential quarters, we should assume that

⁷⁸ Istanbul, BBA MAD 14672 (AH 1070-72 / AD 1660-62). The full entry in BBA Kat. 125 runs: *No: 4722; Tarih: 1070-1072; Defter No: 14672; Sahife: 24; Cizye-i gebran defteri: Vezir İsmail Paşa tarafından Kuşadası, Manisa, İzmir ve Urla'da icra edilen cizye-i gebran tahrir-i cedidine aid müfredatle tahrir olub 945 hane ziyadesi olmakla bu suretle mahallinde hüç olunub suret verilmek üzere arz olunduğunu ve 1071 tarihinde icali beyan edildiği bakında meşrûhat mevcuttur.* The main header of the *defter*'s section dealing with Izmir (pages 11-16) reads as follows: *kaza-ı İzmir ber-müceb-i defter-i tahrir-i cedid-i vezir İsmail Paşa* (“the *kaza* of Izmir according to the new[ly conducted] survey by vizier İsmail Paşa”). The sub-headers list Izmir's non-Muslim communities, or nations, each followed by the names and total numbers of that nation's men found liable to *cizye*: *Cemaat-ı Ermeniyân* (the Armenian nation, 61 names, page 11); *Cemaat-ı Rumîyan* (the Greek nation, 301 names, pages 11-14); *Cemaat-ı Yahudîyan* (the Jewish nation, 271 names, pages 14-16). Finally, the dateline (page 20) is AH 1070 (AD 1659/60).

his enthusiasm here got the better of him. For instance, Antoine Galland, an exceptionally open-minded and thorough witness to Izmir's situation, writes:

Hormis celle [maisons] des Francs et quelque khans, il y en a un grand nombre qui ne sont bâties que de maisons de terre, ou de boue seulement desséchée, et pour avoir plus tôt fait, les maçons ont une caisse sans dessus et sans fond, longue d'environ trois pieds et de largeur de la muraille qu'ils veulent faire, qu'ils remplissent de mortier et qu'ils ôtent ensuite d'abord qu'ils est un peu séché. ... Après les maisons des Francs qui sont, comme je l'ai déjà remarqué, assez commodes et logeables, il n'y en a pas plus d'une vingtaine dans toute la ville qui soient considérables: toutes les autres ne sont que de bois et de planches, ou de terre et de boue. Il n'y a de longues rues que celle du quartier des Francs, celles des Arméniens, deux au bazar qui sont plus larges que les deux premières. Pour les autres, outre qu'elles sont étroites, elles sont encore entrecoupées, tortues et sans ordre, de telle manière que la ville d'aujourd'hui est autant différente de l'ancienne qu'une chose laide et vilaine l'est d'avec une belle et bien proportionnée.⁷⁹

There is no matching this observation with Evliya's, not even if European disparagement (at which Galland is not easily caught) would be allowed for as much as Ottoman pride. To make sense of this dissension, it would help to think about what *tabris*s typically counted, namely families (represented by their adult males), tax/distribution units (consisting of one or several families per unit), or – less likely – dwellings. Since all of these were called *hanes* in Ottoman administrative parlance (a problem to which we will return below), it is very likely that Evliya, in speaking of 10,300 brick buildings (including exquisite mansions and beautiful houses), was actually paraphrasing the 10,300 *hanes* of the *tabris*.⁸⁰

Having thus arrived at a possible number of *hanes* for mid-17th-century Izmir, we should consider further the applicability of Gerber's multiplier. As mentioned earlier, the smaller the taxpaying population to which an extraneous multiplier is applied, the larger the risk that the calculated average family size is inaccurate due to differing local circumstances. Fortunately, mid-17th-century Izmir fits Gerber's main requirement: like Bursa, it lay at the center of the empire both in distance and in traveling time.

Distance from the center aside, there are other noticeable similarities between these two specific cities that limit the margin for errors. These have to do with both cities being commercial centers: Bursa that of the "old" international trade in fine silk, Izmir that of the rapidly expanding "new" international trade in bulky foodstuffs and coarser fabrics. Because of their interna-

⁷⁹ Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 107-8, 110-11).

⁸⁰ This interpretation appears to be corroborated by Nuran Tezcan's critical edition of the *Seyahatname*'s section on Manisa (which uses three codices, viz. Bağdat Köşkü 306, Topkapı Sarayı Kütüphanesi and Beşir Ağa 452 and Pertev Paşa 462, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi). In a summary of the section on Izmir, we read that "In allen Stadtvierteln befinden sich 10.300 *hané*": Tezcan, *Manisa nach Evliya Çelebi*, 46 (emphasis added).

tional transit function and lack of quarantine arrangements, both cities were regularly and severely plague-ridden. Due to their secure location close to the political center and their economic function and opportunities, both were characterized by relatively open and non-traditional societies stimulating nuclear family patterns. Furthermore, Izmir as well as Bursa had a sizeable population of bachelors and male passers-through that populated the cities' many inns and bars; a contingent reinforced by the presence of considerable garrisons in the cities' direct vicinity to protect the rich depots that these cities were.⁸¹ Such functional similarities all suggest that Gerber's multiplier is suitable for estimating the total population of Izmir on the basis of the fiscal data cited by Evliya.

There is, however, one major relevant dissimilarity between the cities; Izmir's population of *zimmis* (Ottoman non-Muslims) was relatively larger and predominantly Greek, while Bursa's was more modest in size and mostly Jewish.⁸² The question then arises whether differences in the population's ethnical composition would not also have consequences for the city's average family size. To be short, it is unlikely that it does. On the basis of a Venetian census of 1700 and an additional Venetian document from 1702/11, Malcolm Wagstaff has recently calculated an average family size for the Peloponnesus of 3.6 in urban communities and 4.17 in rural communities, arguing that this should be considered the standard for most of 18th-century Southern Europe and at least parts of the Ottoman Empire.⁸³ When this Greek average family size is compared to Gerber's averages of 3.65 and 4.9 respectively, it emerges that demographical trends in Ottoman cities at the heart of the empire applied across cultures and mostly developed in conformity with broader urban demographical trends.⁸⁴ Apparently, the oft-cited

⁸¹ Although neither city hosted large numbers of soldiers within its walls, many were stationed nearby: in Izmir in the castle guarding the entrance to the harbor (Sancak(burnu) Kalesi, see Appendix 1, plates 2 and 4 and in Bursa in nearby villages and towns. See Gerber, *Economy and Society*, 9-10.

⁸² See Suraiya Faroqhi et al., *An economic and social history of the Ottoman Empire*, vol 2: 1600-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 517-19. Accord George Wheler, *Voyage de Dalmatie, de Grèce et du Levant* (Amsterdam: Wolters, 1689), 185: 40,000 Turks and 12,000 Jews in Bursa in 1675, but little to no Greeks and Armenians.

⁸³ Malcolm Wagstaff, "Family Size in the Peloponnesus (Southern Greece) in 1700", *Journal of Family History*, 26/3 (2001).

⁸⁴ Fully in line with the considerable similarity between the coefficients of Gerber for Bursa (mainly Turkish population), Jennings for Kayseri (large Armenian population) and Wagstaff for the Peloponnesus (Greek population), neither Barkan's discussion of the Ottoman empire's overall population, nor Jennings' or Gerber's urban studies (see *supra* and the bibliography), have proposed diverging average family sizes for the various ethno-religious communities within their sample populations. When moving from the local crosscultural to the international, it is striking to see how little average family size even varied across much of Southern and North-western Europe's towns and cities. The average for the Dutch towns of Gouda (in 1622) and Leiden (in 1581), for example, was 3.9 and 3.4 respectively: E. K. Grootes, "Het

impact of “Islamic traditionalism” was limited to provinces at the empire’s periphery and to rural areas at the heart of the empire (where it still only generated a difference of 0.73) and was not of much consequence for the demography of urban centers such as Izmir.

If an average family size of 3.65 for 17th-century Izmir is accepted, that figure can subsequently be used to calculate the city’s total population from Evliya’s rendition of İsmail Paşa’s *tabrir* (of AH 1068; AD 1657/58). Depending on what the number 10,300 is taken to represent – the number of taxpayers (most likely in a *tabrir*), the number of dwellings (closest to Evliya’s text), or the number of tax units (increasingly common in 17th-century *tabrirs*) – the calculation will result in a minimum, a middle and a maximum figure, respectively. The minimum is calculated as the number of taxpayers times average family size: $10,300 \cdot 3.65 = 37,595$; say 37,500.

The (middle) calculation, involving the number of dwellings, however, has one more variable that needs fixing. Since more than one family generally occupy one dwelling, an average ratio between dwellings and families must first be identified. In the industrial and post-industrial ages, the ever-increasing number of stories and floor-areas of public housing blocks, apartment complexes, high-rises and skyscrapers, particularly in cities, has resulted in significantly higher numbers of families per dwelling than ever in human history. One might even wonder whether the designation “dwelling”, although common in urban planning, is really still compatible with the modern cityscape. In any case, that of the early modern age was typically that of a small number of towering stone government, religious and, sometimes, commercial structures bathing in a sea of one to three-storied wooden or mud-brick houses. This is not only how Izmir was time and again described by European residents and visitors, but also cities as diverse as London, Amsterdam, Paris, Istanbul and Alexandria. It was, to be short, the typical appearance of the 17th-century city.

This similarity in building types and build-up across many Ottoman and other cities is reflected in the average number of families per dwelling; a figure that roughly ranges from 1.1 to 1.4 for most pre-18th-century cities, averaging at a conservative 1.25.⁸⁵ As this is an average for private dwellings

jeugdig publiek van de “nieuwe liedboeken” in het eerste kwart van de zeventiende eeuw”, in: *Het woord aan de lezer: zeven literatuurhistorische verkenningen*, eds. W. van den Berg and J. Stouten (Groningen: Wolters Noordhoff, 1987), 81.

⁸⁵ The figures were obtained from Daniel Pasciuti, “A Measurement Error Model for Estimating the Population Sizes of Preindustrial Cities” (25 November 2002), *Urbanization and Empire Formation Project, Institute for Research on World-Systems, University of California*, <http://irows.ucr.edu/research/citemp/estcit/modpop/modcitpop.htm> (accessed 13 October 2011). Pasciuti in turn relies heavily on Richard Alston, *The City in Roman and Byzantine Egypt*

and it therefore does not take into account Izmir's dozens of *hans* (inns where multiple families at once lived and traded) and its one *kervansaray* (caravansary; a great inn), the average for this particular case should be slightly higher. If these altogether numbered an estimated 50 in the 1650s and on average housed 15 families instead of the 1.25 of private dwellings, another $((15 - 1.25) \cdot 3.65 \cdot 50 =)$ 2,509.375 individuals have to be added to the calculation.⁸⁶ The result, then, is the number of dwellings times the average number of families per dwelling times average family size, plus the (additional) inhabitants of *hans*: $(10,300 \cdot 1.25 \cdot 3.65 = 46,993.75) + 2,509.375 = 49,503.125$; say 50,000.


In the (maximum) calculation involving the number of tax units, the number of families per dwelling is substituted with the average number of families per unit. As briefly touched on above, the Ottoman tax unit poses several problems for the historian. The first problem is with its designation; *hane* – a homonym for “house”, “household”, or “family” also used for taxation purposes and as such very difficult to distinguish from it when used without further qualification. The second problem is with its size. The size of one unit depended on the total sum that the administration wanted raised, as well as on the relative wealth and size of the taxed households and of those around them. The *hane* as a variable tax unit was used for the levying of *avarız*-taxes. These taxes were originally collected on an *ad hoc* basis to gather funds for specific purposes like military campaigns (hence its name, *avarız*, from the Arabic root ‘*arid*, meaning “incidental”) but became increasingly frequent, until they were just another tool in the eternal battle to balance

(New York: Routledge, 2002) and Roger Finlay, *Population and Metropolis: The Demography of London, 1580-1650* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

⁸⁶ On the number of *hans* and *kervansarays* in 1670s-Izmir, and on their occupancy, compare Evliya, *Seyahatname* 9, 96; Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 104-10 and 144 ; Ülker, *Rise of Izmir*, 327; and M. Münir Aktepe, “İzmir hanları ve çarşıları hakkında ön bilgi”, *İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi*, 25 (1971). Although the numbers of *camis*, *mesçids*, *medreses*, *hamams*, *hans*, *kervansaray*s, *dar ül-kur'an*s, *mekteb-ı sıbyans*, *imarets*, *çeşmes*, *sebilhanes*, *dükkans*, *mahzems*, *kaşvehanes*, *sabunhanes*, *meyhanes*, *bozabanes*, *boyabanes*, *saraçhane*, *şem'hanes* and *gümriükhanes* given by Evliya under reference to his sources in local administration (*kadı*, *voyyoda*, *mubtesib*, etc.) are largely supported by Galland, as well as by other, documentary and archaeological, evidence (see, for instance, the other articles by Aktepe in the bibliography), they do concern the 1670s and not the 1650s. For lack of accurate information on the number of *hans* in that decade, it could be presumed that the number of *hans* rose in correlation with the number of taxpaying households (as established *infra*). Such an estimated increase of $((10,300 \cdot 100) / 16,580 =)$ 62.12% over this 20-year period, ending in a number of 81, would give a number of $((81 \cdot 100) / 162.12 =)$ 50 *hans* for the 1650s. The estimates for the number of *hans* and the average number of families per *han* are admittedly rather loose, but because of the consistently great numerical superiority of the inhabitants of private dwellings over those of *hans*, even changing these variables will not significantly alter the rounded outcome of the final calculation (i.e. the rounded total of the number of inhabitants of private dwellings plus those of *hans*); the result will always fluctuate slightly short of 50,000.

provincial budgets. They were collected from units known as *avarızhanes*, with every *avarızhane* contributing an equal share of the total amount that was to be collected. Since each *hane* consisted of several households that contributed in proportion to their resources, both the height of the tax per household and the number of households per *hane* varied.⁸⁷ There are not many who have ventured to publish figures for these variables, but Gerber has put forward the following averages for Bursa: 2.2 around 1640/41; 2.9 in the 1670s; and 8.6 in 1696 (see Table 2). If we continue to presume that the demography and social indicators of Bursa and Izmir were broadly comparable in the 17th century and that the number of households per *hane* increased in a steady, almost exponential fashion, we would arrive at a figure of approximately 2.5 for the number of *hanes* in Izmir around 1655; a couple of years before İsmail Paşa's *tabrir*. The total taxpaying population would then be the number of tax units times the average number of households per unit times average family size: $10,300 \cdot 2.5 \cdot 3.65 = 93,987.5$; say 100,000.

TABLE 2: AVERAGE NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS PER AVARIZ-HANE (1640-1700)



Based on Gerber, *Economy and Society*, 8.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ H. Bowen, "Awārid", *EI2*, i: 759b-61a.

⁸⁸ Accord the very careful review of the *avarız*-problem in Nenad Močanin, *Town and Country on the Middle Danube, 1526-1690* (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 215-19. Also see Gábor Ágoston, *Guns for the Sultan: Military Power and the Weapons Industry in the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 119; Dina Rizk Khoury, *State and Provincial Society in the*

Of these three estimates of Izmir's residential population in 1657/58 – 37,500, 50,000 and 100,000, omitting the tax-exempt and of course a considerable number of non-residents – the last one can be discarded immediately. A taxpaying population of 100,000 at that time would have made Izmir one of the larger cities of the empire and even of Europe. It would have put it in the league of absolute centers of international maritime trade like Aleppo or Amsterdam (with a population of approximately 100,000 and 150,000 respectively) and far ahead of major textile producing centers like Bursa or Leiden (estimated at about 40,000 and 65,000 respectively).⁸⁹

Although Izmir had been growing continuously since the middle of the 16th century and most foreign consulates and merchants had abandoned Chios for it in the 1620s, the boom was only just starting and it would take a good hundred years more for Izmir to fully swallow up the trade of Chios and Aleppo, and for Izmir's population to pass the six-figure-mark.⁹⁰ The two remaining possible estimates (37,500 and 50,000) lie closer together due to the near-convergence of houses and households in the early modern period; and although the evidence certainly inclines towards İsmail Paşa's *tabrir* having listed families instead of dwellings, there can be little objection to reconciling figures that similar while weighing them in proportion to their likelihood.⁹¹ With an estimated 40,000 taxpaying inhabitants (that is, taxpay-

Ottoman Empire: Mosul, 1540-1834 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 49-50n14; and Bogaç A. Ergene, "Awārīd", *EI2*: "Awārīd were determined by the number of 'awārīd households ('awārīd khānes) in a specific district. The relationship of these tax units to real households varied over time and space. In the early tenth/sixteenth century, one 'awārīd household was equivalent to one real household (Demirci). In later periods, one 'awārīd khāne might have equaled from three to as many as fifteen real households, depending on the relative prosperity of the district."

⁸⁹ Compare Gerber, *Economy and Society*, 12; Jonathan I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness and Fall, 1477-1806* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 621; and Marcus, *Middle East on the Eve of Modernity*, 338.

⁹⁰ See Mübahat S. Kütükoğlu, *XV ve XVI. asırlarda İzmir kazasının sosyal ve iktisâdî yapısı* (Izmir: İzmir Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür Yayını, 2000), 24-33; Goffman, *Izmir and the Levantine World*, 61-64; and Frangakis-Syrett, *Commerce of Smyrna*, 46.

⁹¹ The evidence being; firstly, what is known about 17th-century *tabrires* in general (i.e. that they are most likely to list either households or *avarızhanes*); secondly, that in the case of this particular *tabrir* the latter possibility can safely be discarded (since it would imply an unrealistically inflated population of around 100,000) and; thirdly and most importantly, that the *defter-i cizye-i gebran* (Istanbul, BBA MAD 14672 (AH 1070-72 / AD 1660-62)) that was based on the *tabrir* by İsmail Paşa in AH 1068 (AD 1657/58), does in fact list the names of non-Muslim heads of households (and their sons aged 14 and above) instead of *avarızhanes*. The interpretation of Evliya's figure of 10,300 as being the number of (taxpaying) families in 1657/8, is further supported by comparison with the figures available for 1678. These 20 years witnessed a 62.12% increase in the city's taxpaying families, with taxpaying non-Muslim families (those of *zimmis* found liable to *cizye*) making up 6.15 % of the total population in 1657/58 and 6.51% in 1678. These figures will be discussed in more detail *infra*, but it is safe to say they correspond to the non-statistical data available for the period.

ers and their families) in the 1650s and an increasing pull on international maritime trade, Izmir already rivaled Bursa and was beginning to seriously threaten the dominance of Aleppo.⁹²

Together, the *cizye defter* and Evliya's *Seyahatname* also provide us some insight into the ethno-religious composition of Izmir's population as it was recorded by İsmail Paşa in the middle of the 17th century (see Table 3).

TABLE 3: COMPOSITION OF THE TAXPAYING POPULATION OF IZMIR (1657/58)

	Families	% of total
Total (T)	10,300	100.00
Greek (G)	301	2.92
Armenian (A)	61	0.59
Jewish (J)	271	2.63
Zimmi (Z=G+A+J)	633	6.15
Muslim (M=T-Z)	9,667	93.85

Based on Evliya, *Seyahatname* 9, 93; and Istanbul, BBA MAD 14672 (AH 1070-72 / AD 1660-62).

Size and Composition of the Taxpaying Population in 1678

As previously discussed, the only full *tabrirs* available for Izmir are of AH 929, 935, 983 and 1105 (AD 1522/23, 1528/29, 1575/76 and 1693/94). Had the city's growth been without spectacular interruptions from the 1570s to the 1690s, these last two *tabrirs* and the information in Table 3 might have been combined to create a population curve spanning most of the 17th century. Positioning the 1670s on such a curve would have made it possible to infer a rough estimate for population size during that decade. Unfortunately, a spectacular interruption did take place on 10 July 1688 in the form of an earthquake of truly apocalyptic proportions which leveled three quarters of the city's houses, torched half the city and left an estimated 15-16,000 dead, forcing many survivors to abandon its ruins.⁹³ Although the city did recover from the blow and was already firmly back on its feet as the undisputed center of Levantine trade by the beginning of the 18th century, the extent of the population's destruction and subsequent reconstruction ensures that the 1693/94-survey has no bearing on the pre-earthquake situation – even if the

⁹² Klaus Kreiser also shortly mentions an estimated 40,000 taxpayers in Izmir around 1650: Klaus Kreiser, *Der osmanische Staat, 1300-1922* (München: R. Oldenbourg, 2001), 10.

⁹³ Iconomos, *Étude sur Smyrne*, 128-31.

estimated number of dead is accurate.

Since we do have at our disposal a small number of post-1670 registers on military, customs, minorities' and foreigners' affairs (see the bibliography) the lack of Ottoman administrative sources on 17th-century Izmir is not absolute. But it is deplorable nevertheless, since for all they can tell us about the daily goings-on of Izmir's international trade or the details of *vizye*-collection, these sources offer no quantifiable data on the city's general, or even overall minority, population. Again, information has to be pried from a combination of travelers' testimonies and the odd complementary *defter*; its relevance more inferred from our knowledge of general trends and data from earlier and later periods, than from the actual figures themselves. A glance at Table 1 will quickly reveal how hazardous it is to overly rely on travelers' accounts: their estimates are far too incongruous to reconcile. Among them, however, there is one that stands out: An toine Galland. In giving numbers of families instead of four to five-figure totals for the number of Turks, Greeks, Jews and Armenians or the overall population as his fellow European travelers did, this specific visitor reveals an interesting indebtedness to Ottoman sources.

It was not at all unusual for European travelers to rely on local residents for their general descriptions (and often even for the narration of specific events which they would then claim to have witnessed themselves), but their information was typically gathered from a relatively small and fixed group of informants that was readily accessible to them from within the safe and comfortable confines of Izmir's European quarter, from which many did not want or dare venture too far. These informants typically included European clergy, consuls and merchants, as well as their European and indigenous staff of chaplains, treasurers, secretaries, scribes; and guards, warehousemen, brokers and dragomans (translators, interpreters, advisors and spokesmen all-in-one). The latter group of mostly Greek and Jewish locals naturally dominated among the Ottoman informants, as they were just that by profession and were best equipped to bridge the language gap towards the most often non-Turkish and non-Arabic speaking European visitor.

An added difficulty with such indirect accounts is that both the travelers writing them down and their sources of course had their own private and professional agendas. More often than not these led to considerable distortions. One can easily imagine, for instance, how seductive it was for Ottoman Muslims, non-Muslims and Europeans to inflate the size of their community, for merchants to overstate the importance of their commerce, or for consuls to dwell excessively on the difficulties they had to overcome in the course of their duties. At the same time, any publishing travel-writer – being the early-modern equivalent of a modern best-selling fiction author – knew full well what sold back home and picked his informants' brains for anecdotes that stressed the foreign and Oriental beauty of the Ottoman city and world or that exemplified the proverbial cruelty and avidity of “the Turk”. In

short, most accounts deal in a series of constantly reiterated and often literally copied commonplaces that essentially reflect not much more than the supply and demand of popular literary culture and crosscultural exchange. It is, therefore, no coincidence that the most interesting and informative European first-hand accounts of the 17th-century Ottoman Empire have been left by men who were equipped to go beyond the usual informants; men well-versed in the Turkish, Arabic, Persian and modern Greek languages and with good Ottoman connections that at times even provided them with documents from their private libraries and the archives of the Ottoman administration.⁹⁴ If such men – like Galland – also happened to be adventurous and inquisitive scholars, their accounts are all the more original and valuable for it.

Best known for his, the first European, edition of *Les mille et une nuits* (Paris, 1704-1708) and for his studies on the faith of the Greeks (conducted in French ambassador De Nointel's service from 1670 to assist in the envisaged French protection of Ottoman Christianity), Antoine Galland (b. 1646-d. 1715) might easily be misconceived as a hostile Orientalist. Yet, his work lacks the slightest resemblance to crusading efforts like Michel Febvre's *Théâtre de la Turquie*.⁹⁵ Most interesting for our purposes are his *Journal* (1672-1673) – the daily entries of which testify to his adventurous, open-minded and scholarly nature, as well as to his superb Ottoman connections – and his only very recently published *Voyage à Smyrne* (1678) – an unparalleled and highly detailed inventory of the city of Izmir in all its aspects, which he wrote for Parisian bookseller Barbin in the period between De Nointel's decline and eventual disgrace and his own appointment as Louis XIV's antiquary in the Levant in 1679.⁹⁶

In his *Voyage à Smyrne*, Galland provides us with a whole range of descriptions, measurements and statistics concerning Izmir's geography, topography and demography. He describes the city as a loosely shaped scalene whose sides he textually positions (see Map 2).

According to Galland, his scalene has a perimeter of 7200 geometrical paces (a geometrical pace being 5 feet, or 1.524 meters) and contains 2,000 to 3,000 dwellings (including 81 *bans*, or inns) housing 800 Greek, 130 Armenian, 150 Jewish and 15,000 to 16,000 Turkish families in 13 quarters (*mahalles*).⁹⁷ These statistics reflect Galland's penchant for objective verification – they constitute the main variables still used today in historical demog-

⁹⁴ Paul Rycaut and Dudley North immediately come to mind. For further reference, see generally Sonia P. Anderson, *An English Consul in Turkey: Paul Rycaut at Smyrna, 1667-1678* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).


⁹⁵ Michel Febvre, *Théâtre de la Turquie* (Paris: Edme Couterot, 1682).

⁹⁶ Antoine Galland, *Journal d'Antoine Galland pendant son séjour à Constantinople (1672-1673)* (Paris: E. Leroux, 1881); and Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 103-5 ("Situation géographique"), 104-10 ("Description topographique").

raphy (built-up urban area, number of dwellings, number of families) and appear to have been gathered through personal observation in the field, as well as through the use of informants and Ottoman tax registers. Particularly the fact that he lists the number of families in conjunction with the number of quarters (and further along, their ethno-religious composition), points to tax data either directly or indirectly gathered from local Ottoman administrators. In this respect, Galland's approach resembles Evliya's, although, considering the former's scholarly aptitude and objectives, it is probably more reliable.


MAP 2: TRIANGULAR OUTLINE OF IZMIR IN 1678



Based on Map 1 and Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 104-7.

If the demographic information provided by Galland indeed stemmed from tax registers, it follows that the numbers given concern the taxpaying population and not the population proper (see Table 4).

TABLE 4: COMPOSITION OF THE TAXPAYING POPULATION OF IZMIR (1678)



Based on Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 107.

As before, the total taxpaying population is calculated by multiplying the number of families by average family size: $16,580 \cdot 3.65 = 60,517$; say 60,000.

Jewish Protection and Lump Sum Taxation

However plausible Galland's figures may be, it should be kept in mind that it is impossible to compare or verify them. This is particularly problematic since there is some internal and external evidence that might be considered conflicting. Externally, there is a *cizye-i gebran defter* for Izmir, dated 15 January 1688, which gives alternative numbers of Greeks, Armenians and Jews.⁹⁸ Internally, further along in his description of Izmir's population, Galland gives some widely diverging numbers of Jews.

It is tempting to think that the 1688-*cizye defter* must have been an ante-dated construct, meant to provide the Ottoman administration insight into the state of its tax base in the wake of the earthquake. It simply seems too big a coincidence for a population survey of Izmir to be abstracted by an Istanbul clerk while a few months later the very subjects and holdings it listed were being wiped out by a natural catastrophe. An exceptionally cruel twist of fate without a doubt, but it occurred nonetheless, for not only does the *defter* explicitly refer to a previously conducted survey, the existence of this pre-earthquake survey is further attested to by the MAD-series holding an extensive series of *cizye defters* from 1688 derived entirely from the same full *tabrir* of Anatolia.⁹⁹

The after all authentic *cizye defter* from 15 January 1688 lists the numbers of Greek, Armenian and Jewish taxpayers in Izmir and a number of other towns and cities in its vicinity (see the copy of the *defter* in Appendix 1, Plate 10). In the case of the Greeks and Armenians it states that the numbers were

⁹⁸ Istanbul, BBA MAD 14888 (AH 11 Rebi' I 1099 / AD 15 January 1688).

⁹⁹ See note 66.

taken from an older or previous survey (*tabrir-i atik*), while the numbers of Jews were obtained from a new or recent survey (*tabrir-i cedid*). Sure enough, the numbers for Izmir taken from the *tabrir-i atik* match those of our *cizye defter* taken from İsmail Paşa's *tabrir* of 1657/58 (301 Greeks and 61 Armenians; see Table 3). The registered number of Jewish taxpayers of Izmir, meanwhile, dropped significantly from 271 in 1657/58 to 219 at the beginning of 1688. The drop implied in Galland's breakdown of Izmir's population is even higher than that recorded in the survey: from 271 in 1657/58 to 150 in 1678.

It is peculiar that these two sources speak of a drop in the number of Jewish taxpayers while all contemporary western observers stress that community's growth – it certainly does not correspond to other historical evidence for the city's pull on European and Ottoman Jewry (particularly from Portugal, Chios and Salonica). In a way, the results of a *tabrir* are incontestable: if a certain number of households was deemed taxable, than that was the number of taxpayers as far as the Ottoman administration was concerned and the amount for which they were assessed was usually collected, if not from those surveyed (because of obsolete survey data), then from their families, communities or landlords. What should be questioned, however, is the degree to which changes in the number of recorded taxpayers accurately reflected demographical reality, just as we should wonder whether European visitors cooped up in “Frank Street” (and this does not include Galland, who did in fact venture further out) were able and willing to interrogate their informants critically. Both these issues are succinctly illustrated by a passage from Galland's *Voyage*.

After his treatment of Izmir's “situation géographique” and his “description topographique” (which include the previously discussed statistical data), Galland proceeds with the city's population, community by community: first the “Franks” – the French, English, Dutch, Venetian and Genoese nations and the few Florentines, Siennese and Livornese; then the indigenous communities – the Greek, Armenian, Jewish, Arab and Turkish *taifes*. As much as Ottoman administrative sources shine through in the rest of Galland's account, so obvious is his exclusive use of European and *zimmi*-informants throughout these passages. The organization and functioning of the Jewish community, for instance, is discussed in such expertly detail that the information must have originated from a well-informed (i.e. high status) insider. Concerning the Jews' liability to the poll-tax (*cizye*; here, *haraç*), for instance, he tells us the following:

Pour exiger le droit qu'ils sont obligés de payer au Grand Seigneur pour le carache, ils ont un député de chaque synagogue, qui se change de six mois en six mois, avec chacun un adjoint pour les secourir lorsqu'ils en ont besoin. Mais ces adjoints ne sont changés qu'à la fin de l'année, n'ayant point tant à travailler que les premiers. Ce droit est de 12000 à 15000 piastres, parmi lesquelles il faut comprendre ce qui est nécessaire pour les frais communs de

*la communauté. De 1500 familles qu'il y a parmi eux, il n'y en a que 500 qui contribuent, chacune suivant leurs richesses. Les plus accommodés payent 10 écus sur chaque 3000, et les autres en diminuant jusqu'à un écu seulement. Mais il y en a deux, Joseph et Moseb Algranate qui, à raison de ce qu'ils sont riches, paient 100 écus chacun; ce qui leur revient quelquefois à 500 écus par an.*¹⁰⁰

How, then, do these 1,500 families, with only 500 of them reportedly paying taxes, relate to the 150 families previously reported by Galland? And how can the drop from 271 to 219 recorded in the 1657/58 and 1688-*tabrirs* be explained? And finally, how do the two classes of information fit the same reality?

It remains conjecture, but it seems there are two possible answers to the first question. One is that Galland (for reasons to be explored further on) was unable to obtain reliable Ottoman data on the number of Jewish taxpayers and neatly reduced the number of 1,500 to 150 to illustrate how few families actually paid *cizye*. This, however, would mean he was well aware of these contradicting passages in his work and if that was the case one would have expected him to correct or at least explain the difference in the editing process. A more probable answer is that Galland felt no need to reconcile the diverging figures since he received them as such. As mentioned before, the way the figures are presented suggests they originated from different sources; the first (150 families) from Ottoman administration and the second (1,500 families, of which 500 taxpaying) from Jewish informants – most likely from the same Josef and Moshe Algranate he refers to, not coincidentally the European nations' main trading partners.

Since the 1688-*tabrir* explicitly refers to the last previous survey (*tabrir-i atîk*) and since the figures taken over from that survey are those of the 1657/58-*tabrir*, this confirms that no surveys were conducted during the intervening thirty years. Of course, comprehensive surveys coordinated from the capital were not the only administrative devices available to Izmir's administration; the local *kadi* (magistrate, notary public and tax collector all-in-one) and tax farmers and their various deputies depended on their own, locally compiled or updated, registers in the exercise of their daily duties. Such sources were typically also consulted by well-connected travelers. Just as Evliya, by his own admission, used information provided by (among others) the local market inspector (*muhtesib*), so Galland will have relied on information provided by Ottoman officials deeply involved in Izmir's European affairs, like the *voynoda*, who was responsible for the collection of taxes that had not been farmed out and for issues of public order related to those taxes.

¹⁰⁰ Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 140.

The second question is relatively easy to answer. In itself, a drop in the number of Jewish families assessed for *cişye* from 271 in 1657/58 to 219 shortly before the 1688-earthquake, can be attributed almost entirely to protection by Izmir's European nations. During this interval the city became the absolute center of Ottoman-European maritime trade and its close-knit and well-organized Jewish community managed to (temporarily) capture an effective monopoly on commerce-related positions from the previously dominant Greeks.¹⁰¹ As bankers, dragomans, brokers and wholesalers for the Europeans, a considerable number acquired the protection that European consuls were allowed to extend their native personnel under the Ottoman capitulations.¹⁰²

This protection, originally intended to safeguard the confidentiality of Ottoman subjects in European diplomatic service, had several fiscal and legal advantages. One of these was their own, their families' and their servants' exemption from *cişye*, thus excluding them from any registered totals of *cişye*-payers. The three largest nations (the French, English and Dutch) had over the years acquired an increasing number of dragomans; each held an average three over the last quarter of the century. In addition to these "actual" dragomans, whose importance to their employers most often also lay in the fact that they were members of prominent families doing business with the Europeans, the consuls of these nations appointed a number of "nominal" dragomans and vice-consuls. The purpose of appointing such nominal deputies, or *protégés*, was to patronize even more local business elite by requesting the sultan to recognize their appointments and provide them with the necessary documents. These diplomas (or *berats*) confirmed the protégé in his position and affirmed his right to protection under his employer's capitulations.

A conservative estimate of the average number of nominal deputies nominally employed by the consuls of Izmir's three largest European nations would be five.¹⁰³ If we make the informed guess that an average three of those will have been Jews, and if a combined estimated average of three servants and adult sons per appointee is included, the resulting minimum number of Jewish families freed from *cişye* through European – or, really,

¹⁰¹ See Goffman, *Izmir and the Levantine World*, 87-92. Accord Eldem et al., *Ottoman City*, 97-102; Daniel Goffman, "Jews in Early Modern Ottoman Commerce", in: *Jews, Turks, Ottomans: A Shared History, Fifteenth Through the Twentieth Century*, ed. Avigdor Levy (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2002), 32-34; and Ruderman, *Early Modern Jewry*, 29 and 58.

¹⁰² İnalçik, "İmtiyāzāt", 1187a.

¹⁰³ Cf. Ülker, *Rise of Izmir*, 216 and 246n65; The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684: Dagboek van Daniël-Jan de Hochepeid, secretaris van de resident in Turkije, gehouden tijdens zijn reizen van en naar Turkije en van zijn verblijf in Smirna en Constantinopel, met afschriften van stukken betreffende het Nederlandse gezantschap in Turkije (1677-1680); The Hague, NA 1.02.20 1088; The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6912; The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913; e.g..

indirect Ottoman – protection would be (3 nations • (3 actual dragomans + 3 nominal appointees) • 3 servants and sons =) 54 against a drop of 52 Jewish taxpaying families recorded in the *tahrirs*.

Even if we take into account the considerations above, it still eludes us how the information provided by Galland and that of the Ottoman registers both fit the same historical reality of a flourishing Jewish community. The remaining discrepancy has two causes; one on the European side and another on the Ottoman.

Firstly, European travelers to 1670s-Izmir, as mentioned earlier, could not help but notice the predominance of the Jewish community. Their frequent assertions that it was up to half the size of the Turkish population should perhaps be attributed to its visibility and to the pride of their Jewish informants, but certainly also to their compatriots' annoyance at being at the mercy of this community:

The commerce of the Frank merchants is entirely directed by the Jews, for which purpose each merchant house has its own Jewish brokers (normally 3 to 4 per house) who repartition their brokerage fees amongst each other. To this nation of deceivers the merchants commonly defer, and must trust it with their affairs.

Daniël-Jan de Hoche pied (1678)¹⁰⁴

Ils ne vivent la plupart que de ce qu'ils gagnent en servant de sensal ou courtier aux marchands francs qui ont chacun le leur, ne pouvant presque rien faire sans leur secours. Ils gagnent plus ou moins suivant les achats de marchandises que font leurs marchands, lesquels leur donnent un tant pour cent. Les Anglais et les Hollandois ont plus de confiance en eux que nos marchands, en ce qu'ils leur donnent connaissance de toutes leurs affaires et qu'ils leur confient la clef de leur caisse.

Antoine Galland (1678)¹⁰⁵

When a fresh merchant, or factor, comes to Constantinople, the first Jew, that catches a word of him, marks him for his own, as becoming his peculiar property, and calls him his merchant; and so he must be as long as he stays. And, from this time, no other Jew will interpose to deprive him of his purchase, but as soon rob an house as do it. And thus, by compact or custom among themselves, this sacred rule of right is established. On the other side, the merchant can no more shake off his Jew than his skin. He sticks like a bur, and, whether well used or ill used, will be at every turn in with him; and no remedy. Somewhat the rogue will get out of him in spite of his teeth., and commonly (besides pay) just so much more as he is trusted with: and the merchant cannot be without a Jew, nor change that he hath. The only expedient is to make the best of him, and never trust him upon honour. It is not a little convenience that is had by these appropriated Jews; for they serve in the quality of universal brokers, as well for small as great things. Their trade is running up and

¹⁰⁴ The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 39a (my translation).

¹⁰⁵ Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 142.

down, and through the city, like so many of Job's devils, perpetually busking after one thing or other, according as they are employed. If the merchant wants any thing, be it never so inconsiderable, let him tell his Jew of it, and, if it be above ground, he will find it. This is accounted a common advantage; for there are multitudes of people, that have need of each other, and want means to come together; which office the Jews perform admirably.

Dudley North (1670s)¹⁰⁶

Not only was this a mid-sized minority community wielding a disproportionate amount of economic power, the fact that it was Jewish in particular will also not have alleviated the European nations' frustration at a time so rife with religiously and politically inspired anti-Semitism. Although the passages quoted above are relatively mild, it was not at all uncommon for 17th-century European – or, for that matter, Ottoman – travelers to use pejoratives in referring to Jews, although we should add that many did not. Galland and Tournefort, for instance, wrote with barely concealed admiration about Jewish communal organization and solidarity, and many travel accounts stick to more or less neutral observations about the community's size and institutions.¹⁰⁷

In much commercial and diplomatic correspondence, however, Jews tend to figure as untrustworthy business partners and dragomans – more often than not easy scapegoats for failings and complications not their own. The full extent to which European anti-Semitism could go can be gleaned from the correspondence of Dutch consul Van Dam (see Appendix 2, document 9). The consul had been at odds with his nation's Jewish brokers and their community over his nation's outstanding debts and his taxing their nation's goods at a discriminating tariff. Upon witnessing the Jews of Izmir and Amsterdam successfully working together to demolish his reputation at home and abroad he fell back on attempting to appeal to the States General's religious prejudices by comparing himself to Christ condemned to the cross through a multitude of Jewish false accusations – which practice, he added (echoing the common European misperception of Islamic legal testimony against non-Muslims), their law permits if it is in their community's advantage.¹⁰⁸

Although Van Dam's attempts to cast his own mishandling in terms of the paradigm of Jewish duplicity failed, one can see how European residents and visitors will have confused the influence of Izmir's Jews with their number. As for Ottoman testimonies; if they were indeed so numerous, Evliya would have certainly remarked upon it. Yet in discussing the district to which

¹⁰⁶ Roger North, *The Life of the Honourable Sir Dudley North ...* (London: John Whiston, 1744), 123.

¹⁰⁷ Jacob Barnai, "The Development of Community Organizational Structures: The Case of Izmir", in: *Jews, Turks, Ottomans*, 35.

¹⁰⁸ The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6912: Jacob van Dam to States General, 20 April 1677.

Izmir belonged, his only (disapproving) remarks on “excessive” non-Muslim presence concerned the multitude of Greeks purportedly living in nearby Bornova and the many Frankish ships and churches of Izmir.¹⁰⁹

But secondly, and more decisively, the number of European protégés is not the only cause of the discrepancy between the actual number of Jewish families and the number of Jewish taxpayers in the Ottoman records. Ottoman registration of Izmir’s Jewish taxpayers was inherently inaccurate because of the methods used for the assessment and collection of this community’s *cizye*. While the tax was collected from the members of most, if not all, Armenian and Greek communities on an individual basis, most Jewish communities obtained express sultanic permission to pay it collectively as a fixed lump sum (*ber vech-i maktu’*, literally meaning “in a fixed manner”). In cases where official permission for *maktu’* payment was not forthcoming and collection of the tax had been farmed out, communities often made similar arrangements with the farmer.¹¹⁰ The system had advantages for both sides. On the collecting end, it saved the tax farmer the trouble of updating the records on the standard three-yearly basis and of having to find ways to recoup deficits from evasion or natural turnover. On the paying end, it allowed the community in question maximum control over the internal distribution of the tax load.

Whether officially sanctioned or not, this is how the Jews of Izmir paid their *cizye* (in the 1670s and 80s at least), and they took full advantage of the possibilities offered by the *maktu’*-arrangement with Izmir’s *cizye*-collector (also the director of its foreign customs office) to lower the tax burden, and to transform the tax into an instrument for communal policy.

Faced with a tremendous influx of Portuguese Jews and from the rest of the Ottoman Empire, as well as with the centrifugal potential of foreign protection, the overriding concern of Izmir’s established Jewish leadership was its continuing primacy, and the strengthening and enforcing of communal unity and solidarity. Very much in evidence in all spheres of Jewish life (professional and religious organization and practice, education, healthcare

¹⁰⁹ Evliya, *Seyahatname* 9, 89 and 96-97.

¹¹⁰ See İnalçık, “Dijizya”. On the *maktu’* arrangements of other Ottoman Jewish communities see Daniel Goffman, “The Jews of Safed and the Maktu’ System in the Sixteenth Century: A Study of Two Documents from the Ottoman Archives”, *Journal of Ottoman Studies*, 3 (1982); and Yaron Ben-Naeh, *Jews in the Realm of the Sultans: Ottoman Jewish Society in the Seventeenth Century* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck Verlag, 2008), 148-53. Christian tributary rulers also regularly collected their subjects’ *cizye* to be paid in lump sum to the Ottoman treasury. See, e.g., Ben Slot, *Archipelagus turbatus: les Cyclades entre colonisation latine et occupation Ottomane c. 1500-1718* (Leiden: NINO, 1982), 79 on Naxos; and Marinos Sariyannis, “Notes on the Ottoman Poll-Tax Reforms of the Late Seventeenth Century: The Case of Crete”, *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 54 (2011) on Crete. The resulting conflation of tribute and *cizye*, and the degradation of tributary rulers to tax farmers, is entirely in keeping with the Ottoman view of the world and its sovereign divisions.

and poor-relief, to name but a few), the fiscal elaboration of this policy was that each member of the community was assessed in proportion to his income. The poorest two-thirds of the community were excused, and the remaining 500 paid at a redistributing relative rate of 0.033-0.33% (Galland's "Les plus accommodés payent 10 écus sur chaque 3000, et les autres en diminuant jusqu'à un écu seulement."), without any ceiling being applied. Even the – usually wealthy – members that had acquired European protection and were therefore exempt before Ottoman law, were still required to contribute.

This joint responsibility for *maktu'* meant that the entire community derived substantial benefit from as large a number of members as possible acquiring exemption. So the community regularly put its entire weight behind candidates for protection, and exerted maximum pressure on local authorities to under-assess their liability. A drop from 271 Jewish taxpayers in 1659/60 to 150 in 1678 (Galland) or 219 (*tabrir*) in 1688 – while all other evidence points to a sharp increase in numbers – does not occur of its own. It is no coincidence that the same fund (the *tanza*, as it was called in Levantine parlance) in which the contributions for the *maktu'* were collected, was also drawn upon to pay the extraordinary expenses of the community: it is of course a euphemism for all the legal costs, presents and bribes made to keep the community itself intact and its tax burden low. This, we might add, was not necessarily against local officials' own interests, because by "beating down" the official worth of the *cizye*-farm (in return for unregistered compensation), the price at which a renewal could be purchased also went down.¹¹¹

For the historian, the net result of this situation is that neither the figures local officials sent to Istanbul, nor those of the 1688-census should be considered as reliable as their officiality suggests.

Luckily, Galland offers a way around the documentary consequences of the *maktu'*-system. Taking the lump sum's 12,000 to 15,000 dollars as a starting point and presuming that the difference in Galland's range represents the included communal expenses, we can arrive at a new estimate of the number of adult Jewish males. To do so, we must divide the 12,000 dollars *maktu'* by the 2 to 4 dollars *cizye* paid on an individual basis by the Greeks and Armeni-

¹¹¹ North, *Life*, 84: "Galata, over-against Constantinople, where all the Franks and a great many other Christians live, is a Town that belongs to the Queen Mother, the Revenue of it going to her Maintenance. The Farmers of the Rents for some Years past, to beat down the Farm, for argument's sake, used to allege, that the Place was in a manner wholly peopled with privileged Persons, as Dragomen, who are Interpreters (and notwithstanding that both they and their Wives are the Grand Signor's Subjects, yet are exempted and made free by the Capitulations of the Nations they served, as also by especial Grants to themselves obtained at the Desire of their respective Ambassadors) and married Franks." (emphasis added)

ans of Izmir.¹¹² The (unrealistic) upper limit count would then be $(12,000 / 2 =) 6,000$ – the (somewhat less unrealistic) lower $(12,000 / 4 =) 3,000$. With an average family size of 3.65 (i.e. 1 man, 1 woman, 1.65 children, of which 0.825 female and 0.825 male, and most of them underage), an average *cizye* rate of 3.5 seems reasonable. This would yield a count of $(12,000 / 3.5 =) 3,429$. Given the small difference with the lower count of 3,000 and the uncertainty of the variables, it is sensible to stay with that figure.

There is of course no way to ascertain that the height of the lump sum was indeed determined in this manner – and an increase from 271 individually listed *cizye*-payers in 1657/58 to an approximate 3,000 males included in a lump sum *cizye*-payment in 1678 may (still) seem on the high side. Nevertheless, the figure is not unrealistic when measured against Izmir’s exceptionally rapid economic and demographical development, added unto by the relocation of entire Jewish communities from all over the empire’s western fringes and beyond. And even if it stems from the same source, some reassurance about the calculation and the implied growth rate might be gained from Galland’s estimate of the overall size of the community: his 10,000 souls very closely match the number we would arrive at by multiplying taxpayers by average family size $(3,000 \cdot 3.65 =) 10,950$.¹¹³ The addition of 10,950 more persons (taxpayers plus families) to the previous estimate yields a result of 70,919.5; say an estimated taxpaying population of 70,000.

More interesting, however, is to see what happens when the number of 150 Jewish taxpayers in Table 4 is replaced with the 3,000 of the *maktu*-arrangement; the breakdown changes considerably (see Table 5).


In discussing the comparative grain consumption of Izmir’s communities much further down in his description, Galland unwittingly validates our claim that his previous statements on community size should be adjusted for Jewish protection and lump sum taxation. Especially within the fixed-price Ottoman redistributive economy, grain took up a position of strategic importance, and its production, distribution and processing was monitored and registered closely by the authorities. Galland apparently also had access to the resulting registers, or at least to a summary of their contents (probably

¹¹² On the Greeks and Armenians paying *cizye* at an annual rate of 2 and 4 dollars (men between 15 and 20 years of age, and men over 20 resp.), see Ülker, *Rise of Izmir*, 230-34. Apparently, the first bout of experimentation with *cizye* reform (that sought to achieve a transition from individual universal rates and lump-sum payments to a wealth-related distribution of *cizye* liability, individually determined or according to a preset distribution pattern of poor, middle and rich classes) was not limited to Crete and the Aegean (accord Sariyannis, “Notes on the Ottoman Poll-Tax Reforms”), but had also involved 1670s Izmir. The rates of 2 and 4 dollars correspond to the “middle” and “wealthy” categories in the new three-class system (only the “poor”, with a rate of 1 dollar, have been left out). This makes sense in light of Sariyannis conclusion that from the 1670s onwards Crete and the Aegean islands were testing sites for a planned empire-wide implementation of the three-class system.

¹¹³ Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 140-41.

via the *voyvoda*, who was after all the official responsible for collecting the relevant market and retail dues), and declares that Izmir's grain consumption amounted to 120,000 *quillots per annum*, 30,000 going towards the Jews and 45,000 towards the Turks, with a further 6,000 being taken up by one French and one English oven for the European communities and their shipping.¹¹⁴ The obvious implication is that in estimating the comparative size of Izmir's Jewish community, a significant upward adjustment must indeed be made to compensate for the obscuration of Jewish tax-payers by the *maktu'*-arrangement.

TABLE 5: IDEM, ADJUSTED FOR *MAKTU'* (1678)



Based on Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 107 and 114-41.

Demographic Trends from 1657/58 to 1678

When the data concerning the size and composition of Izmir's taxpaying population in 1678 is contrasted with that of 1657/58, Table 6 emerges.

The table shows a near-doubling of the taxpaying population between 1657/58 and 1678 (coefficient of 1.89), with the non-Muslim part growing at a significantly higher rate than the Muslim part (coefficients of 6.21 and 1.60 respectively), although still being only a quarter of the latter's size. Assuming that the ratio between the number of taxpayers and the number of tax-exempt was more or less equal for all communities over this 20-year period (and having made some adjustments to compensate for the exceptionality of the Jewish case), these general conclusions can be extended to the population proper.

¹¹⁴ Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 145-46. A *quillot* comprised 22 *okkas*, 1 *okka* equals 1.282 *kilograms*, 120,000 *quillots* equals 3,384,480 kilograms of grain.

TABLE 6: DEVELOPMENT OF THE TAXPAYING POPULATION OF IZMIR (1657-1678)

	1657/58			1678			1657/58-1678	
	Families	% of <i>Zimmis</i>	% of total	Families	% of <i>Zimmis</i>	% of total	Abs. growth rate	Rel. growth rate
Total	10,300	-	100.00	19,430	-	100.00	1.89	0.00
Greek	301	47.55	2.92	800	20.36	4.12	2.66	0.41
Armenian	61	9.64	0.59	130	3.31	0.67	2.13	0.14
Jewish	271	42.81	2.63	3,000	76.34	15.44	11.07	4.87
<i>Zimmi</i>	633	100.00	6.15	3,930	100.00	20.23	6.21	2.29
Muslim	9,667	-	93.85	15,500	-	79.77	1.60	-0.15

Based on Tables 3 and 5.

Concerning the composition of the non-Muslim part of the population, we can then conclude that although all non-Muslim communities registered growth (coefficients of 2.66, 2.13 and 11.07), the “original autochthonous” Greek community and the “older immigrant” Armenian community were being outstripped by the “newer immigrant” Jewish community (relative growth rates of 0.41, 0.14 and 4.87 respectively), which is indeed the tenor of most contemporary Ottoman and European sources. In fact, it looks as if the Jewish community grew at an even higher rate, since the ratio between the tax-exempt and the taxpaying was much higher for the Jewish community than for the Greek or Armenian. It should not be forgotten, however, that the semblance of accuracy of the figures in the table is illusory, as they are all the result of repeated reinterpretation. Consequently, they should serve as indicators of general trends only.

This having been said, the foregoing certainly still permits some interesting observations to be made. To begin with, it has been shown that the years 1658-1678 witnessed a near-doubling of the taxpaying population, which could well have meant a doubling of the overall population, particularly if the European communities are included. With a population rapidly approaching the hundred-thousand mark, Izmir was propelling itself into the range of important Ottoman cities. Furthermore, it has become clear that this rapid development reversed the 200-year-old trend of Turkification in favor of the non-Muslim communities, initiating a counter-trend towards the non-Muslim dominance to which the 19th-century designation “infidel Izmir” famously refers. Lastly, the coinciding of intense Jewish immigration with rapid growth in the volume of international trade going through the city, marks that community’s rise to numerical and economic ascendancy at the cost of the city’s older Greek and Armenian communities; a fact reflected in the capturing by Izmir’s Jews of almost all middlemen positions, previously the domain of Greeks and, to a lesser degree, Armenians.

The Tax-Exempt: From Elite to Underclass

So far, in discussing the population of Izmir, we have spoken mainly about taxpayers and their families. In that discussion the tax-exempt have figured a number of times, but without any consistent qualification or quantification. Now that we have arrived at an estimated tax-paying population of 70,000 for 1678-Izmir, let us see whether we can specify that segment of Izmir's population further.

The difference between the taxpaying population and the resident population proper (including semi-resident visitors) was made up of protégés, administrators, military, clergy, the non-productive sick, old and destitute, slaves, and subjects laboring in state monopolies, pious endowments or as civilian guards or watchmen. That leaves us to guess at the size of a considerable segment of the population, commonly estimated at 10-15% (which would add another 10,000 souls or so to the overall population of Izmir in 1678).¹¹⁵ But even worse, other than fiscal sources are also largely silent on the lower classes, equally among the tax-exempt. This silence is especially unfortunate since if one takes the time to consider them, the movements and occupations of these laborers, servants and slaves can be seen to have brought them in regular contact with those of other cultures.

In discussions about the proverbial cosmopolitan or tolerant character of Izmir, claims to that effect are often challenged through statements that contacts of diplomats and merchants with Ottoman officials should not count towards the incidence of crosscultural contact because they are formal, irregular and limited to elites – as if a tolerant attitude towards other cultures only amounts to something if it is shared across the entire society. Seen from this perspective, it will always be debatable whether a society at large is truly multicultural or cosmopolitan, warmly tolerant, or parsimoniously tolerant, its members of different cultures barely tolerating each other out of necessity. Although that is always a sensible question (and a steady antidote against “neo-Ottoman nostalgia” for early modern Izmir, or similarly lyrical descriptions of medieval Granada, the American melting-pot, or Dutch multiculturalism), we might wonder whether cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism have not always been ideologies of the few (a question to which we will return further down).¹¹⁶ What, then, remains if we are to discount those same few, even if it is just because we cannot count them for lack of sources?

The answer often is: little to nothing. But what we can see is that in Izmir (as in Granada; see note 26 and the accompanying discussion) crosscultural contact was pervasive, although it remains well-hidden under a triple layer of

¹¹⁵ Barkan, “Essai sur les données statistiques”, 21-22.

¹¹⁶ “There are, of course, just as many who suffer from neo-Ottoman nostalgia, and pine for the tolerant society of the Ottoman sixteenth and seventeenth centuries”: Virginia H. Aksan, “Theoretical Ottomans”, *History and Theory*, 47/1 (2008), 114.

ethno-religious, class and fiscal silencing. So, let us take a look at the exempted categories, whilst also taking note of the degree of their crosscultural involvement.

Protégés we have already spoken of quite a bit, and we will discuss them some more below, but let us here simply estimate their number at a conservative 5 middleman-protégés for Izmir's Dutch, English and French nation (the Venetians and Genoese in Izmir do not appear to have protected commercial partners in this manner), with each having an average – automatically exempted – 1 son and 3 servants with 1 son each. This would make the number of real and nominal dragomans and vice-consuls 35 – a negligible absolute number, even if it were double or three times as high, although we should remember it represented some of the city's richest families and therefore had a far greater impact on public finance than numbers alone suggest.

As brokers, translators, advisors and warehousemen for the Europeans, these prominent Jews, Greeks and Armenians, their offspring and their servants were in daily contact with European consuls, merchants, captains and crews on the one hand, and Ottoman wholesalers, merchants and officials on the other. They were the oil for Izmir's crosscultural engine. If ever there was a truly cosmopolitan set, this was it.

Administrators, meaning Ottoman officials in charge of Izmir's administration, public order and justice, included the *kadi* (judge/ chief administrator), his *naiibs* (assistants), the *mufti* (jurisconsult), the *voyvoda* (substitute governor) and his troupe, including the *subaşı* (chief of police) and the *muhtesib* (market inspector), and numerous *mukata'acs* and *mültezims* (tax-farmers) and guards (*kapıcı*), as well as all these men's households.

Izmir being a crown domain, its military contingent counted no fief-based cavalry (*sipahis*), but was made up completely of 2 castle wardens (*dizdars*), a regiment of Janissaries (*yeniçeris*; at least 10 employed as consular guards), 72 guards (*bostancıs*) and perhaps some irregulars (*sekbân*). Both administrators and military were in regular contact with Izmir's Europeans because they were overseeing their dealings, were actively lobbied by them for favors, and often struck up mutual friendships to support mutually profitable favoritism and smooth official relations.

Among the aforementioned officials, the *kadi* and the *mufti* were strictly speaking not administrators but clergy (*ülema*), just like those employed in running Izmir's 310 mosques and prayer houses, its 40 advanced religious schools, 3 Koran schools, 40 primary schools, and its single soup kitchen. On the non-Muslim side, European and European-protected clergymen were in charge of the city's seven churches (a Franciscan, Capuchin, and a Jesuit

church in the European quarter, and the native Greek Saint George, Saint Photina, Saint Veneranda and Latin Saint Polycarp).¹¹⁷

To these categories of tax exempt should also be added an unknown and unknowable number of non-productive sick, old and destitute, as well as subjects enjoying exemption by virtue of their daily labor in the service of the state (laboring in the salt fields, as civilian guards or watchmen, and so on). The latter category will have had little to do with Izmir's Europeans, other than guarding the stations along which merchandise found its way to and from Izmir's Europeans, or than having to go through the heart of the European quarter on their way to another day's work in the salt mines (see below).

This leaves one last category to be discussed: slaves. Until its abolishment in 1847 Ottoman slavery was widespread. Before the modern period, when slave labor drove the cotton industry, slaves were commonly used in elite households (as harem servants and guards), in the production of fine textiles (as weavers and dyers) and in brokerage, banking and trade (as most trusted agents).¹¹⁸ A vibrant commercial center of Izmir's size would not only boast markets for grain, wood, fresh produce and caravan items, but certainly also another one, as tightly organized and overseen, for slaves.¹¹⁹ Ottoman legal, fiscal and executive registers do testify more fully to the regulation of slave markets and ownership in general, as well as to legal protection of what little rights slaves did possess.¹²⁰ European diplomatic and travelers' accounts turn to the subject occasionally, but always to relate only the financial consequences of the grinding work of redemption or the most sensational accounts of flight.¹²¹ Nevertheless, glimpses of everyday slavery in the center

¹¹⁷ See Evliya, *Seyahatname* 9, 89: *Ve bu şehrin şeyhülislâmı müftüsü ve nakibüleşrafi ve kethüdyeri ve yeniçeri serdari ve canuşu ve hüncâr bağçesinin bostancıbaşısı ve yetmiş added küllâhl bostancısı ve bir bâkim dâhî gümrük emini iki yüz bin altına iltizâm hükümetdir Ve kal'a dizdâri ikidir Biri lebi deryadaki kal'ada biri dağda Seddi Kabriyye kal'asında bâkimdir Ve voyvodası ve muhtesibi ve şehir naibi dahi bâkimdir Askerî tayifesinden gayri cümle ehlî birefe hükümet ider bâkimlerdir.* The seven churches Evliya goes on to refer to will be discussed in more detail *infra*.

¹¹⁸ Alan Fisher, "Chattel Slavery in the Ottoman Empire", *Slavery and Abolition*, 1/1 (1980).

¹¹⁹ I have not come upon references to Izmir's slave market in European and Ottoman primary and secondary sources studied for this project, except for a confirmation of its existence by Slaars in Iconomos, *Étude sur Smyrne*, 46n82; and in Nicolas Chamfort's famous late-18th-century comedy, Sébastien Roch Nicolas Chamfort, *Le marchand de Smyrne: comédie en un acte et en prose* (Paris: Delalain, 1770).

¹²⁰ See Fisher, "Chattel Slavery"; William Gervase Clarence-Smith, *Islam and the Abolition of Slavery* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2006), 85-93; and Ehud R. Toledano, *Slavery and Abolition in the Ottoman Middle East* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998), 54-80.

¹²¹ Concerning flight, see, e.g. The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 50a-b – on the French and Venetian cases of 1679, in which the incoming French ambassador and Venetian *bailo* were held responsible for a significant number of slaves seeking refuge on their warships whilst they laid anchored off Seraglio Point in Istanbul (with the French resisting consequent visita-

and along the margins of the Ottoman-European commercial system occasionally do make it into European official archives and travelers' accounts, as in Galland's discussion of Izmir as a *tour de Babel*: "Un curieux des langues peut avoir le plaisir à Smyrne d'en entendre parler près d'une douzaine et d'apprendre celles qui lui plairaient le plus: l'arabe, le turc, le persien, l'arménien, le grec vulgaire, *la langue de Russie parmi les esclaves tant hommes que femmes*, l'hébreu, l'italien, le portugais, le français, l'anglais et le hollandais."¹²² Slavery was so common in Izmir as to be impossible to disregard completely.

The most poignant testimony of how widespread slavery actually was in late 17th-century Izmir, is that which indicates that non-Muslims, be they Ottoman or European, kept slaves, even though this was in direct contravention of Islamic law, and oftentimes even of Ottoman law.¹²³ The owning of slaves by Ottoman Jews all over the empire is widely attested, in the case of late 17th-century Izmir again by Galland, who feels the need to state that his estimate of the Jewish community's size does not include their (Christian) slaves.¹²⁴

Just as surprising as Christian slaves being owned by Jews in Ottoman Izmir, are indications that European merchants also owned slaves – and in all probability Christian (or heathen?) ones at that, since any claims to ownership of Islamic slaves would never have been upheld in Ottoman territory (leading to immediate loss of such human property). References to slave-owning by European merchants are very sparse, but its factuality and high incidence may nevertheless be inferred from the unsurprised and matter-of-fact tone with which it was treated whenever mentioning it could not be avoided. In the case of the 1681-bankruptcy of the prominent Dutch merchant J(oh)an(nes) van Breen, for instance, chief Dutch dragoman Willem Theijls, in charge of compiling an inventory of the merchant's house and belongings, dryly navigates a house brimming with multicultural contradictions (see Appendix 2, Document 13), most prominently the combination of the owner's black Sunday dress, the goods of his "Greek" wife Elisabeth Violier and their (?) six children, and right next to the master bedroom a

tion by Ottoman troops, and the Venetians allowing it after having thrown the liberated slaves overboard to drown in the Bosphorus' rapids); or Galland, *Journal*, 133-34; The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacob van Dam to DLH, 6 December 1674; The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6912: Jacob van Dam to States General, 11 July 1676 – on European slaves on Barbarian ships seeking refuge in Izmir's European consulates. For a financial account of redemption work, see, e.g., The Hague, NA 01.03.01 98: Andreas Forestier to DLH, 4 December 1676.

¹²² Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 151 (emphasis added).

¹²³ See Joseph Schacht, *An introduction to Islamic law* (London: Clarendon Press, 1966), 132; Majid Khadduri, *War and peace in the law of Islam* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), 167; and Fisher, "Chattel Slavery".

¹²⁴ Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 141-42: "Entre 10000 âmes qu'ils peuvent être, *sans compter les esclaves chrétiennes qu'ils ont*, il y en a 200 qui demandent l'aumône, et 100 nécessaires à qui l'on fait la charité en secret et aux frais de la communauté" (emphasis added).

“slave girls’ room, 1 large bed with its blankets and pillows for the same, and some boxes with their clothes.”¹²⁵

Another instance of European (Dutch) residents in the Ottoman Empire owning slaves may be encountered in a deposition dated 31 August 1672 by Dutch merchant of Izmir Christoffel Capoen. Finding himself taken hostage by two fellow Dutch merchants (Cornelis Rogier van Goor and Pieter Smout) over a complicated transaction concerning consular duties involving 500 Lion Dollars of theirs handed over to him by the Venetian consul, he manages to jump from a second floor window to the safety of the French consul’s garden and make his way home. His partner, meanwhile, repeatedly sends their servant over to enquire about his whereabouts, and is told by the hostage takers’ *slave* Jusuf (Joseph), leaning out the window of Van Goor and Smout’s reception room, and speaking Italian, that his patrons are having dinner in the garden on the seafront and that there is no one from outside in the house.¹²⁶

Clearly, in delineating the web of crosscultural relations at work in late-17th-century Izmir, the 10-15% tax exempted, from rich to poor to destitute, should be accounted for.

Geography

It goes without saying that more than a century of intense growth had a profound impact on Izmir’s appearance. In the first half of the 16th century it had been a relatively insignificant market town straddling a small regional inner harbor protected by a castle (lower Izmir) and a populated mountain slope with a fortress that was quickly losing importance (upper Izmir), joined together by an ancient commercial district; a neutral ground that might be termed “middle Izmir” (see Map 1). By the second half of the same century this “double city” had been firmly cemented into one, adjoining an inner harbor that now primarily serviced the imperial authorities as a staging point for Ottoman naval expeditions in the Aegean and an interregional provisioning center for Istanbul’s palace and populace.¹²⁷ A century later, in 1678, the port’s regional and interregional functions had been far outstripped by the unstoppable flow of international seaborne trade, and the Ottomans were

¹²⁵ The Hague, NA 1.02.20 1060: Willem Theijls in Justinus Colyer’s chancery, 18 November 1681.

¹²⁶ The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Christoffel Capoen in Jacob van Dam’s chancery, 5 October 1672.

¹²⁷ On twin or double cities, and their frequency, types and instances, in the Muslim world, see Ira M. Lapidus, “Muslim Cities and Islamic Societies”, in: *Middle Eastern Cities: A Symposium on Ancient, Islamic, and Contemporary Middle Eastern Urbanism*, ed. Ira M. Lapidus (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 60-69. On the Ottomans’ wish to reserve Izmir for provisioning tasks, as well as on European smuggling in strategic goods undercutting this policy, see Goffman, *Izmir and the Levantine World*, 7-10.

busy finishing a major reconfiguration of the city's commercial and administrative infrastructure, designed to enhance their control and taxation of that same flow (see below).

Since the inner harbor – too small and shallow to accommodate Western European shipping – remained the exclusive domain of Ottoman commercial and naval vessels, European ships dropped anchor slightly further north of the inner harbor and its castle, opposite Frank Street's jetties in the bay that was Izmir's natural harbor. Again, the city's focus had shifted, be it slightly, from the area east of the inner harbor towards the European quarter (Frank Street) and the (international) customs house, where a new commercial center was taking shape (see Map 3). The rapid growth of the city's population, meanwhile, had been accommodated by filling and expanding the old quarters and creating new ones. Unsurprisingly, the garden-rich plain behind Frank Street (previously considered too unhealthy for habitation) and the quarters adjoining it (inland from the new economic center) absorbed much of the latest growth.


Towards a Plan of the 17th-Century City

It is very difficult to go beyond this general description and elaborate further on the city's 17th-century form and structure. The circumstances are identical to those surrounding our discussion of the size and composition of the population: although there is some relatively detailed information available for 1678 and some additional context from the preceding and succeeding decades, it is a far cry from the survey data available for the 16th century.¹²⁸ The *tabrihs* of AH 935 and 983 (AD 1528/29 and 1575/76) provide precise information regarding the number, location, functions, size and composition of Izmir's quarters.¹²⁹ Beyond that, there is only circumstantial commerce-related evidence. Regrettably, this hides much of the city and its quarters from view, making a full urban geography unattainable and a partial one invariably biased towards the parts most associated with international trade; the non-Muslim communities and the northern half of the city (see Map 3).

¹²⁸ The most interesting of these sources are: Evliya, *Seyahatname* 9, 88-100 (1671-situation); De Bruyn, *Reizen*, 20-36 (1678-sit.), which includes a beautifully accurate and detailed city panorama by the author (see Plate 1); The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684 (1678-sit.); Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne* (1678-sit.); Jean Dumont, *Nouveau voyage du Levant* (The Hague: E. Foulque, 1694) (1691-sit.); the deed (*vakfiye*) of the Köprülü charitable endowment (*vakıf*) that transformed Izmir's commercial infrastructure at Istanbul, SLK MF 4027 (AH 15 Safer 1089 / AD 8 April 1678): Vakfiye-i Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed Paşa (1678-sit.); two French consular reports on the 1688-earthquake summarized in Iconomos, *Étude sur Smyrne*, 128-31 (1688-sit.); and two receipts confirming the lease of houses at Leiden, UBL Legatum Warnerum Cod.Or. 1267 (AH 10-20 Şevvâl 1101 / AD 18-27 July 1690), fos. 5a-6a and 15b-16a (1690-sit.).

¹²⁹ Istanbul, BBA TT 148 (AD 935 / AH 1528/59); and Istanbul, BBA TT 537 (AH 983 / AD 1575/76).

MAP 3: NORTHWARD SHIFT OF IZMIR'S ECONOMIC CENTER FROM 1570S TO 1670S



Based on Map 2.

Nevertheless, if we accept the inevitable shortcomings caused by the lack of sources and complement the information from the *tabirîs* with snippets from the 17th-century, it is still possible to roughly position the city's quarters within the general description above.

The most effective way to do so is graphically, by delineating the city's quarters on a plan of Izmir. Despite printed atlases and collections of city plans becoming exceedingly popular from the middle of the 16th century onwards (and remaining so throughout the 17th), these tended to concentrate on Europe and included only the most ancient and famous Ottoman cities (Cairo, Alexandria, Jerusalem, Damascus, Aleppo, Istanbul, Edirne, and increasingly also corsair centers Algiers and Tunis), without exception neglecting recent upstart Izmir. In another – more practical – cartographic category, that of the sea-chart, Izmir and its gulf are represented frequently, but as is to be expected considering the navigational purpose of such charts, the city itself figures marginally in them. 16th and 17th-century sea-charts of the Gulf of Izmir only rather clumsily depict the city's coastline, inner harbor, upper

and lower castles and, in some cases, a token building or two (see the plates in Appendix 1). The total absence of anything resembling a city plan, or even a delineation of the overall built-up area, has forced scholars who wanted to visualize the information contained in the *tabrihs* of 1528 and 1575 to represent the quarters of the city as text within otherwise bare outline maps.¹³⁰


Due to the city's increasing fame and the growing popularity of the travel account, the same does not have to apply to the 17th-century. As it gained importance to Europe, more and more European travelers flocked to Izmir. Concomitantly, the amount of space these travelers dedicated to the city in their accounts also increased, as did the scope and quality of their descriptions – some even so far as roughly indicating the ethnic composition of areas of the city. Adorning these travelers' descriptions is another type of illustration than the ones previously discussed: the panorama. Originally intended to enhance the attractiveness of commercial editions, panoramas now constitute an important historical source. For 17th-century Izmir, there are essentially two, not counting innumerable imitations: De Bruyn's (from 1678) and De Tournefort's (from 1700) (see Plates 1 and 2). Of these, the former best suits our purpose, both because it predates the 1688-earthquake and because it is much larger, more accurate and more detailed than De Tournefort's (and, for that matter, all others' until well into the 19th century). Combined with his own and other travelers' descriptions, De Bruyn's panorama makes it possible to project a reasonably accurate outline of the 1678-city on a detailed 19th-century map.

The earliest detailed city plan of Izmir was drawn by Lieutenant (later Commander) Thomas Graves and published in 1844 (see Plate 3). Cropped and tilted to correspond to De Bruyn's panorama, it appears as Map 4.

To clearly illustrate the situation of the 1678-city on the basis of this map from 1844, it has been altered in several ways: the map's opacity has been diminished; the main geographical and man-made features have been identified and emphasized or colorized; the triangular area that Galland describes as being built-up in 1678 (see Map 2) has been spotlighted; the approximate position, orientation and field of vision of De Bruyn (when drawing his panorama) have been added; and a number of adjustments have been made to the shoreline on the basis of his and De Tournefort's panoramas as well as several travelers' accounts. The result is shown as Map 5.

¹³⁰ See, e.g., Goffman, *Izmir and the Levantine World*, 12; Eldem et al., *Ottoman City*, 80; Kütükoğlu, *XV ve XVI. asırlarda İzmir*, 23. But see Marie-Carmen Smyrnelis, *Une société hors de soi: identités et relations sociales à Smyrne au XVIIIe et XIXe siècles* (Paris: Peeters, 2005), 251 for another more detailed rendering and strategy, similar to the one taken in this study.

MAP 4: PLAN OF IZMIR IN 1844




Detail from Graves, "City of Ismir or Smyrna", with re-added legend for scale and orientation.

The adjustments on the basis of panoramas and travelers' accounts all concern the shoreline and the structures along it. Most conspicuous is the reappearance of the inner (or, galley) harbor (no. 16 in De Bruyn's panorama), which was filled at the beginning of the 19th century to make space for a marketplace and housing.¹³¹ At the entrance to the inner harbor, the rectangular lower (or, harbor) castle with its landward moat (De Bruyn's no. 15) has been restored over the triangular battery that remained in the middle of

¹³¹ Kütükoğlu, *XV ve XVI. asırlarda İzmir*, 20-21. By then, the harbor was heavily silted up and opening it up again made little sense because ships had grown so much in size from the 16th century that they would not be able to use it anyway. It was more sensible to reclaim it for habitation. Today, as it was back then, the typical circular shape of the harbor is easily recognizable within the city's grid (see Plates 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8) – just as it is with Istanbul's former galley harbor in the Kumpkapı quarter, see <http://maps.google.com/maps/place?ftid=0x14cab99a4a1d22b3:0xbb396fd3b268797d&q=kadirga+limani+&hl=nl&ved=0CA0Q-gswAA&sa=X&ei=XgrjTvrDOIrvjAfDsuHuCw&sig2=rp73V3q00dbxuyDLendusA>.

the 19th-century. When the entire structure was finally torn down in 1870, its remains were used to further broaden Izmir's quays.¹³² Although the overall shape of the shoreline was not altered between 1678 and 1844 (except around the inner harbor), a number of changes along the northern shore have been undone to revert to the 17th-century situation: the fully developed shore and large piers and harbor sheds of the 19th century have disappeared to make room for (from left to right) Frank Street's guarded beach (beneath De Bruyn's nos. 5-11), where boats loaded and unloaded the cargoes of ships

MAP 5: IMPRESSION OF IZMIR'S SITUATION IN 1678; ENHANCED GRAVES' MAP



Based on Map 4.

anchored in the outer harbor; the customs house-pier (De Bruyn's no. 12) that had partly taken over this function in 1675; and the beach between the customs house and the castle, until 1675 the site of a shambles (open-air slaughterhouse), but now the location of the newly built covered market (De

¹³² Kütükoğlu, *XV ve XVI. asırlarda İzmir*, 21. Also see Plate 8.

Bruyn's no. 13). To the right of the inner harbor, on the southern part of the shore, the governor's house, barracks and parade ground should be considered undeveloped; an empty beach with extensive burial grounds inland to the south and southeast (De Bruyn's nos. 19-21).

If we turn our attention from the shore to the city's inland margins, comparison between De Bruyn's panorama and the enhanced Graves' map shows that the southern part of the city in the course of time completely swallowed the Greek and Armenian cemeteries (De Bruyn's no. 19) to form the western arm of a fork stretching southwards along either side of the Urla-road. It also appears that the site of the ancient Greek Church of St. Veneranda (De Bruyn's no. 18; reduced to rubble in the earthquake of 1688) had become a Turkish cemetery (in between the forked quarters), as had much of the mountain's lower flanks further to the south. If we move further inland, to the eastern arm of the fork between the Turkish cemetery and the ancient stadium (on the map, directly left of the text "Mount Pagus"), we notice that – like the western arm – it falls outside Galland's triangle. A glance at the panorama, however, reveals that the city's build-up was not that far removed from this imaginary line between the St. Veneranda and the ancient stadium; although the stadium is not visible in the panorama, a comparison of landmarks positions it in a slight depression between the windmills highest on the hill and the build-up below them. Thus, it seems that at least part of the eastern fork was already in existence around 1678. This is confirmed when a line is drawn between the St. Veneranda and the ancient theatre (on the map, just north of the western side of the upper castle); when this line running straight along the right (or, southern) side of Galland's triangle is replicated in De Bruyn's drawing (no. 18 to no. 3), it is indeed shown to have been crossed by the beginnings of the eastern fork.

Of course, the sides of the scalene were nowhere as defined as the map suggests. In fact, before describing their situation, Galland was careful to point out that the absence of a city wall had caused the city's margins to be ill-defined – his figure indicative of the city's general shape only.¹³³ Concerning the left (or, northern) side of his triangle, for instance, Galland states that it was in reality "beaucoup interrompu par les jardinages" – a fortunate comment since this flat area is not visible in the panorama.¹³⁴ Equally fortunate, it seems, is that while Galland remains silent on the interspersed of the right (or, southern) side of his triangle, the panorama does depict some development in that area.

Although it is safe to assume that the 1678-city crossed and receded from the triangle's left side at several points (due to the gardens and orchards along the distributary of the Meles), and that its build-up crossed the right

¹³³ Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 104.

¹³⁴ *Ibid*, 107.

side (skirting Mount Pagus) at one point at least, it should be added that there are some distortions in the panorama. De Bruyn's position and orientation, as indicated by the arrow on Map 5, were retraced by following the lines of perspective of the customs house, covered market and lower castle, which we know were built at right angles to a relatively even shore. Since the vanishing point of these lines lie slightly above the middle of the market's roof, it seems De Bruyn did his shipboard drawing from the anchorage directly opposite that building. Yet, by his own account, it was when the Dutch convoy was waiting for permission to pass the castle controlling access to Izmir's bay (Sancak Kalesi; see "Chateau" on Plate 2 and "Sanjak Kalassi" on Plate 4).¹³⁵ This would be consistent with the single angle at which the rooftops are depicted along the entire breadth of the coastline. However, the fact that the harbor castle is depicted in line with the mountain castle and the theatre, combined with the perspective chosen to depict the customs house and harbor castle at the heart of the drawing, suggests that the panorama was in fact composed from two locations: from the considerable distance of the entrance to the gulf and from the anchorage in the outer harbor closer by. The artist's shift in position might have resulted in some deformation, not so much of the direct horizon that was the shoreline, but of the inland parts of the city further away. If the build-up to the right of the theatre was drawn from the outer harbor, it might very well be that this is actually a depiction of the part of the city to its left (that is the upper half of the right leg of the triangle), which is so pronounced in Galland's triangle, yet seems so absent from De Bruyn's drawing. All said and done, it seems wise to not to overly rely on the panorama where Izmir's layout beyond the direct shore is concerned.

The City and its Quarters According to the Survey of 1528

The information on Izmir's quarters contained in the *tabir*s of 1528 and 1575 has been expertly analyzed and effectively presented by Kütükoğlu, so a short summary will suffice here.¹³⁶ The *tabir* of 1528 lists six quarters (*mahalles*) belonging to the jurisdiction (*kaza*) of Izmir: Faik Paşa, Mescid-i Selatinzade, Han Bey (Pazar), Limon (Liman), Cemaat-ı Gebran and Boynusekisi. Of these, the first five made up the city proper, the last being a nearby village administratively attached to Izmir. Of the total 224 families (*hanes*) and 75 unmarried men (*mücerreds*; bachelors and celibates) constituting the jurisdiction's population, 50 and 11 lived in Boynusekisi, leaving, respectively, 174 and 64 for the actual urban area. All members of the Greek community (the only non-Muslim community the surveys of 1528 and 1575 list for Izmir) lived together in one exclusively non-Muslim quarter, appropriate-

¹³⁵ De Bruyn, *Reizen*, 20.

¹³⁶ See Kütükoğlu, *XV ve XVI. asırlarda İzmir*, 23-33.

ly referred to as “the community of non-Muslims” (*cemaat-ı gebran*). The other four quarters, as well as Boynusekisi, were registered as being fully Muslim. The distribution of the population over the five quarters of the city proper, then, is as seen in Table 7.

TABLE 7: DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION OF IZMIR PROPER (1528)

	Registered Individuals	% of Total	Families	Bachelors & Celibates	Exempted Muslims			
					Higher Clergy	Higher Officials	Saltpan Workers	Destitute & Disabled
Faik Paşa	70	29.41	52	18	6	2	8	-
Mescid-i Selatinzade	61	25.63	43	18	1	-	5	2
Han Bey (Pazar)	39	16.39	30	9	2	-	4	1
Limon (Liman)	25	10.50	18	7	-	-	-	-
Cemaat-ı Gebran	43	18.07	31	12	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	238	100	174	64	9	2	17	3

Based on Kütükoğlu, *XV ve XVI. asırlarda İzmir*, 25.

Before these five older quarters can be located on the enhanced version of Graves’ city plan, we need to call to our aid another cartographic device; the tourist map. Since the modern equivalents of most historic quarters have already been identified by historians of the municipality and since city quarters are commonly indicated on tourist maps, the whereabouts of the historic quarters on Graves’ city plan can be partly retraced by projecting modern maps over it. The two tourist maps that will be used for this purpose have also been reproduced as Plates 6 and 7. The resulting projections are shown as Maps 6 and 7.

Comparison of the two maps clearly shows that the second one best fits Graves’ map. Nevertheless, the first has also been included, because it lists alternative, older, names for some quarters. Altınordu (in the top of the triangle on the second map), for instance, is the modern equivalent of Faik Paşa (same location on the first map). Similarly, modern Kurtuluş and Namazgah (around the old agora on the second map) used to constitute Han Bey (Pazar) and Mescid-i Selatinzade, indicated on the first map as Pazaryeri.¹³⁷


¹³⁷ See *ibid.*, 23-24.

MAP 6: TOURIST MAP (C. 1990) PROJECTED ONTO OUR ENHANCED MAP (1844)



Based on Map 5 and Plate 6.

MAP 7: TOURIST MAP (1992) PROJECTED ONTO OUR ENHANCED MAP (1844)



Based on Map 5 and Plate 7.

The locations of Limon (Liman) and Cemaat-ı Gebran cannot be retraced in this manner, but this is not a problem since there is ample evidence (including the *tabrihs*) that confirms what is already implied by their names and associates the former with the inner harbor (İç Liman) and the garrison of the lower castle (Liman Kalesi), and the latter with the area further to the north and northeast, easily identifiable by its two historic Greek churches of Saint George (Hagios Georgios) and Saint Photina (Hagia Photini) and the Latin church of Saint Polycarp (see, from right to left, the three temple-shaped objects directly above the customs house on Map 5). The Greek churches were located opposite the entrance to what would later become Frank Street and the Latin church lay at the beginning of that same street. Indeed, our knowledge of Frank Street may serve as an additional aid, since we know that the non-Muslim quarter originated in the area around the abovementioned churches and developed with Frank Street as its westernmost border, it is easy to determine the location of Cemaat-ı Gebran and the direction of its development.¹³⁸


The five quarters of the city proper, then, can be positioned as shown in Map 8.

The names of the quarters are not the only new additions to the map; the main streets visible on Graves' map have also been highlighted. These are the streets of 1844, of course, but since no rigorous urban planning (like in Amsterdam and London in the 17th, Washington in the 18th, or Paris in the 19th century) took place in the old quarters before the burning of the city in the War of Independence, the main street network of 1844 was the result of an uninterrupted process of evolution. If its relative continuity (as evident in Maps 6 and 7), past even the utter destruction of 1923, is any indication of the tenacity of the city's main grid, there is little danger of anachronism in assuming that it will also have changed little over the previous centuries.

The absence of far-reaching coordinated redevelopment aside, two interlinked positive factors also contributed to the continuity of Izmir's street network. Firstly, the two main functions of the lower and lower-middle city, military and commercial, had been concentrated in the area directly east and north of the inner harbor long before the 16th century. In the second half of the 17th century these central areas were functionally supplanted by Cemaat-ı Gebran and Sancak Kalesi. By that time, however, the city's build-up had already acquired the triangular shape noted by Galland and the main streets within that built-up area were already firmly in place.

¹³⁸ Incidentally, Frank Street is not to be found on any modern map, since it has been replaced by a number of interspersed smaller streets. Its function as a thoroughfare has been taken over by two main roads, Cumhuriyet Bulvarı and Atatürk Caddesi; the first constructed over the old shoreline where the sea once washed over Frank Street's beach, the second on an artificially extended coastal strip or *kordon* (see Plates 6 and 7).

MAP 8: QUARTERS OF IZMIR PROPER IN 1528



Based on Map 5.

Secondly, the city's two main approaches – the road over the caravan bridge and the road to Urla – were in existence well before the 16th century. Before the renewed rise of Ottoman Izmir at the turn of that century, these two roads meeting in the city had been a single thoroughfare connecting the western Anatolian caravan routes to Chios, as an overland alternative to the sea-lane running from Aleppo to Chios.¹³⁹ From Izmir, the caravan road crossed the river, where an arm branched off to follow the Meles upstream around Mount Pagus and towards the town of Buca, while the main road passed in between the ancient ruins of the bath of Diana and the mosaic pavement (thought to have belonged to the temple of Dionysus; see Plate 4) and from there continued on to the towns of Bornova (referred to by Evliya as mostly Greek; see above) and ancient Hacilar, from where it continued to

¹³⁹ See Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 285-86.

central and northwestern Anatolia. The Urla road was not only a remainder of the old caravan route, but also Izmir's sole landward connection with the district capital (at Urla) and the wider Karaburun-peninsula that defines and guards the city's seaward approach. Since accessibility by road has been a precondition for the formation of administrative entities throughout history and since both Byzantine and Ottoman Izmir were part of maritime provinces centered on Chios and the Karaburun-peninsula, it is certain this road's importance went far back and had not only been commercial, but political and military as well.

Together, the absence of major coordinated projects of redevelopment and the longevity of the roads connecting a stable central area to its wider hinterland and foreland ensured that the city and its main streets consistently developed along these outward axes and in amplification of them. It will not have gone unnoticed that a third approach has so far been ignored – because its characteristics were very different from those discussed above. This third approach, the coastal road running north from Frank Street, was not a thoroughfare connecting the city to any wider commercial network or administrative entity, but a short road to the saltpan located at the deep end of the bay (see Plates 4 and 5; now the location of the quarter of Alsancak, see Plates 6 and 7). Nonetheless, as the surveys of 1528 and 1575 and several historical maps attest to its prolonged existence, as well as to its continued importance to many city dwellers (see under “saltpan workers” in Tables 7 and 8), it might well be considered a third, albeit minor, axis of development. Viewed in this light, Izmir's triangular shape was not merely the automatic result of its natural boundaries (the river Meles, Mount Pagus and the sea). The river in particular might just as easily have been crossed – after all, there are plenty of examples of historical “double” cities developing on either side of a river. Rather, the three axes at the crossroads of which the city expanded, played a pivotal role in determining the course and direction of growth. This strengthens the assumption that, in developing, the city's main streets and quarters followed the overriding logic of these axes of development. In practice, this means that utilizing the main streets highlighted in Map 8 in visualizing Izmir's growth is not as hazardous as it might seem at first glance.

Returning to the quarters in Table 7 and on Map 8, we see that Han Bey (Pazar) is located at the crossroads of the main overland axes (the caravan road and the Urla road). This old commercial district (hence the addition of *pazar*, signifying market or bazaar, to its name) was centered on the ancient agora and was the linchpin that connected the upper and lower parts of the city. It is joined to the third overland axis (the salt road) and the inner harbor (the terminus of a fourth, overseas, axis of growing importance) by Limon (Liman). This quarter was the center of the lower city and facilitated both the commercial and military functions of the inner harbor. The former function, which generated the typically intricate structure still recognizable in the 19th-century (see Map 4), was concentrated in the higher, northern, part of the

quarter between the harbor and Han Bey. Lower Limon was a garrison quarter centered on the lower castle. Its regiment, however, was not included in the *tabrir*.

North and southeast of these central but relatively small quarters lie the bigger three; Cemaat-ı Gebran, Faik Paşa and Mescid-i Selatinzade. The fully Greek-Orthodox population of the first, heir to Byzantine Izmir, rebuilt and repopulated its quarter after Timur's devastation and swelled further as the city passed to the emirates for good and Turks from the hillside quarters populated Limon (1402 and after; see above). Together, Mescid-i Selatinzade and Faik Paşa constituted upper Izmir, where the bulk of the city's Turkish population still dwelt. Mescid-i Selatinzade served the commercial functions of this part of the city in much the same way as upper Limon served those of the lower city (notice that both adjoin Han Bey). Faik Paşa, meanwhile, was the political and religious center of the upper city, as is illustrated by its concentration of higher clergy and officials (in the survey data from 1528).

Looking at the quarters and their main functions, we can distinguish the beginnings of a process of internal diversification prompted by the unification and consequent growth of the city. The development of a division of labor over areas of a city and this division's reshuffling under circumstances of further growth or decline are processes central to urbanization.¹⁴⁰ Izmir's history as a double city becoming one makes these processes all the more visible. Where once both the lower and upper city had each displayed the primary urban features (commercial, political-religious and military), these were now slowly being redistributed under the *pax Ottomanica*. The eventual result was the concentration of commercial functions along the shore (inter-regional-commercial around the inner harbor and international-commercial along the outer harbor), political and religious functions in the upper quarters and manufacturing in between the two. After the upper castle had lost its function as a stronghold against depredations from the lower city and the sea, military functions were concentrated in the lower castle (which would be supplanted by Sancak Kalesi in the 17th century). In the 16th century, however, this division of labor was still in its beginnings, as were the economic and demographical developments behind it.

The City and its Quarters According to the Survey of 1575

By 1575, the number of quarters of the city proper had increased from five to eight, as shown in Table 8.

¹⁴⁰ Cf. Burgess, "Growth of the City", 154-56; Sjoberg, *Preindustrial City*, 11, 101 and 209-11; Frederic C. Lane, *Venice: A Maritime Republic* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 155-56; Henri Lefèbvre, *The Production of Space* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991; 2009), 347; Savage, *Urban Sociology*, 39 and 122; and Saskia Sassen, *Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 57-58.

TABLE 8: DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION OF IZMIR PROPER (1575)

	Registered Individuals (F)+BC)	Difference with 1528	% of Total	Bachelors & Celibates (BC)	Exempted Muslims		
					Higher Clergy	Saltpan Workers	Destitute & Disabled
Faik Paşa	83	+13	16.87	4	2	16	-
Mescid-i Selatin-zade	56	-5	11.38	-	2	6	4
Han Bey (Pazar)	92	+53	18.70	1	-	8	1
Limon (Liman)	54	+29	10.98	-	1	9	-
Ali Çavuş (new)	35	+35	7.11	-	-	3	-
Yazıcı (new)	32	+32	6.50	-	-	7	-
Şeyhler/Şaphane (new)	30	+30	6.10	-	-	-	-
Cemaat-ı Gebran	110	+67	22.36	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	492	+254	100.00	5	5	49	5

Based on Kütükoğlu, *XV ve XVI. asırlarda İzmir*, 26-30.

The table introduces three new quarters, Ali Çavuş, Yazıcı and Şeyhler/Şaphane. In previous studies these quarters' possible locations appear surrounded by question marks. These express an uncertainty both illustrated and exacerbated by their being situated on otherwise nearly blank maps.¹⁴¹ This uncertainty can be mitigated, however, with the help of the enhanced versions of Graves' plan, travelers' testimonies and some modern tourist maps. Previously, the built-up areas of 1528 and 1678 have been determined and displayed in a fixed projection in relation to a number of permanent landmarks. The uninterrupted growth (without major relocations) of İzmir's population in the period between those years means that the build-up of 1575 will have exceeded that of 1528, but will easily have stayed within Galand's 1678-outline.

Within these limits, the direction of growth can be specified even further by eliminating any areas that would later accommodate the Armenian and Jewish immigrants that started arriving around the turn of the 16th century. Would the growth of the Greek and the Armenian and Jewish communities of İzmir have coincided with a decline of the Turkish population, some quarters that had formerly been Turkish would certainly have passed to the minorities. As it was, however, the growth of the Turkish population did not lag that far behind; between 1528 and 1657 it was at least as prodigious as the minorities' (compare Tables 6 and 8) and between 1657 and 1678 it was indeed still growth, although at a lower rate than the minorities' (see Table 6). The lower social status of the non-Muslim population and the uninter-

¹⁴¹ See Goffman, *İzmir and the Levantine World*, 12; and Kütükoğlu, *XV ve XVI. asırlarda İzmir*, 23.

rupted growth of the Muslim population make it highly unlikely that the former (its growth notwithstanding) displaced any solid concentrations of the latter. To put it more emphatically; under such circumstances it was out of the question that institutionalized and well-defined Muslim quarters like the ones in the 1575-*tahrir* would become partly or entirely non-Muslim, let alone within a mere half century. Thus, the areas that were to house the Armenian and Jewish communities in the 17th century (the Greek has already been accounted for with Cemaat-ı Gebran) should be considered largely undeveloped in the 16th, although some incidental spillover from the Muslim quarters might first have settled there.


Which, then, are these areas that should be excluded as possible locations for the three new quarters, because they would later be inhabited by the Armenian and Jewish communities? Some visual indications can be gathered from a French map from the first years of the 20th century, published in Karl Baedeker's guide for European tourists visiting Izmir (see Plate 8). The map indicates a *Quartier Turc* hugging the full breadth of the northwestern slopes of Mount Pagus, a *Quartier Juif* between the agora and the (filled) inner harbor, a *Quartier Arménien* directly north of the Turkish quarter(s), a *Quartier Grec* north and northwest of the Armenian quarter and a *Quartier Franc* between the northern Greek quarter and the shore. Again, note the broadened quays: the 17th-century quays corresponded to the Eski Balık Pazarı (old fish market) and the *Quai Anglais* of the map and continued northeast from there; Frank Street was the street running directly behind it, renamed Sultan Djaddessi (Sultan's Street) and continuing on as Medjidié Djaddessi (Street of Sultan Abdülmecid). If Baedeker's map is given the same treatment as that of Graves in Map 8, but with the names of the quarters omitted and the text indicating the ethnic distribution brought to the front, the result is Map 9.

Although centuries separate Baedeker's map from the beginnings of Izmir's Armenian and Jewish communities, it displays considerable continuity where the various communities' development is concerned. The addition of some minor qualifications will make it fit to help determine where the growth of the years 1528-1575 (and after) was directed.

Map 9 clearly illustrates that the *Quartier Franc* and *Quartier Grec* had sprung from the quarter of Cemaat-ı Gebran, by comparison still embryonic in the 16th century. South of the Greek quarter, we see the *Quartier Arménien*, with the Armenian cathedral of St. Stephen at its westernmost border (see Plates 3 and 8 for a better view). Notwithstanding the fact that one of the most erudite works on the history of Izmir states that this was not the location of the Armenian quarter at the time of the earthquake of 1688¹⁴²

¹⁴² Iconomos, *Étude sur Smyrne*, 128.

MAP 9: ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF IZMIR'S POPULATION IN 1905



Based on Map 8; Karl Baedeker, *Konstantinopel, Balkanstaaten, Kleinasien, Archipel, Cypern: Handbuch für Reisende* (Leipzig: Karl Baedeker, 1905; 1914), between 332-33.

(a statement repeated in all modern works on Izmir) contemporary evidence shows that it certainly was. The confusion might have been caused by its name; “*Apano-Machala* (Haut-Quartier)”, which appears to have been interpreted as meaning “on the slopes of Mount Pagus”. It should be kept in mind, however, that the inhabitants of the miniature Europe along the northern seashore considered all quarters further inland as lying higher up in town, no matter whether these quarters were actually located on the plain or the hillside. This lies behind 17th-century European visitors to Izmir saying that “the Turks, Greeks, Armenians and Jews live in the upper city; the latter mostly together in one quarter”, while Galland simultaneously testifies to the St. Stephen lying in the Armenian quarter.¹⁴³ That the early 20th-century Ar-

¹⁴³ The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 42b. Similar statements can be found in, e.g., De Bruyn, *Reizen*, 27: “The Armenians and Jews mostly live in the upper city” and Jean-Baptiste Tavernier, *Les six voyages de Jean-Baptiste Tavernier en Turquie, en Perse et aux Indes* (Paris: n.p.,

menian quarter did in fact evolve from the 17th-century quarter is corroborated by references to an Armenian street. Galland tells us “Il n’y a de longues rues que celle du quartier des Francs, celles des Arméniens, deux au bazar qui sont plus larges que les deux premières.”¹⁴⁴ A quick look at Map 9 shows he is speaking of Frank Street and the three streets carrying traffic from the caravan bridge westwards to the 17th-century city’s commercial center (the area northeast of the inner harbor). If the higher half of the northernmost of these three streets (above the southern end of Frank Street and running east off the St. Stephen) was indeed popularly called Armenian Street, this effectively identifies the quarter on either side of this street as the Armenian quarter.¹⁴⁵

The traveler’s statements above could be interpreted as suggesting that the Armenians shared their quarter with the Jewish community, or that the Jewish quarter was located in the same general area as the Armenian. In reality, however, Izmir’s Jews inhabited the area west of the agora in the 17th century as they still would in the beginning of the 20th (see Map 9).¹⁴⁶ The old center of the Jewish part of the bazaar quarter is Havra Sokak (Synagogue Street, see Plate 7; slightly left of Güneş, between the old inner harbor and the agora). This street – now officially known as 927th Street – was once lined with no less than nine synagogues and oratories, six of which are still in existence (in use, disuse, or at least identifiable) today.¹⁴⁷ A further two synagogues and one oratory can also still be found in streets nearby.¹⁴⁸ Their geographical concentration, as well as the continuity evident in their being founded in an uninterrupted series from before the community’s formal establishment in 1605 until well into the 18th century, indisputably shows that the center of the *Quartier Juif* was as old as the community it housed.¹⁴⁹ Of

1679), 83: “Les Turcs, les Grecs, les Armeniens & les Juifs demeurent sur la colline, & toute le bas qui est le long de de la mer n’est habité que par des Chrestiens d’Europe, François, Anglois, Hollandois & Italiens”. Contra Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 136.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 110.

¹⁴⁵ This location is confirmed by geographical descriptions of its location in *ibid.*, 89; and Iconomos, *Étude sur Smyrne*, 48-55.

¹⁴⁶ Today most of Izmir’s approximately 2,500 Jews live in the Alsancak-quarter, which also houses the city’s Grand Rabbinate.

¹⁴⁷ These are Senyora or Gheveret, Portugal, Shalom or Aydinlis, Algazi or Kaal de Ariva, Nevranı or Hevra and Mizrahi.

¹⁴⁸ These are the synagogues Etz ha-Haïm (no. 5, 937th Street) and Bikur Holim (no. 40, İkiçeşmelik Street), and the oratory Bet Hillel (no. 23, 920th Street).

¹⁴⁹ The older synagogues can be dated as follows: Etz ha-Haïm (Byzantine), Senyora or Gheveret (16th ct.), Portugal (pre-1620), Gerush (*id.*), Shalom or Aydinlis (*id.*), Talmud Torah (*id.*), Mahazike Torah (pre-1622), Pinto (pre-1666), Galanté (c1666), Bakiche (17th ct.), Bikur Holim (1724) and Algazi or Kaal de Ariva (*id.*): Abraham Galanté, *Histoire des Juifs d’Anatolie: les Juifs d’Izmir (Smyrne)* (Istanbul: Imprimerie Baroque, 1937), 37-45 and throughout. The community’s history (up to its formalization in 1605) is discussed on 7-12, its distribution on 12-16.

more recent date, however, was the eastern part of the quarter, away from the old center around the synagogues. This part would in time take up much of what had previously been the Muslim quarter of Han Bey (see Map 9), but the *tabriirs* show that this change in ethnic composition occurred after the 16th century – perhaps after the massive displacement caused in the area by the earthquake of 1688, or as a gradual process over hundreds of years.¹⁵⁰

Now that the areas have been identified that were to host the non-Muslim communities from the late 16th and early 17th century onwards, these can safely be discounted as locations where the main thrust of the Muslim population's expansion of the years 1528-1575 was not directed. This does not mean that no Muslims settled in those areas, however. Ethno-religious separation was not strictly observed in early modern and modern Ottoman Izmir. Although no non-Muslims lived in the Muslim quarters, many Turks certainly did live in the city's non-Muslim quarters. Similarly, there was also a great deal of residential mingling taking place among Izmir's non-Muslim communities.¹⁵¹ This leaves the more elevated areas (the south-eastern part of the triangle in Map 9) as the only ones that could have absorbed the bulk of the growth of the four older Muslim quarters and the creation of three new ones. These areas lie on either side of the upper quarters of 1528 (in Maps 8 and 9), confined by the later Armenian quarter to the north and the Urla-road to the west.

Kütükoğlu argues that the new quarter of Şaphane was in reality called Şeyhler, the former being a misreading of the *tabriir's* text by previous scholars.¹⁵² If this is indeed the case, the misreading was probably occasioned by attempts to identify a likely location for the quarter: *şaphane* translates as “alum-house” or “alum-factory” and *şaf*, or alum, was used in tanning leather and dying fabrics. Such a reading, therefore, would suggest a location around the tan-yard (or tanneries) halfway along the distributary of the Meles (see the constructions built over this waterway in Map 4).¹⁵³ But this location is problematic as Baedeker's map shows the area to have later belonged to the Armenian quarter. Even if only the area taken up by the small Armenian quarter of the 17th-century (limited to the direct proximity of the St. Stephen) is discounted as a possible location, this would still leave too little room for a 16th-century Muslim quarter around the tanneries. What's more, such a miniscule quarter would have been separated from the city's other Muslim quarters, which is unconvincing considering its spillover function. Instead, reading the quarter's name as Şeyhler has led Kütükoğlu to identify it as the

¹⁵⁰ The earthquake hit the lower lying areas the hardest: Ülker, *Rise of Izmir*, 43-47

¹⁵¹ See, e.g., Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 107; and Istanbul, SLK MF 4027.

¹⁵² Kütükoğlu, *XV ve XVI. asırlarda İzmir*, 23n24.

¹⁵³ Which is indeed the location proposed by Goffman, *Izmir and the Levantine World*, 12.

16th-century equivalent of the 19th-century quarter of Şeyh (also known as Yaycılar). This puts it neatly between the 1528-buildup and the location of the later Armenian quarter; that is, south and west of the modern Basmane-train station (see Maps 7 and 8). Ironically, this re-legitimizes the Şaphane-reading since the station's name is a corruption of *basmahane*, signifying a place where fabrics are dyed and/or printed, which establishes it as a second location that historically housed dyeing industries.

Of the remaining two quarters, that registered as Ali Çavuş has been identified as an early version of the quarter of Ali Reis (see Map 7; southeast of the agora), historically placing it southwest of Mescid-i Selatinzade.¹⁵⁴ The last quarter, Yazıcı, is much more difficult to identify. In this case, there is no toponymical continuity, however vague, as with the other two quarters. We are forced, therefore, to rely on an estimation of the space available between the five quarters of 1528, the two already established new quarters of 1575, the 17th-century Greek, Jewish and Armenian quarters and the city's general triangular shape of 1678. These limitations really only leave enough space for Yazıcı between Ali Çavuş and the future Jewish quarter.¹⁵⁵

With the three newest quarters topographically accounted for, it is now possible to represent the situation of 1575 graphically (see Map 10).

Although Izmir had grown a great deal since its definitive unification in 1424, the furrows left by a long history of duality were so deep that they were still clearly visible 150 years later. A slightly unequal distribution of growth had transformed the city: from the boomerang-shaped top-heavy city of the early 16th century into the hourglass-shaped late-16th-century one (see Maps 8 and 10). But its form was still reminiscent of an upper and lower city connected by a commercial corridor. In figures, the change can be represented by grouping the upper, middle and lower quarters together to compare the population-sizes of these parts in 1528 and 1575 (see Table 9).


The table shows that the 16th century witnessed a moderate shift in population from the higher to the lower-lying areas. This shift reflects three inter-related trends that are characteristic of Izmir's development from a modest market town and regional harbor to an international port city in the course of the 16th and 17th centuries: the unification of the double town and the consequent Turkification of the lower-middle city (1), the internationaliza-

¹⁵⁴ The quarter of Ali Reis already comes up in Ottoman documents from the 17th century and still exists today: Kütükoğlu, *XV ve XVI. asırlarda İzmir*, 24. It is also listed in Istanbul, SLK MF 4027, 18r.

¹⁵⁵ Kütükoğlu's map omits the quarter altogether (*id.*, *XV ve XVI. asırlarda İzmir*, 23), while Goffman's (which is dated 1650 but appears to have been based on the 1575-*tabiri*) puts it in the same location, but with Ali Çavuş below instead of above it (Goffman, *Izmir and the Levantine World*, 12). Unfortunately, neither author elaborates on the subject.

tion of the city's economy and the resulting shift in economic focus (2) and the growing importance of the non-Muslim population (3).

MAP 10: QUARTERS OF IZMIR IN 1575



Based on Map 8; Kütükoğlu, *XV ve XVI. asırlarda İzmir*, 23-24; Goffman, *Izmir and the Levantine World*, 12.

TABLE 9: POPULATION OF UPPER, MIDDLE AND LOWER IZMIR (1528-1575)

	1528		1575	
	Quarters	% of total	Quarters	% of total
Upper Izmir	Faik Paşa Mescid-i Selatinzade	55.04 %	Faik Paşa Mescid-i Selatinzade Şeyhler (Şaphane) Ali Çavuş	41.46 %
Middle Izmir	Han Bey (Pazar)	16.39 %	Han Bey (Pazar) Yazıcı	25.20 %
Lower Izmir	Limon (Liman) Cemaat-ı Gebran	28.57 %	Limon (Liman) Cemaat-ı Gebran	33.34 %

Based on Tables 7 and 8.

As discussed previously, Izmir was originally a double town with both parts dependent on an uninterrupted flow of commerce between the caravan road, the Urla-road and the inner harbor. This made the ancient agora at the junction of these crossroads the commercial center where the geographical opposites were united in the pursuit of worldly gain. Once the double town was united under the Ottomans, the commercial district around the agora (now identifiable with Han Bey) became the corridor through which part of the Turkish population of the higher town flowed towards the lower part. The incentive for this movement (the “pull factor”) was the growing commercial importance of Izmir’s harbor. As the port began to compete with Chios to become the Anatolian caravan route’s western terminus, international trade started to account for an ever larger share of the city’s economy. Manufacturing and the marketing of regional produce were slowly but certainly internationalized, regional commodities being exported along with the extra-regional luxury commodities from the caravans.

This change in economic orientation brought with it a shift of focus from the inner harbor and the crossroads to its west towards the shore along the outer harbor. Although this process was still in its beginnings in 1575, there is no doubt that it was already reflected in the exceptional growth of the “community of non-Muslims” – after all the main facilitator of the city’s Ottoman-European trade. The limited mobility between residence and employment characteristic of the pre-industrial age dictates that the size and density of an area’s population was closely correlated to that area’s economic importance, which implies that changes in the distribution of pre-industrial populations are a sound indicator of economic focus. A brief glance at Map 10 is enough to confirm the validity of this rule, not only for 16th, but also for 17th-century Izmir: as its economy increasingly revolved around international trade, the city’s population was drawn towards the shore, in the end creating the triangular shape noted by Galland. Judging by Graves’ map and the way in which one of the world’s largest port cities today envelopes most of the bay that made its fortune, this process continued well past the period under discussion.

Now that 16th and 17th-century demographical developments and trends have been discussed and a necessary excursion into Izmir’s 16th-century geography has identified the physical margins of 17th-century growth, it is time to return to the city of 1678.

The City and its Quarters According to Evliya and Galland

Just as before, it is Evliya and Galland who provide us with the most elaborate accounts, this time of Izmir’s quarters. In 1678, Galland counts eleven exclusively Turkish quarters, three quarters inhabited by Greeks, Armenians

and Jews, and one, Kasap Hazır, housing the Franks.¹⁵⁶ Evliya, quoting İsmail Paşa's survey of 1657/58 as his source, gives no less than "ten Muslim, ten exclusively Greek, ten Frankish and Jewish quarters, two Armenian quarters and one Gypsy quarter".¹⁵⁷

Evliya's numbers seem suspiciously high, the more so since the total number of 16th and 17th-century historical quarters' names come down to us barely amount to twenty – and that is including quite a few duplicates due to name changes.¹⁵⁸ Then, there is another famous Ottoman man-of-letters, the historian-bibliographer-geographer Katip Çelebi (b. 1609-d. 1657; also known as Hacı Halifa), who speaks of "up to twenty quarters" in the mid-17th century.¹⁵⁹

There is no way of checking these figures against official data as the original detailed register of İsmail Paşa's survey is not extant and the derived register that is extant (the aforementioned BBA MAD 14672) does not list quarters. The only way out is to revert to steering a course through contradicting evidence in the hope of arriving at a sensible destination. Luckily, Galland has left us what might be a valuable clue: just before his ethnic breakdown of the city's quarters, he speaks of a total number of thirteen, only to go on to count fifteen, which figure he confirms two paragraphs down. If Evliya's numbers are considered in light of Galland's contradictory statements, it appears that a course may yet be plotted.

Galland's and Evliya's access to Ottoman fiscal data (be it directly or indirectly) and the latter's penchant for hyperbole have already been established. We have also seen that the joining of information from various sources and times typically led to internal contradictions that could slip by the author producing them. At the risk of reading too much into his unblinkingly giving us two different figures in a single sentence, it seems that Galland, when confronted with discrepancy in his sources, took the same route as before (concerning the number of Jews) and followed a short mention of the last-known official figures up with more extensive contemporary or personal observations.

Let us assume for a moment that Galland took his figure of thirteen quarters from the last *tabrir* available to him, being the one conducted by İsmail Paşa in 1657/58, and that his figure of fifteen quarters represents the situation around his own visit in 1678. Then, let us ask ourselves whether it is not too much of a coincidence that Evliya's "ten Muslim, ten exclusively Greek, ten Frankish and Jewish quarters, two Armenian quarters and one Gypsy quarter", explicitly derived from İsmail Paşa's survey, can be brought down

¹⁵⁶ Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 107-8.

¹⁵⁷ Evliya, *Seyahatname* 9, 93.

¹⁵⁸ Kütükoğlu, *XV ve XVI. asırlarda İzmir*, 23-24.

¹⁵⁹ Katip Çelebi, *Kitab-ı Cihannüma* (Kostantuniye / Istanbul: Darulibaaat-ul Amire, 1065 / 1654; 1145 / 1732, 669.

to Galland’s thirteen through a very slight syntactical reinterpretation: “ten Muslim, Greek, Frankish and Jewish quarters, two Armenian quarters and one Gypsy quarter”” Could Evliya’s account be the result of the reverse procedure?

TABLE 10: AVG. NUMBER OF TAXPAYING FAMILIES PER QUARTER (1528-1678)

Year	Taxpaying families	Number of Quarters	Taxpaying families per quarter
1528	238	5	47.6
1575	492	8	61.5
1657/58	10,300	13	792.3
1678	19,430	15	1,295.3

Based on Tables 6, 7 and 8; Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 107-8.

Evliya’s credibility aside, an increase in the number of quarters from eight in 1575 to fifteen in 1678 does seem more consistent with the development of Izmir’s built-up space over this period: the space between the quarters of 1575 and Galland’s 1678-outline indeed represents about half of the triangle’s total area (see Map 10). On the other hand, such an increase seems remarkably slight when compared to the growth of the taxpaying population. If the increase in the number of quarters was proportionate to the growth of the city’s area, the relation between the number of quarters and the size of the population became increasingly disproportionate (see Table 10). Nevertheless, this would hold true even for much higher numbers of quarters.

The table not only suggests that the filling and expanding of existing quarters played a larger role in accommodating population growth than the creation of new quarters, it also points to a rapid increase in population density. If we leave, for a moment, the uncertain confines of the 17th-century quarters and consider the city’s population in light of the area it occupied, we cannot but conclude that both population and administration faced a major challenge.

Galland’s scalene delimits an area of just over half a square mile, or slightly under one and a half square kilometers.¹⁶⁰ As appears from the maps of the situation in 1528 and 1575 (see Maps 8 and 10), the main built-up area was about one third and one half, respectively, of the area later delimited by Galland. Dividing our population estimates for those same years (see Table 10) by these areas results in the population densities shown in Table 11.

¹⁶⁰ 0.5 nautical mile equals 0.926 km. The triangle’s perimeter measures about 2.88 nautical mi, or 5.334 km. If the triangle is taken to be a scalene (which it indeed almost is), the length of the sides is 0.96 nautical mi, or 1.778 km, equaling 1.106 mi. This results in an area ($0.5 \cdot \text{sides}^2 \cdot \sin 60^\circ$) of 0.399 nautical mi², 1.369 km², or 0.529 mi², a figure confirmed by other maps.

TABLE 11: DENSITY OF THE TAXPAYING POPULATION (1528-1678)

Year	Taxpay- ing families	Average family size	Taxpaying population	Occupied area in mi ² / km ²	Urban Density per mi ² / km ²
1528	238	4.90	1,166	0.176 / 0.456	6,625 / 2,557
1575	492	4.90	2,411	0.265 / 0.685	9,098 / 3,520
1657/58	10,300	3.65	37,595 (49,503)	0.450 / 1.164	83,544 (110,007) / 32,298 (42,528)
1678	(16,580) 19,430	3.65	(60,517) 70,920	0.529 / 1.369	(114,399) 134,064 / (44,205) 51,804

Based on Maps 8 and 10; Tables 3, 4, 5 and 10.

Please note that the figures in the table are not as accurate as the use of decimals might suggest; these were only added to avoid the added inaccuracy inherent in doing calculations with round variables. Also note that the estimated numbers of taxpaying families are interpretations of Ottoman fiscal data and travelers' estimates, themselves contemporary interpretations. Furthermore, the multipliers used were obtained from solid research, but on another region (Bursa and surroundings) and should be considered generalizations. They introduce a rather mechanical difference between average family size in the 16th and 17th century, presumably reflecting the evolution of Izmir's typical family structure from one of the village to one of the city. Furthermore, it should be kept in mind that the areas are approximate because they were obtained from edited historical maps delineating city quarters whose exact boundaries remain unknown. Lastly, the absence of similar data for the *tabiri*-year of 1657/58 has meant that this year's area had to be derived from statistical context.¹⁶¹

For all the leeway these interpretations allow in the table's middle columns, however, the jump in population density visible in the final column remains amazingly high, even if the calculation is done with our lower population estimates (the figures between the brackets in the table). No matter how much we question the number of taxpaying families (and particularly the 1678-figure), the difference between 16th and 17th-century family size, the resultant size of the taxpaying population (several possible options in 1657/58 and 1678), or the approximate area taken up within the 1678-outline – any and all adjustments are simply dwarfed by the unequivocally explosive growth of the number of taxpayers in relation to the relatively

¹⁶¹ If we were to make a scale of average area growth per decade on the basis of our sample years (1528, 1575, 1657/58 and 1678), we would arrive at an average growth of about 0.0174 per decade between 1528 and 1575 and about 0.0238 per decade between 1575 and 1678. On such a scale, the estimated area in 1657/58 would amount to 0.543. The assumption of course is that the city's area grew at a more or less constant rate, with an acceleration occurring around 1575, at the time the city started booming.

modest area occupied. This is even more surprising when considering that these estimated densities are made up entirely of taxpaying bachelors and families, excluding what must have been a sizeable population of tax-exempt, visitors and slaves.

To put this density of 134,064 taxpaying inhabitants (taxpayers and family) per square mile in historical perspective, we could look to one of the best-conserved and most-researched historical cities; the booming provincial Roman port-city of Pompeii. Such a comparison across many centuries may seem peculiar, but mid-17th-century Izmir shared a number of significant commonalities with Pompeii as it stood on the eve of its destruction on AD 79: a comparable geography (on the seaside, at the far end of a large bay, with a sizeable natural harbor and a slightly sloping buildup, oriented to the windward side and protected in the rear by hills and mountains), function (port town, regional trade center, culturally diverse), life cycle-phase (previously booming Pompeii still recovering from the heavy earthquake that had struck it 17 years earlier, Izmir still removed a similar number of years from the peak of its original boom), size (probably similar if we include the area and population directly beyond Pompeii's walls) and supporting technology (it would take until the 19th century until the infrastructure of waterworks and sanitation began to overtake that of Roman times).

On the eve of its burial underneath Vesuvius' pyroclastic flow and downpour of ashes, Pompeii housed an estimated 10 to 20,000 on the 0.25 mi² (0.647 km²) area within its walls.¹⁶² That makes the estimated population density of its walled-in area 40 to 80,000 persons per mi² (15,456 to 30,912 per km²); only very slightly behind the freshly booming Izmir of 1657/58. The neat Roman grid so vividly in evidence in Pompeii's uncovered center has seduced many a visitor into contemplating a calm and orderly city, forgetting not only about the mass of simple homes and winding streets that still lie buried underneath the Campanian landscape, but also simply about what such densities mean in reality.

Anyone who imagines walled-in Pompeii to have been anywhere near as calm and orderly as its planned center suggests should know that its maximum estimated density of some 80,000 p/mi² (30,912 p/km²) nearly equals today's highest officially recorded urban density (that of Mumbai), and its minimum of 40,000 p/mi² (15,456 p/km²) the 7th highest (that of Taipei), while the urban densities of modern western port cities like Amsterdam,

¹⁶² See Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, *Houses and Society in Pompeii and Herculaneum* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 95 and throughout.

Naples and New York amount to but 11,865 p/mi² (4,581 p/km²), 10,619 p/mi² (4,100 p/km²) and 5,309 p/mi² (2,050 p/km²) respectively.¹⁶³

Considering the enormous contrast the bustling chaos of a living Ottoman city and the stately wistful vestiges of the planned Roman city center shimmering beneath it, it is not difficult to see why many a visiting Renaissance man, remarking upon the city's overcrowding, would lament the demise of the romanticized ancient grid: "Pour les autres, outre qu'elles sont étroites, elles sont encore entrecoupées, tortues et sans ordre, de telle manière que la ville d'aujourd'hui est autant différente de l'ancienne qu'une chose laide et vilaine l'est d'avec une belle et bien proportionnée".¹⁶⁴ Still, that such complaints were already uttered in the 17th century is rather remarkable in light of future developments. For the city's population would continue to grow for centuries to come, hitting the 200,000-mark in the mid-19th century.¹⁶⁵ And that without significant expansion of its built-up area!¹⁶⁶ And this is without even considering the increasing numbers of non-residents attracted to Izmir's ever-increasing commerce. Under such circumstances, would one not expect the city to have suffocated its own development?

The solution to this apparent contradiction lies in the application of technological innovation to urban infrastructure. Improvements in building, utilities and transport can dramatically increase a city's tolerance for higher population densities through increasing the number of floors of buildings, through providing adequate lighting, water supplies, waste disposal and sewerage and through building and maintaining paved roads, bridges and means of public transport. In our wealthier and individualistic modern age, such advances have tended to go hand in hand with demands for ever larger private living space, largely nullifying the net effect of infrastructural advances on urban density. Nonetheless, this effect was not yet in play in the early modern city of Izmir. Life in the overcrowded city of the 1670s could only remain bearable and economically viable if adjustments were made to Izmir's old town-like infrastructure. In other words; to survive Izmir needed an upgrade to city-status, not just by being reattached administratively to the im-

¹⁶³ "The largest cities in the world by land area, population and density" (6 January 2007), *CityMayors Statistics*, <http://www.citymayors.com/statistics/largest-cities-density-125.html> (accessed 23 November 2011).

¹⁶⁴ Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 111.

¹⁶⁵ Cf., e.g., Niyazi Berkes and Feroz Ahmad, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (New York: Routledge, 1964), 141n8; Reşat Kasaba, *The Ottoman Empire and the World economy: The Nineteenth Century* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1988), 151n45; Roger Owen, *The Middle East in the World economy, 1800-1914* (London: I.B.Tauris, 1993), 98; and Peter Sluglett, *The Urban Social History of the Middle East, 1750-1950* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2008), 159.

¹⁶⁶ In Map 5, compare the 1678-triangle and the build-up of 1844.

portant district of Aydın and the central province of Anatolia, or by fiscal interference by court, but also by modernizing its infrastructure.

In Western Europe such projects were typically planned, funded and executed by the municipality or subordinate civic bodies. In the Ottoman Empire, however, such chartered local institutions were conspicuously absent from the political-administrative configuration. This is not to say that there were no Ottoman associations based on vocation (*esnaf*), religious profession (*tarikeat*) or social status (*esraf* and *ayan*), nor that these did not wield any influence in local politics – but these were not civic bodies in the western European sense and their membership was not necessarily limited to citizens or inhabitants of a given town or city. In fact, these associations had not come into being as a reaction to aristocratic and dynastic authority as they had in Europe. Rather, they functioned as an extension of the state, albeit with the capacity to exert considerable influence over the practical application of its policies on the local and regional levels. Along with the *millets*, this functional difference with Europe's urban institutions has been considered so crucial as to warrant propositions that the term “city” should not be applied to Ottoman urban phenomena (or, for that matter, to Islamic or Middle Eastern ones; see the quotations preceding the introduction).

The third set of institutions to share in this dubious honor of often being viewed as an insurmountable obstacle to a modernity grafted on civic identity in particular and civil society in general, is the charitable endowment, or *wakf*.¹⁶⁷ Although the vast majority of Ottoman public works was realized, administrated and maintained through this essentially benign class of institutions, it was nevertheless regarded as a root cause of Ottoman backwardness by 19th and 20th-century western analysts from Max Weber onwards.¹⁶⁸ And by the Ottoman and Turkish modernizers who undertook to act upon their diagnoses. In their view the trouble with *wakfs* was that they provided their public services not from budgets furnished by regular taxation and private investment (as in the West), but from incomes generated by movable and immovable holdings bequeathed to it *ad infinitum* by private benefactors.

¹⁶⁷ See R. Peters et al., “Wakf”, *EI2*, ii: 59a-b.

¹⁶⁸ See Bryan S. Turner, *Weber and Islam* (London: Routledge, 1998), 124. Or, in his own words – Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, vol. 4: *Herrschaft* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009), 120: “Denn daß die höchst nachhaltige Immobilisierung akkumulierten Besitzes in Gestalt der Wakufgebundenheit – ganz dem Geist der antiken Wirtschaft entsprechend, welche akkumuliertes Vermögen als Rentenfonds, nicht als Erwerbskapital benutzte – für die ökonomische Entwicklung des Orients von sehr großer Bedeutung gewesen ist, nimmt Carl Heinrich Becker sicher mit recht an.” In the preceding and following pages it becomes clear that Weber considered the Islamic institution to be the source of similarly counter-capitalist institutions in Europe, from Spain to Germany.

Such a removal from free market circulation of what might by the 19th century have amounted to “three-quarters of the buildings and arable land in the empire” was regarded by Weber *cum suis* as a major if not *the* factor hindering the healthy development of Ottoman private interest and capitalism, thereby blocking first civic and later civil progress (as well as full European economic hegemony).¹⁶⁹ Whether or not the institution of *wakf* was indeed instrumental in the underdevelopment of market capitalism in the Ottoman Empire (and whether or not this was of direct consequence for its ability to survive in the periphery of the expanding western world economy), the view that up to three quarters of the assets in the Ottoman Empire was forever immovably fixed in place and function and played no role in the market economy is plainly absurd.

Here, the problem is similar to that surrounding the question of whether or not Ottoman or Islamic cities really constituted cities. Essentially, the issue is not with the studied subject, but with the foreign conceptualizations used in studying it. When the very definitions of capital, enterprise, market and economy we use are formulated on the basis of European practice, how can functional equivalents elsewhere ever be recognized as such and meet the standards of those conceptualizations? They cannot. At least, not until they are destroyed and rebuilt completely after the European *idea* – in which case they will of course still never quite attain the ideal.

It is beyond the scope of this study to suggest an Ottoman alternative to the selection bias inherent in the *wakf*-paradigm. That is something others (cited directly above and below) have already attempted with some success. We will here limit ourselves to describing the many roles and functions of Izmir’s main *wakf*, and leave for elsewhere the question if the functions of such *wakfs* indeed differed that much from the European civic and civil institutions to which they have been compared so unfavorably.

The City and its Quarters According to the 1678-Deed

Sound descriptions of the institution of *wakf* and its functions are very hard to come by. They invariably focus heavily on either its general legal foundation or on its specific physical manifestations. In his superb case study of the *wakfs* of Ottoman Damascus, Richard van Leeuwen attempts to go beyond this dichotomy to arrive at a (Bourdieuian) approach that integrates both the *wakf*’s formal theoretical bases and its manifold practical expressions.¹⁷⁰ He does so starting from the following schematic description of its functions:

The proliferation of waqfs in Muslim societies in the course of time fostered the diversification of their functions and characteristics. Essentially a waqf consisted of an object which

¹⁶⁹ Peters et al., “Wakf”, 91.

¹⁷⁰ Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991; 2010).

was endowed to a specific pious purpose for eternity. The founder (waqif) gave up his property rights and determined the pious purpose and the regulations for the exploitation of the object, which became 'the property of God'. The object was dissociated from the market circulation and any form of alienation (sale, pawning, donation) was strictly forbidden. Waqfs were often founded for the benefit of mosques, which themselves also had the status of waqf. In such a case, agricultural lands were converted into waqf and their revenues destined to build and maintain a specified mosque and its functionaries. Waqfs could thus either be possessions yielding revenues and profit, or objects consuming these revenues and serving as religious or social institutions. At an early stage of the development of waqf regulations, the founder was allowed to designate himself and/or his family and descendants as the beneficiaries of his foundation. Only after the extinction of his line would the revenue be allocated to a certain pious purpose (for instance, 'the poor of Damascus'). He could, moreover, appoint himself and his descendants as trustees of the waqf, thus keeping control of the waqf possessions in spite of having relinquished the rights of ownership.¹⁷¹

As was the case throughout the Ottoman Empire, Izmir's inhabitants spent most of their public lives, as well as a significant part of their private ones, depending on the properties, services and employment of Islamic pious endowments (*vakıfs*). Not only were all major Muslim places of worship (mosques), learning (schools and libraries), and charity (soup kitchens) owned and maintained by such institutions, they also accounted for the construction, governance, upkeep and security of most Ottoman roads, bridges, waterworks, inns, markets, and shops.

In principle any *paterfamilias* with some capital, land or real estate to spare could endow it to pious purposes. By doing so he stood to gain socially *and* economically. He could appoint progeny or clients to administer his endowment, thereby also enhancing his own and his family's power of patronage for as long as the endowment was operated, which in turn encouraged sustained good governance of the lands and buildings endowed. That endowing property was at once devout and socially and economically advantageous made the *vakıf* the predominant mode of civil investment in the Ottoman Empire. Without it Ottoman society could never have survived as long as it did.

While countless relatively modest provincial *vakıfs* together formed the sinew of Ottoman civilization, it was their highly prestigious imperial equivalents that made up its muscle.¹⁷² Endowed by patrons at the center of power

¹⁷¹ Van Leeuwen, *Waqfs and Urban Structures*, 11-12.

¹⁷² Discussions of the *vakıf*-institution usually distinguish between royal and other (smaller or provincial) endowments. I find the distinction between imperial and provincial or local endowments a more useful one, certainly within the Ottoman context. There existed a good number of Ottoman non-royal *vakıfs* that rivaled royal ones in geographical dispersion, size and influence. If these can be seen to have served the needs of their founders and certain populations while also emphatically serving that of the imperial state and civilization, there is no point in suggesting that they were functionally different and belong in a separate category

(sultans, *valides*, *vezîrs*, *şeyhülislams*, etc.), and encompassing a wide range of public services (mosques, schools, bathhouses, inns, soup kitchens, fountains, shops, warehouses, factories, customs houses and merchants' apartments) – often all at once – such endowments delivered public services of superior quality in an environment of dazzling grandeur. In the process they provided immense prestige and enduring political capital to their founders, who demonstrated their moral uprightness while simultaneously tying local elites to their households and networks of patronage through investment and employment. In this respect the social, political and economic roles of the institution did not differ that much from those of the institutions organizing public services in contemporary European cities.

Quite apart from delivering such obvious advantages to their founders and the public, imperial endowments had another easily overlooked but more fundamental function. They renewed, affirmed and projected Ottoman civilization by forging new dependencies between imperial and regional centers, by legitimating its social, economic and political order in the eyes of its subjects, and by showing off its vigorous splendor and equitable greatness to the outside world it aspired to dominate. Although many *vakıf* holdings were located in the countryside, most of their purposes were dedicated to support Ottoman urban civilization. Leaving aside discussions about its basic urban character or gradual urbanization, we might simply point out that it was “the city” in which this administrative and civilizing order could manifest itself most visibly and effectively to the highest number of Ottoman subjects and foreigners. In this manner the degree to which imperial endowments imposed administrative and cultural order on a city came to be an important marker for that city's perceived importance – second only to administrative rank.

By both measures the status of 1660s-Izmir lagged considerably behind the city's real political, economic and cultural impact. It has already been noted that booming Izmir was still stuck with the commercial and cultural infrastructure of an important town while its influence had far outgrown that status. This was due in large part to its relatively late incorporation into the empire: although the city itself was securely Ottoman from 1424 it only became truly safe for full institutional investment and cultivation under the *pax Ottomanica* after its bay and the wider Aegean had also been secured with the Ottoman taking of Chios and Crete in 1566 and 1669 respectively. Although the Venetians, the Genoese, the French, the English and the Dutch had all relocated from Chios to Izmir at the turn of the 16th to 17th century and had perfected their own commercial networks and infrastructure there, Ottoman

from *vakıfs* that were royal in the strict sense of being endowed by members of the Ottoman dynasty.

efforts to control the city's development were mired in sustained dynastic crises and popular revolts and had to wait until the 1670s to be taken up in earnest.

During the preceding century of rapid growth all infrastructural initiative in the expanding city had been left to small local endowments. As these proved unable to meet the accelerating requirements of Izmir's population and trades, the European communities' need to maintain their own private commercial infrastructure along Frank Street was continually underlined. In the absence of viable Ottoman alternatives nothing much could be done against the European trading partners' monopolization of the handling of Izmir's international trade. This left the Ottoman administration without the structural leverage it needed to effectively monitor and control the flow of trade through its territory. Although this problem did surely not go unnoticed on the Ottoman side the cost of adequate infrastructural renewal required in Izmir must have become prohibitive by the 1670s. Certainly it was bigger than any local or provincial personages would be willing or able to bear. In the end the challenge was taken up by the sultan's second-in-command, grand vizier Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed Paşa.

Why he did so will concern us a little further down; of more interest to us here is the extent of his *vakefs*' holdings, which are listed in the – fortunately still extant – endowment deed or *vakefiye* (see Appendix 1, plate 9).¹⁷³ The document lists a host of possessions throughout the empire. Mosques, schools, bathhouses, inns, soup kitchens, fountains, shops, warehouses, factories, customs houses, apartments and lands were endowed in recently conquered or strategically important places in the Ottoman Balkans (in and around Uyvar, Kamenice and Belgrade) and on Crete (in and around Candia), in the northern Anatolian village of Kedegire or Köprü (where the Köprülü dynasty had its origins), in Istanbul and – of course – in Izmir.¹⁷⁴ In the latter city, the *vakefs*' holdings comprised no less than seventy-three structures scattered over eleven quarters.¹⁷⁵

The way in which the *vakefs*' numerous holdings in Izmir are positioned and described practically turns the *vakefiye* into an urban topography, be it a partial one. Typically, the enumeration of bequeathed buildings is structured as follows: I have devoted to pious uses my property of [name and/or kind of property], in the quarter of [name], next to [this or that structure, landmark or location], including [number of] rooms on [number of] floors, made

¹⁷³ SLK MF 4027 – a Süleymaniye Library-microfilm of the original in the Köprülü Library.

¹⁷⁴ Uyvar is modern-day Nové Zámky in southern Slovakia; Kamenice is now Ukrainian Kamenetz-Podolsky; Cretan Candia is today called Irákleion; and the Turkish village of Kedegire, once more widely known as Köprü, now goes by the name Vezirköprü.

¹⁷⁵ SLK MF 4027, 17r-20v.

of [building material] and including [any additional property such as a garden or wall].

Fifteen items of real estate are listed following this pattern, all of them in the quarter of Kasap Hazır:

TABLE 12: REAL ESTATE ENDOWED IN IZMIR'S KASAP HAZIR-QUARTER (1678)

Folio	Item	Description
17r	a1	with known boundaries comprising fifty rooms on the ground floor and fifty-four rooms on the second floor newly constructed of masonry a great <i>han</i> (<i>han-ı kebir</i>)
	a2	adjoining the great <i>han</i> comprising seventeen rooms and a warehouse on the ground floor and eighteen rooms on the second floor of masonry a small <i>han</i> (<i>sagır han</i>)
	a3	adjoining the great <i>han</i> twenty-four shops (<i>diükkanlar</i>)
	a4	designated the covered market (<i>bezestan</i>) forty-four shops (<i>diükkanlar</i>) with warehouses and rooms on the second floors
	a5	adjoining the back of the covered market twenty-four shops (<i>diükkanlar</i>) of masonry
17v	a6	opposite the gate of the covered market leading to the customs house two warehouses (<i>mabzen</i>) of masonry
	a7	in front of the covered market towards the slaughterhouse of Hüseyin Ağa with boundaries known to the inhabitants a vacant lot (<i>arza-ı baliye</i>)
	a8	adjoining the covered market [extending] over the sea comprising eighteen rooms and a kitchen and a small bathhouse with a warehouse and stable below newly constructed a customs house (<i>gümriükhane</i>)
	a9	[as] purchased property (<i>mülk-i müsteram</i>) with known boundaries another customs house (<i>gümriükhane</i>) and two rooms on the second floor
	a10	a pastry cook's oven (<i>börekçi fırını</i>)
	a11	a sherbet maker's shop (<i>serbetçi diükkanı</i>) and a room on the second floor
	a12	with known boundaries a Jews' apartment (<i>Yahudihane</i>) including all its belongings
	a13	adjoining the Jews' apartment two apartments (<i>hane</i>) on the ground floor
	a14	adjoining the Gülhane bathhouse comprising many rooms on the ground and second floors an apartment (<i>hane</i>)
18r	a15	adjoining the castle wall on the beach with known boundaries two candle factories (<i>şemhane</i>)

Based on Istanbul, SLK MF 4027, 17r-18r.

To function properly, the endowed commercial facilities needed additional infrastructural support in the form of a reliable supply of drinking water. The existing unplanned water supply system that fed the city's public fountains and institutions (as enumerated by Evliya, see note 34), however, did not carry enough water with sufficient pressure to allow feeding such extensive additions.¹⁷⁶ This obstacle was overcome by the construction of a double aqueduct (*keşmer*) that tapped the river Meles at a point of higher altitude and

¹⁷⁶ See M. Münir Aktepe, "İzmir suları, çeşme ve sebilleri ile şadırvanları hakkında bir araştırma", *İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi*, 30 (1976), 135-37.

delivered its water to a distribution point in the easternmost part of the city (see the two dotted lines in Plate 4).¹⁷⁷

Between the distribution point and its final destinations along the northern seashore, the flow traversed the full breadth of the city from east to west. Along the way, it alleviated the general population's shortage of freely available drinking water through a network of fifty-eight public fountains. The fountains of this "vizier's water(system)", or *vezir suyu*, were part of Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed Paşa's endowment and are therefore also listed in its deed (directly after the real estate in Table 12). Here, the enumeration of the holdings is much more summary, listing only a general (quarter and/or ward) and a precise location (street and/or house) for each fountain:

TABLE 13: FOUNTAINS ENDOWED IN IZMIR (1678)

Folio	Item	Quarter	Description
18r (cont.)	b1	[Kocakapı (1)] ¹⁷⁸	known as Çukurçeşme
	b2	Çiçek (2)	on Sadıkzade Halil Efendi's wall
	b3	Ali Reis (3)	on Abdülkadroğlu Hasan's wall
	b4	Pazaryeri (4)	on Dellak el-Hac Mehmed's wall
	b5	Mahalle-i Cedid (5)	along the thoroughfare on the wall of Belci Ömer
	b6		near the Uzun Hüseyin Ağa bathhouse on the wall of el-Hac Mehmed
	b7		on Taviil Mustafa Çelebi's wall
18v	b8	Kefeli (6)	on Şerbetçi Cafer Beşe's wall
	b9		on el-Hac Mustafa's wall
	b10		at the entrance to the three-road junction on Kaymoğlu Ahmed's wall
	b11		in Jews [the Jewish ward] on a <i>zımmi</i> named Mihalaki's wall
	b12		on Küçük Mehmed Ağa's wall

¹⁷⁷ In Plate 4, the aqueduct's intake is located in the vicinity of Homer's Cave (the remains at this location are currently known as the Şirinyer aqueducts). From there, the aqueduct followed the Meles at a higher elevation towards Mount Pagus, with one arm crossing the river halfway between the inlet and Kadifekale (the remains of this crossover are currently known as the Yeşildere aqueduct). From there, it proceeded hugging the eastern slopes of Mount Pagus, delivering its contents to a distribution point slightly southwest of the caravan bridge and east of the quarter of Faik Paşa. The final stretch of the aqueduct is also visible in Plate 3, where it is accompanied by the inscription "Aqueduct begun by Visir Ahmet in 1674".


¹⁷⁸ In fact, the *vakfiye* does not mention a quarter here – the reference to this first fountain in the list reads: *ve yine medine-i mezburade Çukurçeşme demekle marif bir çeşmeyi* ("and in the aforementioned city a fountain known as Çukurçeşme"). In an inventory that was made of the endowment's fountains in 1912, however, the 17th-century descriptions of location are followed by updated ones. Here, it is added that this Çukurçeşme-fountain is located in the vicinity of Kocakapı, "the great gate" (Aktepe, "İzmir suları", 139). This places it in the area that would later become the quarter of Kocakapı, located slightly east of Faik Paşa and southwest of the caravan bridge (see Maps 6 and 7, Plates 6 and 7). Incidentally, Aktepe's list omits items b24 and b50, arriving at a total of fifty-six fountains instead of the original *vakfiye*'s fifty-eight. Further comparison with our microfilm copy of the original *vakfiye* shows that the inventory consulted by Aktepe contains not only omissions but many misreadings as well.

	b13		near the day-laborer's market on Kalaycı Murad's wall
	b14		on a <i>zımmi</i> named Karayani's wall
	b15		on the governor's mansion's wall
	b16		on Kasap Bodur Ali's wall
	b17		at the fence on Derzi Yorgaki's wall
19r	b18	Cami-i Atik (7)	on el-Hac Hüseyin's wall
	b19		on Solak Mahmud Ağazade Abdülkerim Ağa's wall
	b20		on el-Hac Süleymanoğlu Mehmed Ağa's wall
	b21		on the corner of Ali Yazıcı's house
	b22		on el-Hac Halil's wall
	b23		in Hazır Efendi street on el-Hac Ali's sons-in-law's wall
	b24		in the vicinity of the el-Hac Muhammed mosque
	b25		in Palanduzoğlu street on el-Hac Süleyman's wall
	b26		on the long road near the Ümmehatı Hatun prayer house on Süleyman's wall
19v	b27		on Baba Hasan Bey's wall
	b28		on the el-Hac Mahmud mosque's wall
	b29		on Sabuncı el-Hac Hüseyin's wall
	b30		in Kara Hüseyin Ağa street on Ali Yazıcı's wall
	b31		on el-Hac Hasan's wall
	b32		in the Kaplan Paşa market in the middle aisle at the entrance to the four-road junction on the wall of a warehouse
	b33		on the Ahmed Ağa mosque's preacher Abdurrahman Efendi's wall
	b34		on Konyalı el-Hac Ömer's wall
	b35		in the vicinity of the el-Hac Hüseyin mosque
	b36	Hatuniye (8)	opposite the Demirci el-Hac Mehmed prayerhouse
20r	b37		in the vicinity of the oratory on el-Hac Osmanoğlu's wall
	b38		on es-Şeyh Mustafa Efendi's wall
	b39		on the abovementioned şeyh's paternal uncle Mehmed Ağa's wall
	b40		adjoining the pair of scales installed in a place called Tilkilik
	b41		on Osman Çavuş's wall
	b42		opposite the Mahmud Efendi holy mosque
	b43		on Seyyid Ömer's wall
	b44	Hasan Hoca (9)	on the Hasan Hoca school's wall
	b45		adjoining the gate of the sellers of roasted chickpeas' inn
	b46		in the vicinity of the courthouse on the el-Hac Ebubekr school's wall
20v	b47		in the middle of the grain market
	b48	Kasap Hazır (10)	on Aydınhoğlu el-Hac Mehmed's wall
	b49		in the vicinity of the Hasan Beşe inn
	b50		on Hewwa Hatun's wall
	b51		on Hasan Çavuş's wall
	b52	Frenk Mahallesi (11)	opposite the French consul's
	b53		on the Hungarian consul's wall
	b54		on the inn's wall opposite the customs house
	b55		inside the customs house
	b56		in the vicinity of the castle
	b57		in the vicinity of the bathhouse
	b58		in the vicinity of the abovementioned bathhouse inside the Jews' apartment

Based on SLK MF 4027, 18r-20v.

With the help of our panoramas and maps, of an article giving the 1912-equivalents for the fountains' locations and of Izmir municipality's excellent searchable digital map of the modern city, the descriptions of the fountains can be utilized to the fullest. Not only does it become possible to locate the listed quarters on Graves' city plan (see Map 11), the descriptions also give valuable clues about these quarters' spatial organization and ethno-religious composition.

MAP 11: QUARTERS OF IZMIR IN 1678, AS LISTED IN THE ENDOWMENT DEED



Based on Istanbul, SLK MF 4027, 18r-20v; Maps 9 and 10; Plates 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8; Aktepe, "İzmir suları"; *İzmir Sayısal Kent Rehberi* (n.d.), by İzmir Konak Belediyesi Bilgi Sistemleri Müdürlüğü, and İzmir Büyükşehir Belediyesi Harita Şube Müdürlüğü, <http://rehber.izmir-bld.gov.tr> (accessed 2003; no longer available).

As is to be expected, the new water system primarily serviced Izmir's principal quarters, providing us with a topography of the city's socially, economi-

cally and politically central areas – which the endowment was after all designed to support and promote. If the Greek and Armenian quarters (the locations of which have already been established) are included, most of the 1678-city's area is now covered.

One of the first things to catch our attention is the appearance of many new quarters' names, most often associated with areas already inhabited a century earlier. The frequent alternation of quarters' names is a recurring phenomenon throughout the Ottoman Empire. Many quarters went by several names, the choice for one or the other seemingly only depending on the preference of the person whose documentary testimony we are left to interpret (for instance; the name Faik Paşa, although absent from the *vakfiye*, never went out of use). On the other hand, some quarters' names did change for good (Mescid-i Selatinzade to Hasan Hoca for instance). Most often this was the result of the construction of new public facilities (mosque's, schools, baths, and so on) and the quarters' being identified through these facilities' names.

Besides name changes, comparison of Maps 10 and 11 also suggests that some quarters' boundaries were redrawn. Considering that the Ottoman quarter was an important administrative unit, this redrawing might have occurred in response to the increase in population density – as a way to maintain administrative manageability.

As briefly touched upon above, the information in the *vakfiye* allows a number of observations to be made about the individual quarters, their certainty increasing with the number of references:

1. **Çukurçeşme** (exclusively Muslim): This area between the caravan bridge and the top of Galland's triangle was apparently not a quarter. The fountain (b1) might have been intended for use by travelers.
2. **Çiçek** (exclusively Muslim): Its precise location is uncertain, but considering the course of the aqueduct and the structure of the *vakfiye* this probably refers to the area formerly associated with the Muslim quarter of Faik Paşa. In any case, SadıkHzade Halil Efendi (b2) is a Muslim name.
3. **Ali Reis** (exclusively Muslim): The Muslim quarter formerly known as Ali Çavuş. Abdülkadroğlu Hasan (b3) is a Muslim name.
4. **Pazaryeri** (exclusively Muslim): The Muslim quarter formerly known as Han Bey (Pazar); the old commercial center. Dellak el-Hac Mehmed (b4) refers to a Muslim; a *dellak* is a shampooer in a bathhouse (an exclusively Muslim occupation) and *el-hac* or *haci* is a title reserved for Muslims who have completed the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina (and for Christians who have made the pilgrimage to the Holy Sepulcher).
5. **Mahalle-i Cedid** (exclusively Muslim): Signifying "the new quarter", appears to have been a matured version of the Muslim quarter of Yazıcı. The thoroughfare (b5) referred to is probably the eastern arm of the road coming in from Urla. Belci Ömer (b5), Uzun Hüseyin Ağa (b6), el-

- Hac Mehmed (b6), Taviil Mustafa Çelebi (b7) and Şerbetçi Cafer Beşe (b8) all indicate Muslim heritage. A *belci* is a maker or seller of spades and forks and a *şerbetçi* is a maker and seller of sweet beverages.
6. **Kefeli** (fully mixed): A large commercial quarter (as also indicated by the presence of the day-laborer's market (b13) put together from parts of the former quarters of Han Bey and Limon, extending far south-westwards to include the Jewish quarter as a separate ward referred to as *Yabudiler* (b11; "Jews"). It enclosed most of the inner harbor, including the governor's mansion (b15) on the far end of its western shore. The "fence" (b17) might denote a barrier between the Muslim and Jewish parts of the quarter. The number "6" on the map is located over the three-road junction (b10). el-Hac Mustafa (b9), Kaymoğlu Ahmed (b10), Küçük Mehmed Ağa (b12), Kalaycı (tinsmith) Murad (b13) and Kasap (butcher) Bodur Ali (b16) point to Muslim habitation. Mention of the *xiimis* Mihalaki (Jewish?; b11) and Karayani (Greek?; b14) confirm non-Muslim settlement. Derzi (tailor) Yorgaki, although not referred to as a *xiimi*, must have been a Greek.
 7. **Cami-i Atik** (exclusively Muslim): Signifying "the ancient mosque", this quarter was a completely new and exclusively Muslim quarter. It had absorbed most of the past century's growth of the Muslim population and took up the entire lower right corner of Galland's triangle (with the exception of the inner harbor's shore). It was not only residential, but certainly also commercially oriented, as is evidenced by the presence of the Kaplan Paşa market (b32) and at least one warehouse (b32). The long road (b26) could be the western arm of the road coming in from Urla. All accompanying descriptions (b18 to b35) indicate Muslim occupation. A *solak* (b19) is a guardsman in attendance on the Sultan in processions, a *yazıcı* is a (letter) writer (b21 and b30), a *sabuncu* (b29) is a maker and seller of soap.
 8. **Hatuniye** (exclusively Muslim): A quarter consisting of (the western part of) Şeyhler/Şaphane and the northern fringes of Mescid-i Selatinzade and Han Bey. Again, the references (b36-b43) point to Muslim habitation, to which we should add that most are religiously oriented (b36, b37, b38, b39, b42, b43). A *şeyb* (b38) is a head of a religious order, a *sey-yid* (or *şerif*; b43) is a descendant of the prophet Muhammad, a *çavuş* (b41) is a pursuivant and halberdier of the sultan's bodyguard. The place called Tilkilik ("craftiness" or "foxiness") has often been associated with İzmir's Armenian population. However, as the Armenian quarter appears to have bordered on the obviously Muslim quarter of Hatuniye, this association is probably not due to residence. It could be that the pair of scales (could it be a weighing-house?) to which the *vakfiye* refers (b40) was used for weighing the silk imported by caravans before its sale to the Armenian-dominated silk-weaving industry.
 9. **Hasan Hoca** (exclusively Muslim): Formerly the quarter of Mescid-i

Selatinzade. There are only four references to this quarter in the *vakfiye*, which could very well be an indication of some diminished importance. Since the 16th century the center of gravity had shifted even further towards the city's shore and middle and lower Izmir now housed a sizeable part of the Muslim population (in Pazaryeri and Kefeli, but particularly in the newer quarters of Mahalle-i Cedid and Cami-i Atik). Even so, the old center of Muslim habitation east of Pazar(yeri) was still the site of the *kadi's* residence, or courthouse (b46); the city's undisputed judicial and administrative center. It also still served commercial purposes, as is evidenced by the presence of the *leblebici hanı* (the inn of the sellers of roast chickpeas; b45) and the all-important *ırgad pazarı* (the grain market; b47). With its two *mektebs* (Islamic schools; b44 and b46), one of which was apparently part of a *vakf* important enough to name the quarter after, it also qualifies as a center of Muslim education.

10. **Kasap Hazır** (fully mixed): Named after the open-air slaughterhouse (shambles) formerly located on the beach north of the harbor castle and comprising the old quarter of Limon, this quarter was the center of the endowment's construction program – and the principal target of the *vezir suyu*. Kasap Hazır has often been confused with its Frankish (or European) neighbor. Even the *vakfiye* is unclear about where the one ended and the other began: a8 places the customs house in Kasap Hazır, while b52 refers to a fountain inside this customs house as lying in Frenk Mahallesi, which quarter b56 erroneously suggests to have extended until just under the walls of the harbor castle. As the *vakfiye* also illustrates, however, Kasap Hazır is not to be confused with Frenk Mahallesi and was not European but Ottoman in character; it housed Muslim (b48-b51), as well as Jewish (the *Yahudihane*; a12) and Armenian (a *han* described by Galland¹⁷⁹) institutions and inhabitants.
11. **Frenk Mahallesi** (fully mixed, but predominantly European): Taking up the entire lower left corner of Galland's triangle, this Frankish or European quarter was the last one to profit from the *vezir suyu* (b52-b58). This quarter and its organization will be the subject of the next part (on The European City).
- [..]. Unmentioned **Armenian and Greek quarters** (mixed, but predominantly Armenian, resp. Greek): The Armenian and Greek quarters were also inhabited by Muslims – who were present in all quarters (even the European). The Greek quarter also housed many Europeans, who chose to live there either out of necessity (due to lower rents) or choice (being in relationships with Greek women).

¹⁷⁹ Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 106.

Pluralism within and among 1678-Izmir's Quarters

Given the mixed character of all but Izmir's exclusively Muslims quarters, it is misleading to speak of quarters as "Jewish", "Greek", "Armenian" or "European". Even if such ethno-religious designations are meant as shorthand for "the predominance of an ethnicity in a quarter", or for "how an ethnicity is centered on a given quarter", they all too easily obscure the non-uniform character of all Izmir's northern quarters. It is much more useful to have a rendering that permits not only visualization of a group's central area, but also its secondary areas, and how they overlapped with those of other groups. We then see (in Map 12):

- Turks centered in the southern quarters, but also ever-present in the northern quarters where all of Izmir's non-Muslims resided¹⁸⁰;
- Jews centered in their ward in the old market quarter of Kefeli, but also renting apartments and storehouses further east and in the new commercial center of Kasap Hazır to the north¹⁸¹;
- Armenians centered in their old Şaphane quarter, but following the flow of trade with extensions into the commercial centers of old Kefeli and new Kasap Hazır¹⁸²;
- Greeks centered in old Cemaat-ı Gebran, but also still present along the entire northern shore in rented apartments and *hans* at the southern and northern end of Frank Street.¹⁸³


¹⁸⁰ See, e.g., *ibid.*, 108: "Il n'y a point d'autre nation que les Turcs qui demeure dans les onze premiers quartiers, comme je l'ai déjà remarqué, mais il se trouve des Turcs qui sont dispersés dans les quatre autres."

¹⁸¹ See, e.g., the *Yahudihane* of the *vaksfiye*, and two contracts (*temessük*s) for the lease of apartments to members of the Jewish *taije*: Leiden, Leiden University Library, Legatum Warn-erianum, Or. 1267, 5a-6a and 15b-16a (AH 10-20 Şevvâl 1101 / AD 18-27 July 1690).

¹⁸² See, e.g., the Armenian *han* of the *vaksfiye*, described by Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 106.

¹⁸³ See, e.g., the Greeks living in Kefeli according to the *vaksfiye*, and the Greek *han* illustrated and described by Cornelis de Bruyn, Reizen van Cornelis de Bruyn (Delft, 1698), plate 2 and 23-25.

MAP 12: ETHNO-RELIGIOUS DISTRIBUTION OF HABITATION IN 1678-IZMIR



Based on Map 11 and all cited primary sources.

Crosscultural Traffic in 1678-Izmir


The *vaksfiye* also adds unto other (previously discussed) information from *tabrihs* and European correspondence and accounts in a way that makes it possible to include systemic traffic between and through quarters to our map.

The arrows in Map 13 represent the direction and flow of systemic cross-cultural traffic in 1678-Izmir, which breaks down into the following recurring movements:

- Caravan merchants carrying goods to and from Kasap Hazır, over the caravan bridge and through the city;
- Groups of Europeans on their way to and from their summer residences in the countryside and on archaeological excursions, or travelling elsewhere overland;

- ships' staff, crews, merchants and other visitors arriving at the customs house coming in or heading out;

MAP 13: SYSTEMIC TRAFFIC BETWEEN THE QUARTERS OF 1678-IZMIR



Based on Map 11 and all cited primary sources.

- heavy traffic of all sorts between Frank Street, Kasap Hazır and the customs house, including of Ottoman notables and their retinues taking passage on European ships, and of customs guards heading out to guard the quays along Frank Street;
- Ottoman and Barbary crews on shore-leave spilling out onto the inner harbor's quays and heading out to roam the European quarters;
- salt miners commuting between the Islamic quarters, through Frank Street, to the salt fields further north;
- Ottoman notables visiting Frank Street's consulates, merchant houses, taverns and theatres, the deputy grand vizier's residence on the southern end of Frank Street, as well as the *voivoda's* pavilion (or playhouse) at its far end;

- Janissary guards commuting to and from their employment in Frank Street;
- European and *zimmi* delegations and individuals crossing into the Muslim parts of the city visiting Ottoman notables and officials, particularly the *kadı's* and the *vojvoda's* courts;
- Europeans and *zimmi's* crossing the breadth of the city on their way to and from the cemeteries beyond its southwestern limit;
- Jewish middlemen constantly travelling between their ward, Kasap Hazır's storehouses and markets, the customs house and Frank Street;
- Armenians and Greeks heading out to their various employments in Frank Street, and Europeans heading in to their quarters for professional, residential and leisurely purposes;
- And, crossing the town in every which way and at every given hour, inspectors and guards on their route and countless people of all sorts on personal or professional errands (not included in the map).

Perhaps the spaghetti of winding arrows in the map is not the most accessible way to illustrate an urban topography of systemic crosscultural movement, of movements that were so integral to the city's economy, demography and geography that groups of inhabitants repeated them day after day, month after month, year after year, and even century upon century. Their point, however, is not to identify those movements precisely, or to trace their exact course. Rather, it is to impress upon us that the seemingly static veins of the grid were always alive with an intense and diverse pulse of crosscultural traffic. What's more, cohabitation, employment or meetings across cultures were not that alone, they were always preceded and followed by travel through the city, and therefore by ever so many interactions with other cultures. Similarly, we should always be aware that people of different cultures living together, employing each other, or simply meeting each other for business or pleasure unavoidably impacted either side's outlook and probably also that of their direct environments. When speaking about the impact, or spill-over effect, of crosscultural contact it would have been more accurate (but even less legible) to have the arrows drag wide wakes behind them and to have them begin and end in huge oil-spill-like blots.

A familiar trope to describe the supposedly superficial and haphazard interaction of members of various *millets* is that of "people meeting on the stairs". Let us for a moment go with that image... Imagine Ottoman Izmir as an apartment building housing the sultan's deputies (the landlords), Turks (his family), Ottoman non-Muslims (the tenants) and Europeans (the landlords' guests). In such a building, in which power equaled elevation, the sultan's deputies would occupy the penthouse, the Turks the 5th floor, the Jews the 4th floor; the Europeans the guest apartments on the 3rd floor, the Greeks the 2nd floor apartments, and the Armenians the 1st floor apartments.

But occupation is one thing, what about movement? The trope suggests that ethno-religious separation was near-total and fixed immutably, and that contact between the ethnicities on the building's floors was mostly short and superficial: a simple nod or civilized platitude in arriving or leaving. However resourceful the trope might be, it fails to account for three complicating realities, namely ethnic mobility, professional mobility and social mobility. It supposes ethno-religious uniformity was strictly maintained in habitation, in faith, in religion, in marriage, in love and sex, in government employment, in private employment, in entertainment, in friendship, and so on. As if a building like this would have no need for janitors and bellboys – resident Jews and Greeks – running from floor to floor and apartment to apartment doing maintenance work, opening and shutting doors, operating the elevators and passing along notes in the service of the landlord and his family. And as if no employment or friendships would have been struck up across floors.

The point of the trope of course is to suggest that an Ottoman society like Izmir's was plural yet deeply segregated, that it could not have been cosmopolitan because its parts were so insulated and their interaction so limited by parochialism. The implication is that this was a society that merely tolerated otherness, and often barely so. This is not the place to delve too deeply into the question of how to delineate such complicated, changing and overlapping concepts as tolerance, multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism. Nor should we want to decide upon one of them and discuss how it suited late-17th Izmir. But we can afford ourselves a few more thoughts on the subject.

Cosmopolitanism has recently been characterized as follows:

So there are two strands that intertwine in the notion of cosmopolitanism. One is the idea that we have obligations to others, obligations that stretch beyond those to whom we are related by the ties of kith and faith, or even the more formal ties of a shared citizenship. The other is we take seriously the value not just of human life but of particular human lives, which means taking an interest in the practices and beliefs that lend them significance. People are different, the cosmopolitan knows, and there is much to learn from our differences. Because there are so many human possibilities worth exploring, we neither expect nor desire that every person or every society should converge on a single mode of life.¹⁸⁴

The historical record certainly testifies to the sense of shared humanity and personal interest signaled by Appiah; they are discernible in the writings of some of late-17th-century Izmir's most lettered inhabitants and visitors. How many of their less erudite and communicative neighbors shared the sentiment and to what degree is unknowable, and pointless to discuss. Nevertheless, if we let the inhabitants' ethnic, professional and social mobility do the

¹⁸⁴ Kwame Anthony Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers* (London: Penguin Books, 2006), xiii.

talking, it should be clear that crosscultural contact was not limited to passings-by.

It has been shown above that nearly half of the residential floors of the building that was Izmir were ethnically mixed, and that all ethnicities competed for additional footholds in and around the lobby that was Kasap Hazır, as well as in its two adjacent forums of Frank Street and Kefeli. Besides the wild residential hotchpotch on the lower and ground floors, we have also taken a look around the lobby itself (the covered markets), in the service areas (the customs house, inns, warehouses, and brokers' apartments), in the elevators and on the stairs (the city's thoroughfares), and have noticed the heavy crosscultural traffic continually moving through all of them. Naturally there were sections of this complex that were calm, neat and ethnically homogenous; the interiors of the residential wards that made up the quarters. But all around them was the never-ending, intense and indiscriminating bustle of people of all sorts meeting up to do deals or simply to enjoy each other's company or satisfy their curiosity. Forget about people inadvertently bumping into each other on their way out or coming in – in Izmir the non-private areas were the destination: the best opportunities presented themselves in the crosscultural tangle of the markets and the thoroughfares.

Whatever container we would choose to sweep all that interaction into (tolerance, multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism), it would always be too encompassing and too narrow at once. I propose to forget about such burdensome concepts for now and simply attempt to remain conscious of what living and navigating the city really involved in the way of crosscultural sights and communications, and of the potential for crosscultural understanding and cooperation they carried as their frequency increased.

It was the commercial and political side of this potential which the Köprülü *vakf* was intended to unlock, organize, control and tap. So, before we move to the European side of the Izmirian equation, let us take a closer look the *vakf*'s founder Fazıl Ahmed Paşa and his Köprülü dynasty, outline the extent of their involvement in Izmir's affairs and explore the intended and unintended effects of their interference.

*The Köprülüs, Their Endowment and Its Impact*¹⁸⁵

Obviously, the Köprülü *vakf*'s Izmir program was a singular undertaking. The vastness of the project is all the more striking if one considers that it was not carried out as part of a royal endowment intended to forever serve the reputation of the ruling dynasty. This endowment, though actively sup-

¹⁸⁵ A shorter version of this section was previously published in honor of my dear mentor as "Köprülü Imperial Policy and the Refashioning of Izmir", in: *Ottoman Izmir: Studies in Honour of Alexander H. de Groot*, ed. Maurits H. van den Boogert (Leiden: NINO, 2007).

ported from court, was planned, funded and executed by a grand vizier with little more than a decade in power behind him, but it rivaled most royal ones in size and influence.

Who, then, was this Köprülü vizier, what guided his attention to Izmir, and what was the immediate impact of his involvement in that city's economic, political and social fabric? Any retelling of Fazıl Ahmed Köprülü's rise to the grand vizierate and his involvement in Izmir has to begin with the ascension of his dynasty's founder, Mehmed Köprülü, and the state of affairs he was called upon to remedy – and should end with their successor Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa's heading down the road to Vienna. Although that campaign did not end the dynasty, it did mark the high point of the dynasty's power and influence, as well as its consistent and methodical interference with Izmir.

The three consecutive grand vizierates of scions of the renowned Köprülü family spanned nearly the entire second half of the seventeenth century. Mehmed Paşa Köprülü held the office of grand vizier from 1656 to 1661, when he was succeeded by his son Köprülüzaade Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, who held the position until 1676. His successor was his adopted brother, Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa, who held the post until 1683 and should be considered an important beneficiary, partaker and promoter of the Köprülü legacy of statesmanship.¹⁸⁶ Together, the grand vizierates of these three Köprülüs constitute a remarkably resurgent yet stable quarter of an otherwise stormy Ottoman century.

When Mehmed Paşa Köprülü took over the reins of executive power on 15 September 1656 he inherited an empire paralyzed by dynastic, bureaucratic, military, monetary and fiscal mismanagement. Among his most pressing concerns were a major ongoing crisis surrounding the sultanate and the empire's highest offices, an Ottoman-Venetian war of more than a decade that was quickly becoming catastrophic, and a seemingly unending series of uprisings throughout the empire and particularly in Anatolia. The history of the protracted period of troubles predating the Köprülüs' rise is also relevant here, because it highlights the near-miraculous turnaround their policies managed to effect.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁶ On Merzifonlu Mustafa Paşa and his reign, see C.J. Heywood, "Karā Mustafa Pasha, Merzifonlu, maktül", *EI2*, iv: 589b-92b; and my "'A most agreeable and pleasant creature?' Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa in the Correspondence of Justinus Colyer (168-1682)", in: *The Ottoman Capitulations: Text and Context*, eds. Maurits H. van den Boogert and Kate Fleet (Rome: Istituto per l'Oriente, 2003).

¹⁸⁷ For the basic historical context of Kösem's rule as well as the Köprülü period, I have relied primarily on İsmail Hami Danişmend, *İzablı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi*, vol. 3 (Istanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1972); Joseph von Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches* (Pest: C.A. Hartleben, 1827-36); and Robert Mantran, *Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman* (Paris: Fayard, 1989).

The dire state of the empire in 1656 had many causes, some external and beyond the Ottomans' control. Nevertheless, the seizure of power by the sultan's harem in the person of Kösem Sultan Mahpeyker had proved to be an important factor in exacerbating an already insecure situation. Not because "harem rule" as such was necessarily bad – it could be an effective way to cushion the effects of rule by inadequate sultans while maintaining imperial authority and stability by continuing the dynasty.¹⁸⁸ But Kösem's purpose, it appears, was never primarily to protect the sultanate but to control it at any cost. From Sultan Ahmed I's death in 1617 until her own murder in 1651, Kösem had done everything she could to secure her prominent place at the center of power. This included having suitable candidates for the sultanate passed over or killed, and even engineering the deposition of reigning sultans to have them replaced with her own creatures, who were invariably either mentally incapable or still minor when they ascended the throne (see Table 14).

TABLE 14: HAREM RULE FROM 1617 TO 1648

Sultan	Reign	Reign ended by	Principle relationship	Main protector
Mustafa I	1617-1618	deposition	brother of Ahmed I	Kösem Sultan
Osman II	1618-1622	deposition & execution	son of Ahmed I & Mahfiruz Haseki Sultan	Mahfiruz Haseki Sultan
Mustafa I	1622-1623	deposition	brother of Ahmed I	Kösem Sultan
Murad IV	1623-1640	natural death	son of Ahmed I & Kösem Sultan	Kösem Sultan
Ibrahim I	1640-1648	deposition & execution	son of Ahmed I & Kösem Sultan	Kösem Sultan
Mehmed IV	1648-1687	deposition	son of Ibrahim I & Turhan Sultan	Kösem Sultan > Turhan Sultan

Two notable exceptions were the rules of Osman II and Murad IV. The first was enthroned in opposition to Kösem's influence. His deposition and execution in 1622, after a reign of merely five years, brought an end to his attempts at fiscal and military reforms and marked the renewed ascendancy of Kösem. The reign of Murad IV, who had become sultan at the age of eleven, started under the regency of Kösem and with all the familiar troubles. Any policy or vision regarding government and administration seemed to be lacking as she went through eight grand-viziers and nine *defterdars* between 1623 and 1632. This insecurity of office caused a veritable mass migration as high officials desperately tried to secure their positions by maneuvering their dependents (from their own households and other clients) into all echelons of central and provincial administration. The gravity of the resulting discontinu-

¹⁸⁸ Cf. Christoph K. Neumann, "Political and diplomatic developments", in: *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, vol. 3: *The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603–1839*, ed. Suraiya N. Faroqhi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 48; and Aksan, "Theoretical Ottomans", 119.

ity in the state's affairs became apparent as large rebellions flared up all over the empire and the Safavid Şah reopened hostilities and managed to take Baghdad.

No doubt prompted by this deteriorating state of affairs, Murad ended his mother's regency and assumed control in 1632, initiating a policy of severe purges and reactionary measures, which under the grand vizierates of Tabaniyası Mehmed Paşa and Kemankeş Kara Mustafa Paşa managed – for the moment – to stabilize the empire. The blueprint for their policy was Koçi Bey's *Risale*, which advocated a return to the imagined perfections of the Ottoman classical age that was considered to have ended after the reign of Süleyman the Great. This "Ottoman fundamentalism" included the following suggestions for imperial policy: the restoration of the grand vizier's independence; the neutralization of the influence of palace favorites; putting a stop to the high frequency of rotation of offices, particularly regarding governors(-general); the dismissal of ignorant clergy (*ulema*) and their replacement with learned men; the restoration of sumptuary laws; the (re)distribution of feudal fiefs (*timars*) to worthy men only; ending the practice of distributing *timars* as other forms of tenure.¹⁸⁹

These suggested measures amounted to a rather desperate attempt to undo the superficial manifestations of a series of profound economic and societal changes that had their origin in the longer sixteenth century (see further below). Of course, forcing a 17th-century society back into an early-16th-century mold could never be an adequate long-term answer to the challenges of the money economy and the pressures exerted on the empire by the evolving economic world-system. Not because the outcome – the semi-peripheralization of the Ottoman economy in the nineteenth-century (see below) – was inescapable, but because new economic realities and challenges required new solutions and strategies. But although they were out-of-sync with the age, the measures at least restored some predictability and accountability to Ottoman rule.

After Murad had died of an illness in 1640 and his demented brother, Ibrahim I, had taken the throne, the Ottoman fundamentalist policy unraveled as quickly as Kemankeş Kara Mustafa Paşa's fortunes. Confronted with renewed attempts by Kösem to obtain control over the highest offices of state, he held out for four more years before being dismissed and executed. Thus began another period of rapid deterioration, continuing well into the sultanate of Ibrahim's minor son, Mehmed IV. Even the downfall of Kösem in 1651 and the assumption of the regency by her daughter, Mehmed's mother,

¹⁸⁹ How far the reality of appointments to the executive branch became removed from the ideal is vividly portrayed, quantified and reasoned in Rifaat Ali Abou-el-Haj, "The Ottoman Vezir and Paşa Households, 1683-1703: A Preliminary Report", *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 94/4 (1974).

Hatice Turhan brought no relief, as no less than 18 grand viziers, 12 *şeyh üll-İslams*, 23 *başdefterdars*, 18 *kapudans* and countless provincial governors were changed – and, more often than not, executed – like small coinage between 1644 and 1656.

Amidst this administrative chaos Kösem's clique, particularly the sultan's teacher, Hüseyin Efendi Cinci Hoca, in 1644 managed to plunge the empire headlong into an unprovoked war with Venice (and eventually with half of Europe) over Crete. The war, which Kemankuş Kara Mustafa Paşa had done his utmost to prevent and which commenced almost immediately after his execution, directed scarce resources from the central and provincial treasuries towards the war effort, and also from the enormous and increasing number of clients upon which the rule of the harem depended.

The results were predictable: a doubling of salaried government personnel, an enormous budget deficit, riotous unpaid soldiery, the levying of huge extraordinary taxes (of up to 50% on *timars*, for instance), the institutionalized venality of offices, radical and uncompensated devaluations of coinage, revolts and counter-revolts, and the erosion of Ottoman power in the provinces. But worst of all were the Venetian blockades of the Dardanelles, Istanbul's lifeline for communications and provisions, from 1650. In 1656, the last year of the blockade, the defeat of the Ottoman naval expedition sent out to break it, the subsequent abandonment of Limnos, Samothrace and Tenedos by the Ottomans and the seemingly imminent siege of the capital caused great panic in Istanbul. Food prices rocketed and the sultan momentarily took flight to Üsküdar. It was under these circumstances that the sultan-mother called the elderly and relatively unknown provincial governor, Mehmed Paşa Köprülü, to the grand vizierate. He accepted the appointment only after she had sworn a formal oath guaranteeing him absolute independence and freedom from interference.

Within the five short years of his grand vizierate Mehmed Paşa, an erstwhile protégé of Kemankuş, managed to repair most of the damage caused by the rule of the harem – and more. Numerous rebellions were suppressed both in Istanbul and the provinces, and a number of severe purges were carried out to prevent them flaring up again. Simultaneously, the causes of the rebellions were addressed when the grand vizier considered them reasonable. Government expenses were cut drastically to balance income and expenditure, making the payment of state wages and stipends more reliable.¹⁹⁰

¹⁹⁰ According to Evliya Çelebi: "In 1067 (1656) Köprülü Mehmed Paşa was made independent grand vizier. Since the Ottoman state was in turmoil, he killed 400,000 *celalis* in Anatolia, 17 viziers, 41 *begler-begs*, 70 *sancak-begs*, 3 mollahs, and a certain Moroccan cabbalist named Şeyh Salim. He balanced the revenues and expenditures of the Ottoman state, erasing three years of arrears and also accomplished several conquests": Robert Dankoff, *The Intimate Life of an Ottoman Statesman: Melek Ahmed Pasha (1588-1662) as Portrayed in Evliya Çelebi's "Book of Travels" ("Seyahat-Name")* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 55.

Köprülü's firm hold on power also meant less uncoordinated reshuffling in Ottoman administration as a whole. Officials could now be relatively sure of their continued employment if they deserved it. Although the grand vizier was in the habit of rotating key posts on an annual basis in order to prevent the holders of these offices forging potentially threatening local and provincial alliances, the prospect of reappointment was in fact a leap forward from the uncertainty of previous times.

On the international front Mehmed Köprülü's activities were limited but successful. They were aimed first and foremost at the direct survival of the Ottoman Empire and at maintaining its physical integrity. Careful not to stretch the empire's still recuperating resources too thin, he concentrated his efforts on lifting the Venetian blockade, retaking the islands which had been lost to Venice a short time before, and replacing the rebellious Transylvanian vassal prince George II Rakoczi with Arkos Barcsay after the Ottoman army had taken Varad (Grosswardein).

Before he died of old age in 1661, Mehmed Köprülü had secured his own succession for his son, Fazıl Ahmed. With the empire's domestic affairs reasonably well in order, the task fell to him to marshal the resources necessary to secure the empire's northern and western borders (with Italy, Austria, Russia and Poland). The son's stabilization of the periphery thus followed the father's stabilization of the central lands and the capital. Fazıl Ahmed Paşa first concern was the northern borders. Continuing his father's campaign in support of the new vassal king of Transylvania and the securing of Varad (Grosswardein), in 1663 Fazıl Ahmed took Uyvar (Neuhäusel) on the Austro-Hungarian border, a town on the road to Vienna, which was now only 150 tantalizing kilometers from the Ottomans' grasp.

After the peace of Vasvar (Eisenburg) formally ended hostilities on 10 August 1664, and once the renewed demarcation and fortification of the northern frontier had been completed, Fazıl Ahmed's attention turned to the festering issue of Crete which had been draining the empire's resources for two decades. No doubt considering full Ottoman mastery of the Eastern Mediterranean basin too important a prize to let go after such investment, he rejected several Venetian overtures for peace and managed to take Candia (Heraklion) in 1669 after a prolonged and massive siege. Once again turning around to the northern frontier, Fazıl Ahmed then supported the Dniepr Cossacks against the Zaporogue Cossacks – making sure the Ottomans would not lose the overland connection with the vassal Crimea Khanate and mastery of the Black Sea. The subsequent effort to broaden and buffer the corridor connecting the two resulted in a number of campaigns against Poland, and the conquest of Kaminiec (Kamenetz Podolski) in 1672 and nearby Hotin in 1674. Only a week after he had secured – partly through his adopted brother and proxy Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa – advantageous positions and peace on the empire's western and northern borders, and having

for the moment kept at bay the resurgent powers of western and eastern Europe (France and Italy in Crete; Muscovy and Poland in Ukraine and Podolia) Fazıl Ahmed Paşa died from the effects of a stroke.

The further implementation and consolidation of Fazıl Ahmed's conquests and policies fell to Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa, who indeed followed Fazıl Ahmed's policy prescriptions right up until his catastrophic siege of Vienna and the subsequent Austro-Hungarian onslaught (how he did so precisely will concern us later on). But what were these policies? From the summary of events above it becomes clear that the Köprülüs' principal aim was the restoration of Ottoman power and territories, first inward, then outward. The record of their actions consistently suggests that this aim was promoted through an evolving yet coherent set of policies that dictated which political associations, acts and attitudes should have priority over others. Whatever their policy implied precisely (and this will be discussed throughout the remainder of this text), it certainly differed significantly from the reactionary type (as taken straight from Koçi Bey, and pursued by, among others, Murad IV). Their commands, correspondences and other communications – although they often forcefully reaffirmed neglected Islamic principles in law, economy and society to support Ottoman claims to sovereignty – nowhere betray any kind of systematic attempt to turn back the clock to an earlier age.

To find out what the Köprülüs' policy alternative to Ottoman fundamentalism might have looked like and, more to the point, to get an idea of what part Izmir was meant to play in it, we should take a close look at the timing, composition and operation of the Köprülüs' largest single investment; their endowment.

It is easy and tempting retrospectively to interpret a series of historical events as the results of a deliberate policy. This danger is particularly great when we lack policy statements of the kind produced by modern bureaucracies, or by that of Louis XIV's administration in France, for example. Can we ever discover the long-term perspective of someone like Fazıl Ahmed Paşa without superimposing our own policies *ex post facto*? How can we hope to accomplish this without documents which explicitly reveal motivations and policy statements?

Although it does not solve the problem entirely, Fazıl Ahmed's *vakefiye* is one document that can take us a considerable distance beyond the mere reading of grand events – a political testament of sorts. It describes a project larger than the ones bequeathed by countless other wealthy and powerful Ottomans, surpassing even many royal endowments in ambition and scope. As we have seen, in Izmir alone it provided an extraordinarily large number of institutions for the benefit of both the public and professionals, as well as contributing to the status and influence of its founder.

What distinguishes the Köprülü *vakf* from earlier and contemporary elite endowments, however, is that the classical form of its deed actually masks this particular endowment's radical departure from classical physical form. The purpose of all major Ottoman urban *vakfs* was to express piety, to increase social capital, to gain influence and to add missing functions to a site thereby transforming it into a functioning micro-model and mirror of an ideal Ottoman urban civilization. More often than not such acts of piety and conviction, whether self-serving or not, were simultaneously acts of politics *and* of policy, of economic *and* of social engineering, like the constructing of a mosque-complex in recently-conquered lands or the construction of a mosque with bazaar, seminar, lodgings and so on in the burnt Jewish Istanbul neighborhood of Eminönü.¹⁹¹

Although this was certainly also the case with the Köprülü endowment it nevertheless deviated considerably from the accepted forms and purposes of the institution. The Köprülüs took a very novel approach to the functional distribution of their endowment's facilities: the properties endowed in Uyvar, Kaminiec and Candia were all designed to support these cities' military infrastructure; those in Istanbul and Belgrade were overwhelmingly "civilizational" (religious, educational, etc.); while the 73 structures and properties endowed in Izmir served commercial purposes exclusively. This might not seem exceptional since Uyvar, Kaminiec and Candia were already primarily military bastions, while Istanbul and Belgrade already had prominent civilizational functions, and while Izmir was by now a well-established economic center.

Exactly so, but there is a telling difference between a city having a specific function because of historical circumstance and a city being purposely designated to further specialize in a particular function, as happened here. If the Köprülüs would have wanted to rebrand commercial upstart Izmir as a center of Ottoman civilization they would have invested lightly in its commercial infrastructure and heavily in its religious and educational facilities, or – since the city's commercial infrastructure was dangerously makeshift and out of the Ottomans' control – perhaps equally in both. As it happened, they chose to strengthen Izmir's commercial capacity at the cost of all other functions Ottoman cities normally fulfilled.

That this was a purposeful expression of a carefully planned policy (to curb European contraband trade and stimulate Izmir's economy in the service of the empire and, of course, the Köprülü household) would be in evi-

¹⁹¹ See Marc David Baer, *Honored by the Glory of Islam: Conversion and Conquest in Ottoman Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 81-104 on the Yeni Camii complex in Eminönü. The complex was a pet project of Mehmed IV's mother Hatice Turhan and was erected on the site of Istanbul's confiscated Jewish ward destroyed in the great fire of 1660.

dence throughout the remainder of Köprülü rule, but is already implied by the sheer amount of planning and investment that went into the endowment.

The endowment's cities were carefully selected, properties were acquired and converted, effective and beneficial uses were sought out, building plans were commissioned, major construction teams were put together to work for years on end, and personnel was picked and hired to run the endowed institutions.

It is safe to say that from the moment construction of its properties began, the Köprülü *vakf* and its benefactors dominated Izmir socially, economically and geographically and tied the city to Köprülü power. This was a radical reassertion of central authority after decades of semi-independence and ineffectual rule.¹⁹² Through their project the Köprülüs established a degree of control otherwise unattainable. They not only determined what the city was going to look like, but also *how* it was to be lived, worked and interacted in. Their hiring of (army) architects and engineers, of workmen, of administrators, as well as their determining which professions and, ultimately, professionals would operate from what sites under what conditions, also gave them and their proxies considerable influence; over *who* would live, work and interact in which part of it.

When it was completed, the endowment not only comprised the city's central meeting points and its most important markets, warehouses and shops, it had also become the main employer of its educated population and had profoundly changed its outward appearance. The imperial might and splendor projected by the endowment, however, not only radiated outward across the bay to visitors arriving by sea, it also communicated to Izmir's Ottoman elite (*ayan*) and European communities, that after a century of disorder, instability and waning influence, the Ottoman center intended to take full control of the economy of Izmir and its hinterland. Relations between *taifes* would be redefined, and any local informal arrangements the *ayan* and the Europeans had set up (and perhaps the beginnings of a budding internationally-oriented civic identity) would be broken up. Still, the assertion of Ottoman power could work to the advantage of local Ottoman and European power brokers – as long as they adjusted and cooperated: *ayan* would be coopted by the Köprülü household or *vakf*; European officials would see their consular and ambassadorial duties increased through the curbing of smuggling. I said “take control” and not “retake”, because the measure of control over Ottoman-European trade that was aspired to was greater than any accomplished, or even attempted, before. Few would have failed to un-

¹⁹² Cf. Goffman, *Izmir and the Levantine World*, 26-33, 132-35, 138-46. According to Goffman, the reconfiguration and ignition of Izmir – the one that irreversibly primed and launched it into the European semi-periphery – took place during such a period at the turn of the 17th century when Istanbul was too busy to notice. Thereafter, this process could at best be contained, but never reversed.

derstand the language and ultimate message of this imperial project, if only because its changes to the cityscape were too dramatic to be overlooked.

In the foregoing we have seen how, historically, the northern part of town had been Christian (Armenian, Greek and Latin, later European), the south-eastern part being inhabited by the various Muslim communities (Turkish, Arab, Persian) with a ward adjacent to the inner harbor reserved for the Jews. Originally these two parts had been two separate and opposing towns, one Byzantine and one Turkish, that met in the market district of Han Bey/Pazar(yeri). When the towns merged in the sixteenth century under the *Pax Ottomanica*, their economies fused as well – the former parts, however, retaining much of their specialized economic functions. Generally speaking, the Latin/European quarter's economic activities focused on international seaborne trade (shipping from the outer harbor); those of the Armenian quarters focused on textile manufacturing and marketing; while the Greek quarter facilitated both with middlemen. The Muslim quarters fulfilled all other, regular, economic functions, but with a heavy emphasis on supplying Istanbul with regional produce and with luxury items arriving through the southern arm of the Anatolian caravan route (on Map 11; coming in over the caravan bridge, stocked in warehouses between the lower castle and items 6 and 10, and shipped from the inner harbor). Predictably, the necessary financial services were provided by the Jewish ward.

As Izmir and its seaborne trade were increasingly integrated into international markets from the middle of the seventeenth century onward, and as more and more ships anchored in the outer harbor and more and more goods were sold from European and Greek warehouses in the northern quarters, the city's economy had been pulled ever further from the Ottomans' grasp as they were too embroiled in war, revolt and dynastic reversal to do much about it. The construction of an Ottoman alternative in the form of a fully up-to-date commercial district in the quarter of Kasap Hazır, financed and controlled by the grand vizier's family and staffed with that family's local clients, was designed to redirect the flow of commerce from the European quarter's quays and warehouses and seize back control (if not initiative) in a movement of unprecedented intensity and ambition. Under the Köprülüs, it was clear, the Ottomans would tolerate and even stimulate international trade and local and regional arrangements, but within appropriate limits and only as long as they could be seen as working towards the benefit of their empire and its population.¹⁹³

¹⁹³ The Köprülüs' effort to reclaim, centralize, sponsor and appropriate commercial activity from the periphery might well be interpreted as forming part of a transition from pre-industrialism to modernity. In Western Europe, this process – state incorporation of international trade – came to be known as mercantilism.

To complete the attempted reorientation of the city's economy, the enterprise was complemented with a new set of rules by which the city's European merchants had to abide. No longer were they permitted to freely shuttle goods between ships in the outer harbor and their warehouses along Frank Street, only to declare an estimated amount to customs afterwards. According to contemporary estimates, this arrangement had enabled them to smuggle up to half the value of their total trade at major personal gain and at the minor cost of paying off the Ottoman watchmen along the quays:

The aforesaid merchant ships drop anchor ... right in front of ... Frank Street. The merchant houses there have double entrances: one in the front and one in the back, on the sea-shore, the latter of which is of great commodity and advantage to them ..., in particular for smuggling and defrauding customs, at which the Smirniotes in general are very adept. All the more so because, when caught, they don't risk much beyond being charged customs at a double rate, which, at worst, is no more than 3% of all cargo according to the imperial capitulations. And to avoid being subject to that danger, the individual merchants usually manage to come to an agreement with the guards and inspectors of said customs, who tend to be highly corruptible, to fix the matter for half the amount.¹⁹⁴

Naturally, it was a setup detrimental to the interests of the Ottoman customer (a tax farmer) and, because of the looming devaluation of his tax farm, to those of the state. With the completion, in 1675, of the new customs house (*uc gümrüğü*), constructed and leased out by the *vakıf*, however, all goods were to pass through there to be physically assessed by the customer and his deputies. An added discomfort for the Europeans, and at least a number of their middlemen, was that the *vakıf*'s warehouses and markets, all but one adjacent to the customs house and firmly in Ottoman hands, were now in serious competition with their own further north. And yet, the Europeans could not object too much without incriminating themselves, for no-one could openly deny Ottoman claims that such structural improvements as had been made to the city's commercial infrastructure could only promote commerce.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹⁴ The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 39a-b) (my translation).

¹⁹⁵ See Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 105-6: "La rue, que ces maisons forment du côté de la ville avec celles qui sont vis-à-vis, est longue, à la vérité, mais elle est forte étroite. L'on trouve, au bout, la grande douane pour les marchandises de dehors où le douanier fait sa demeure. C'est un bâtiment nouveau, qui n'est que de bois et bâti sur pilotis, avec une grande avance de planches soutenue en l'air, sous laquelle la mer bat, avec des degrés pour monter et descendre à la mer et pour décharger les balles de marchandises. Les marchands sont beaucoup mortifiés de cette nouveauté, parce qu'on les oblige d'y faire aborder ce qu'ils veulent débarquer ou embarquer pour être fouillé et examiné afin que les droits ne soient point frustrés et pour empêcher les marchandises de contra bande, qui étaient auparavant fort fréquentes lorsque chacun débarquait directement à son magasin, ou qu'il embarquait pour envoyer aux vaisseaux. On dit que les consuls n'en sont point fâchés parce que les marchands ne peuvent rien soustraire à leurs droits, en faisant embarquer quoi que ce soit à son insu, pouvant avoir con-

The customs house was the first major new structure of the endowment to be completed (full completion of its assets would take two more years). This suggests that customs reform was indeed a cornerstone of the policy the endowment was set up to support. The imperial writ dictating that from then on European ships unload their cargoes at the customs office was dispatched to Izmir at the end of July 1675 by express imperial messenger (*çavuş*).¹⁹⁶ There was considerable resistance from the European communities, but by 15 November of that year all attempts to undo the order had come to nothing and the foreigners had no choice but to comply. By the Dutch consul's own admission, neither the various consuls of Izmir, nor their superiors in Istanbul stood to gain from blocking execution of the order: given that most of their incomes were paid from consular and ambassadorial duties over the same goods, the widespread evasion of duties hit them as much as it did the customer.¹⁹⁷ Even if they had countered the order full force, however, the Köprülüs' investment would have been too great for them to give in and revert to the previous arrangement.

Leading the effort to wrestle European economic activity in Izmir under Ottoman sovereignty would be Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa.¹⁹⁸ When illness forced his adopted brother to lay down his public functions in July 1676, he not only inherited the functions of the grand vizier but also his position as the head of the family's political-administrative network or "household" and its policies, as well as control over the state's and the family's assets with which to realize them – first and foremost the as yet uncompleted endowment in Izmir.

naissance de tout par le mémoire de la douane. Le douanier ne se contente pas de cette innovation: il veut aussi que les vaisseaux demeurent devant la douane et que personne ne s'embarque ou débarque, soit marchand, soit marinier, qu'on ne le fouille partout."

¹⁹⁶ The Hague, NA 01.03.01 124: Jacob van Dam to DLH, 22 August 1675: "Some days ago a *çavuş* or bailiff from Adrianople arrived here on horseback, with a written order or commandment, personally signed by the grand Turk, and therefore named a Hatt-ı Şerif ..., which is of great force and should be obeyed pertinently; that all Frankish or Christian ships are henceforth commanded to visit the customs house, unload their cargo there, and pay customs in the same manner as is usual in Constantinople" (my translation).

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*; *id.*: Jacob van Dam to Justinus Colyer, 20 September 1675; *id.*: Justinus Colyer to Jacob van Dam and the Dutch Nation of Izmir, 20 September 1675; *id.*: Jacob van Dam and Dutch Nation Izmir to Justinus Colyer, 25 September 1675; *id.*: Justinus Colyer to Jacob van Dam and the Dutch Nation of Izmir, 4 October 1675; *id.*: Jacob van Dam and Dutch Nation Izmir to Justinus Colyer, 14 October 1675; *id.*: Jacob van Dam to DLH, 14 October 1675; *id.*: Justinus Colyer to Jacob van Dam and the Dutch Nation of Izmir, 21 October 1675; *id.*: Jacob van Dam and Dutch Nation Izmir to Justinus Colyer, 24 October 1675; *id.*: Jacob van Dam to DLH, 15 November 1675; and The Hague, NA 01.03.01 98: Justinus Colyer to DLH, 14 May 1676, 7 June 1676, and 3 September 1676. For a brief summary of the English point of view, see North, *Life*, 111-12; and Anderson, *English Consul*, 3-4.

¹⁹⁸ More on Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa's reformalization of Ottoman-European relations under "Kara Mustafa Paşa and the Reassertion of Ottoman Control".

Once the endowment was up and running and the (re)regulation of European commercial activity was adequately supported by law and enforcement, the new grand vizier followed it up with a policy aiming to (re)regulate the European communities' formal status. Again, the aim was to counter the ever growing liberty taken by their "impudent" European guests, this time not by forcing their trade back into the Ottoman economic mold, but by underlining the unilateral quality of their sultanic privileges (capitulations) and diplomas (*berats*) through limitation and revocation, reestablishing their proper place within Ottoman law and administration and renegotiating their practical application.¹⁹⁹

While Ottoman reactionary politics had always inclined towards having as little to do as possible with these foreigners and their commerce, the Köprülüs were clearly aiming for full control and profit. That is, for the strict physical, legal and social subjugation of Ottoman-European contact to the rules of Ottoman society and (distributive) economy; and for incorporation of the European nations in the Ottoman system under the same system of group-autonomy that served the empire's minorities.

With the Köprülüs' major investment Izmir's appearance had been transformed from that of a smugglers' paradise and regional port supplying Istanbul, to that of a major Ottoman commercial center and a true focus of empire. The upgrade heralded a drive for increased Ottoman control which, if it was to be consistently followed up with matching legislation and administrative practices, would significantly curtail the uncommon liberty the European merchant communities of Izmir had become accustomed to. The city's previously discussed provincial and fiscal reassignment seems to have further signaled the firmness of the Köprülüs' resolve to bring it more fully into the imperial fold. On another (more informal) level the *vakf* also tied local elite (*ayan*) to the imperial center through the investment and employment opportunities it offered.

The direct cause of this drive to give Izmir an imperial upgrade and tie it to the Köprülü family and its fortunes was the Cretan experience: while trying desperately to secure the necessary provisions for their troops laying siege to Candia, Fazıl Ahmed and his deputy Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa had encountered growing obstruction from Izmir's non-Muslim wholesalers and European merchants. Their smuggling of raw materials and staple foodstuffs to the defenders of Candia had dealt a triple blow to the Ottoman effort: firstly in lost taxes, secondly in taking up ships' holds desperately needed by the other side, and thirdly in providing the defenders with goods earmarked for the besiegers. Now, with the war over and the western frontier pushed back from the Aegean and past the Peloponnesus, the time had finally come

¹⁹⁹ On *berats* and their proliferation, see, generally, Van den Boogert, *The capitulations*.

to integrate what was still essentially a frontier boom town and a provisioning port fully into the Ottoman administration and economy.

Stabilization and incorporation appear to have been the Köprülüs' answers to the challenges posed by the increasing pull of the emerging economic world-system. And although it may seem a conservative strategy and it included at least some of Koçi Bey's prescriptions, it was not reactionary or Ottoman fundamentalist in essence. In this respect, European observers were correct when they complained that Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa – the Köprülü to whom the burden to integrate Izmir's Europeans ultimately fell – cared about only two things; power and money, for the attaining of which he was very willing to trample what they considered to be their capitulatory "rights" (but which were in fact privileges). What they failed to appreciate (and how could they?) is that to the Ottomans the capitulations were instruments, not goals. It seems that proper and strict subjugation of foreign merchants and their commerce to the laws of the realm was fully in accordance with the logic of the Ottoman polity *and* was instrumental to being a good Köprülü grand-vizier. Whether it was a legal, ethical or even reasonable goal to pursue, was beside the point. If stabilization and incorporation were the purpose, the attitude with which they were to be attained was one of ruthless subjugation.

How this policy played out in practice will be the theme running through the following part's survey of the "The European City".

The European City

In short, among the possessions of the Ottoman dynasty there are two-hundred and sixty populous trading ports. Of these cities importing and exporting cargo, the port of İzmir is the most famous. For in all the world there are eighteen unbelieving [Christian] kings that have befriended the Ottoman dynasty and all their balios [consuls of the Italian city-states] and consuls reside there. And their merchants bring products from all over the face of the earth and goods from all the peoples of the world. Every year a thousand ships come and go to have their goods sold in this city of İzmir. Thus, this place has become a truly shining trading port adorned with bustling quays. And because of these malevolent Frankish ships arriving, half the city of İzmir resembles the land of the Franks [Western Europe]. And if someone strikes an unbeliever of rank, doormen and watchmen immediately encircle the man and, without showing any mercy whatsoever, bring him straight before the judge. Whether the judge kills him or the unbelievers, then and there the corpse is lost to the Muslims. On one side, therefore, the place is sinister like Malta and modeled on the land of the Franks. But because of the charm of this city's light-blue sky there are such attractive tavern-waiters, young monks and unbelieving unripe beauties with their locks let down — as to bring the minds of lovers still further to the same disorder as that of a beauty's hair.²⁰⁰ Of such qualities are the beauties born of the tavern-keep. And the markets and bazaars of this Frankish quarter are very richly adorned. In its public squares stand seven churches, which they call places of worship, where they can perform their corrupted rites and evil ceremonies. These are sinister places brimful with Patriarchs and priests. And all the houses of the polytheists [those professing the Holy Trinity, here; Greeks and Armenians] are in the northern part of the city; many more houses of impious unbelievers [here; Franks] being situated among the buildings along the [outer] harbor's shore. In going back and forth between their ships and [these] their houses in boats, they always fire a canon from every ship [in salute]. As it is their custom to do so night and day, the city of İzmir is never spared the canons' noise.

Evliya (1671)²⁰¹

History

Considering 17th-century Izmir as a double city consisting of distinct Ottoman and European parts not only strengthens our awareness of the city's

²⁰⁰ Here, Evliya draws heavily upon the Persian-Ottoman lyrical tradition to sing the praises of Izmir's Frankish quarter. The *motif* used is that in which intoxication with the love of God is likened to the intoxication caused by the consumption of inordinate amounts of wine. In this *topos* the object of the metaphorical alcohol-induced enamoredness is the person filling the glasses; the tavern-waiter. This is usually a young monk since the Islamic prohibition of alcohol meant that wine was only (supposed to be) available in Christian monasteries. Cleverly toying with the possibilities offered by both the unsuspect language of the accepted literary *topos* and the absence of gender in the Turkish language, however, Evliya is in fact paraphrasing the very real alcoholic and (hetero)sexual pleasures to be had in the taverns of the European quarter (see *infra*).

²⁰¹ Evliya, *Seyahatname* 9, 96-97 (my translation).

history as a frontier; it also forces us to think about what defined and separated the city's parts in the minds of its inhabitants and visitors. As such, the interest of Evliya's description above not only lies in its being a rare Ottoman narrative description of the city's situation, but also in its providing a clear illustration of contemporary attitudes towards the city's constituent communities. While everyone, be they Ottoman or European, seemed to agree wholeheartedly upon the basic polarity between the Turkish and Frankish zones, the status of the Armenian, Greek and – to a lesser degree – Jewish elements was never so clear. The following sections will discuss the historical causes of this ambivalence, its development in light of a growing European presence, and the history of that privileged presence as embodied in the Ottoman capitulations.

From "the Community of Non-Muslims" to "Frank Street"

As the foregoing has shown, the dichotomy between East and West, land and sea, Muslim and Christian, Turk and Greek played an important part in shaping Izmir, in body as well as in soul. Due to the geographical characteristics of the city's location this dichotomy was translated to one of North-South, lower-upper on the ground. Among other things, it is apparent in the location of the city's two fortresses and in the distribution of its population over quarters according to creed.

After the Battle of Manzikert (1071) opened up Anatolia to the full thrust of Central-Asian migration, centuries of growing Turkish population pressure, a crushing Mongolian invasion (Timur Lenk's of 1402) and the subsequent restoration of the Ottoman emirate had combined to press Izmir's Byzantine/Greek population north; ever further away from the ancient agora, the inner harbor, and eventually from the last vestige of its former independence, the lower castle. Guarded opposition, always at least partially military, was superseded by cautious cohabitation. A cohabitation, nevertheless, in which the former frontier still lingered as ethno-religious and administrative separation. The definitive incorporation, in 1424, of a now marginalized Greek element into the Ottoman polity, although not doing away completely with the lingering frontier of a *status aparte*, did formally dissolve the Greco-Turkish duality.

This did not, however, mean the end of the East-West dichotomy in Izmir. For as the Greco-Turkish dimension was losing relevance (through increased incorporation of the Greeks into the Ottoman polity), the East-West quality of Izmir's inner frontier was given a new lease on life by Latins (and later Franks) representing the Western side of the equation. We have already noted how the Venetians and Genoese had acquired increasing power in the region, leading to a formalization of the Genoese presence in Izmir in 1304, how a Frankish contingent had taken the lower castle in 1344, and how Latins and Franks had conjointly taken over where the Byzantines were forced to leave off. With the departure of the Knights Hospitallers in 1402

and the Ottomans firmly in control of the city and its bay from 1424, the military and political power of the Latins no longer extended to the Anatolian coast. Nevertheless, their commercial influence, though diminished, seems to have been uninterrupted.

There is no definitive proof for it, but in all likelihood the presence of Latin and perhaps even Frankish resident merchants in Izmir survived the string of Seljukid, Byzantine, Aydınoğlu, Timurid and Ottoman takeovers. Mercantile evidence apart, as much is also suggested by the existence of privileges awarded the Venetians and Cyprus by the Seljuks of Rum in 1207, the Genoese by the Byzantines in 1304, the Holy League (i.e. the Papacy, Venice, the Knights Hospitallers and Cyprus) by the Aydınoğlus in 1348, and the Genoese and Venetians by the Ottomans starting from the mid-14th century onwards.²⁰² Although Izmir is not explicitly referred to in these documents, the frequency with which it was fought over, was used as a naval (victualing) base, and was maintained as the regional seat of government does signal an unceasing desire to capture it for its commercial riches and implies that the various rulers must have pragmatically protected its commercial routes and ventures in times of military upheaval and administrative transition. It is this pragmatism that accounts for the common practice among all heirs to the Byzantine possessions to confirm the privileges awarded by their predecessors and often to extend them significantly.

Given the continuity of Izmir's status as commercial center during many otherwise tumultuous stretches of its history, it is fair to assume that the Genoese quarter of 1304 with its *loggia*, bath, bakery, church and so on was in fact the first incarnation of 17th-century Izmir's Frenk Mahallesi. Even so, one should take care not to ascribe too much value to the continuity of European trade through Izmir. It would be tempting to construe its history as one of steady growth, promoted by stable resident "foreign" merchant communities somehow impervious to the vicissitudes of the great historical changes that were occurring in the region. In fact, though a general need was felt to protect the city's international commerce, its masters did not command the full length of the trade routes running through their territories. On their end they could attempt to keep the risks and costs of transport to a minimum and guarantee proper conditions for an uninterrupted flow of commodities, but what happened further along the routes was beyond their control.

²⁰² For the texts here referred to, as well as others, see, e.g., İnalçık, "İmtiyâzât", 1182b-83a and throughout. See also Dölger, *Regesten* 4; and Theunissen, *Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats*. There are many corpora of Byzantine, pre-Ottoman and Ottoman privileges, treaties and capitulations and even more discussions of their history. See the bibliographies of the articles cited above for further reference.

Aside from fluctuations in supply and demand, the fortunes of individual European nations trading through Izmir – as elsewhere – also very much depended on the policies of their home governments, not only with regard to commerce but, more decisively, to questions of war and peace. Venice, for instance, spent much of its life as a republic aggressively pursuing absolute mastery of the Eastern Mediterranean. Not content with competing against the Genoese and others for a piece of the trade plying between Western Anatolia and the Levant to the Western Mediterranean seaboard, its ambition was instead to conquer it entirely, entrepôts and ports of call included. This drive for *imperium* naturally put it at odds with Western Anatolian powers, provoking an endless string of wars with their Byzantine, Genoese, Aydınoglu, and Ottoman competitors.²⁰³ By comparison, Genoa's more modest policies put it at an advantage where trade with stronger Western Anatolian partners was concerned. While Venice was time and again barred from participating in Izmir's trade because of its "win or lose all"-attitude, the continued presence of Genoa's merchants gave it an edge in knowledge of local circumstances and the cultivation of trade networks, which it would use to its advantage as long as its alliance with the Spanish Crown gave it enough leverage to out-trade its rival.²⁰⁴

The political and military fortunes of a nation surely had consequences for its capacity to trade on its own terms. At the same time, a reversal of fortune did not necessarily mean the end of a nation's trade. Halting trade requires more commitment and control than many a modern state can muster (compare, for instance, problems with modern unilateral or even multilateral embargos), let alone any medieval or early modern state could.²⁰⁵ In a sense, this should not come as a surprise, as trade has a greater claim to eternity than the relatively recent inventions of the empire, the dynastic state or the nation-state. The appropriation of trade nodes, routes and income is central to the process of state formation, the state's struggle to impose itself and steer and appropriate trade for its own purposes ageless (in our current age of globalization and the multinational this should be more apparent than ever). Consequently, trade with the enemy is of all times and places, and pre-Ottoman and Ottoman Western Anatolia is no exception. Most often,

²⁰³ See Lane, *Venice*, 406-21. Lane, perhaps over-sympathetically, attributes Venice's drive for Ionian and Morean dominion to the need to prevent future incursions into the Aegean.

²⁰⁴ On Venetian and Genoese trade in the Ottoman emirate see, generally, Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade*. Herman van der Wee, "Structural changes in European long-distance trade, and particularly in the re-export trade from south to north, 1350-1750", in: *The Rise of Merchant Empires: Long-Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350-1750*, ed. James D. Tracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) is more concerned with larger trends and structures, and does take the comparison into the 17th century.

²⁰⁵ See Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott and Kimberly Ann Elliott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy* (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1985), 4-10 and throughout.

though not always, such trade has been illicit – conducted under the cloak of darkness or, by daylight, under flags of other nations.

In the Levant, trading under another nation's flag typically also meant paying consular fees (consulage) to that nation's representative and enjoying his protection under a capitulatory regime, which could be regarded as acquiring a second "nationality" abroad. The resultant fluidity in the composition of merchant communities renders unreliable any statements about any given nationalities' absence from Izmir: as much as they hold true legally and officially, they tell us little about any nationality's physical presence or absence. This means that our conclusion about the existence and composition of a pre and early-Ottoman "European Izmir" is necessarily couched in fairly general terms, namely that a mostly Genoese merchant community of varying size, and possibly including other Latin and Frankish nationalities, appears to have survived along Izmir's northern shore amid the tumultuous replacement of the Byzantine by the Ottoman Empire.

The survival of Izmir's European element meant that as Izmir's Greek element was absorbed into the expanding Ottoman polity and the city's inner frontier seemed to dissolve, another element "foreign" to the Ottoman system was there to take its place as "the other". Thus, the frontier between Ottoman and non-Ottoman shifted to run between the Greek quarter and the European part of the city along the northern shore later called Frank Street (see Map 11).

The Changing Character of the Frontier

Speaking about the polarity between Muslim and non-Muslim being superseded by one between "Ottoman" and "non-Ottoman" can be misleading: it seems to suggest a superseding of religious by national loyalty. In fact attempts at creating a real Ottoman national identity encompassing all the empire's subjects only date back to the mid-19th century (most notably with the Ottoman Law on Nationality of January 19, 1869), and even then proved unsuccessful. It is equally true, however, that the concept of nationality in the modern sense, and of an international law based on it, was already maturing in Europe at the time we are discussing.²⁰⁶

Just as was the case with the eventual solidification of Ottoman *millet*s, the supersession of religion by nationality as a foundation and embodiment of sovereignty and statehood for now still remained primarily a theoretical proposition, applicable to actual practice in fits and starts as circumstances

²⁰⁶ See Immanuel Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 42-59 on "The Rise of the States-System" and the codification of interstate relations that would develop into international law; and Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 181-84 on the interaction between absolutism, the expansion of sovereignty, commercial ambition and interaction, and international law.

dictated. Ages of theoretical refinement, of confrontations with practice and of eventual syntheses lay ahead; and on the ground loyalty would for a long time still be commanded primarily by kin groups, professional associations and religious affiliation. The mindset we clumsily call “early modernity” definitely existed, in 17th-century Europe, and through the flow of people and goods also in the Ottoman world. But as European and Ottoman societies adapted to the economic, social, religious and political challenges of the early modern age through their own versions of early modernity, there was no sudden break with previous organizing mechanisms and systems, or the beliefs and behaviors associated with them. A specifically early modern sensibility, and the institutions through which it thrived and developed, existed side-by-side with what was eventually to be relegated to the past. In an Ottoman setting this might mean that the developing notion of the “nation” as a more restrictive ethnic or sovereign entity might coexist with its corporative interpretation (as with *taifés*; “nations”, in the now archaic sense), perhaps even being applied to the very same collective and its members. The chances of this happening of course increased with the cultural distance between the beholders.

As the standardized wording of Ottoman capitulations, diplomas and orders makes clear, the Ottomans considered European representatives first and foremost as members of Christendom (*kedvet-i ümera-’i ’l-millet-i ’l-mesihîyye*), representing the interests of a specific Christian ruler or state (*Nederlanda elçisi/konsolosu*), as well as advancing those of that nation’s resident merchant community and its protégés (*Felemenk gemileri bayrağı altında yürüyen tüccar taifesi* or *Nederlanda ve ona tab’i olan bazergan taifesi*).²⁰⁷ This Ottoman perspective (and the capitulatory system it engendered) could accommodate European diplomats representing the interests of their compatriots residing in Ottoman lands (like *millet başs*), and even their simultaneously serving those of the foreign states they served (as proper *elçis*). But the realities of Ottoman-European contact and exchange were infinitely more tangled than this.

Throughout the 17th-century Dutch representatives in Istanbul repeatedly sought from Ottoman court official confirmation of the capitulatory article that “The consuls and dragomans who are employed by their ambassador are exempt from tribute, *kaassabiye*-tax and extraordinary taxes (*tekalif-i ’örfîyye*), as has become usual.”²⁰⁸ Ottoman officials were particularly disinclined to abide by the part where dragomans employed by the Dutch were exempted from *baraç*.²⁰⁹ They often implicitly or explicitly disputed the legality of Ottoman

²⁰⁷ See Istanbul, BBA A.DVN.DVE 22/1.

²⁰⁸ A.H. de Groot, *The Ottoman Empire and the Dutch Republic: A History of the Earliest Diplomatic Relations, 1610-1630* (Leiden: NINO, 1978), 255.

²⁰⁹ Hence the frequency with which reaffirming orders (*fermans*) to that effect were requested (and obtained) by European representatives. See, e.g., The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684,

zimmi' being freed from the very tax that marked their submission to Ottoman dominion, and their enjoying the fiscal and legal privileges extended to Franks while simultaneously remaining under Ottoman rule and relying on Ottoman justice and protection when it suited them. But this was missing the point: the improvised status halfway between Ottoman and European of which these fiscal privileges were part had been intended to enable native diplomatic staff to handle their employer's sensitive information without fear of undue fiscal, legal (or extra-legal) Ottoman pressure to divulge it. As such, it initially served its purpose well enough.

This perception of functional effectiveness changed as the selling of nominal vice-consulships and dragomanships became standard practice in the second half the 17th century as a result of the intense competition between the European nations for the third-party carrying trade. European representatives' selling Ottoman diplomas to their Ottoman wholesalers *cum* brokers *cum* money-lenders in an attempt to monopolize their trade and local networks unhappily coincided with the privatization, and the Köprülüs' subsequent maximization and politicization, of the collection of the very same taxes. The tensions around the seemingly practical and mundane question of fiscal liability, brought to the surface by European commercial aspirations and Ottoman administrative developments, in fact had their deeper causes in a series of cultural misconceptions which were at play throughout the tectonics of Ottoman-European contact but which converged on both sides' diverging classification of communities (socio-economic, professional, religious, fiscal, sovereign, national) and what obligations and rights membership thereof entailed. Consider the example of the Jews of Izmir and their relations with the Dutch:

In 1668 Dutch resident Justinus Colyer reports home that he has obtained an imperial order (*ferman*) addressed to the customer of Izmir that he is not to collect *baraç* (*cizye*) from the brokers of the Dutch nation.²¹⁰ During this period, the brokers to the Dutch nation are invariably Portuguese Jewish subjects of the sultan. As far as Ottoman administration is concerned this double-sorted them into the ethno-religious *taiife* of subject Jews and the professional *taiife* of *simsars* (middlemen/brokers). Membership in both is officially organized and marked by fiscal and legal obligations and entitlements determined and explicitly conferred by Ottoman censuses and diplomas. Crucially, the order must have mentioned dragomans instead of brokers (as countless others do, and don't, respectively). In reporting back home Colyer attempted

64a-65a: additional privileges obtained during Dutch resident Justinus Colyer's first audience with substitute grand vizier Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa, 6 August 1668; and The Hague, NA 1.02.20 1088: Inventory of *fermans* etc. regarding the Dutch nation, 1690-1709.

²¹⁰ The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 64a.

to cover up that the nominal dragomans he arranged this confirmation for were in fact his nation's brokers: he did not want to over-inform the home authorities about the risky business of reselling Dutch protection and Ottoman tax-exemption.

However reliant they were on their Jewish dragomans and brokers financially, diplomatically and commercially – and although, perhaps out of sheer economic necessity, they had a higher tolerance for them than their fellow-Franks – individual Dutch nations nevertheless preferred to give them the minimum protection they required and to stop far short of letting them into their nation and having them partake in national decisions or enjoying Dutch legal and fiscal privileges fully. It must in fact have been clear to all concerned (be they Ottoman, Jewish, or Dutch) that a nationalization of middlemen was not in anyone's interest and, in any case, forbidden by Ottoman law. The downside of this flexible and oblique arrangement was that neither side was exactly sure how neutral and/or trustworthy those *men* in the *middle* really were. Nor was it clear whether these *berat*-holders (*beraths*) were the nations' clients or, in fact, their patrons.

In this respect, it is telling that Dutch consul Van Dam expressed worries that Izmir's Jewish leadership was attempting (and with some success) to fully subject the Dutch consul and merchants to its own interests.²¹¹ What's more, failure to comply with the commercial demands of the Jewish nation would frequently be retaliated with a "battelation", i.e. a formal embargo by the city's Jewish community.²¹² Such embargoes were so detrimental to Dutch interests that they were considered unbearable and to be avoided or cut short at any cost. Their influence over the flow, conditions, and composition of Ottoman-Dutch trade begs the question whether Izmir's Jews were really just buying and selling in the service of the Dutch, or if it would be closer to the truth to claim that the Dutch carried trade for the Jews in exchange for a cut of the extra profit they made from trading under the Dutch capitulations.

For the Dutch, it always remained to be seen to which nation and justice the Jews of Izmir would turn to achieve their aims. Would it be to the Jewish, to the Dutch, or to the Turkish? Seen from the Dutch point of view, Jewish loyalty was first and foremost to the Jewish *taijfe*, which the Dutch almost considered to be at once an ethno-religious grouping *and* a professional association – one that had Dutch affairs in a stranglehold and could and would manipulate them if it was in the community's interest. It would seem Izmir's Jews considered their statuses as Dutch protégés and Ottoman

²¹¹ Disdainfully adding "as it is in the habit of doing with its own people": The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6912: Jacob van Dam to States General, 20 April 1677.

²¹² For instances of embargoes, see, e.g., The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacob van Dam to DLH, 10 February 1677; and The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6912: Jacob van Dam to States General, 20 April 1677.

subjects as supplementary, and only truly relevant in so far as they impacted their fiscal, commercial and legal affairs. Indeed their attachment to the Dutch nation or their Ottoman overlords was not sentimental or principled; such adherence was strictly reserved for (and claimed by) their own tightly organized community.

It was within this context of national meanings and attitudes that, in February 1677, the Dutch consul to Izmir Jacob van Dam received a petition by the Jewish creditors of his nation demanding their outstanding loans to be repaid immediately. Since the document was not in Dutch but in a *pidgin* form of Italian used by all nations in the Levant for international communication (as a *lingua franca*), it was apparently intended for broader dissemination and/or reuse outside the Dutch nation. The loans with which it dealt, by now amounting to 7,254.50 Lion Dollars, had been taken out from 1671 to forward representative expenses that Izmir's Dutch merchants had not been willing and/or able to meet, particularly in light of the near-annihilation of Dutch Levant trade during the Dutch War of 1672-1678 (with England, France, Cologne, and Munster). The Jewish creditors in question were "Abraham Leon, Efraim Arditte, Nisim and Jeuda Amatto, and Haim Algranatte, sons of Ishac Algranatte, Hebrew merchants of this place", all of them Portuguese-Jewish Ottoman subjects of Izmir and in all likelihood Dutch protégés.²¹³

Shortly after the initial Algranatte/Amatto-petition Van Dam was handed a memorandum by the Jewish creditors, adding that non-compliance would force them to bring the matter to the local *kadi's* court.²¹⁴ Their willingness to do so and their warning against it are illustrative of three attitudes that

²¹³ The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Haim Algranatte, Jehuda Amatto and Nisim Amatto to Jacob van Dam, undated [shortly before or on 10 February 1677]. The Algranatte, Amatto and Arditte in this correspondence are more commonly referred to as Algranati, Amato and Ardit – all still current names in Izmir and beyond (cf. Mathilde Tagger, "Epitaphs of the Rabbis from Izmir (Smyrna)" (July 2001), *Turkey in Laniado's Book (17th-19th Century)*, <http://www.sephardicstudies.org/pdf/Laniado.pdf> (accessed 16 June 2011). Prior to this offensive by the creditors, and as soon as a Dutch convoy of significant size finally managed to make it to Izmir again, a sizeable part of the debt had already been partitioned by Van Dam and Colyer, and disputed by the Izmir nation. The partitioning, per the consignments aboard the convoy under Engel de Ruyter (which arrived in Izmir on 30 August 1675, see The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacob van Dam to DLH, 13 September 1675), directed letters of exchange to be handed over to "Abraham de Leon et Efraim Arditi" and to "Nissim et Juda Amatos" for 1,000 and 2,100 Lion Dollars respectively, see The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6912: Justinus Colyer to States General, 7 October 1677. Another "Algranatte" is mentioned in consul Van Dam's correspondence with the States General, when he recounts how one of the merchants of his nation (by the name of Jacob van Crayesteyn) had met with accidental death while secretly fleeing Izmir because of his debt to Joseph Algranate, see The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Van Dam to States General, 8 April 1679. Arditi family members also figure as English protégés in 1702/3, cf. Ülker, *Rise of Izmir*, 246n65.

²¹⁴ The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacob van Dam to DLH, 10 February 1677.

typically motivated and underlied crosscultural contact in Izmir: firstly, that the Jewish creditors felt secure enough as Ottoman subjects to bring to Turkish justice a case against the Dutch that did not necessarily require its intervention from a jurisdictional point of view (since it involved non-Muslims only and might therefore have been settled in any consular or Jewish court); secondly, that neither party trusted the other's national justice enough to rely on it decisively, and that neither national justice was expected to rule objectively in such high stakes cases; and thirdly, that the *kadi's* court (*mahkeme*), representing the ultimate law of the land, would predictably rule in favor of those holding adequate written proof supported by credible witnesses (here; the Jewish creditors and their nation) without paying too much interest to the relative status or power of the parties or to secondary evidence or testimony – which discouraged clandestine trading and ensured that the European nations avoided *Turkish* justice as much as they could for fear of inadvertently inviting further official scrutiny of their affairs.

The matter that brought the issue of the old debt to a head was the total breakdown of wider commercial relations between the Jews and Dutch of Izmir over the tariff according to which the latter were to tax the former for their consignments with them. The Jews were unconvinced that the Dutch consul indeed extended them considerable courtesy (*courtoisie*) and taxed their goods for consular and ambassadorial duties at a significantly lower rate of one to two-thirds of that paid by the merchants of his own Dutch nation under the old tariff.²¹⁵ As a result, the Jews had refused to pay consulage over their latest consignments and demanded Van Dam show them the concept of the new tariff that the Directorate had sent over for annotation. The consul defended himself saying that in applying the old tariff with courtesy he had followed common practice as he had found it upon his arrival, and that he would tax them according to the new tariff if and when it had been formalized. But in the meantime the Dutch had in fact already begun applying the concept tariff to their own trade, while taxing the Jews as of old.²¹⁶ Van Dam's high-handed final opinion was that the Jews had no ground to complain and should simply be glad to be allowed to enjoy Dutch protection because their trading under the Dutch flag already saved them 2% to 4% in Ottoman customs duties (because of the capitulatory privilege reducing their customs rate to 3%).

²¹⁵ The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6912: Jacob van Dam to States General, 20 April 1677: "Memorie of notitie hoedanigh de coopluyden van onse Nederlantsche natie en die van de Joodtsche natie tot Smirna de Ambassaet en conculaetrechtten van de onderstaende goederen hebben betaelt, waerbij blijktt hoeveel, het differeert dat die van de voorsz. Joodtsche natie minder daervoor hebben betaelt, en gevolgelijck meer courtoisie hebben genoten als de voorn. onse natie".

²¹⁶ See The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacobus van der Merct to DLH, 29 August 1676.

The Jewish protégés responded by registering their protest against this discriminatory and unlawful practice in the chancery of the English consul, and by having their communal authorities declare an embargo against the Dutch. This fourth Jewish *batellation* against the Dutch in under ten years completely halted Dutch trade in Izmir precisely at the time it had finally started to return.²¹⁷ With Dutch buying, selling and shipping completely halted because of the embargo by his nation's Jewish wholesalers, brokers and financiers, Van Dam fell back on his trademark undiplomatic pigheadedness and retreated into an exasperated and righteous indignation, perhaps hoping the Jews would lift their boycott as soon as the Dutch spring convoy sailed onto the horizon.

Apparently the consul had unwisely underestimated the importance his Jewish protégés attached to percentage points of fiscal advantage gained or lost, as he had the swiftness and heaviness of the influence they could wield back home. A mere two and a half months after they had turned to the English to register their complaint, the nation's creditors handed Van Dam a severe reprimand and resolution by the States General concerning his treatment of them. This order of 21 December 1676 was not sympathetic justice. It showed that the Jewish protégés knew perfectly well how to mobilize their interests over vast stretches of Europe, via Italy, and all the way to the coast of the North Sea. They had managed to obtain a formal complaint from the Grand Duke of Tuscany (on behalf of the influential Jewish community of Livorno) and had arranged for Amsterdam's wealthiest Jewish merchant Jacob de Pinto to take up their cause and have the DLH and the States of Holland and West-Friesland lodge a formal complaint with the States General on their behalf.²¹⁸

Having remained oblivious to the forces that had been aligned against him back home (due to a considerable lapse in the relaying of correspondence), Van Dam was caught completely off-guard by the reprimand and responded with a sincerely emotional yet shockingly disrespectful reply to the States-General. In it he vehemently defended himself against the complaints made by Jacob de Pinto of Amsterdam on behalf of the Jews of Izmir to the effect that he unjustly treated them as third-party shippers on Dutch vessels. Dismayed by the highest Dutch authority's bending to outside pressure at the cost of its own representative abroad, he stressed how Izmir's Jews controlled Dutch trade as *Ottoman* subjects and with full *Ottoman* backing. Going on to explain that they had expected to be included in the new tariff on equal footing with "Christian subjects of our lands", but had found to have been categorized by Dutch authorities as foreign merchants shipping with the Dutch, Van Dam surmised that their complaint – far from being

²¹⁷ See *id.*: Jacob van Dam to DLH, 10 February 1677.

²¹⁸ See *id.*: Jacob van Dam to DLH, 21 August 1677.

provoked – served only their own particular interests without reckoning with the interests of the United Provinces, or with those of its respective Jewish inhabitants. According to Van Dam, the disloyal and self-serving attitude of Izmir’s Jews was exemplified by their demanding fiscal treatment as Dutch nationals, while also simultaneously and continuously attempting to get the utmost from their association with the Dutch by calling upon Ottoman authorities to the detriment of Dutch national interests.²¹⁹

The States General in their turn responded by giving Van Dam permission to leave his post and return to Holland to speak in his own defense (unfortunately for Van Dam they subsequently retracted this permission for fear that he would leave too many loose ends and would fail to return to his post).²²⁰ None of this, however, forestalled their second formal reprimand to Van Dam, which was issued 12 July 1677.²²¹ In the meantime, the Dutch nation’s Jewish creditors still had nothing to show for their efforts but a lot of unrest within Dutch ranks. Which is why on 21 August 1677 they again threatened to go to the *kadi* if the nation’s debt of 7,254.50 Lion Dollars was not promptly settled.²²²

Stuck in Izmir without any prospect of defending himself in person, Van Dam on 22 October 1677 offered the States General another emotional but informed written defense. In it he (presciently, as we will see later on) warned them not to overextend their protection of Ottoman Jews lest it might appear to the Ottomans as an attempt to nationalize its subjects (and their wealth). I will here reproduce part of his plea (in my translation) because it touches directly upon the problem of *nationality* in crosscultural affairs in the early modern Ottoman Empire:

Meanwhile I feel obliged to stress beforehand, as a loyal minister should, my fear that it will prove perilous for some Jews, born to this country and thereby being reayas or subjects of the Grand Turk, to be admitted to our protection and thereby to be allowed to enjoy the privileges enshrined in our capitulation, most specifically concerning the payment of customs, which is what they covet most, as was told to me a while ago by one of the most notable Jews

²¹⁹ The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Jacob van Dam to States General, 20 April 1677. That Van Dam was not exaggerating the measure of control his Jewish protégés could exert, nor their willingness to halt Dutch trade or their closeness to Ottoman authorities, is corroborated by Daniel-Jan de Hochepped, Antoine Galland and others. De Hochepped, in touching upon the controversy, explains that “each Dutch *raggion* (company) has 2 to 4 Jewish brokers that exclusively handle their business” (The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 39a), a service they could only perform by virtue of their status as Ottoman merchants, Dutch protégés and holders of *berats* detailing the rights and obligations of both. See Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 141-42.

²²⁰ See The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Jacob van Dam, Johan Calckoen and Dutch Nation of Izmir to Justinus Colyer, 28 July 1677 to 22 December 1677; and The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 36a.

²²¹ K. Heeringa, *Bronnen tot de Geschiedenis van den Levantschen Handel*, vol. 2: 1661-1726 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1917), 257n1.

²²² See The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacob van Dam to DLH, 21 August 1677.

here, that he wanted to acquire our protection for that reason alone, because he and his nation were being severely maltreated by the customer, while still having to pay 6-7% for their goods, where our nation only pays 3%, so that I fear that the customer here will oppose this on his own strength, or will write Constantinople to say that this state of affairs hurts the Grand Turk's treasury as far as his income from customs is concerned, which might well invite an avania, especially since the Turkish ministers are looking for ways to levy avanias from the Franks (Christians), and the more so this vizier, who is very covetous.²²³

In the end Van Dam was forced to stay on for another ten years, overseeing repayment of this and the nation's many other debts as Dutch trade with Izmir continued to pick up. Yet the problematic relation between protection and nationality remained unsolved. (In a way it survived into our modern age, which saw the unilateral Ottoman abolition of the capitulations in September 1914, their forced restoration by the Allies in August 1920 in the Treaty of Sèvres, the violent disentanglement of Izmir's nationalities with the city's destruction by fire in September 1922, and finally the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey on 29 October 1923.) This is not to say that attempts were not repeatedly made to determine and fix the boundary between protection and nationality, but the documentary record certainly merits the conclusion that all parties concerned (European consular authorities, protégés, Ottoman administration) were less than consistent in their attitudes toward either status and the grey areas in between – perhaps because such clarity allowed too little room for local manoeuvring.

A case in point is an inventory of Ottoman imperial orders (*fermans*) regarding the Dutch issued from 1690 through 1709. The first orders restate the principle that no Ottoman customs may be demanded from consular staff (including dragomans; i.e. *beraths*/protégés) and that no poll-tax may be demanded from native staff. Then, in 1694, the Dutch request and obtain an Ottoman order to the effect that “Portuguese Jews, after having resided in Ottoman lands for longer than a year, have to pay duties and customs as subjects of the land”, signaling that the Dutch authorities had made up their minds and intended to draw a hard line between its own Portuguese subjects and their relations in the Ottoman Empire, irrespective of the territorial fluidity within the said Jewish community. National sovereignty was clearly catching up with ethno-religious group identities as a determinant of legal status. Still, all the following orders collected in the inventory are blanket restatements of the previous orders that no customs and poll-tax may be demanded or collected from any Dutch *berath*.²²⁴

²²³ The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Jacob van Dam to States General, 22 October 1677 (reproduced here as Appendix 2, document 9).

²²⁴ The Hague, NA 1.02.20 1088. In his 1975 dissertation, Necmi Ülker refers to the original Ottoman transcript of the *ferman* in Istanbul, BBA MH 108 (AH 1107 / AD 1695/96): Ülker, *Rise of Izmir*, 232.

The case of the Jews and Dutch of Izmir (and Amsterdam) perfectly illustrates the diverse interpretations and interactions of the concepts of protection (professional and religious) and nationality (ethno-religious, geographical, and sovereign) at play in an early modern center of crosscultural trade like Izmir. Throughout the period, and between all Izmir's European and minority communities (whether Jewish, Armenian, Greek, or Dutch, English, French, Italian) similar discussions were taking place (though not necessarily as pronounced as the one in our example). Both the European and the Ottoman states appear to have been looking for a mutually accepted delineation between communities whose members they considered subjects (or even just preferred trading partners²²⁵), to discover time and again that the individual "subjects" (or "partners") in question were increasingly adept at slipping past their national (or monopolistic) constructs.

As we have seen, such exceptional room as the convergence of historical acceleration and cultural distance created could lead to many misunderstandings. These were not necessarily destructive; not for the states on either side (because their commerce depended on able middlemen whether they liked it or not), and certainly not for the middlemen in question. Belonging to one, or more often, several "nations" or *tajfes* and being aware of the way in which the meanings attached to those categorizations shifted and multiplied across time and geography could carry a lot of promise for someone plying between cultures. By purposefully framing either side's understanding of the other, their relations, and his role in them in terms advantageous for his trade the middleman could carve out a narrative space between them that was his to inhabit and thrive in. In the words of Richard White, who invented "the Middle Ground" as a specific field of socio-historical analysis, in an explanation of behavior that neatly applies to the utilization of various interpretations of the concept of "nation" by Ottoman-European middlemen:

*By middle ground I meant, I realized in ways that I did not fully grasp when writing the book, two twinned things. First, I was trying to describe a process that arose from the willingness "of those who ... [sought] to justify their own actions in terms of what they perceived to be their partner's cultural premises." Such actors sought out cultural congruencies, either perceived or actual." These "often seemed – and, indeed, were results of misunderstandings or accidents." Such interpretations could be ludicrous, but it did not matter. "Any congruence, no matter how tenuous, can be put to work and take on a life of its own if it is accepted by both sides." This was and is a process of mutual and creative misunderstanding.*²²⁶

²²⁵ See, e.g., Dutch demands that "all foreign nations, coming to enjoy Dutch protection, should address [the Dutch consul] in writing and therein declare to adhere to that protection and renounce all others" (my translation): The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacob van Dam to DLH, 6 December 1674.

²²⁶ Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), xii.

Such strategic *dissimulation*, even if it *used* instead of *openly resisted* the mindsets and conditions of the larger collectives to which allegiance was still owed, is typically what early modernity had to offer in the way of individualism.²²⁷

Mostly disingenuous but sometimes blatant, individualism such as this was an increasingly available alternative to assume in the “unimaginable chaos” of identity that marked the transition from the Middle Ages to modernity.²²⁸ If that is the diagnosis for Europe’s heartlands, it is not surprising that the condition was even more pronounced in further-off centers of European trade like Izmir. Although contemporary and pre-WWII sources mostly hide it to present a city neatly segregated along communal or national lines, historical evidence indicates that a willfully constructed, maintained and elaborated social, economic, legal-administrative cross-over zone that – within boundaries – permitted individuals considerable leeway did in fact exist beneath the deliberately constructed dominant narrative of organized and policed segregation so often attested to. This mental *middle ground* comprised three fields of structural crosscultural interaction: inter-European, European-Ottoman non-Muslim, and European-Ottoman Muslim.

In the first field, due to physical proximity and cultural similarity, interaction was intense in all spheres, in the form of social, economic and legal-administrative cooperation and competition. It was not unusual for consuls of one nation to simultaneously take on representational tasks for others.²²⁹ Resident or passing Europeans who were not automatically sorted under a specific nation’s diplomatic authority through the automatic protection of a capitulation freely sought that of any they preferred.²³⁰ This spirit of mutual

²²⁷ On the theory, practice and history of dissimulation, specifically in early modern Europe, see Jon R. Snyder, *Dissimulation and the Culture of Secrecy in Early Modern Europe* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009).

²²⁸ James B. Collins and Karen L. Taylor (eds.), *Early Modern Europe: Issues and Interpretations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 13 and 9-17.

²²⁹ See, e.g., The Hague, NA 1.03.01 122: cover of the folder (Francesco Lupasoli is appointed chancellor to the Dutch consulate of Izmir); and The Hague, NA 1.03.01 123: Dutch Nation Izmir to Jacob van Dam, 25 May 1668 (the Dutch nation is informed of the likelihood that their chancellor Lupasoli might be hanged for being a Venetian spy, and request his dismissal). Cf. O. Schutte, *Repertorium der Nederlandse vertegenwoordigers, residerende in het buitenland: 1584-1810* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), 302-80.

²³⁰ See, e.g., The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacob van Dam to DLH, 13 September 1675 (concerning the protection of the Danish subject “Marco di poco Broes”, elsewhere in the correspondence referred to as “Mattio de la Broen” and “Marco di P.sz Broen”); The Hague, NA 01.03.01 98: Justinus Colyer to DLH, 4 December 1676 (in which Dutch resident Colyer discusses the delivery of the child of one Abraham Meijer, “a Swissman, who acting as factor for a number of Dutch merchants, incurred a considerable bankruptcy on their account, and for that reason moved from Dutch jurisdiction to French protection”); and *id.*: John Finch to Justinus Colyer, 22 October 1677 (where English ambassador John Finch complains to his Dutch colleague about consul Van Dam affording protection to a Venetian bankrupt by the

politeness (with the occasional violent aberration) was generally also in evidence during official occasions, festivities and outings.²³¹

What was accepted for persons, was even more common for ships, and doubly so for goods: ships routinely changed flags *en route*, and often sought the protection of other nations' fleets.²³² Considering that foreigners' (*forestiere*) goods made up a large part of any cargo leaving Izmir, it made sense for all fleets to award any friendly ship additional protection when needed.²³³

name of Pizzimano, previously denied any further Venetian and, shortly before also, French protection). As for visiting travelers registering with consular authorities on arrival (a practice called "immatriculation"): although they commonly did so with the consul of their own nation (see De Bruyn, *Reizen*, 22: immatriculates with Dutch consul Jacob van Dam; The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 22b: *idem*, and Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 71: immatriculates with French consul Henri Dupuy) this was not without exception (see, e.g., Dumont, *Nouveau voyage*, 271 (immatriculates with Dutch consul Daniël-Jan de Hochepped)).

²³¹ See, e.g., The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 23b; and De Bruyn, *Reizen*, 151: Daniël-Jan de Hochepped's and Cornelis de Bruyn's descriptions of the Dutch and French nations' joint celebration of the Peace of Nijmegen. For Izmir's Dutch treasurer's complaint about the excessive costs involved, see The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacobus van der Merct to DLH, 22 January 1679. On an Anglo-Dutch excursion to Ephesus, see, e.g., The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 23a-b; and De Bruyn, *Reizen*, 28-34. On intermingling in the countryside, where all nations held summer residences *cum* hunting lodges, see, e.g., The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Nicolas Legouche in Jacob van Dam's chancery, 14 August 1674 (although this and the following documents deal with the violent consequences of a dispute between members/protégés of the French and Dutch nations). Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 133 also mentions the Anglo-French violence of Easter 1678.

²³² Cf, e.g., The Hague, NA 1.02.22 676: Particuliere aantekeningen en briefwisselingen van leden van de familie De Hochepped; afschriften van stukken betreffende algemene politieke aangelegenheden, betreffende de Nederlandse politiek in de Levant en betreffende het consulaat in Smyrna, verzameld door de consul Daniel Jan de Hochepped; verzameling afschriften van stukken betreffende de Levantse handel in het algemeen, betreffende de internationale politiek, alsmede van brieven, ontvangen en verzonden door de Nederlandse consuls te Smyrna en van akten van de Nederlandse kanselarij aldaar, 1611-1685. This reconstruction of Dutch consular archives (shortly after their loss in the 1688-earthquake) by De Hochepped contains much valuable and scarce information – among which a 1676-memorandum by the DLH detailing Dutch shipping with Izmir from 1668 to 1671 (i.e. during its greatest success, just prior to the Dutch War of 1672-1678); and The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacobus van der Merct to DLH, 25 September 1679 (Dutch treasurer Jacobus van der Merct commenting on the departure of the latest Dutch convoy, taking one English and two French vessels along).

²³³ See, e.g., *id.*: Jacob van Dam to DLH, 10 December 1674 (on English ship *The Hunter*, or *Il Cacciatore*, being taken by Tripolitan corsairs, and the subsequent requests for restitution and compensation lodged with English consul Paul Rycout, among which a large claim by Dutch factor François Schregels – the (mis)handling of which prompts Van Dam to add that this is part of the reason why the English have lost the profitable carrying trade to the Dutch); *id.*: Jacob van Dam and Dutch Nation Izmir to Justinus Colyer, 14 October 1675 (in which Van Dam complains that all cargo off the last English convoy, whether it be French, Dutch, Venetian, Genoese, Jewish, or Armenian, has been taken to customs and kept there, the English treating the Dutch as if they were subjects of the sultan); *id.*: Jacobus van der Merct to DLH, 29 August 1676 (in which the Dutch treasurer of Izmir calculates the consular duties

But inter-European contact in Izmir was not limited to business and pleasure, it was equally pervasive in both the most exalted *and* the most prosaic spheres of life. Both religious establishments, menial employment and shops along the eastern (landward) side of Frank Street provided ample occasion for structural inter-European contact.²³⁴

The image of this outpost of multinational yet heavily integrated European civilization along Ottoman Izmir's bay proved highly seductive to contemporaries (and moderns), who often got caught up in the romance of a miniature outpost of Western values and practices doggedly resisting a full Ottoman embrace. As a result, too little has been made not only of the frequency and depth of European contact with Ottoman non-Muslims and Muslims, but also of the specifically Levantine social and cultural forms these communities embraced and shared in order to be able to interact and move around as smoothly as possible. This middle ground of language, dress, social norms and commercial practices was a delicate mix of Italian and Turkish forms, modes and styles. Inherited from the Latin communities that predated the Ottoman conquest of Anatolia, the Black Sea and the Aegean (i.e. the Levantines), this Levantine way was the proven commercial and cultural standard to which, until well into the 19th century at least, all newcomers had to adjust as rapidly as possible to survive and thrive as Westerners in the Ottoman world. The adjustment was not necessarily a difficult or halfhearted one – as much is gathered from the enthusiasm with which especially Dutch merchants employed and stuck with Italianized versions of their names (even in letters home), their easy conversion to Mediterranean tastes in food, drink and interior decoration, and the apparent ease with which they switched between Turkish and formal European and Sunday dress and, one might add, habits and morals (although the French appear to have been more steadfast in their sumptuary preferences – being known for always going about as French gentlemen, and as a consequence continually having their *tricorne* hats knocked off their heads by Muslim varmints).²³⁵

collected from foreigners' goods in the most recent Dutch convoy); and *id.*: Jacobus van der Merct to DLH, 24 November 1678 (*idem* for 1678).

²³⁴ See, *e.g.*, The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 24a (where De Hochepped says that “most artisans or workers used by the Franks ... are most all French subjects, native to Marseilles and its surroundings” (my translation)) and a similar statement on 39a; Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 114 (on the French nation of Izmir “Il y a de plus 40 ou 50 familles qui font au moins 160 personnes: de gens tenant auberge, médecins, apothicaires, chirurgiens, barbiers, tailleurs, cordonniers. J'y ai vu aussi deux médecins qui ne sont pas mariés. Il y en a de plus une vingtaine qui ne sont pas mariés tant tailleurs que cordonniers et cuisiniers, qui sont la plupart au service des Anglais et des Hollandais.”); The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 39a-b; and Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 113-27 (on Frank Street's three Roman Catholic churches – Jesuite, Capuchin, and Franciscan – and their mixed congregations and protectors).

²³⁵ See, *e.g.*, throughout The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124, where the members of the Dutch nation often sign with Italianized versions of their names (a few, in italics, consistently sticking

In discussing the cultural flexibility of European merchants whose successful business kept them in Izmir (and Istanbul) for years on end, we have automatically arrived at the second field of crosscultural contact making up Izmir's mental middle ground; that between European and Ottoman non-Muslim. It will be apparent from the foregoing and the following pages and chapters that contact between the two was intense in the professional sphere (in trade, retail and services) – but not only there. European merchants spending many years, and often the rest of their lives, in Izmir and Istanbul often became fully integrated in Levantine society. Naturally, these men were not only well at home in their brokers and wholesalers businesses and homes, but as a consequence also in their wider quarters, inns, taverns and

to the Dutch spelling however): Marco di Pietro Broen, Giovanni Calkoen, *Christoffel Capoen*, Giovanni Charelles, *Abrabam en Daniel Cosson*, Jacob en Henrico van Craijesteijn, Giovanni Eijgels, Benedetto Gluck, Adriano Groeninx, *Dionis Housset*, *Arnout Kerkerinck*, Cornelio van Laer, Giovanni Lepa, Gasparo de Lespaul, Guglielmo Marquis, Henrico Mesteecker, Giovanni de Moll, Cornelio van Persijn, Pietro van de Poel, Guiglielmo van Pradelles, Philippo van der Sanden, *Francois and Galenus de Schregel*, *Daniel de Slachmulder*, Guglielmo Slaers, Huberto Snellewaert. That this was not common practice among Dutch (Levant) merchants in general or within specific merchant families, may be inferred from The Hague, NA 1.02.22 676, 219b-220a: a petition by Amsterdam's Levant merchants to the States General. The petition figures many fathers and elder brothers of Izmir's Dutch merchants, who sign their names in proper Dutch spelling. See, e.g., Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 146-49; and De Bruyn, *Reizen*, 27-28 on the consumption of Izmir's Franks. The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 23b; and De Bruyn, *Reizen*, 151 on the food and drink served in the double feast thrown by the Dutch and the French to celebrate the Peace of Nijmegen. See, e.g., The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 43b and 77b-80b, highlighting both the advantages (in moving about beyond non-Muslim areas) and discrete disadvantages (offending Muslims) of going about *a la turca* (while behaving as Christians). See, e.g., The Hague, NA 1.02.20 1060: Willem Theijls in Justinus Colyer's chancery, 18 November 1681, details the Italian-Dutch-Turkish interior of the house of Van Breen, as well as his keeping of slavegirls, his family life, his Turkish dress, his Sunday dress, and so on; Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 121-22 speaks of 23 Dutch Izmir merchants, of which 3 are married to local women; The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Justinus Colyer to States General, 13 March 1678, on the 3 Dutch Istanbul merchants married locally; and, *id.*: Justinus Colyer to States General, 6 July 1678, on the problem of protecting merchants married to local women. See, e.g., Dumont, *Nouveau voyage*, 315 and 334, on European merchants use of prostitutes and concubines (315): "Plusieurs de nos Franes qui craignent le sous Bachi, en ont puis de cette sorte [temporary marriage licenses obtained upon payment to the *kadi*], car il n'y a pas de sureté ici à voir les filles de joye, quant même elles seroient Grecques, les Turcs étant la dessus tout-à-fait intraitables. Je ne sçay quelle raison les fait agir, car ils ne croyent point du tout que la simple fornication soit un peché, & toutefois ils ne souffrent pas un lieu public; le sous Bachi en fait une recherche si exacte, qu'il ne lui en échaperoit pas un, & quant il surprend un homme sur le fait, il faut qu'il finance, & considerablement, autrement les coups de bâton jouent leur jeu. Quant à la pauvre malheureuse, on l'a fait promener par la Ville, montée sur un âne, avec une tripe de boeuf au cou, le visage tourné vers le derrière de la bete, & tenant la queue à la main au lieu de la bride, après quoi elle est vendue esclave au premier acheteur. Accord. De Bruyn, *Reizen*, 154, on, respectively, temporary marriage (*kebin*) and "The treachery of the Greeks. The head-tax for male children. The faults of Greek women. The dangers of Franks consorting with them. The punishment of Greek women prostituting themselves."

brothels (as vice versa). Intermarriage also was not uncommon: almost invariably with Ottoman Greeks, never with Jews and almost never with Armenians (although “Greek” sometimes figured as shorthand for all non-Jewish and non-Armenian Ottoman Christians).²³⁶

The third field, that of structural interaction between Izmir’s European Christians and Ottoman Muslims, is at once the most and the least visible of the three. Official relations between the two are well documented, as in audiences and other national presentations with the city’s *kadi* and other officers and administrators (legal and administrative interventions and protests, the giving of presents upon festive occasions, and so on).²³⁷ On the other extreme, and barely leaving a trace in the sources, we encounter private relations between Europeans and Ottoman Muslims: acquaintances, friendships

²³⁶ See, e.g., The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 38b, on Izmir’s Venetian consul Lupasoli having married locally; The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Justinus Colyer to States General, 13 March 1678, on François de Brosse, Jan van Breen en Jan Croesen (Dutch merchants of Istanbul) having done the same, as well as on the many local wives of the French; idem: Justinus Colyer to States General, 23 April 1678, on Colyer’s Dutch doctor Henning Wolde’s local wife; The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 25a-b, on Samuel Pentlow (English merchant of Izmir)’s local wife; Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 115, on the French Capuchin parish where “c’est ordinairement le père supérieur qui fait les fonctions paroissiales, et qui fait le prône en grec vulgaire pour se faire entendre aux femmes, qui sont presque toutes du pays, quoique mariées à des Français ou à d’autres Francs ...”. The “local” wives of Jan van Breen, his partner François de Brosse, and Jan Croesen are identified (throughout The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 01.03.01 98, 1.02.20 1060 and 1.03.01 124) as Elisabeth Violier, Luisa Violier, and Maria Violier, all daughters of master watchmaker Jean-Pierre Violier of Geneva (“Jean Pierre VIOLLIER (1618-)” (21 September 2008), *Société Genevoise de Généalogie*, <http://www.gen-gen.ch/?a=20&p=473&Perma=1&IndFN=Jean+Pierre&IndLN=VIOLLIER&OrigIndID=71839&BYearFrom=1618&BYearTo=1618> (accessed 5 June 2011)), and in any case not Greeks (although often referred to as such). A register of marriages, contracted in private houses by the ministers of all European representatives, includes two marriages of Jean-Pierre’s (the first marriage by Samuel Roger, chaplain to English ambassador John Finch, the second by Dutch minister Eduard Danckertsz), testifying to the enduring interwovenness of the Swiss watchmakers of Istanbul (subjects of the sultan) and the capitulatory nations. On the Greek wife of Samuel Pentlow, and the trouble she encountered upon her husband’s demise because of their house in the Greek quarter and her status as an Ottoman subject, see my “Towards Classifying Avaniās”. On European-Greek prostitution and concubinage, see note 235.

²³⁷ See, e.g., The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 22b-23a, on an audience of the Dutch nation with the *Kadi* of Izmir concerning the taking of provisions by the Dutch Smyrna-fleet; and The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacob van Dam to DLH, 29 December 1677; *id.*: “discrepant thirteen” of the Dutch Nation of Izmir to DLH, 13 December 1677, on consul Van Dam’s preparations to repatriate, including the formal presentation of his self-appointed substitute (Johan Calkoen) to the *kadi*, and the other nations’ congratulations on the occasion; *id.*: Jacobus van der Merct to DLH, 30 April 1679, being an account of Dutch consular duties (and their expenditure towards salaries and presents for dragomen, Janissary guards and Ottoman officials) from 1675 to 1679; accord., for the English nation, Ülker, *Rise of Izmir*, 224n48, listing presents made upon the arrival of an English convoy to Izmir’s *kadi*, customer, governor, *naip*, Greek metropolitan, castle guardian, *vojvoda*, Janissary chief, *mufiti*, and three *ayan*.

and familial relations.²³⁸ Obviously, there existed a large grey area between these sub-fields of European-Ottoman Muslim contact; that of wheeling and dealing. Here, Europeans and Ottomans fused the professional and the private to mutually strengthen and support professional and private relations. This is where clients, employees, servants and slaves became advisors, investors, friends, and patrons – where the principal character of relationships was invested with added meanings to make them as complete and inseverable as possible. To those trying to control what was happening on the ground this was a zone of corruptibility and immorality, to those on the ground in Izmir (and Istanbul, and Aleppo, and elsewhere) it was that of commercial reality and necessity.²³⁹ Lest we imagine the heart of Izmir’s mental middle ground as an idyllic harmony, it was in fact a place of rampant illegality and bribing: all European sources from Izmir testify to continuous efforts of every European nation to have Ottoman officials allow all manner of illicit dealings (smuggling, theft, prostitution, coining, and so on), as they do to Ottoman

²³⁸ As glimpsed in, e.g., North, *Life*, where comings and goings at the English embassy are discussed in some detail; Galland, *Journal*, records many passing acquaintances and persistent friendships with Ottoman Muslims; The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124, throughout the folder detailing the disputes of 1672, 1674 and 1675 between consul Van Dam and his nation, where we read that Dutch factors Legouche and Van Broen (part of a the “disobedient band of 13” that had formed against Van Dam) were lodged in the countryhouse of Izmir’s *voivoda* in Seydiköy, where they invoked their Ottoman host’s authority when under threat from their own consul (one imagines they, as well as Franks of other nationalities, were also occasionally entertained in the *voivoda*’s *küşke* (pavilion) at the far end of Frank Street (see *infra*)); The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 25a-b, on deceased English merchant Samuel Pentlow’s close friendship with chief customer Hüseyin Ağa.

²³⁹ See, e.g., Laurent d’Arvieux, *Mémoires* (Paris: C.J.B. Delespine, 1735), i: 125-27 on a comedy performed at the French consulate in 1657, with Muslim families attending; The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6912: Justinus Colyer to States General, 19 June 1673, where Colyer requests permission to hire the grand vizier’s private doctor Alexander Mavrocardato as his own; The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacobus van der Merct to DLH, October 1677, for expenses declared “general” by consul Van Dam, but disputed as being “private” by his nation (presents to his dragomans, to the *kadi*, to the *naip* upon his wedding, to Derviş Ağa, to the sons of Kara Mustafa Paşa, towards bloodmoney for a Turkish mariner found dead on the consul’s doorstep, to the *voivoda* upon the circumcision of his son); The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: three accounts of Pieter Smout for the years 1672-74 testifying to the merchants regular trade relations with two Muslim merchants; *id.*: Jacob van Dam and Dutch Nation Izmir to Justinus Colyer, 14 October 1675, on Derviş oğlan (or; ağa), secretary to the province of Bosnia and “great friend of the nation” offering his services to the Dutch in their attempts to undo the new customs regulations; The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 43a, on a Turk living in Kadifekale being employed by customer and consuls to look out for ships and announce their imminent arrival; The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Justinus Colyer to States General, 1 May 1678, in which Colyer informs the States General that he has hired Alexander Mavrocardato, by now the Porte’s chief dragoman, to promote Dutch affairs while away on campaign with the grand vizier; and, *id.*: DLH to States General, 13 September 1679, where they second Mavrocardato’s hiring, complement his past efforts on behalf of the Dutch, and request that the gratuity awarded him not exceed 500 Lion Dollars.

power brokers' actively seeking rewards in return for the promise of shutting their eyes.

If we observe 17th-century Izmir with questions of individual and group identities in mind, it becomes apparent that its long history as a frontier *and* a center of crosscultural trade added extra flexibility and options to the relation between individual and nation, to relations between individuals from different nations, and to relations amongst nations. This historically determined flexibility with regard to individual and group nonconformity had served the city, its merchants and their home governments (in Istanbul/Edirne as in Europe's capital cities) well as long as the latter did not manage to truly project their jurisdiction to Izmir's quays. That is; as long as rules were made in the centers and it was left up to local culture and initiative to deal with, around or without them to everyone's satisfaction.

But from around the middle of the 17th-century, when cities, dynasties and states were starting to settle into a new balance after the manifold challenges of the long 16th century, they increasingly came to view such crosscultural freewheeling as a challenge to their authority and a liability for their *mercantilist* policies of protectionism and expansion.²⁴⁰ The growing appetite and capability of early modern states for systematically enhancing their sovereignty put a particularly heavy strain on the nations and *nationals* of Izmir. The marshaling of assets and populations in the service of monetary and territorial expansion not only required further fiscalization and centralization, but also stricter allegiance and obeisance. This limited the opportunity for sincere feedback (*voive*) from those who had to implement (i.e. live and trade with) policies thought up elsewhere, making it more likely that they would voice their objections by privately disregarding public policies and resisting their practical implementation (a dissimulated *exiit*).²⁴¹ One of the outcomes of the stress put on the mental middle ground described above was that it became more compact and was hidden from view even further.

The increase in pressure to identify more fully with the needs and wishes of one's state was most strongly felt among the European communities, who had after all been furthest removed from the power projected by their centers. Until the early 17th century these communities had been pragmatic groupings of merchants centered around whoever, against a modest fee, would and could best protect their interests. Whether these representatives were fellow countrymen or not was of little importance; allegiances could be switched as circumstances dictated and formal organization was minimal. A

²⁴⁰ On *mercantilism*, its development, and its variations across Western Europe and the wider world, see Ronald Findlay and Kevin H. O'Rourke, *Power and Plenty: Trade, War, and the World Economy in the Second Millennium* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 227-310.

²⁴¹ On "voice" and "exit" see Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).

Dutchman, for instance, could come from the Spanish or the United provinces and might choose to seek the protection of the Dutch consul, but also that of the Venetian, the French or the English. The choice made could depend on personal preference, religious affiliation or quite simply on the kind, origin and destination of the merchandise he was shipping. Although it proved exceedingly difficult for home governments to change this situation and turn Levant commerce to their own profit and direction (i.e. integrate it into their wider economic policies), they all made continuous and concerted efforts to do so; in the course of the 17th century a barrage of rules, procedures and orders was issued through which the European nations in the Levant were formally (re)constituted and demarcated from each other.²⁴²

Efforts at reconstitution and demarcation were not limited to the European communities amongst themselves. A logical next step towards the “nationalization” of the Levant merchants and their trade was demarcating them from the Ottoman context, affirming the frontier between Ottoman and non-Ottoman and securing a designated and increasingly extraterritorialized European zone in Izmir. One method of doing so was through the consistent misinterpretation of the capitulations – regarding them not as revocable privileges awarded by the sultan, but as treaties carving self-administered European enclaves out of Ottoman territory – and the bringing subsidiary administrative rules and measures in line with this interpretation.²⁴³ Another was the administrative and moral discouragement of more than polite relations between European merchants and locals.²⁴⁴ The purpose of such inter-

²⁴² Such as new tariffs (in which the diverging rates paid by nationals and protégés were laid down per commodity), oaths of allegiance to the home authorities and its representatives, procedures detailing where diplomatic assistance was warranted and where not (particularly where national and personal financial liability began and ended, especially in cases in which national lines were blurred by intermarriage or international over-familiarity), and so on: The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 32a-35b; Heeringa, *Bronnen 2*, #59; W.E. van Dam van Isselt, “Het ‘in train brengen’ van het in 1675 voor de Levant ontworpen formulier (1675-1680)”, *Bijdragen voor vaderlandsche geschiedenis en oudheidkunde*, 4/7 (1909). My “Towards Classifying Avantias” compares Dutch and English efforts to limit the liability of their nations, institutions and states for private and professional crosscultural liberties taken by individual merchants. To no surprise, it turned out that separating the private from the professional and the crossculturally modest from the licentious to determine a subject’s right to diplomatic assistance was impractical, if only because in cases where personal or national attachments and losses involved were deemed too great, nations and representatives were strongly inclined to turn their burden (i.e., of cases that had escalated beyond the possibility of local resolution through silent diplomacy) over to the authorities back home by presenting them as unprovoked injustices brought upon them by the typically untrustworthy, avid and cruel “Turk”.

²⁴³ See İnalçik, “İmtiyâzât”.

²⁴⁴ In cases where Dutch- or Englishmen who were less than popular with their representatives and/or nations got into trouble that could be attributed to careless or over-ambitious crosscultural enthusiasm, diplomatic and national indifference could be severe. See, e.g., the case of the lethal beating received by secretary to the Dutch embassy François de Brosses (1680) in the Ottoman Imperial Council (see *infra*), or the unsympathetic representa-

pretations and the resulting measures was, firstly, to prevent the alienation of the subjects and capital of the expatriate community, and, secondly, to make the frontier between Ottoman and non-Ottoman impermeable in all but commercial matters – and then only in one direction, namely that from Ottoman to non-Ottoman. Combined with the first European efforts at protecting Ottoman Christians *en masse* and at circumventing the controlled Ottoman economic system with its wholesalers and inflexible pricing, these attempts amounted to the European quarter being used as a base of operations for expansion.²⁴⁵

The increasing push and pull exerted by the home governments caused considerable friction in the European communities of Izmir. Their members – some merchant “adventurers” in the truest sense – had grown accustomed to relative freedom from many of the restraints Western society imposed on them. In essence, they had been able to do as they pleased as long as the books were kept in order, as profits were regularly remitted to their principals back home, and as any quarrels with Ottoman officials were solved on the local level. For some, there were not many temptations beyond those of a commercial nature (smuggling, usury, to name but a view) and the promise of their families back home, their religion and culture, and their loyalty and obedience kept them in place.

Many others, though, assumed lifestyles that would have been impossible and unacceptable back home; deviating from their proper social station, abandoning the church, or taking on Ottoman customs. Such individualistic freedoms were not easily abandoned once acquired and made sure that part of the European merchants of Izmir (or Istanbul for that matter) would always respond to the home governments’ pull by pulling back harder. Aside from the unappealing prospect of returning fully to the fold of a nation progressively subdued by all the institutions of state and religion from which they had managed to free themselves, the more independent merchants’ objections were above all practical. The biggest fortunes were to be made by *not* relying on the consular and commercial system of your nation too much (nor, we should add, too little), by bridging the divide and cultivating alliances with local officials and families beyond the scope of competitors, principals and the state, in short; by not accepting a rigid physical or mental boundary between Ottoman and non-Ottoman.²⁴⁶

tion of English merchants Gabriel Smyth and John Ashby, who – left to fend for themselves as they dealt with the blowback from the disputed inheritance of their friend Samuel Pentlow – were extorted to bankruptcy, threatened with torture, and thrown into a dungeon (1678) (my “Towards Classifying Avaniās”).

²⁴⁵ On the successes and failures of Dutch (and other nations’) attempts to capture Ottoman mohair trade at its source in Ankara, see Kadı, “Natives and Interlopers”, 84-133.

²⁴⁶ This was particularly apparent during the period of greatest Dutch success in Izmir (from around mid-century until the Dutch War of 1672), when more than half of the Dutch

Although merchants' home states condemned any crossing to the Ottoman side, they welcomed movement in the other direction. As much as they disapproved of European merchants crossing over to become clients of some Greek or Jewish wholesaler, they did approve of Greek or Jewish Ottomans tying themselves to Frank Street.²⁴⁷

The contradiction apparent in attempting to enforce a physical and mental boundary, only to encourage incoming traffic across it, aptly illustrates the requirements of late-17th and 18th-century European policy in the Levant. If the purpose was to enhance sovereignty, jurisdiction and economic control, the method was to extend it over as many people and sources of wealth as possible. In a colonial situation such expansion would typically occur at the cost of a weaker native authority and would be directed outward from a fortified European center, or "factory". In the Levant, there could be no physical or direct expansion against Ottoman will and all such attempts were necessarily indirect and limited to increasing economic leverage and fostering religious bonds.

In this way, Izmir's European quarter slowly but certainly became not a base of operations for expeditions into the Ottoman interior, but a commercial and religious center that, instead of focusing on direct economic expansion, increasingly aimed at accumulating jurisdiction and loyalty through protection and greater economic interdependence. This process, however, was only just beginning in the period under discussion here: Louis XIV's

nation systematically evaded consular duties and jurisdiction, and did well by it. See all the Dutch archival series in the bibliography; and W.E. van Dam van Isselt, "De klachten, tusschen 1672 en 1675 ingebracht tegen Jacob van Dam, consul te Smirna (1668-1688)", *Bijdragen voor vaderlandsche geschiedenis en oudheidkunde*, 4/6 (1907); *id.*, "Het 'in train brengen'", *id.*, "De dertien "discreperende" kooplieden te Smirna (1685-1687)", *Bijdragen voor vaderlandsche geschiedenis en oudheidkunde*, 4/8 (1910); *id.*, "Een lang uitgestelde reis: episode uit onzen Levantschen handel", *Bijdragen voor vaderlandsche geschiedenis en oudheidkunde*, 5/4 (1917). For the English and the French, see also, generally, North, *Life*; Galland, *Journal*; and the other references *supra* in the extensive notes (230 through 239).

²⁴⁷ As much is clear from the protection policies of the French, English and Dutch. See (resp.) Ülker, *Rise of Izmir*, 216: M. Barbier, M. Fouribée, Sr. Zacharie Vulaque, Sr. Mousé Abenassera, Christofy Amira, and Isaac Abenassera (French dragomans of Izmir in 1700); *idem*, 246n65 (English protégés of Izmir in 1702/3): Paulo di Giorgio, Nicolachi di Luco, Jeanachy di Giorgio, Christophero di Paulo, Cercheis di Sapher, and Zaccaria di Jacob (dragomans), Mose Arditì, Abram Arditì, Babriel di Pietro, and Morat di Avancee (sons of dragomans), Aratoon Sapher (broker to Sercheis Chellabee), Yanny di Luvanìs (butler), Dimitreée di Arvas (underbutler), Nicola di Monali (baker), Francesco di Billio (gardener), Marco di Macale (undercook), Georgio di Pietro (undercook), Antonio di Gasoar (lise), Arvas di Mirian (lise), Batista di Giorgio (minister), Antonio de Noir (barber), Giovanni di Crokio (fiddler), and 7 servants to the dragomans); Appendix 2, document 1 (selected dragomans of Izmir in 1671): Constantin Amira (Dutch), Michael Attalas (Venetian), Isaac Berbignan (Dutch), Porlo Homero (English), Spiro di Niccolo (Genoese), Giacomo Sandernara (Dutch); and Appendix 2, document 9 for the Dutch protection of Ottoman Portuguese Jews.

France was as yet the only state to have declared its promotion official policy.²⁴⁸ Although the larger European nations in the Levant had always competed with each other for the favors of their districts' most powerful commercial players and communities, the number of protégés had remained fairly modest as a result of effective Ottoman bureaucratic controls on the Ottoman diplomas arranging protection (*berats*).²⁴⁹ Whether the number of individually protected persons (i.e. *beratls*) went up significantly as European projects for extending and deepening sovereignty gained momentum is doubtful, but it is certain that Louis XIV's attempts at acquiring French protection over whole nations of Ottoman Christian (i.e. not through individual *berats*, but through the insertion of new articles in the French capitulations) indeed formed an integral part of his policy towards full French mastery of the Levant trade.²⁵⁰

In considering the drive to increase sovereignty and the impossibility of outright expansion as coming to redefine Izmir's East-West boundary, we have so far overlooked one crucial aspect: ideology. Relatively closed to Europeans and relatively open to Ottoman Christians and (to a lesser extent) Jews, the physical and mental boundary between Ottoman and European Izmir was near absolute for Ottoman Turks. Although early nationalisms were inclusive when compared to modern-day exclusive (ethnicity-based) interpretations, including Muslims was considered beyond the pale (unless they were Christian converts to Islam wishing to revert) – all the more since it would challenge Ottoman sovereignty to the detriment of European diplomatic and mercantile interests.

As it turns out, the incorporation of the “Community of non-Muslims” into the Ottoman polity, the European quarter's subsequent assumption of the role of the “other”, and the inherent transformation of Izmir's East-West divide from one based primarily on religion to one based on nationality did

²⁴⁸ See notes 51 and 52.

²⁴⁹ Maurits van den Boogert has written extensively about Ottoman procedures and controls on protection through Ottoman diplomas (*berats*) indicating employment by a European representative: *id.*, “European Patronage in the Ottoman Empire: Anglo-Dutch Conflicts of Interest in Aleppo (1703-1755)”, in: Hamilton et al., *Friends and Rivals*; *id.*, “Consular Jurisdiction in the Ottoman Legal System in the Eighteenth Century”, in: *Ottoman Capitulations*; Van den Boogert, *The capitulations*. The Ottomans carefully recorded which nations were provided with how many *berats* (and often also for whom). However, there were occasional attempts to recall all outstanding *berats* for verification: these were not aimed at taking stock of an otherwise unknowable amount of *berats* issued, but rather at uncovering any that were deemed to be held in contravention of a stricter interpretation or change of the legal criteria underpinning their original issuing.

²⁵⁰ On French plans for a monopoly on trade (and, therefore, protection) in the Levant, and the Ottomans' reaction to them, see below under “Kara Mustafa Paşa and the Reassertion of Ottoman control”.

not fully override the previous situation. Formally, the frontier now separated European and Ottoman, but to many (be they Ottoman Muslim, Ottoman non-Muslim or European) this new divide was above all an echo of the old religious frontier, formal differences notwithstanding.²⁵¹

The result was complex, and indicative of the shifting identities of early modern Europe: a situation in which there were as many mental and physical frontiers as there were parties involved. First of all, many Europeans *and* Turks regarded the Christian communities of Ottoman Izmir as a sort of appendage of the European quarter, culturally in any case. These communities themselves, meanwhile, cherished their middlemen-positions in justice as in commerce. Although they will have felt a measure of spiritual affinity with Frank Street's Christians, most were keenly aware that their advantageous position as European protégés depended first and foremost on their allegiance to the sultan; i.e. on their remaining Ottoman subjects.²⁵² Running through the main currents of such group attitudes was a broad range of undercurrents; the diverse attitudes of people living diverse personal and professional lives.

Within the formally clear but otherwise murky setup described above, Izmir's Jews occupied a particular position, both geographically, administratively, economically and socially.²⁵³ As we have seen, geographically, the Jewish was the only non-Muslim community incorporated in the Turkish part of the city and as such clearly distinct from the Christian quarters to the north. Administratively, the Jews constituted an organized minority (*taije*) like the Greeks and Armenians, but their more defined internal organization and relative proximity to Turkish power enabled them to obtain additional communal

²⁵¹ Cf., generally, Turner, *Frontier*, where the development of a distinct frontier society is conceptualized as passing through three phases, corresponding to three waves of increasingly deep settlement (that of the pioneer, of the settler, and of men of capital) washing over each other and pushing the frontier ahead of them. (19-20) "As successive terminal moraines result from successive glaciations, so each frontier leaves its traces behind it, and when it becomes a settled area the region still partakes of the frontier characteristics." (4) In the same vein, we might conceive of Izmir's proceeding Ottomanization as changing the status and character of the city's polarity without completely supplanting its older characteristics; culturally, Izmir's new (national) frontier retained an undercurrent of the older (religious) frontier.

²⁵² It is easy to overstate this inter-Christian affinity. In reality, an age-old and deep chasm separated the Eastern and Western churches. It was only in the 17th century that the West began sustained efforts to increase its understanding of Eastern rites, partly out of scholarly interest, partly with the goal of reuniting the church. European traveler-scholars such as Paul Rycaut enthusiastically catered to this demand: Paul Rycaut, *The Present State of the Greek and Armenian Churches, Anno Christi 1678: Written at the Command of His Majesty* (London: John Starkey, 1679).

²⁵³ Cf. Minna Rozen, "The Ottoman Jews", in: *Cambridge History of Turkey* 3, throughout, but especially 259-63, comprising "The Jews vis-à-vis the Ottoman state", "The Jews vis-à-vis the ambient society" and "The ambient society vis-à-vis the Jews".

privileges, such as the payment (and manipulation) of their poll-tax as a fixed lump sum (*ber vech-i maktu*). Economically, they relied on their diaspora networks throughout Europe and the Middle East to trade and invest, in turn investing profits in loans to Ottoman and European merchants alike.²⁵⁴ From this strong basis in international trade and helped by the leverage acquired through finance, they managed to displace the Greeks as chief partners and middlemen (financiers, wholesalers, warehousemen, dragomans, shippers) to the Europeans in the second half of the 17th century (a position the Greeks would later recapture under British patronage).²⁵⁵ Socially, the Jews were at their common disadvantage. In the Middle East they were viewed with the familiar combination of disapproval and apprehension, though decidedly less so than in Europe and with correspondingly less disruptive consequences for their lives and livelihoods.

Relative closeness to the Turkish center, stronger communal emancipation, economic influence, lower social standing with Europeans than with Turks: such factors determined, and were further determined by, the Jewish *taife*'s preferment of strengthening autonomy under Turkish rule over gravitation towards Frank Street on any other than its own terms. Highly indicative of this attitude is the community's preference for Turkish courts and procedures, especially in cases against European debtors. Jews almost never applied to consular courts and were well-represented at the local *kadi*'s court:

*Ils entretiennent aussi un des leurs auprès du cadi sous le nom de kĩaia [i.e. kethüda, or commissioner], lequel est instruit de toutes les procédures de la justice, pour être comme leur procureur et leur avocat, et ils lui font une pension de 150 écus pour sa peine, qui était autrefois de 400 écus.*²⁵⁶

As a consequence of these circumstances and attitudes, Izmir's Jewish ward – firmly integrated in the Turkish part of the city yet also separated from it, closely involved with the European nations yet remaining at arm's length – took no part in the blurring of inter-Christian socio-religious borders in the northern part of the city and became the preferred (though often reviled) intermediary and buffer between European and Turk.

²⁵⁴ See Braudel, *Mediterranean* (1995), 802-26, esp. 817-20; and Francesca Trivellato, *The Familiarity of Strangers: The Sephardic Diaspora, Livorno, and Cross-Cultural Trade in the Early Modern Period* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), generally, but esp. chapters 1 (*Diasporic Families and the Making of a Business Partnership*, 21-42), 4 (*Between State Commercial Power and Trading Diasporas: Sephardim in the Mediterranean*, 102-31), 6 (*Commission Agency, Economic Information, and the Legal and Social Foundations of Business Cooperation*, 153-76), and 8 (*Ergas and Silvera's Heterogeneous Trading Networks*, 194-223). See the legal opinions (*response*) under Part II: *Trade and Other Professions in the Sephardi Diaspora* in Matt Goldish, *Jewish Questions: Responsa on Sephardic Life in the Early Modern Period* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

²⁵⁵ See Kadi, "Natives and Interlopers", 150-54.

²⁵⁶ Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 141.

The Capitulations

In the preceding paragraphs we have sketched the development of the frontier between Christian and Turk, and later European and Ottoman, in Izmir. First the physical and mental displacement of the native Greek element by a Latin one; then the Latin quarter's evolving into a European quarter; and the rise of absolutism, mercantilism, religious protectionism and proto-nationalism, with all the consequences this entailed for community identities and loyalties. Out of necessity those sketches were rather rough ones. They were of processes and trends not easily identifiable with the specific documentary sources or the specific historical events of traditional history. And although the state, diplomacy, politics and administration indeed account for a mere fraction of history, we shall for now have to neglect the personal, the social, the economic and many other spheres of life in order to arrive at a more coherent history of European presence in the Ottoman Empire, and, by extension, in Izmir.

The most convenient thread to follow for such a history is that provided by the succession of Ottoman capitulations.²⁵⁷ From the Ottomans' entry into the Balkans in 1352 to their definitive abolishment through article 28 of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, these privileges and their precursors embodied the legal framework for all Ottoman relations with Europe. Adopted from various types of treaties and charters of preceding polities (the Byzantine, the Seljukid, the Mamluk, &c.), the instrument in Ottoman hands developed into a coherent system for the governing of international relations at home. The history of these Ottoman capitulations is a complex one, but as their origins and development are crucial to understanding the conditions under which European nations were present in the empire, we should devote some attention to it before moving on.

As was the case with most previous regimes in the region, the Ottomans did not maintain reciprocal relations with the European states with which its subjects traded. Instead, all permanent relations with such states took place on Ottoman soil. Previously, it had been common in the region to regard international diplomacy and local commercial relations as belonging to different if occasionally overlapping spheres. According to this logic, terms of peace were negotiated between heads of state through their representatives, while commercial charters were awarded to individual merchants or communities through their own. Certainly, terms of peace could include stipulations on the administration and the trading conditions of foreign communities, but this often amounted to little more than the incorporation in a treaty of such abovementioned terms of trade. In short, though commercial privileges

²⁵⁷ For the Ottoman capitulatory system, see İnalcık, "İmtiyâzât"; and Van den Boogert and Fleet, *Ottoman Capitulations*, throughout.

could be inserted in a wider treaty between two polities, their application would still be restricted to specific communities in specific places.

The Ottomans' most significant innovations in adopting the practice of awarding capitulations were twofold: they vastly increased their geographical and administrative scope and with the increased leverage thus created, used them as instruments for diplomatic and commercial policy. As their realm grew and their economy increasingly became a redistributive one, the view that commercial relations must be inextricably bound up with diplomatic relations became dominant in Istanbul. In their own response to the challenges of the age, and on a par with Europe's mercantilist and centralizing policies, the Ottomans, partly out of political ideology and partly out of the very real necessity to cater for Istanbul's voracious appetite, thoroughly instrumentalized their international commercial relations. Diplomatically, this translated into a practice in which the awarding of privileges served as the proverbial carrot to entice European states into alliances, while their possible withdrawal was the stick with which to beat them back to the preferred political course if they seemed to stray. Of course this approach only worked so long as Europe needed Ottoman trade more than the Ottomans needed Europe's (and when this balance definitively shifted in Europe's favor in the nineteenth century, it was Europe that increasingly wielded the capitulatory stick).

As mentioned earlier, the process through which the Ottomans adopted and expanded capitulatory practice dated back to the mid-14th century. By that time the advancing emirate had far outgrown the political vacuum between Byzantines, Latins and the Turcoman successors of the Seljuks of Rum in Bithynia and needed to secure its position amongst and against them. Being the frontier principality that it was, it seized on the possibilities offered by its position at the node between three major political and commercial complexes by playing the balance between them through intensified alliance politics, simultaneously increasing the commercial scope of its alliances. This is not the place to enter into a detailed discussion of the exact timing and degree to which various predating instruments for conducting foreign commercial and political relations contributed to the full-fledged Ottoman capitulations of later date; let us merely note that it combined aspects of three interrelated strands of instruments adopted by the Ottomans (in chronological order): localized commercial privileges, peace treaties with commercial clauses, and privileges granted to tributary states.²⁵⁸ A short discussion of

²⁵⁸ There are now two approaches to, or perspectives in, the historiography of the Ottoman capitulations: the older one regards them first and foremost as being descended from (bilateral) commercial privileges and peace treaties, and only belatedly joined to (unilateral) tributary instruments; the revisionist sees a reverse relation and regards the tributary relationship as the essential inherited characteristic of the evolved capitulatory system. The first perspective has been promoted by contemporaries and moderns alike, partly to support claims

these more or less consecutive strands and the capitulations that superseded them may serve to introduce which nationalities were present in Izmir under what historical-diplomatic conditions.

With regard to pre-Ottoman (localized) commercial privileges, it should be said beforehand that these are too many in number and diplomatically and geographically too varied for their history to be summarized in an orderly fashion. Suffice to say that it was common practice among pre-Ottoman regimes, be they Christian or Muslim, to attract commerce to their territories by conferring formalized privileges on favored trading partners.²⁵⁹ If their relations with the privileged parties allowed it, Ottoman conquest of the territories concerned was usually followed by confirmation, and often extension, of such previously awarded privileges.

It is important to note, however, that the character and scope of these privileges did not develop linearly. Depending on the period and place from which one proceeds, they can be seen as having developed from bilaterally agreed treaties to unilaterally awarded privileges or conversely; and from empire-wide to local validity or the other way around. We need not go into the former development too much here. Instead, let us merely state the basic law governing capitulatory relations: a polity's capacity for unilateral action is as great as its relative power. This is to say that as one party acquires power and another loses it, the nature of the agreements between them will change too – if not on paper than at least on the ground.

As for the latter development; it is clear that the oft-cited capitulations the Fatimid and Mamluk rulers of Egypt granted to France, Venice, Genoa, Castile and Aragon, the Kingdom of Cyprus, Naples, Ancona, Marseilles, Crete and Narbonne from the 1150s to the 1390s, became more limited and local in character as Mamluk power waned and as first Seljukid, then Turkish rulers selectively confirmed them.²⁶⁰ A similar movement occurred at the opposite, northwestern end of the Anatolian power vacuum, as the retreating Byzantine empire was succeeded by various Turkish principalities that chose to continue the privileged status of the Venetians, Genoese and other Latins. Conversely, the rise of the Ottoman successors to this combined Byzantine-Latin-Central-Asian heritage signaled the approaching end of such diplomat-

that France's capitulatory relationship with the Ottomans went straight back to (pre-Ottoman) Mamluk and Fatimid treaties. It is also apparent in İnalçık, "İmtiyâzât". In a landmark article on the historical development of the Ottoman capitulatory regime (A. H. de Groot, "The Historical Development of the Capitulatory Regime in the Ottoman Middle East from the Fifteenth to the Nineteenth Centuries", in: *Ottoman Capitulations*) recently pioneered the second approach, building a strong case for retracing the diplomatic and legal origin of the Ottoman capitulations to tributary relationships and documents. For further reading and reference on and from both perspectives, also see the various contributions to the same volume.

²⁵⁹ See note 258 and *supra* under "The City as a Frontier".

²⁶⁰ See De Groot, "Historical Development", 578.

ic fragmentation. As Ottoman power grew and centralized, individual localized privileges would increasingly be absorbed into wider Ottoman international arrangements such as peace treaties.

The first Ottoman peace treaty usually associated with the inception of a uniform capitulatory regime is that concluded with Genoa in 1352 against Venice. It was followed by similar peace treaties with commercial dimensions: a treaty with the Holy League (Venice, Byzantium, Genoa, the Knights Hospitallers) in 1403, confirmed with Venice in 1411, and followed by a string of renewals and confirmations until 1479, but also at least two separate treaties with the Knights Hospitallers and one with the King of Naples.²⁶¹ Although much of the phraseology and organization of the Ottoman capitulations proper can be retraced to them, there is one crucial difference, namely that these documents were bilateral (and in the case of treaties with the Holy League even multilateral), where the defining character of the later Ottoman capitulations is their unilateralism.²⁶²

It is in the third strand, that of the documents codifying tributary relationships, that we first encounter the insistence on unilateralism that would become the hallmark of Ottoman dealings with Europe. Proceeding in large part from the abovementioned corpora and incorporating several other local pre-Ottoman treaties, concessions and laws, the privileges granted to the Republic of Ragusa (modern Dubrovnik) from 1430, to the Latin communities of the former Genoese colonies of Galata (in modern Istanbul) and Scio (Chios) from 1453, and to the previously Venetian-protected Duchy of Naxos (i.e. the Cyclades) from 1537, betray a strong Ottoman preoccupation with somehow bringing relations with non-Muslim states (and their subjects) more fully in line with Islamic law. Unilateralism was to be instrumental to the Ottomans' attempts.

It is no coincidence that this phase in the development of the capitulations coincided with the Ottomans' taking Constantinople (in 1453) and establishing the seat of government there. What for a century and a half had been one of many Turkish emirates in Asia Minor, was by now clearly becoming a real empire, with aspirations to boot. It has been said that "empires have no interest in operating within an international system; they aspire to be the international system".²⁶³ In the Ottoman case, this might be considered doubly so, since the state religion, Islam, was imperialist in the truest sense. It formally distinguished only between a "land of Islam" and a "land of war"

²⁶¹ For dates and texts, see, resp., İnalçik, "İmtiyāzāt"; and Theunissen, *Ottoman-Venetian Diplomacy*, 104-84.

²⁶² De Groot, "Historical Development", 578-80.

²⁶³ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Touchstone, 1994), 21. A good introduction to the term "empire", its evolution, its connotations and its meaning in the early modern period is Anthony Pagden, "The Legacy of Rome", in: *Early Modern Europe*.

and regarded the complete absorption of the second into the first as its ultimate fulfillment.²⁶⁴ Imbued with this ideal of empire, yet also confronted with the reality of limited power and the necessity of economic continuity, the Ottomans restyled their relations with trading partners, allies and befriended states. Although most of their predecessors' and their own concrete policies were continued, and although the negotiations leading up to new capitulations and the language used in them betrayed a waning bilateral heritage, their theoretical, legal, basis was reconfigured to correspond more closely to the new balance of power, as well as to Islamic law. As far as the Ottomans were concerned the relationship between foreign powers and the sultan would no longer be one of more or less equal partners, but one of petitioner and petitioned.

It is easy to see why the instruments best suited to the Ottomans' purposes were those regulating their relations with tributary states. Not only is a formal tributary relationship the embodiment of asymmetry between otherwise autonomous states, it also takes up an unclear position somewhere between the domestic and the foreign spheres. In a legal-religious system that left no space for lasting peace, truce or relations with non-Muslims from beyond the "land of Islam" (*dar ıil-Islam*), it formed the perfect model to fashion other lasting foreign relations after.

The first fully independent state to receive capitulations in the proper unilateral sense was Venice.²⁶⁵ After a string of Ottoman-Venetian peace treaties from 1408/9 to 1479 the sultan's dealings with the Republic of St. Mark acquired definite tributary form in 1482. Although the previous treaties had already included a number of tributary arrangements for Venetian possessions or protectorates under Ottoman overlordship (viz. in the Archipelago, Crete, Cyprus, Albania and Dalmatia) and although Venice's diplomatic relations with the sultan had therefore already been an amalgam of tributary and independent relations for some time, their form had remained bilateral.

The capitulation granted by Beyazid II in 1482 changed the diplomatic form and legal basis of relations, though not their scope and practice. It was preceded by negotiations commenced by the sultan, included the adjustment of mutual boundaries and previous tributary arrangements (remission of a tributary debt of 100,000 ducats and confirmation of a yearly tribute of 5,000

²⁶⁴ See *supra* under "The Status of the Non-Muslim Communities".

²⁶⁵ I.e. in truly unilateral diplomatic form, see De Groot, "Historical Development", 579): "... 'proper' capitulations, in the accepted meaning of charters of fiscal and commercial privilege given by the Ottoman sultans. The Ottoman term is '*abname*'. The diplomatic form of the documents may vary from a sultanic decree, *ferman*, to a fiscal ordinance, *berat*, or general order, *nışan*, i.e. an order without formal addressee in its heading but beginning with the so-called *nışan* formula, or to the most solemn documents, the sultan's letter (*name*, *name-i hümayun*) or '*abname* with the titles of the Ottoman ruler (*intitulatio*) and those of the addressee (*inscriptio*) in full."

instead of the old 10,000), its further contents corresponding in large part to that of the 1479 peace treaty. The continued privileges, all of which would also find their way into the capitulations later granted to Venice and its competitors, were the following:

... mutual prohibition of damage and offence, reciprocal obligations of restitution of booty, reciprocal permission of sojourn in each party's territories with exemption from special levies and duties; inclusion of the Duchy of Naxos; reciprocal assistance at sea to merchant ships and men of war alike; punishment of piracy; prohibition of reprisals for debts incurred by each other's subjects; restitution of fugitive non-Muslim slaves or payment of compensation to their owners of 1,000 akçe; refraining from appropriating shipwrecked goods; attribution of intestate inheritances of Venetians to the state of Venice in the absence of any heirs; permission for the bailo to live in Istanbul with his "embassy family" and recognition of his jurisdiction over the Venetian community with the right to invoke the assistance of the Ottoman chief of police (*subaşı*) of Istanbul.²⁶⁶

As the above summary of its circumstances and articles makes clear, the Venetian capitulation of 1482, though unilateral in form, was still in fact bilateral in context and content. In De Groot's words, this peculiar concoction made it possible for the Ottomans "to reduce the reality of lasting peaceful foreign relations with the 'unbelievers' of the *dar al-harb* to the legally acceptable fiction of these being no more than domestic arrangements fitting with the legal principle of *aman*, safe-conduct to be given to non-Muslim visitors to the *dar al-islam* or of *hudna*, truce with the enemies of Islam, or even of *zimma*, legal protection given to non-Muslim subjects. Foreign commercial and political relations, which were in fact conducted on a basis of reciprocity and bilateralism, could thus, by subtle legal formulation, be reduced to administrative ordinances of the home government, in one word to *fermans*, sultanic commands."²⁶⁷

A policy of "deliberate obfuscation" using the Islamic legal terminology of safe-conduct, truce and protection thus enabled the sultan to maintain he was acting in accordance with Islamic legal theory while the reality of daily practice showed him to be at lasting peace with Christian partners and allies, even allowing their nationals to settle in the empire. The legal justification through which *aman*, *hudna*, and implicitly even *zimma*, were awarded to capitulatory powers and their subjects went something as follows: privileges had not been awarded to *harbi* (i.e. those from *dar ül-harb*, the "land of war") persons or states per se, but only to those that had acquired the sultan's protection or safe-conduct (*aman*) through offering him a promise of sincere friendship (*dostluk*) and/or submission (*ubudiyyet*). His acceptance of that promise and his oath (*ahd*) to uphold the truce (*musalaha*) as long as the con-

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 589; text in Theunissen, *Ottoman-Venetian Diplomatics*, 370-76.

²⁶⁷ De Groot, "Historical Development", 576.

dition of friendship was met and mutual benefit derived from it, had qualified them as protégés (*müstemin*) and permitted them to remain in Muslim lands for the space of one year without becoming non-Muslim subjects (*zimmis*) liable to the poll-tax payable by obedient non-Muslims (*cizye*; *haraç*). This temporary legal arrangement was complemented with an implicit one, namely that the unworkable one-year term for liability to the poll-tax need not apply as the merchants operating under capitulatory privilege did so as subjects of tributary states, not through any temporary personal arrangement.

From the Ottoman viewpoint – and this brings us back to the imperial aspirations mentioned earlier – relations with the capitulatory communities living in the empire lay in the domestic sphere. Initially this had been a legal-theoretical proposition only, but in the course of the 17th century (when maximization of sovereignty became a key driver for European and Ottoman foreign policy) the Ottomans increasingly utilized the legal fiction of an Ottoman-European tributary relationship as a stratagem to keep Europe’s diplomats and merchants at bay and claim and assert Ottoman dominance in relations. The concretization of the tributary fiction in Ottoman relations with Europe for a while had the desired effect between 1666 and 1683, as practical relations were reconfigured and European merchants, diplomats, trade organizations and even states and sovereigns became increasingly circumspect in their dealings with Ottoman administration and in mercantile practice (as detailed below under “Kara Mustafa Paşa and the Reassertion of Ottoman Control”).²⁶⁸

Accordingly, these communities’ administrative and legal status within Ottoman administration should be fashioned in likeness of the *millet*’s (see the discussion in “The Status of the Non-Muslim Communities”): the consul should function much as a *millet başı* (the officially sanctioned head and representative of his *millet*) and a lump-sum tribute was collected in lieu of the individual or lump-sum poll-tax paid by *zimmi*-subjects. In official language the process of obfuscation and incorporation was especially pronounced as the same terminology was applied across the empire’s domestic and foreign affairs. The terms *taiife* and *millet*, for instance, were employed for both non-

²⁶⁸ Although such a reassertion of the Islamic legal prerogative of unilaterality in relations implies the development and implementation of an Ottoman fundamentalist policy (see *supra*), to draw such a conclusion would be to grossly overstate the importance of religious beliefs in the shaping of Ottoman policy and practice in international relations and trade. Instead of (once more) falling into the trap of Ottoman finesse (and our own prejudices), we should recognize that Ottoman policy (just like any other consciously thought out) originated in a certain world view only to be continuously reshaped and redirected by military, political, legal, economic, social and personal realities, necessities and considerations before and during its implementation. In the Ottomans’ concretization of unilaterality as a strategy to capture control over foreign diplomatic activity and trade in the empire, we see a concrete goal (capture) for the attainment of which a strategy (concretization) was selected from among those available within their specific (Islamic) world view.

Muslim and capitulatory communities and *baraç* was used to designate both the poll-tax payable by non-Muslim subjects (originally *cişme*) and the tribute due from tributary states.

From the European viewpoint, however, this legal window-dressing for internal Ottoman consumption mattered little as long as practical relations were conducted on the old footing and previous privileges were continued or augmented. And so, the drive for ever more advantageous Ottoman capitulations could proceed in earnest, with the *Serenissima* obtaining renewals and confirmations of her 1482-capitulation in 1513, 1517, 1521, 1540, 1567, 1573, 1575, 1576, 1595, 1604, 1615, 1619, 1625, 1641, 1670, 1706, 1733, and 1734.²⁶⁹ This drive for increased privilege acquired a competitive edge when the Ottoman-Venetian-bred system was extended to include other states, namely France from 1569 (renewals and confirmations in 1581, 1597, 1604, 1618, 1673, and 1740), England from 1580 (followed up in 1601, 1604, 1614, 1624, 1641, 1662, and 1675), and the Dutch Republic from 1612 (and, again, in 1634 and 1680).²⁷⁰

Within the sequences above a number of decisive evolutions in the capitulations' form, contents and functions may be discerned. On a general level, there is the transition from the capitulations' codifying a real tributary relationship to their formulating a symbolic one. As is to be expected, this shift coincides with the capitulatory system's application beyond the semi-tributary Ottoman-Venetian relationship, that is to say, with the first proper French capitulation of 1569. In this newly invented symbolic tributary relationship, the act of requesting privileges and promising friendship figured as submission and the presenting of gifts as tribute. In the course of the further development of the capitulatory system, the originally explicit references to such "submission" and "tribute" increasingly became implicit.

At the same time that the tributary nature of capitulatory relationships was becoming ever less explicit, a seemingly contrary development from bilaterality to unilaterality was also taking place.

²⁶⁹ See Theunissen, *Ottoman-Venetian Diplomacy*; De Groot, "Historical Development"; İnalçık, "İmtiyâzât". Five administrative copies of Venetian capitulations are extant in the dedicated register in the *düvel-i ecnebiye* (Istanbul, BBA A.DVN.DVE 16/4 (AH 1081-1111 / AD 1670-1700)): (doc. 1 / fos. 1-2) Venetian capitulation / to the Republic of Venice / *tabriren fi evâbir-ı şehr-i Rebr' ül-ahır sene ahedi ve semanin ve elf* (between 7 and 15 September 1670); (doc. 2 / fos. 3-8) Venetian capitulation / to the Doge of Venice / *fi 983* (1575/76); (doc. 3 / fos. 9-11) Ottoman-Venetian peace treaty / to the Republic of Venice / *fi 11* [Ramazân] *sene 1080* (2 February 1670); (doc. 4 / fos. 11-18) Venetian capitulation / to the Doge of Venice / *tabriren fi evâbir-ı şehr-i Zi 'l-hice üs-şerife min şabvar sene semanin ve elf* (between 12 and 20 May 1670); and (doc. 5 / fos. 19-30) Venetian capitulation / to the Doge of Venice / *tabriren fi evâyül-i Zi 'l-ka'de sene isni-'i 'aşr ve mâ'e ve elf* (between 20 and 29 April 1700).

²⁷⁰ See, e.g., De Groot, "Historical Development"; and İnalçık, "İmtiyâzât".

We have discussed how the growth of Ottoman power and imperial aspiration led to a reorganization of international relations, away from the equality of bilateral treaties and towards the supremacy of unilateral capitulations (a development that was mirrored in that towards incorporation of the European communities on the ground on Izmir). It has also become clear that this was at first mostly a matter of style and form, not of content; a matter of bridging the gap between the legal responsibility resulting from Ottoman claims to Islamic empire on the one hand and maintaining the necessary commercial relations and political alliances with *dar ü'l-harb* on the other. The resulting ambivalence in the capitulations was of the essence for the Ottoman sultans: mighty as they were, their power would always fall short of being able to force a truly unilateral international relationship upon the capitulatory states, or of asserting their legal initiative and lawmaking power (*örf*) through sultanic law (*kanun*, including the capitulations) without taking account of Islamic law (*şerial*). This being said, the 17th century certainly saw efforts in these directions and as the capitulatory system matured its legal ambivalence and bilateral heritage were increasingly – though never definitively – done away with. Both, seemingly contradictory, developments may be regarded as expressions of sultanic power, towards the Ottoman and wider Muslim world on the one hand and towards Europe on the other.

On the level of the privileges granted there were three interconnected processes at play; the augmentation of privileges, their theoretical validity for ever wider stretches of Ottoman territory, and their extension over an increasing number of nations. We cannot discuss here the evolution of all the capitulatory privileges in the course of over four centuries, but let us discuss the most important ones consecutively.

The Ottoman capitulations were originally designed to enable Venetian merchants to trade with Ottoman territories in safety and on advantageous terms. Therefore, their oldest and most important articles date back to the first proper Venetian capitulation of 1482 (also see De Groot's quotation above). It established the following basic rules: safe passage, reciprocal assistance at sea, restitution of booty and shipwrecked goods, compensation for fugitive non-Muslim slaves, punishment of piracy, diplomatic protection of non-capitulatory merchants and their goods, advantageous customs rates for capitulatory trade, exemption from other internal Ottoman duties (market taxes, administrative taxes and so on), permission to sojourn in the sultan's dominions without danger to life or belongings, representation by consuls and ambassadors, these representatives' jurisdiction in exclusively communal affairs, their non-liability for debts incurred by their nationals, and their right to invoke the assistance of the Ottoman chief of police (the *subaşı*).

Later Venetian capitulations fine-tuned or added unto many of these articles, most importantly those concerning Ottoman court-cases involving Venetian subjects and protected persons (first Venetian witnesses were made admissible, then it was specified that such cases could only be heard when

the dragoman of the Venetian nation was present) and those dealing with tribute/poll-tax (married and unmarried Venetian merchants – and, by implication, protected persons – residing in Ottoman lands would not be liable to *baraq*).²⁷¹

With the French acquiring their first fully Ottoman capitulation in 1569 privilege increased significantly. In 1517 the sultan had already confirmed France's Mamluk privileges for Egypt, but now these were extended over the entire Ottoman realm in a full Ottoman grant. In one sweep (and with one article) France obtained all privileges contained in the Venetian capitulations, as well as some additional ones: "assistance and salvage in cases of French shipwreck; freedom of traffic; individual legal responsibility; execution of French testaments or delivery of intestate inheritances to the consul; release of French slaves; exemption from the payment of *ciyye*; obligatory presence of the dragoman of the French at trials before the *kadi*; internal French law suits within the competence of the French consul; visitation of ships only at Istanbul and the Dardanelles (Çanakkale, Kale-i Sultaniye) on departure; friendly salutation at meeting on the high seas of French and Ottoman ships".²⁷²

In 1581 the French were explicitly granted the (previously exclusively Venetian) right of extending diplomatic protection to non-capitulatory nations. Already implied in the article of the 1569-capitulation stating that all Venetian privileges would be applicable to the French, it was now explicitly confirmed that the protection of the French flag could be extended to the Venetians, the Genoese, the English, the Portuguese, the Catalans, the Anconitans, the Ragusans, and any other nations that the French had protected in the past. Furthermore, France was given permission to set up consulates in Alexandria, Tripoli, Algiers and any other Ottoman ports designated for international trade.

France's and Venice's institutional advantage came to an end when the English were awarded their first capitulation in 1580. It was based on the Venetian and French capitulations then in effect and consequently included a similarly reduced customs tariff of 5% for English exports. The English removal from Venetian and French protection dealt a sensitive blow to the interests of the older capitulatory states. Not only were their rising English competitors now permitted to compete with them under their own private jurisdiction (signifying a significant loss in consular and ambassadorial duties for protected goods), their acquiring the same tariff also meant competition on equal terms. This situation was compounded in 1601, when England gained the capitulatory privileges of a reduced customs tariff of 3% and protection of the up-and-coming trade from the Dutch seafaring provinces, and

²⁷¹ See Theunissen, *Ottoman-Venetian Diplomacy*, 398: article 40.

²⁷² De Groot, "Historical Development", 596.

again in 1604 when France's new capitulation explicitly removed the Venetians and the English from French protection.²⁷³

In 1612 the Dutch received their own capitulation, modeled after the most recent French and English capitulations. The Dutch were at once awarded the reduced tariff of 3% and were expressly permitted to open consulates in all designated Ottoman ports (factories/scales), including in the ordinarily restricted ones on the Black Sea and those of Alexandria, Tripoli of Syria, the Archipelago, Tunis, Algiers and Cairo.²⁷⁴ The striking generosity of privilege awarded a new capitulatory state aside, this capitulation was noteworthy for something other as well: it marked the disappearance of the instrument's most important reminder of tributary origin. Although the Dutch presented the sultan with gifts around the amount previously explicitly accepted as tribute from Venice, France and England, no payment of tribute was mentioned in their capitulation.

The disappearance of references to tribute as a precondition for relations does not mean that all language reminiscent of tributary relations had disappeared. Its formulae continued to echo through in the vocabulary of unilateralism: "with letters sealed by sincere *friendship*", "the *requests* contained therein", "the *petition* for friendship and privilege", "the petitions were met with *acceptance*", "as long as [the States General] will remain steadfast in friendship and devotion following this aforementioned *promise*, I too *accept* their friendship".²⁷⁵ Stripped of all references to tribute, however, the fixed sequence of phrases that had previously marked the exchanges leading up to the fastening of a tributary bond, did little more than lend a tributary slant to a testament of full sultanic power and prerogative.

Nevertheless, the omission of direct references to tributary relations signals an important development with regard to the capitulations' legal basis. With it, the chancery of Ahmed I (r. 1603-1617) was taking another step away from the instrument's bilateral heritage, but not automatically towards greater conformity with Islamic law. Over the years – as capitulations had been awarded to the non-tributary states of France, England and the Dutch Republic and as the articles they contained had become wider in scope and relevance – it had become apparent that they embodied an institution rather than an *ad hoc*-arrangement. Confronted with the increasingly ritualistic character of the capitulations' tributary basis and exchanges, but also with a form of open-ended truce and protection (*budna* and *'aman*) that could hardly be justified outside a tributary arrangement, the Ottomans were taking ever more care to compensate by stressing their basis in sultanic initiative and

²⁷³ See *ibid.*, 597 and 600.

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.* Text in De Groot, *Ottoman Empire*, 241-42 and 255: article 34.

²⁷⁵ My italics. See the full transliteration and translation in *ibid.*

their unilateral character. The removal of references to tribute further narrowed the capitulations' already shaky basis in Islamic law (*seriat*) since the proper Islamic legal conditions of safe-conduct (*'aman*) had never fitted capitulatory relations to begin with. In response, their diplomatic form was made significantly more majestic and unilateral, so as to stress their basis in the legal alternative of sultanic initiative (*'örf*). Beginning in the reign of Ahmed I we can discern a preference for the heavier diplomatic forms of the full *'abdname* (letter of promise, i.e. capitulation) or the sultanic letter (*name-i hümayun*) over the more straightforward sultanic order (the *ferman*) and its fiscal variant (the *berat*, or diploma). It seems that the legal ambivalence already hinted at a few paragraphs earlier was indeed less a static given than a balance to be tipped in the sultan's favor.

Until the mid-18th century no further changes of significance were made to the capitulations' form and legal principles (except perhaps for their increasingly figuring as supplements to peace treaties). The competition over their privileges continued unabated however. In 1665, Genoa was removed from French protection with her own capitulation and (like the Dutch in 1612) was at once awarded the reduced customs tariff of 3%. More importantly, the French in 1673 acquired precedence over the other capitulatory nations, saw their right of protection over non-capitulatory foreigners confirmed, were accorded the protection of Frankish ecclesiastics and of French and other western Christians on pilgrimage, and finally saw their customs tariff also reduced from 5% to 3%. Through their capitulation of 1675, the English were extended all privileges previously granted to France, Venice, Poland and other capitulatory states, including protection of non-capitulatory foreigners.

The coping stone of the capitulatory system followed more than a half-century later, in 1740, when the French were the first to be awarded most-favored-nation status. Henceforth any increase in privilege awarded other nations could automatically also be claimed by them. As more and more other powers acquired similar status, the once separately awarded charters became a homogenous textual corpus from which all recognized foreign partners could draw.

Demography

Now that a short history of the Ottoman capitulations has introduced a more formal chronology to our discussion of the European presence in the Ottoman Empire and has highlighted the capitulatory conditions under which subjects of European states lived and traded in Ottoman port cities and their satellites, it is time to focus on the structure within which these subjects operated in Izmir specifically. Our summary history above has shown the following capitulatory states to be operating in the Ottoman Empire in 1678: Genoa (under her capitulation of 1665), Venice (capitulation of 1670), France (capitulation of 1673), England (capitulation of 1675), and the

Dutch Republic (capitulation of 1634). As is attested to by Galland (as by other sources), merchants of all these states were indeed living and trading in Izmir.²⁷⁶

The administrative structure supporting and, to an extent, governing these merchants' expatriate lives and trades was the result of a complicated interplay between administrative powers – viz. the issuing of capitulations and additional orders by the Ottoman central government, of commercial directives and diplomatic instructions by European central governments and trade organizations, and of decisions by local Ottoman officials based on local administrative practice and records. Certainly, the capitulations set the general conditions for their presence in terms of commerce, administration and representation: they stipulated the tariffs according to which customs would be paid; barred certain strategic goods from trade; specified how, where and when customs would be collected; created an internal jurisdiction by indicating in what cases Ottoman officials should not become involved and when they could be called on for assistance; and appointed a representative at the “Threshold of Felicity” (Istanbul), empowering him to nominate deputies to represent the merchant communities in his care.²⁷⁷

Yet, the capitulatory regime indeed only set the *general* conditions under which trade was to be conducted. The results of application (and non-application) to the practices of daily life and trade varied heavily under the influence of nationality, local circumstance and historical timing. More directly put, the lives and trades of all European nations in the Ottoman Empire were organized differently in accordance with the history, needs and wishes of their governments and principals back home and they proceeded in various towns and cities under conditions determined by local and international trade, administration and relations. Perhaps the best way to understand how capitulations and capitulatory practice relate, is to compare them to a civil code and the practice of everyday life, respectively. Although civil law invisibly insinuates itself into our lives to become part of our morality and daily conduct, it in fact rarely swings into full view as we go about our everyday lives.²⁷⁸ In fact, we often navigate the law's edges of permissibility, regularly zigzagging over its edges and back again. It is only when such transgressions result in civil conflict, since they are not acceptable to all parties in-

²⁷⁶ See Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 113-27 and 150-51.

²⁷⁷ It should be stressed that what the Europeans considered to be their representatives' accreditation by the sultan, was their appointment upon nomination as far as the Ottomans were concerned. According to the same logic consuls and vice-consuls were nominated by their chief in Istanbul or institutions back home and appointed by the sultan.

²⁷⁸ See Kitty Calavita, *Invitation to Law & Society: An Introduction to the Study of Real Law* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 37: “The ability of law to create social realities that appear natural by inventing many of the concepts and categories we think with, means that it insinuates itself invisibly into our everyday worlds and wields extraordinary power.”

volved (or made so by mitigating negotiations), that the law (and its enforcement) come into action.²⁷⁹ Just as civil law does not effectively govern our lives, so the capitulations did not govern foreign presence and trade in the Ottoman Empire.

What the capitulations did do, is provide the legal-administrative framework for European merchants' activities in the Ottoman Empire. Through them, European representatives were appointed to the Porte (the Ottoman government) and put in charge of the consuls in the factories. What the Ottomans expected from these consuls was not outlined in the capitulations exclusively, but was worked out in more detail in fiscal ordinances (*berats*) issued by the Porte to complement the capitulations. These documents were handed over to their bearers, the consuls, to be produced to Ottoman officials as legal proof of the competences the bearer had received from the sultan. For all practical purposes these were "diplomas", listing the consuls' duties and rights with respect to Ottoman administration *and* to their nations. Through their adjusting and formalizing existing consular practices and tying them in with the international diplomacy of ambassadors and resident envoys, the capitulations imposed a preferred, increasingly uniform, formal structure and hierarchy on all European affairs in the empire. As discussed previously, actual commercial and administrative practice within the structure thus set up was then adjusted through commercial directives and diplomatic instructions from Europe, as through the policies of local Ottoman officials.

This is not to say that between this Ottoman legal framework, European governments' and trade bodies' interpretations of it, and its application by local officials, there was barely room to maneuver. By leaving the practical administration of international commerce in the hands of lower officials in charge of day-to-day administration the Ottomans had for most of the 17th-century made sure that there was no unnecessary interference by high-level officials, so that – within the fiscal and economic limits that were deemed essential to the Ottoman system – a zone of contact was maintained in

²⁷⁹ See Calavita, *Invitation to Law*, 34: "E. Adamson Hoebel Karl Llewellyn (1941) ... pieced together a picture of a traditional system of law organized around two main functions. The first was to set the parameters for ordinary life so people could 'go around in more or less clear ways' (20), 'trouble cases' inevitably arose – for example, in the form of disputes or egregious violations – and then law made a flamboyant entrance to clean up the 'social mess.' As Hoebel and Llewellyn found with the Cheyenne, law in contemporary Western society sets the ground rules and stays in the background, only commanding attention when trouble comes. We nonetheless sense its routine strictures ... The impulse to abide by law's restrictions may vary across time, culture, social class, personality type, and punishment severity (a topic of what are called compliance studies), but even violators usually modify their behavior to minimize detection." This process is a significant part of "the gap between the law-on-the-books and the-law-in-action" that is "a canonical concern for law and society scholarship" (*ibid.*, 9).

which Ottoman and European merchants could fend for themselves and deal with each other in relative freedom.²⁸⁰

To return to our discussion of the relation between law and the practice of everyday life: the fact that two (or more) parties (and subsidiaries) in relations may collude to act against law (here; the capitulations) does not have consequences in and of itself. In a manner, transgressions are in the eye of the beholder, and if its contemporary beholders saw no problem with what they were arranging between themselves, who are we to decide that one party must have been forcing another through bribes or threats, even if there appear to have existed some misgivings about the collusion. In analyzing capitulatory relations – or really, counter-capitulatory relations – allowance should be made at every level for the possibility that transgressions were in fact (and perhaps against the impression given by the documentary evidence available) often the result of agreements between those pulling the strings on that specific level and in that given context. Such an interpretation – according to which law is a guide to action in case of irresolvable disputes between those directly involved instead of a set of rules everyone must necessarily always obey – neatly fits early modern society and administration in general, and the Ottoman’s in particular. In the Ottoman Empire, as in many other societies, law was “one of the major points of contact between state and society” and first and foremost an instrument for the resolution of conflicts (i.e. “restitutive”), as opposed to a semi-sacral system for exemplary punishment *per se* (i.e. “repressive”).²⁸¹ Seen in that light, European utterances of frustration with Ottoman legal or administrative proceedings were probably as often the sore loser’s complaints about failed exchanges and compromises, as expressions of sincere shock about perceived corruption.

The more or less uniform diplomatic hierarchy achieved through sultanic decree happened to be a perfect conduit for extending the already noted European drive towards centralization to the Levant. In this, joining commercial to diplomatic affairs by bringing consuls definitively under the jurisdiction of ambassadors proved especially effective. As chosen headmen gave

²⁸⁰ See Faroqhi, *Economic and Social History* 2, 480-83: “The Ottoman State and Foreign Traders”. But see Goffman, *Izmir and the Levantine World*, where the argument is set forth that “Izmir in the late sixteenth century blossomed into a regional market and commercial hub ... despite Istanbul’s objections” (18), and that Izmir’s low-level administration was a consequence of Ottoman inability or unwillingness to recognize the city’s international development for the overwhelming trend it was and take timely administrative measures to protect their own interests from that development’s unwanted consequences.

²⁸¹ Haim Gerber, *State, Society, and Law in Islam: Ottoman Law in Comparative Perspective* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), 2-3. Although the two systems do not exist separately: every society maintains some kind of balance between the two, see Calavita, *Invitation to Law*, 10-29: “Types of Society, Types of Law”, and 30-50: “Law in the Everyday, Everywhere”. For the Ottoman context specifically, see, generally, Fariba Zarinebaf, *Crime and Punishment in Istanbul: 1700/1800* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010); and Gerber, *State, Society*.

way to consuls firmly embedded in diplomatic hierarchy, the often irregular correspondence to and from the factories became more regular and detailed. Partly in response to the wish of those higher up to remain informed of what happened under their authority, the increase in correspondence was certainly also the natural result of the heightened answerability that came with the stricter definition of merchants', consuls', ambassadors', trade organizations' and governments' duties and responsibilities. If higher authorities can be held responsible for your actions and will in turn hold you to account for them, it is best to keep minute and verifiable records (preferably of the kind that cast you in a favorable light). Hence the identification of hierarchically organized administration, i.e. bureaucracy, with the production of written records, filing and archiving. It is thanks to the 17th-century formalization of consular affairs that many details from the lives and trades of European merchants in the Levant were committed to paper at all, and it is bureaucratic practice we should thank for enabling us to study organized series of such papers in a number of European national archives.

So, between these papers and the available Ottoman ones, what do we know about capitulatory practice in Izmir on a non-individual, national, level? What was the place of the European quarter within the city's administration and society? And how were its Genoese, Venetian, French, English, and Dutch parts made up and organized?

Measures of Liberty

As Evliya makes abundantly clear, Izmir's Muslims will have cared little for the difference between the city's Franks and its Greeks and Armenians. The only thing many will have felt they needed to know was that these were Christians not Muslims. They will no doubt have noticed the Franks' different dress and housing, as well as the exaggerated and improper pride and pomp with which processions of these "unbelievers" regularly marched through the city on their way to audiences or funerals. Perhaps they will even have considered their privileged status with a mixture of envy and disapproval, or simply with disinterest. But whether they were envious of the liberties and advantages permitted these foreigners, disapproved of their unbecoming displays of status and wealth, or looked on them with a stoicism born from the certainty of being far superior – it will not have escaped them that here were unbelievers permanently residing in the land of Islam to whom not many laws of that land seemed to apply. If Izmir's Muslims couldn't be bothered with the finer points of Christian doctrine, they will have found it all the more difficult to make sense of the leeway afforded the Franks in comparison to the subjected Greeks and Armenians.

The incomprehension and irritation caused by a position so special being occupied by nations considered inferior was never quite grasped by the Europeans. On their part, they appear to have had – or at least showed – little sensitivity for the tension between Islamic law, sultanic law and administra-

tive practice their somewhat demanding presence could occasion. Just as many Muslims will have preferred to think of the subjects of the capitulatory nations as a peculiar kind of *zimmis*, and therefore equally dependent on the goodwill of the Islamic community, so most Europeans claimed a measure of independence not fully warranted by their *müstemin*-status. They envisaged an *alafiranga*-life of far greater freedom than back home, under full protection of the Ottoman state, but with few obligations for them to fulfill in return.

Since the hazy status of the non-Ottoman nations was bred into the Ottoman capitulatory system, the measure of liberty and autonomy permitted the Europeans in capitulatory practice was perpetually in flux. The inherent distance between conflicting Ottoman and European interpretations of capitulatory status could only effectively be bridged by shared interest. Such shared interest, particularly in a situation where several nations were competing against each other for most favorable conditions, was necessarily of a volatile nature. If this was already the case in Istanbul, it was even more so in the factories, where local officials were more often than not primarily occupied with interests that yielded results within the short term of their tenure. Plainly, this bridge, this constantly renegotiated “middle ground” of shared interest, could be a cut-throat place of fast business, short-term yields and fierce competition for economic and political leverage. As a cut-throat market, it was also a place where professional conflict easily spilled over into the personal sphere. There were some alleviating circumstances, however.

Within the European quarter, a sense of shared Christian-European culture softened at least some of the edge of professional competition – although increasingly less so as the 17th century witnessed the evolution of a loosely organized European community of merchants into a number of more tightly organized and competing trading nations. Then there was the timetable of economic activity, in which the biannual arrival of convoys from Europe (in July-August-September, and in January-February-March) occasioned periods of frantic buying and selling alternated by long spells of relative inactivity during which merchants of all nations sought each other’s company for entertainment and vacationing.²⁸² Furthermore, the fact that the Ottoman economy was a redistributive one meant that European merchants did not operate in a free market and therefore did not compete with each other in all aspects of trade. In buying and selling competition was limited and relatively

²⁸² See, e.g., De Bruyn, *Reizen*, 22-23; and The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 22b, on the plague regularly visiting Izmir, the Europeans’ fleeing to the countryside, and/or locking themselves in their houses with some other families to combat boredom; De Bruyn, *Reizen*, 28, on European hunting, fishing and feasting; The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: The “discrepant” Dutch merchants of Izmir to DLH, 14 August 1674, on several conflicts fought out in and around Seydiköy; Ülker, *Rise of Izmir*, 43: “most Europeans did not do business during weekend and either vacationed in their cottages located outside of Izmir or else were hunting in the countryside”; and the examples of international excursions and travel cited *supra*.

indirect, centering not on the conditions obtained from producers but on those obtained from a limited number of wholesalers (as well as, not to forget, from providers of contraband). Instead, the points of fiercest competition between European merchants were favorable shipping rates and tax duties – which is where Ottoman administration re-enters the equation.²⁸³

It appears that in Izmir the bridge between Ottoman and European may have been broader, the distance it covered less forbidding, than in Istanbul or Aleppo. In Istanbul, the seat of supreme imperial authority, infinite care was always taken to safeguard the distance between the court and European envoys. If, in an audience, an European was permitted to walk this bridge and enter the presence of the sultan, it was not on his feet, but in prostration and without being able to enter into conversation. It was not much different formally meeting with higher officials: face-to-face communication was sporadically permitted (through a translator of course), but wholly on the Ottomans' conditions.²⁸⁴ Any real business of deliberation and negotiation was conducted by sending go-betweens (dragomans) back and forth between residences. It was easier arranging matters lower down in hierarchy, although the close proximity of sultanic and grand-vizieral power generally made officials tread carefully; arrangements and personages were easily overturned.²⁸⁵

²⁸³ See, e.g., North, *Life*, 123; Daniel Goffman, "Izmir: from Village to Colonial Port City", in: Eldem et al., *Ottoman City*, 87-93 and 105-10; Faroqhi, *Economic and Social History* 2, 517-20; Elena Frangakis-Syrett, "Commercial Growth and Economic Development in the Middle East: Izmir from the Early 18th to the Early 20th Centuries", in: *Ottoman Izmir*, 7-8 and throughout; Kadı, "Natives and Interlopers", 18-45.

²⁸⁴ There are countless contemporary descriptions of audiences with Ottoman high officials and the sultan. For a good summary of the protocol and procedures involved, see the article on *divan-ı hümayun* (imperial council) in Samuel Taylor Coleridge, *Encyclopaedia metropolitana* (London: B. Fellowes, 1845), 18: 153-56, and esp. the section on the diplomatic audience at 156: "Çapıjis Bâshis support the stranger under the arm with one hand, and bow down his head with the other. The ambassador then delivers his speech, which is repeated in Turkish by the *Dragoman* of the Porte to the Grand *Vezîr*, and by him to the Sultân. No answer is returned, except in very extraordinary cases." Also see the examples in the section on Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa *infra*.

²⁸⁵ See North, *Life*, 58-66, where North recounts various dealings and sincere friendships with several holders of high office, his having constructed a "*sopha* room, wherein he might receive, and entertain the *Turks*, that came to visit him, after their own way", his borrowing a *sancak bey's* galley slaves for construction work, his selling his house to a rich Turk to rent it back to avoid any problems upon his eventual repatriation, his private cultivation of the chief customer, how he made loans to the palace and other high officials and made sure they were repaid, and his audience with the sultan ("The great officers about the Grand Signor, with whom he had transacted, and (with such respects as became him) familiarly conversed, told his Majesty that there was now, in the city of *Constantinople*, an extraordinary *gover* [unbeliever], as well for person as abilities, to transact the greatest affairs; and so, in the ordinary conversation with the Grand Signor, he was often named for somewhat considerable, besides his acting as *hasnadar* of the English nation under their ambassador. The Grand Signor declared, he would see this extraordinary *gover*, and accordingly the merchant was told of it; and, at the time appointed, an officer conducted him into the *Seraglio*, and carried him about until he

In Aleppo, the restrictions imposed on European merchants were stricter than those in Istanbul. Merchants appear to have had difficulty moving around freely, periodically locked themselves in reserved national *hans*, had frequent conflicts with local guilds and *esraf* (the fraternity of descendants of the prophet) upon venturing out, and – like the city’s general population – suffered excessively from overbearing (military) governors-general (*beylerbeyis*). As much is confirmed by contemporary accounts.²⁸⁶

By contrast, Izmir’s Europeans were allowed a greater measure of private and professional liberty, both as individuals and as nations. This difference in attitude may be attributed to several factors. Qua mentality, Aleppo was an old regional center of Arab civilization with a mostly indigenous population, instead of a heterogeneous frontier town. Economically and socially too, its characteristics were not those of the frontier town and the trading port, but rather those of the ancient caravan center (relaying part of its well-organized luxury trade through the small ports of Alexandretta (modern Iskenderun) and Latakia. Conjuncturally, its international export business was (temporarily) eclipsed by Izmir. Aleppo’s marketing of the locally and regionally produced goods Europe increasingly sought as industrial input lagged behind Izmir’s, with a contracting market being the result – and if growth ends and crisis looms, it is always the outsider or “other” who suffers disproportionately, if not economically then at least socially.

Izmir, on the other hand, was a much younger Ottoman boom-port with a largely imported population, inevitably better geared to accommodating outsiders and “otherness”. It had overtaken Aleppo as demand from Europe shifted from the luxury goods brought by long-distance caravans to the regional produce of Izmir’s fertile hinterland (it lay closer to the new source, shortening the expensive overland route, as had previously been the case with Aleppo). The predominance of regionally produced exports also gave the regional population a greater stake in the international trade going through Izmir, even if it was mostly indirectly.

But most importantly for our questions, Izmir’s administration appears to have developed in such a way as to specifically accommodate and facilitate

came to a little garden, and there two other men took him by the two arms, and led him to a place where he saw the Grand Signor sitting against a large window open, in a chamber not very high from the ground; the men, that were his conductors, holding each an arm, put their hands upon his neck, and bowed him down till his forehead touched the ground; and this was done more than once, and is the very same forced obeisance of ambassadors at their audiences. After this, he stood bolt upright as long as the Grand Signor thought fit to look at him; and then, upon a sign given, he was taken away and set free again by himself, to reflect on this his romantic audience.”). Again, also see the section on Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa *infra*.

²⁸⁶ See Bruce Masters, “Aleppo: The Ottoman Empire’s Caravan City”, in: Eldem et al., *Ottoman City*, 46-47 and throughout; as well as the work on 18th-century Aleppo by Van den Boogert (in the bibliography) and Marcus, *Middle East on the Eve of Modernity*, 75-101 and 145-54.

(rather than roughly impose itself on) the city's history of crosscultural trade and the diversity it thrived on. That is also how official interference with Izmir was generally interpreted during the restoration of Ottoman power in the region under grand viziers Mehmed Köprülü and his son Fazıl Ahmed Paşa. With his successor Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa's taking over the reins of power, however, high European hopes that the restraint and benevolence of Köprülü-power they had experienced would be continued, were abruptly smashed. Or were they?

*Kara Mustafa Paşa and the Reassertion of Ottoman Control*²⁸⁷

Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa (c1635-25 December 1683), third vizier from the famed house of Köprülü, is to this day remembered as one of the most terrible Ottoman statesmen to have ever held office. In the course of his career as grand admiral (1661-1666), deputy grand vizier (1663, 1666-1670, 1676), and ultimately grand vizier (1676-1683), the opinions held of him by the European representatives in Istanbul – even before the fiasco of Vienna – declined steeply from “a wise and experienced person, of a smooth behavior” to “this grievous oppressor of all Christendom”.²⁸⁸

At first sight, the reason for Kara Mustafa Paşa's unpopularity with his European contemporaries appears to have been money, which he extracted from their communities in a “stream of avanias during the years 1676-1683”.²⁸⁹ But surely Kara Mustafa was not the first grand vizier to do that; his two adopted relatives and predecessors Mehmed and Fazıl Ahmed Köprülü, for instance, were responsible for some famous reportedly unjust (i.e. in violation of the capitulations) financial demands and penalties of their own without their reputation with the Europeans suffering greatly from it. In fact, all their complaints aside, Europeans living and working in the Levant seem to have been realistic enough to regard commercial and legal disputes with their hosts as part of the trade.

If the accustomed commerce-related conflicts are not wholly responsible, what, then, made relations with Kara Mustafa so unbearable and, more importantly, is there any need to reconsider the received image of him? The following pages will argue that there is indeed such a need, and that understanding how the historical distortion around his person was produced, as well as what it hides from scrutiny, is of the essence for our understanding of

²⁸⁷ A shorter version of this section was previously published as Olon, “A most agreeable and pleasant creature?”, in: *Ottoman Capitulations*.

²⁸⁸ Paul Rycaut, *The History of the Turkish Empire from the Year 1623 to the Year 1677* (London: John Starkey, 1680), 333; G.F. Abbott, *Under the Turk in Constantinople: A Record of Sir John Finch's Embassy, 1674-1681* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1920), 359.

²⁸⁹ Heywood, “Karā Mustafa Pasha”, 591a. On avanias – Ottoman demands on European nationals, deemed unjust and in violation of the capitulations – see my “Towards Classifying Avanias”.

Izmir at this crucial junction in its history, of the Ottomans' and Europeans' designs for it, and of how they worked out.

The general image we have of this grand vizier is to no small extent determined by the emotionally charged descriptions of his character by his European contemporaries. As a matter of fact, the sheer number of vehement denouncements historians have had to account for, has made it very difficult for them to consider the history of his rule in a detached manner. In this respect, it is worth noting that there exists no Ottoman equivalent to the European litany handed down to us.

An explanation for the extreme dislike displayed by the Europeans might be sought in Kara Mustafa's policy of ruthlessly subjecting even the most fundamental diplomatic rules and capitulatory articles to the conjunctures of his rule, or – put more favorably – to the needs of the state he served. To illustrate the shape this deliberate policy took and the manner in which it transformed how Kara Mustafa was perceived even before the Vienna campaign, we will take a look at the correspondence of Justinus Colyer, Dutch envoy (first resident, then ambassador) in Istanbul from 1668 to 1682. From his correspondence a small collection of encounters will be presented that is both illustrative of the attitudes with which this statesman and the European representatives sent to his government approached one another, as it is indicative of the policies and politics underlying these attitudes.

Where the correspondences of the other European representatives in Istanbul become extremely hostile immediately after Kara Mustafa's becoming grand vizier, Colyer's is one significant exception begging to be explained. Unfortunately, Colyer's correspondence has not received the same measure of attention as that of De Nointel, Finch or even his Venetian colleagues. This we can attribute to the fact that it is in the Dutch language and concerns the eventually declining commerce of a geopolitically important but minor European power. But this relative insignificance is also an advantage, for it allows us to compare between Kara Mustafa's politically laden relations with the French, English and Venetian envoys and his politically neutral relations with the Dutch. An added advantage of regarding the period through Justinus Colyer's correspondence is that his envoyship (1668-1682) encompasses almost completely Kara Mustafa Paşa's stay as deputy grand vizier and grand vizier (1666-1683), thereby providing a unique opportunity to trace his exceedingly terrible reputation in a continuous fashion and with a oneness of voice.

But before going over to Colyer's correspondence, let us first establish more firmly the nature of Kara Mustafa's reputation and the stations marking his rise to power.

On 6 August 1668 Dutch Resident Justinus Colyer had his first ever audience at the Ottoman court in Edirne (Adrianople). Quite impressed with the entire proceedings and with his auditor in particular, he entered the following

“Description of the person, stature and years of the Caimacam of Adriano-ple” in his day book:

*The said caymacam is twenty eight to twenty nine years of age, of great intellect and eloquence; a most agreeable and pleasant creature. He has a large broad beard, and is of average stature. He never wears gold, silver or silk clothing; this being a general order of the empire, but solely applicable to the grand vizier and the said caymacam, so as to avoid them stooping to awanias for the sake of splendid robes.*²⁹⁰

Interestingly, the *kaymmakam*, or deputy grand vizier, referred to is indeed this very Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa, would-be conqueror of Vienna in 1683, and a strong candidate for the title of most vilified Ottoman statesman in history. Considering this, one might be tempted to ascribe Colyer’s sympathetic description to his inexperience at the time. He had first arrived in the Ottoman Empire only five months earlier and had not yet been in direct contact with those at the top of Ottoman hierarchy. But in another equally positive account of this official from the – more experienced and considerably more authoritative – hand of Paul Rycaut (English consul in Izmir from 1667 to 1678), dated 1680, he is referred to as “a wise and experienced person, of a smooth behavior, and a great courtier”.²⁹¹ Furthermore, in a report prepared in 1675/76 for the marquis de Nointel, French ambassador in Istanbul from 1670 to 1679, it is said that “L’humeur du Pacha est fort bonne, quoiqu’elle soit un peu prompt.”²⁹²

But these and other such statements may be considered exceptions. Much more current are the extremely hostile accounts, mostly of later dates. In the *relazione* of his embassy, Giovanni Morosini di Alvisè, Venetian bailo in Istanbul from 1675 to 1680, tells us that Kara Mustafa Paşa was “Nato per castigo de’ popoli in luogo oscuro dell’Asia in vicinanza di Trebisonda [Trabzon; sic] e tra il più vili domestici” and that he was “tutto venale, crudele e

²⁹⁰ The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 63b. The published version of this *dagbregister*, and particularly Colyer’s description of Sultan Mehmed IV, later caused great scandal in the Dutch Republic and such an international incident that the States General had to denounce and retract it: “A pained, morose and extremely melancholy creature. A large scar on his countenance, which Sultan Ibrahim his father, with the intent of killing him, inflicted on him with a knife. A sharp nose, two pointy erected moustaches and no beard beneath. He has no less than seven fistulas or fontanels. Is absolutely no lover of women, but more so of hunting. Cruel and very bloodthirsty at heart.” The printed version: Justinus Colyer, *Oprecht journael*, ... (The Hague: Heirs of H. Jacobz. van Wouw, 1668).

²⁹¹ Rycaut, *History of the Turkish Empire*, 333. For general overviews of Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa’s life and career, and for the opinions Paul Rycaut and other contemporary commentators held of him, see Anderson, *English Consul*, 242 and throughout; and Heywood, “Kara Mustafa Pasha”, throughout and esp. the bibliography at 592a-b.

²⁹² Galland, *Journal*, ii: 197.

ingiusto”.²⁹³ Around 1680/81 John Finch, English ambassador in Istanbul from 1674 to 1681, characterized him as “a Vesier who is of a temper to doe anything for money and nothing without it” and referred to him as “this grievous oppressor of all Christendom”.²⁹⁴

Nor did the initial enthusiasm of our positive commentators persist. On 27 February 1679, eleven years after his first meeting with Kara Mustafa, Justinus Colyer’s admiration had turned into severe frustration as he described him as “extremely avid and intransigent in all his dealings”. He was joined in this by Jacobus van der Merct, treasurer to the Dutch consulate in Izmir, who wrote home on 21 October 1681 describing him as “a griffin with ravenous claws, since he proceeds solely with violence and sheer tyranny” and by Jacob van Dam, Dutch consul in Izmir from 1668 to 1689, who, on 4 March 1679, described “a man of great enterprise and exorbitant procedures against the Christian nations”.²⁹⁵ Judgments became even harsher after the events before Vienna had run their course. In the second edition of his great History (published in 1700) Rycaut remembered him as “a person of violence, rapine, pride, covetousness, false, perfidious, bloody, and without reason or justice”.²⁹⁶

Modern history has felt little need to add or adjust. Kara Mustafa was until relatively recently still universally recognized as a “despote de basse espèce, barbare corrompu, qui porta au plus haut degré l’avidité d’argent proverbiale des Turcs”, and now at best as “un vizir assez exceptionnel tant dans ses exigences financières que dans sa xénophobie”.²⁹⁷

It should come as no surprise that an event like the second Ottoman siege of Vienna, which caused considerable panic throughout Europe, would mar forever the reputation of the person responsible (although the stark contrast with the opinions held in the West of that first Ottoman besieger of Vienna, Süleyman the Magnificent, raises some interesting questions in this respect).²⁹⁸ After all, it is the winners who write history. But even when leaving the Vienna issue aside and concentrating on the 25-odd years of Kara Mustafa’s career preceding his downfall, it becomes clear that something had already gone terribly wrong in his relations with the European representa-

²⁹³ My italics. Nicolò Barozzi and Guglielmo Berchet, *Relazioni degli stati Europei lette al senato dagli ambasciatori Veneti nel secolo XVII*, vol. 1: *Spagna* (Venice: P. Naratovich, 1856), 207.

²⁹⁴ Abbott, *Under the Turk*, 359.

²⁹⁵ The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Justinus Colyer to the States General, 27 February 1679; The Hague, NA 01.03.01 125: Jacobus van der Merct to DLH, 21 October 1681; The Hague, NA 01.03.01 98: Jacob van Dam to Justinus Colyer, 4 March 1679.

²⁹⁶ Paul Rycaut, *The history of the Turks: Beginning with the Year 1679 ... until the end of the year 1698, and 1699* (London: Robert Clavell, 1700), 1.

²⁹⁷ A.C. Stourdzia, *L’Europe Orientale et le Rôle Historique des Maurocordato (1660-1830)* (Paris: Plon, 1913), 9; Robert Mantran, *Istanbul dans la Seconde Moitié du XVIIe Siècle* (Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve, 1962), 548.

²⁹⁸ Cf. G. Veinstein, “Süleymân”, *EI2*, ix: 832b-42a.

tives and communities much earlier on. That “something” – as indicated above – lies at the heart of our investigation.

Little can be said with certainty about Kara Mustafa’s life before his first becoming a public figure in 1656.²⁹⁹ Most probably, he was born in the village of Marınca near Merzifon around 1635 as the son of a cavalry officer (*sipahi*), who was said to have served under Köprülü Mehmed Paşa during his career in the Asian provinces.³⁰⁰ It is not certain when, but at some time during his youth, probably as a teenager, Kara Mustafa was introduced into the Köprülü household to enhance his opportunities of starting an administrative career, as was common for ambitious and intelligent Ottoman youths with well-connected fathers. Köprülü had him educated alongside his natural son Fazıl Ahmed; an indication that Kara Mustafa enjoyed a position of some preference to other *iç oğlans* (young servants/pages) taken into the household. He is reported to have held a number of positions within the household’s inner service (*enderun*; privy), eventually being employed as Köprülü Mehmed Paşa’s *telhisci* (*referendarius*; “the official who presents his employer’s memoirs and reports to the sultan”) shortly after his assuming the grand vizierate on 15 September 1656. It was in this capacity that, in September 1658, he brought Sultan Mehmed IV the news of the Ottoman army’s taking of the Transylvanian fortress of Yanova. As a reward the sultan made him *küçük mirahor* (master of the lesser stable).³⁰¹ On 15 February 1660 Kara Mustafa was promoted to the governor-generalship of Silistria (*Silistre beylerbeyliği*; on the Walachian border). In April 1661 he superintend the journey of Tarhan Sultan (the sultana-mother, or, *valide sultan*) from the court in Edirne to Istanbul, after which he was promoted to the rank of vizier and appointed to the governorship (*valilik*) of Diyarbakr.³⁰²

Upon the death of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa and his son Fazıl Ahmed’s succession to the post of grand vizier (31 October/1 November 1661), Kara

²⁹⁹ What we do know has been skillfully summarized in Heywood, “Karā Mustafa Pasha”, which is not only an excellent overview of Kara Mustafa’s life and career, but also a very good guide past all the pitfalls in the European and Ottoman accounts recording his rise and fall. Also see Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i ‘Osmani* (Istanbul: Matbaa-yi Amire, AH 1308-1316 / AD 1890-1898), 402, which, however, is erroneous in its chronology.

³⁰⁰ On the different positions Köprülü Mehmed Paşa held during these years see M. Tayyib Gökbilgin and R.C. Repp, “Köprülü”, *EI2*, v: 256a-63a (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 256b-57b.

³⁰¹ A function which brought him into close contact with the sultan, since it involved the “care and maintenance of the sultan’s privy stable or *kebās ākhūr* located in the second court of the Topkapı Palace opposite the kitchens” and particularly of “a small number of exceptional show horses belonging to the sultan personally”: R. Murphey, “Mīr-ākhūr”, *EI2*, vii: 88a. In this context it should be remembered that Sultan Mehmed IV was called *avcı* (“the hunter”) for good reason: J.H. Kramers, “Mehemmed IV”, *EI2*, iv: 982a-b.

³⁰² For the regency of Tarhan Sultan and the Köprülüs, see *ibid.*

Mustafa Paşa was appointed grand admiral of the Ottoman fleet (*kapudan-ı derya*; *kapudan paşa*), which he remained until February 1666. While retaining his *kapudanlık*, he also became deputy grand vizier (*sadaret kayımmakamı*) during Fazıl Ahmed's Hungarian campaign of 1663.³⁰³ This made him both the second and third highest ranking official of the empire. His tenure as grand admiral was largely taken up by naval preparations for Köprülü's prolonged campaign for the final reduction of Venetian-held Crete (the last campaign in the drawn-out War over Candia, 1645-1669).

In the extensive reassignment of posts preceding the departure of the grand vizier's army for Crete, Kara Mustafa was first removed from the office of *kapudan* and promoted to the rank of second vizier (February 1666), and subsequently made deputy grand vizier again (9 May 1666), which he remained for the full duration of the grand vizier's absence from court (15 May 1666-27 June 1670).³⁰⁴ As during his *kapudanpaşalık*, Kara Mustafa's activities as *kayımmakam* were aimed largely at sustaining the grand vizier's efforts on Crete. Apart from the setback of being demoted to the rank of third vizier (31 July 1666) to make room for the promotion to second vizier of another favorite of the sultan, his tenure and standing at court seem to have been relatively secure during this period. After the capitulation of Crete (5 September 1669) and the grand vizier's return to Edirne, Kara Mustafa was dismissed from his *sadaret kayımmakamlığı*, but maintained his rank and popularity with the sultan as a courtier and *rikab kayımmakamı* (deputy of the stirrup).³⁰⁵

He joined the Polish campaign of 1672 as a reasonably successful commander, and was appointed chief plenipotentiary to negotiate a cessation of hostilities that turned out to be very favorable to the Ottomans (annexation of Podolia; protection of Ukraine). Although holding no high administrative office for some four years, his influence at court remained undiminished; as part of the circumcision festivities held in Edirne he was affianced to the sultan's youngest daughter (i.e. became *namazlı*, 29 May 1675).³⁰⁶

³⁰³ From April to November: Danişmend, *İzablı Osmanlı Tarihi* 3, 431-32.

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 436-40.

³⁰⁵ *Rikab*, literally meaning stirrup, was used to refer to "the service of the sultan or simply his presence". "It is from this connection that we have the use of the words *rikab-ı hümayun* or *rikab* in the sense of interim or substitute. When the Grand Vizier moved from place to place, the government was thought to go with him and there was appointed "to the sovereign a substitute for the Grand Vizier who was called *rikab kâ'immakamı*": J. Deny, "Rikâb", *EI2*, viii: 529a.

³⁰⁶ For descriptions of these festivities, at which all European representatives at the *Porte* (the Ottoman government) were expected to be present, see John Covel, "Extracts From the Diaries of Dr. John Covel, 1670-1679", in: *Early Voyages and Travels in the Levant*, ed. J. Theodore Bent (London: Hakluyt Society, 1893), 171-...; and Yusuf Nabi, *Vekeyi-i bitân-ı şebzâdegân-ı hazret-i sultan Mehmed Gazî*, available in transliteration as A.S.Levend, *Yusuf Nabi'nin*

The year 1676 marked the ending of the grand vizierate of Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed Paşa and his succession by Kara Mustafa Paşa. During the last phase of Ahmed Paşa's illness, his public functions had already been taken over by Mustafa (from 28 July 1676 onwards). Then, on 3 November 1676 – while accompanying the sultan from Istanbul to Edirne in the capacity of *yol kayımmakamı* – he received his appointment to the highest post of the empire; a post he held until his execution in Belgrade on 25 December 1683.

So when and how was it, that this promising statesman, so strongly connected to the Köprülü house and careers, and expected to continue the policies of his predecessors with respect to the European merchant communities residing in the empire, begot this reputation of terror?

Strikingly enough, it was not during his years as *kapudan* (23 December 1661-6/19 February 1666), an office which by its nature implied a considerable amount of contact with European shipping. What's more, the port city of Izmir, home to the largest and richest European trading communities of the empire, was under threefold control of the *kapudanpaşalık*: The city itself was freehold property (*has*) of the chief secretary of the admiralty (*tersane-i 'amire kethüdası*), who administrated it through a *kadi* (judge *cum* civil administrator); the province (or *sancağ*) of *Suğla* of which it was part, with its capital at *Urla*, was governed by a *derya beyi* (fleet governor) appointed by the *kapudan* and answerable to him alone; and as part of the *kapudan's beylerbeyilik* (governor-generalship) the security of the city, its bay, its province, and even part of its hinterland and surrounding shorelines, the upkeep of its fortifications, and the availability of vital supplies were all the direct responsibility of the *kapudan* himself.³⁰⁷ We can be absolutely certain that the European communities and their consuls and ambassadors would have commented extensively upon any unfriendly behaviour. But even during Kara Mustafa's active command in the region throughout 1662 nothing much out of the ordinary was reported.

Surnâmesi (Istanbul: n.p., 1944). Her name is given as “Küçük Sultân” by Heywood (*id.*, “Karâ Mustafa Pasha”) and Süreyya (*id.*, *Sicill-i 'Osmanî*). Yılmaz Öztuna gives “Emetullâh (Ümmî) (Küçük) Sultan”: Yılmaz Öztuna, *Devletler ve hanedanlar*, vol. 2: *Türkiye (1074-1990)* (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1989), 202. As for the age of the parties, in October 1676, when the actual marriage had not yet taken place, Colyer estimated that of Kara Mustafa as forty, and that of his fiancée as three: The Hague, NA 01.03.01 98: Justinus Colyer to DLH, 9 October 1676.

³⁰⁷ On the *tersane-i 'amire* (the imperial dockyards; the home base of the *kapudan paşa*), the *derya beyi*, the *kapudan-ı derya* and his *beylerbeyilik* of *Ceza'ir-i Babr-ı Sefid*, see, generally, Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı devletinin ... teşkilâtı*, *id.*, “Bahriyya, 3: The Ottoman navy”, *EI2*, i: 947a-48b; B. Lewis, “Daryâ-begi”, *EI2*, ii: 165b; S. Özbaran, “Kapudan Pasha”, *EI2*, iv: 571b-72b; C.F. Beckingham, “Djazâ'ir-i Bahr-ı Safid”, *EI2*, ii: 521b-22a.

It is at the very end of his service as *kapudan* and during his succeeding tenure as *sadaret kaymmakam* (9 May 1666-17 June 1670), that we start to hear the first complaints ⁽³⁰⁸⁾ about Kara Mustafa:

[He] was subsequently put in charge of naval preparations for the planned final reduction of Crete. His actions at this time, in attempting to commandeer for transport purposes ships of the European maritime powers, were resisted by their representatives at the Porte, and contributed materially to the exaggerated accounts concerning him which became current in Europe.³⁰⁹

Although these commandeering actions were not taken lightly at the time, they were not the reason behind what Heywood rightly terms “the exaggerated accounts”. Naturally, there was much protesting and posturing. But after all was said and done, irritations had not run so high as to overcome prudence – as we may infer from the positive descriptions of *kaymmakam* Kara Mustafa of still later dates. The Europeans in the Levant were well aware of the sensitivity of the issue of Crete and of the immense importance the Porte attached to the final attempt to gain the entire island. As their petitions make clear, they also realised that in this, Kara Mustafa was merely following orders. At this point, the most irritating side to his behaviour would have been his unwillingness to accept bribes to make the commandeering-problems go away. This willingness to forgive (if not to forget) is evident in Colyer’s correspondence on the case of *d’Oude Tobias* (the ship “The Old Thobias”):

Having arrived in Izmir aboard a Dutch convoy of seven ships on 12 April 1668 to take up their positions as Dutch consul of Izmir and Dutch resident to Istanbul respectively, Jacob van Dam and Justinus Colyer were summoned before the local *kadi* on 30 April 1668. There, they were confronted with a *ferman* (command; order) from Istanbul drawn up “in the first quarter of the noble moon of Zilkade, in the year 1078”.³¹⁰ In it, *kaymmakam* Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa, who had just returned from a

³⁰⁸ There had been some commandeering of French vessels in 1661, but this was rightly perceived to be a consequence of France’s strained relations with the Ottoman Empire during the Ottoman-Venetian war of 1645-1669. Duparc’s *Recueil des instructions* 29 provides a clear overview of the Ottoman-French controversy during this period.

³⁰⁹ Heywood, “Karā Mustafa Pasha”, 590b. On Kara Mustafa’s commandeering of English shipping, see Anderson, *English Consul*, 174-78; - of French shipping, see Paul Masson, *Histoire du commerce français dans le Levant au XVIIe siècle* (Paris: Hachette, 1896), 12 and throughout; - of Dutch shipping, see W.E. van Dam van Isselt, “Avaniën in de Levant”, *De Navorscher*, 56/10 (1906), 527-31.

³¹⁰ Between 13 and 22 April 1668.

stay at Lárisa with the sultan³¹¹, ordered the requisitioning of a Dutch ship for grain transports from Izmir to Köprülü's besieging army on Crete:

*Command of the Grand Signor, given to his kaymakam of Constantinople, addressed to the kadi, kapıbaşı [commander of the guard], gümrük emini [customer; customs collector] and Dutch Consul of the scale or port of Smyrna. / Be it known unto you that my highest order will be; that, it being very necessary at present that larger quantities of grain be sent to the island of Candia, 25,000 kilos of grain will be sent thither from the scale of Smyrna on a Dutch ship, being big and strong, which will be chartered, and the moneys needed to that end, will be taken, and you will pay those to them [the Dutch] out of the revenue of the aforementioned scale and the customs, and draw up a public act of the money given them. And my notable command also orders that the said grain be laden into the said ship as soon as possible, and will be dispatched in all hurry and haste to the said island, ...*³¹²

Van Dam and Colyer immediately went to work, attempting to have the order reversed. They petitioned the *kadi* of Izmir, the grand vizier, as well as his *kethüda* (steward; personal representative) Mahmad Ağa, calling upon them to honor the article of the Dutch capitulation designed to protect the Dutch against commandeering (*angariye*; corvée) – but to no avail.

The Dutch capitulation then in force was that of 1612 (confirmed in 1634). The only article that dealt with commandeering was article 47:

*ve kahyınları u gemileri her kangı iskelede olursa tamām gümrüklerin ‘abdnâme mücibince verdikden soñra ba’zı angariye için alıkomayalar ve angariye teklif eylemeyeler / After their galleons and ships have paid full customs duties according to the capitulation in whatever scale it may be, they may not be detained for some corvée (angariye) nor may it be proposed.*³¹³

Naturally, the *kaymakam* was also aware of this article and had circumvented it by not exacting *angariye* pure and simple, instead turning it into a forced lease, just as he had done, and would continue to do, in similar

³¹¹ “so as to observe more closely the progress of the siege of Kandiye”: Heywood, “Karā Mustafa Pasha”, 590b.

³¹² See this dragoman’s translation and several other documents on the case in The Hague, NA 1.03.01 123, specifically: Jacob van Dam and Justinus Colyer to DLH, 5 May 1688. The Dutch had been relatively fortunate, as the French had already been forced to send eleven ships and several more requisitioned French and English ships were awaiting departure in Izmir harbor. The reason behind this bout of Ottoman commandeering was that the Venetians had recently destroyed seven large Ottoman ships off Crete: Van Dam van Isselt, “Avaniën in de Levant”, 527-29.

³¹³ De Groot, *Ottoman Empire*, 244 and 257. *Angariye* (“angary” in English) is the requisitioning by a belligerent state of neutral possessions, and refers to the right of belligerents to destroy or use in case of need, neutral possessions within their territory or on the open seas, be it in defence or in attack: *Woordenboek der Nederlandsche Taal op CD-Rom* (Den Haag: Sdu Uitgevers, 2000).

cases with the other European trading communities. But there is a more significant reason for the failure of the petitions; the near-complete control both the grand vizier and his deputy exerted over the chain of authorities involved in the order and in fact over practically every official concerned with the administration of foreign commerce. During the administrations of Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed Paşa and Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa the offices of poll-tax collector of Istanbul, poll-tax collector of Izmir and Chios, customs collector of Istanbul, customs collector of Izmir and Chios, and steward of the grand vizier were all firmly linked to each other, to the palace-faction (sultana-mother; *valide*) and through friendship, marriage, and employment to Fazıl Ahmed's as well as Kara Mustafa's households.³¹⁴

Faced with so formidable a network of alliances, the Dutch stopped petitioning and decided to give in. In a general meeting of the Izmir nation it was decided to use "d'Oude Tobias", the most run down barge they could muster.³¹⁵ The nation bought the ship from its captain for 10,200 pieces of eight (*reals*), which it advanced with interest.³¹⁶ In the end, the ship never made it past Chios for fear of cruising Venetian men-of-war. It had lain there for three months before Colyer, during his first audience with Kara Mustafa, pledged to indemnify the Ottomans for half its cargo and obtained permission to have it unloaded and released.³¹⁷ The Old Thobias returned to home waters in 1669 and was never to return to the Levant again. Part of the 10,220 pieces of eight was recouped by reselling the ship to its captain, and the interest and costs of the ship's release by collecting an additional consular duty of 1,25 % from the next Dutch convoy to arrive in Izmir.³¹⁸

6 May 1668, the day after the Dutch nation of Izmir had decided to place d'Oude Tobias at the Ottomans' disposal and had agreed upon an apportionment of the projected costs of the resident's first audience at court, Colyer embarked for Istanbul to take up his embassy. His ships arrived there on the 25th and he entered the city in procession on the 31st. After settling in, preparations immediately began for the journey to Edirne, where he and Van

³¹⁴ See Table 15 *infra*.

³¹⁵ As much is admitted in the correspondence home, but may also be verified from a list of all Dutch ships (incl. the ambassadorial and consular duties levied from them according to the worth of their cargo) that made port in Izmir between 12 April 1668 and 31 October 1671. The convoy under commodore Hendrik van Toll with which Van Dam and Colyer had arrived in Izmir, had included seven merchantmen; "The Old Thobias" was about 60% smaller than the bigger vessels in the convoy: The Hague, NA 1.02.22 676, 204b-9b: DLH to States of Holland and West-Friesland, 1676.

³¹⁶ In the Levant in 1668 the common exchange rate of the piece of eight, or (eight-)real, was about 110 *akçes* (that of the Lion Dollar 100 *akçes*). See note 320.

³¹⁷ The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 64a-65a.

³¹⁸ Van Dam van Isselt, "Avaniën in de Levant", 537.

Dam would present their credentials.³¹⁹ Having received 28,000 *akçe* from Kara Mustafa to meet preliminary expenses, Colyer and his train left for Edirne July 26th.³²⁰ Van Dam and his train left Izmir on the 19th and the two parties met up outside Edirne on the 29th. During its stay in Edirne from 3 to 24 August, the Dutch delegation felt it was treated with extraordinary magnanimity, receiving gifts and treatment on equal footing with the representatives of the Porte's most valued European allies, particularly from Kara Mustafa.³²¹

This partiality was also in evidence during Colyer's audience with him; he not only received the resident with courtesy, but also acceded to Colyer's every request concerning mercantile affairs, issuing four dragomans' *berats* to Colyer and no less than fifteen *fermans* in favour of the Dutch to several Ottoman officials in Istanbul, Izmir and Chios.³²² When he left Edirne, Colyer had good reason to look upon Kara Mustafa as positively as he did.

The remainder of Kara Mustafa's tenure as *kaymmakam* passed without the Dutch coming into any major conflict with him. In the course of 1669 and 1670, there were some trade related disputes between a number of Dutch factors of Izmir and their Ottoman creditors, felt by the Dutch to have been

³¹⁹ For the full account of Colyer's arrival in Istanbul and his audiences at Edirne, see Colyer, *Oprecht journael*.

³²⁰ The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 53b-54a. In the Levant in 1668 28,000 *akçes* were worth about 120 Venetian ducats, 255 Spanish eight-reals, or 280 Dutch Lion Dollars: Şevket Pamuk, *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 144. According to Colyer's account of 17 September 1668, the total expenses of the audience amounted to 7,500 Lion Dollars: The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 73a. This amounted to slightly more than Colyer's total annual salary as it was fixed in 1675 - 5,000 eight-reals and 7,500 guilders: Schutte, *Repertorium*, 308. At the time one eight-real was reckoned worth slightly more than 2.5 guilders (a rix-dollar). By way of comparison, the fixed part of the salary of the *kadi* of Izmir was 500 *akçes* per day (appr. 1,825 Lion Dollars a year), a captain or a pilot in the service of the Dutch navy received a monthly salary of about 30 guilders (appr. 144 Lion Dollars a year), a sailor of about 11 guilders a month (appr. 52 Lion Dollars a year): respectively, Evliya, *Seyahatname* 9, 89: "Ve beş yüz akçe mevleviyettir"; J.G. van Dillen, *Van Rijkdom en Regenten* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), 439-80; and C.R. Boxer, *The Dutch Seaborne Empire 1600-1800* (London: Hutchinson, 1965), 337-41.

³²¹ These were specified as the German Emperor, the Grand Duke of Moscovy and the King of Poland. Kara Mustafa bestowed 25 vests (*tabards*) upon them, which was a considerable honor since the French and English had never received more than 12. Gifts from the sultan included 10 live sheep, 100 hens, 50 white breads, 20 sugar breads, 20 wax candles, 25 eight-reals a day for the table, 230 eight-reals for furniture: W.E. van Dam van Isselt, "Eenige lotgevallen van Jacob van Dam, consul te Smirna van 1668-1688", *Bijdragen voor vaderlandsche geschiedenis en oudheidkunde*, 4/6 (1907), 102-3.

³²² Normally, audiences would be given by the sultan and his grand vizier, but since Fazıl Ahmed was in Crete conducting the siege, deputy grand vizier Kara Mustafa Paşa observed his functions. These dragomans' *berats* (diplomas for the embassy's interpreters) and *fermans* (imperial orders) have all been lost, but fortunately an elaborate description of their contents does still exist in The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 64a-65a.

instigated by the *kadi* of Izmir for his own profit. Kara Mustafa's involvement in these seems to have been limited to adjusting them; that is, to negotiating settlements between the parties (informally) as referee and (formally) as acting president of the *divan-ı hümayun* ("the imperial council"; the Ottoman cabinet and supreme court in Istanbul). Although the rulings in all these cases were in favour of the Dutch, there was some irritation about the expenses they had to make to get the cases heard to begin with, and about the "fees" Kara Mustafa charged for his services.

In March 1670 all European ships then in the harbour of Izmir were commandeered for troop transport. This time the order came directly from Grand Vizier Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, who was demobilising his army from Crete after its capitulation (4 September 1669). Consul van Dam managed to get a number of ships sailing under the Dutch flag released from this duty by sending his chief dragoman to Crete with a petition and some presents. Some problems with the *kadi* of Izmir aside, matters were resolved with relative ease. Kara Mustafa, whose importance as *kaymmakam* was declining steadily as the grand vizier resumed the reins of government, was not involved.³²³

Upon his brother's return to the court in Edirne in 27 June 1670, Kara Mustafa was relieved of his office of *sadaret kaymmakam*. Perhaps having fallen out of favour with Fazıl Ahmed (for having schemed against him during his long absence, it was rumoured), he was removed from real administrative power. But the grand vizier did not stop there; he also loosened Kara Mustafa's grip on the administration of foreign trade by ridding himself of his "particular friend" customs collector Hüseyin Ağa (I), for whom Kara Mustafa had procured promotion from the Izmir to the Istanbul customs.³²⁴

Just as the war with Venice over Crete had prompted his father Mehmed Köprülü to invest in Izmir's defences (³²⁵), so Fazıl Ahmed now focussed his attention on the city and initiated the Izmir-leg of his *vakıf*'s construction program. The new *bedestan* and *gümrük* were completed in 1675, but building

³²³ See generally, The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6911; The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124; The Hague, NA 1.02.22 676 204b-9b; *id.* 684, 73b-80a; Van Dam van Isselt, "Avaniën in de Levant", 533-38.

³²⁴ The customs collector of Istanbul was also the empire's chief customs collector, to whom all other customs collectors were answerable. These officials were tax-farmers; they purchased their "farm" (*ilîzâm*), i.e. their right to collect customs, on an annual basis through a bidding procedure. The relation between Kara Mustafa and Hüseyin Ağa (I) figures prominently in all contemporary accounts, but see Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 123 and 170-71 in particular. Galland tells us Hüseyin Ağa felt the grand vizier might move against him and left his post to make the pilgrimage (*hac*), which was a common method of officials out-of-favour to get out of the way before they got hurt.

³²⁵ On Mehmed's strengthening of Izmir's defences, see *ibid.*, 103; and Iconomos, *Étude sur Smyrne*, 42-43.

on the other structures continued under Kara Mustafa's supervision until their completion in 1677.³²⁶ This meant that the introduction and enforcement of the accompanying procedures was left up to Kara Mustafa, whose reputation in the eyes of the Europeans would diminish considerably because of his determination to position the *vakf* and make the most of its potential for trade regulation and taxation.

Kara Mustafa Paşa had survived the reversal which had been the result of the return of the grand vizier through the personal protection of the sultan. After two years at court he rebuilt his career during Fazıl Ahmed's Polish campaigns, in which the sultan took an active interest. During these campaigns he proved himself a capable commander and tough negotiator. In 1672 he concluded a cessation of hostilities with the Poles at Buçaş (Buczacz), which was so harsh that the Polish Diet refused to ratify it, opening the door to the Polish and Ukrainian campaigns of '73, '74, '75 and '76.³²⁷ As the grand vizier's health declined (from November 1674 onwards) Kara Mustafa's power increased, a process culminating in his assuming the functions of grand vizier in July 1676 and finally in his appointment to the grand vizierate in November of the same year.

The first months of Kara Mustafa's grand vizierate were spent in Edirne; with the latest news from court reaching the European representatives in Istanbul through their own and the Porte's dragomans. A change of grand viziers usually brought about considerable changes in the empire's key posts and all news was feverishly analysed for hints of the new administration's policy regarding European political and mercantile affairs. 31 January 1677, Colyer first reported home on the subject:

The changes regarding the high ministers of this realm since my last of 9 November of the previous year, are the following. The paşas or governors of places and frontiers adjoining Christendom have been moved and have most been sent to other governorships in Asia Minor. The kaymakam of Constantinople, kapudan paşa, or admiral of the sea, and the bostancıbaşı, being the chief forester, have all been continued in their charges. Süleyman Ağa, chief secretary [kethüda] of the late grand vizier, has been made master of the great stable [büyük mirahor]. One of the sultanas or concubines of the grand signor, called the wife sultana [haseki sultan], was delivered of a young princess. The paşa, recently appointed by the Porte over that of Tunis, was violently rejected by its inhabitants, and has returned here. That paşa, to obtain that governorship, spent vast treasures, and principally to the aforesaid Süleyman Ağa, who alone enjoyed 600 purses from him, each purse being 500 rix-dollars. The current grand vizier having become acquainted with this, as well as with the exorbitant moneys that the bostancıbaşı of Adrianople, one of the favourites of the grand signor [the sultan], who was to construct a new building there for the sultan's women

³²⁶ Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 105-10; Ülker, *Rise of İzmir*, 36-39.

³²⁷ Gökbilgin and Repp, "Köprülü", 260b; and Heywood, "Karā Mustafa Pasha", 590b.

*(during the emperors stay here last year), is charging for it, has brought both great men to account; such that much is feared for their persons. The entire court will return here towards the month of March, at which time the Christian ministers will have to personally congratulate him on his high office with extra presents.*³²⁸

All considered, Colyer thought it safe to conclude that Kara Mustafa would continue most of the policies of his predecessor, and it was hoped that this would be in the same spirit of uprightness for which Fazıl Ahmed Paşa was remembered, by the Dutch and the English at least. The almost immediate reappointment of Hüseyin Ağa (I) as chief customs collector, although not welcomed in equal measure by all European merchant communities, seemed at least to confirm their expectations. Less than a month after the new grand vizier's festive return from Edirne of April 12th, French ambassador De Nointel, ranking highest among the European representatives in Ottoman protocol, was the first to put the assessment of the corps diplomatique to the test.

Because of their at times barely concealed sympathy and even intelligence and military support for the Austrians during the 1664 Battle of Saint Gotthard and for the Venetian defenders' efforts on Crete, the French had not been on good footing with the Köprülü. Previous French ambassadors had personally suffered the consequences of their own and their king's actions, to the extent of being imprisoned in Istanbul's *Yedikule* tower.³²⁹ In spite of this recent history, Louis XIV and Colbert had developed great designs for the Levant and for the future of Ottoman-French trade and relations, and expected the Ottomans to cooperate. The plan was to gain a complete French monopoly of the Levant trade and full and exclusive access to the Red Sea and the overland trading routes connecting the Mediterranean to the Far East. With these instruments the French would displace the other European trading nations from the Levant as well as the East India trades. In this vision, the Ottomans would cooperate for the sole purpose of increasing tax revenue: they would have greater control over the flow of trade through their domains, with the added advantage of adding to their revenue taxes from the rerouted Cape trade now flowing through their territories. Apart from the Ottomans' commitment to these grandiose designs, ambassador De Nointel (1670-1679) was expected to obtain the Porte's sincere apologies for its treatment of his predecessors, and acknowledgment of his status as equal to the sultan and as standing above all other rulers.

³²⁸ The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6912: Justinus Colyer to States General, 31 January 1677; The Hague, NA 01.03.01 98: Justinus Colyer to DLH, 31 January 1677.

³²⁹ On Ottoman-French relations during the grand vizierates of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa, Köprülüzaade Fazıl Ahmed Paşa and Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa, see Vandal, *Odyssée d'un ambassadeur*, i-xvi, and xiii for the *yedikule* episode).

Fazıl Ahmed Köprülü had no intention of signing over the empire's entire international trade to one nation for the delusion of gaining more power through it. Aiding France as it was engaged in a series of wars for the domination of Europe's richest entrepot the Dutch Republic (the Franco-Dutch and Franco-Allied wars of 1672-1678) was not an attractive proposition to the Ottomans. This not least since France had proven itself fickle in its friendship during his own and his fathers Cretan and Austrian campaigns, and since the king of France was arrogating for himself a rank equal to his own lord's. He had renewed France's capitulation in 1673, giving it rights equal to the English and confirming its right to protect French clergy in the Ottoman Empire (which, incidentally, they went on to willfully misinterpret as their right to protect all Christians in the Ottoman empire, including those – Orthodox, Protestants – that had strayed from the mother church) and had left it at that. Now, with a new grand vizier heading government, De Nointel was ordered to see if he could revive their plans, at the very least (re)gaining undisputed precedence over the representatives of all other nations.

Due to De Nointel's insistence on an adjustment of protocol in favour of the French, his audience of 2 May 1677 ended in utter disaster, wasting any chance of French diplomatic success with the Ottomans for years to come and destroying De Nointel's career in the process. The Dutch resident gleefully described the audience and the subsequent course of events in a letter to the Board of Directors of Levant Trade, dated 24 May 1677, which merits extensive quotation because of the insight it provides into Kara Mustafa's politics and the European envoys' response to it:

The second instant [2 May 1677] the first audience with the current grand vizier was permitted to the Lord ambassador of France; who, having ridden on horseback from his palace [the French embassy in Pera] to the channel [the Golden Horn] with very great pomp in the morning, having passed the same in twenty barges, and having arrived in that prince's seraglio [serail], was led into the room of the kethüda or chief secretary of the grand vizier, where he was told to await the return of His Excellency from the divan (being the [supreme] court). Three hours had passed before the said minister was advised that the grand vizier had left the divan, and another hour before he was advised to come to the audience chamber. This long and unusual waiting being perceived as an affront (which it indeed is) by the French ambassador, deliberately inflicted on him in the presence of the assorted nations, His Excellency, entering de said audience chamber and seeing the seat of the grand vizier (being a bench or stool on top of a large sofa covered with tapestries, which is a place elevated one and a half feet) and his own beneath the said sofa on the floor, at once instructed his chief dragoman to pick the bench up and place it on top in the front of the sofa. Which having been thus executed, His Excellency too stepped onto the sofa, and intending to seat himself on the stool, was at once given notice that his place was not on top, but beneath the aforementioned sofa. This disconcerted the said ambassador to such a degree that he himself took the said stool up from the front of the sofa, and placed it close and to the right-hand side of the seat or bench of the grand vizier (which was high above), at once

seating himself on it. Many great men of the empire being present there, and the grand vizier having been informed by them and by his chief page of that act, immediately ordered Mr. Alexander Mavrocordati [Mavrocordato], chief dragoman of the realm, to explain to the ambassador his error and add that he should kindly refrain from an action so extravagant. But this falling on deaf ears, the *çavuşbaşı*, being the chief executor of orders, was commanded to de facto remove the said stool from the sofa and put it down on the floor where it had been placed before. He [the *çavuşbaşı*] presently and with great fury appeared in the audience chamber and in a loud voice, and with an attitude of perfect contempt for his people, ordered the said bench (on which the ambassador was seated) to be taken from under him. Which was executed with such skill that the Lord ambassador could scarcely save himself from tumbling down. Seeing himself stripped of all honour and civility, but on top of that showered with all sorts of public ignominy and vicissitudes, and doubtlessly fearing worse, he stepped off the said sofa and departed, saying in parting that (if he were treated in such a fashion) he did not even want an audience with the grand vizier. Which having been reported to His Excellency, prompted the following response from him: let him have it with him who be damned, then. The following afternoon and evening the grand vizier, of his own accord and with great courtesy, had the Lords ambassadors of England and of Venice, as well as the States General's minister, yours truly, informed of his wish to receive them the next day. To this day, this courtesy has never been practiced by any grand vizier. But the current, after all being no less highly placed than his predecessors, wanted merely to find out how the other ministers would look upon the encounter described above. The Lord English ambassador responded that his indisposition didn't allow him to perform the said call, this because (so I have been informed), firstly, the grand vizier had given precedence to France in that ceremony, and, secondly, that he, being an ambassador of a king who did not yield to France, now found himself implicated in the actions of the said French ambassador. The Lord ambassador of Venice, and the States General's minister have not felt those impediments, and as a consequence have not attached ourselves to the circumstances of another, but have in this adhered to the old custom, namely that the Christian ministers, be they from a king or from a republic, in their first audience with a newly appointed grand vizier of this realm are generally received below the sofa. And had the Lord ambassador of France not previously been treated with such disdain as having to wait for so long, I am sure that he would not have let himself be carried to such extremities. The 3 instant [3 May 1677] at ten in the morning the aforesaid Venetian minister had his audience seated on a stool below the sofa, during which some difficulties occurred because the chief dragoman of that republic wanting to mediate, the grand vizier objected and ordered the abovementioned Mr. Mavrocordati to relate what the ambassador wanted to make known. At first not being obeyed in this, the affair stood to end very badly for the chief dragoman on account of the grand vizier's quick-tempereness, but the Lord ambassador prevented this with great foresight by shortening his compliment.³³⁰

Colyer had his own audience that same day and was again received with exceptional courtesy, being allowed as a mark of respect to ride his horse through the palace gate, past the guardsmen and officials lined up across the outer court, and right up to the palace steps where he was received by the

³³⁰ The Hague, NA 01.03.01 98: Justinus Colyer to DLH, 24 May 1677.

Porte's abovementioned chief dragoman, Mavrocordato. He was not taken to the steward's office to wait, but was led straightaway to the audience chamber, where he was again welcomed by Mavrocordato, who showed him his stool beneath the sofa and introduced him to the chief officials of the empire. The grand vizier presently appeared amid loud cheers, greeted the ambassador in passing by bringing his right hand to his chest and bowing his head, and stepped onto the sofa. The grand vizier's bench and Colyer's stool were picked up and put directly opposite one another, one on top of the sofa, the other below it. Being seated, Kara Mustafa personally bid him welcome, referring to him as "Lord ambassador" ("elçi bey"). Colyer thanked him, congratulated him on his appointment, and presented him with the required gifts. While coffee, sherbet, rose water and incense were brought in and taken, he and Kara Mustafa Paşa discussed Europe's current wars, with Mavrocordato interpreting the whole time. The audience ended with the usual ceremony, the grand vizier taking his leave of Colyer with two nods of the head.³³¹

Regarding the French and English ambassadors' audiences, Colyer tells us that De Nointel afterwards tried to obtain another audience by "capitulating" on the subject of the stool, but was denied one, while the English ambassador, John Finch, had gone into hiding in his country house. He also mentions that the resident of Genoa had not been able to obtain an audience.³³² Colyer ends his letter with the remark that "the government under the current vizier will to all appearances be very severe", which, however, was not in reference to his contacts with Europe, but to the methods by which he eliminated any internal threat to his position, as is illustrated by a list of the high Ottoman officials whose severed heads had recently been displayed in front of the palace and in Istanbul's public places.

It is at this juncture that we see Kara Mustafa's reputation receive its first serious and irreversible dents; less than a year into his grand vizierate and as a direct consequence of his first rapports in that capacity with the European representatives in Istanbul. The failed audience exasperated De Nointel and Finch (who had inadvertently and without necessity allowed himself to be drawn into a similar position). Stalling audiences was a proven tactic of the

³³¹ On Ottoman ceremony in general, see A.H. de Groot, "Marāsım, 4: In the Ottoman Empire", *EI2*, vi: 529b-32a; and Ö. Nutku, "Mawākib, 4: In the Ottoman Empire", *EI2*, vi: 858a-65b. The ceremony used by Kara Mustafâ Paşa in receiving Ottoman grandees is described in Galland, *Journal*, ii: 199-200 and 204-5 ("Les différentes manières de recevoir le Grand Seigneur, le Visir, le Moufti et les autres").

³³² The episode figures prominently in all contemporary diplomatic correspondence from Istanbul, as well as in histories of the period; see the bibliography, e.g., Masson, *Histoire du commerce*; Vandal, *Odyssée d'un ambassadeur*; Duparc's *Recueil des instructions* 29; North, *Life*, 74-76; Abbott, *Under the Turk*.

Ottomans to gain space for political manoeuvring and to make it clear to the Europeans that audiences and privileges were not a right but a grant. But categorically being denied an audience was something usually reserved for states on the brink of war with the Ottomans. Strictly speaking, it rendered the capitulations of the states involved worthless. For without confirmation of their privileges, the ambassadors had no supreme authority to turn to in case of disputes.

In their letters home, both the English and French ambassadors attributed what had happened exclusively to what they considered to be the base character and ignorance of the grand vizier. Capitalising on prejudices prevalent in Europe at the time to masquerade their own inadequate handling of the affair, they suggested that the cause of the grand vizier's refusal to grant them an audience was the "proverbial arrogance and avidity of the Turks"; meaning that he was trying to find out what they would be willing to sacrifice for a second chance and took pleasure in humiliating them. Unfortunately, these biased explanations have found their way into even much of the more recent literature on Kara Mustafa Paşa, in which he is invariably described as an extortionate xenophobe. Explanations like these, however, ignore the fact that Colyer had no problems whatsoever during his audience; quite the contrary. To ascribe this to his willingness to go along with Kara Mustafa in sitting below the sofa or in using the Porte's dragoman Mavrocordato is also not quite convincing, for it fails to account for the marked difference between the events preceding the actual audience of De Nointel and that of Colyer.

If we credit Kara Mustafa with slightly more capabilities and insight, and take the international arena in which he was operating into consideration, a more realistic picture emerges. In light of the evidence available on his conduct throughout his grand vizierate, we may certainly assume that, confronted with the excessive demands of Louis XIV and his ambassador, he did his utmost best to press home the point that the sultan and his ministers considered themselves superior to the French king and his emissary. But any explanation of what took place during and following these audiences, should also take into account Kara Mustafa's preoccupation with European affairs and their bearing on the Ottoman position. Not only was his grand vizierate marked by an endless succession of campaigns against Austria, Hungary, Poland, and Russia, this preoccupation was also evident in his diplomatic contacts with Europe. In this respect, it is more than revealing that he continued Fazıl Ahmed Paşa's experienced foreign affairs advisor Mavrocordato, and, what's more, personally insisted on making active use of his expertise in all his contacts with the European envoys.³³³ If we add to this

³³³ The Phanariote Alexander Mavrocordato (1637-1719) succeeded Panagiotis (Panaioti Nicousios) to the office of imperial dragoman in 1673. Having studied medicine in Padua, he

the fact that in giving audiences Kara Mustafa regularly inquired after the latest political and military developments in Europe and – in doing so – proved well-informed about its wars (³³⁴), it becomes clear that his diverging treatment of De Nointel and Colyer must be considered a calculated political act. After all, the Dutch were fighting a war for their very survival as an independent nation against an alliance headed by France, and this survival was considered by many as a crucial obstacle to any further increase in the French king's power and realm. All of which is not to say that Kara Mustafa's diplomacy was as clever as his predecessors.

Almost seven months later, the antagonism that was the result of the events of 2 and 3 May had still not been mended. 25 November 1677 saw the end of the month of Ramadan and the start of the festivities marking the breaking of the fast (*seker bayramı*). On this day, the foreign envoys usually sent their dragomans to congratulate the grand vizier during an audience and present him with gifts to a certain fixed value. But the interpreters of English ambassador (Finch) and Genoese resident (Spinola) were refused their audiences: the former because his employer had avoided having his ever since the “stool”-incident, the latter because he had already been in Istanbul for two and a half years without having presented his credentials and the gifts from his *kral* (king).³³⁵ Here too, it was claimed that the sole motive behind Kara Mustafa's behavior was his lust for money. But just as with the first audiences discussed above, the grand vizier's treatment of the Dutch and Venetians contradicts this.

After intense negotiations the grand vizier agreed to receive Finch and Spinola as soon as possible (but without setting a date), provided they compensated for their previous disrespect by adding to their usual gifts “current gold sequins” to the value of 5,000 Lion Dollars for the grand vizier, and the same to the value of 1,000 Lion Dollars for the grand vizier's steward and the *reis ül-küttab* (secretary of state). This increase in gifts worried

was not only Fazıl Ahmed's and Kara Mustafa's foreign affairs advisor but also their, as well as the sultan's, personal physician. On the Phanariotes, see J.H. Mordtmann, “Fener”, *EI2*, ii: 879b-80a. On Panagiotis, see Galland, *Journal*, i: 18n1-19. On Mavrocordato, see Stourdza, *Europe Orientale*.

³³⁴ Another example: “Il est fort curieux de nouvelles et lorsque M. le Bayle de Venise eut audience, il s'informa fort de l'état des guerres de la France avec l'Espagne, l'Allemagne et la Hollande”, Galland, *Journal*, ii: 205. See also Heywood, “Karā Mustafa Pasha”, 591a.

³³⁵ The reason for this is not entirely clear. Colyer claims it was because the Genoese resident did not want to present the required gifts to Kara Mustafa Paşa: The Hague, NA 01.03.01 98: Justinus Colyer to DLH, 9 December 1677. This is not unlikely, since the value of Genoese trade, and thereby of the amount of money the resident could spend on relations, had become negligible when compared to that of France, England or Holland. This will have made it very difficult for the Genoese to keep up with these competitors in spending, and would have required the resident to advance the costs involved without being certain of their repayment by the home authorities, with no small chance of bankrupting him.

the other representatives, who complained that the English and Genoese had increased their gifts regardless the consequences of their actions for the other nations. Their worries proved premature however, for the presents offered by Colyer and Venetian *bailo* Morosini were graciously received, although they had not been increased.³³⁶

Up until this point, the European representatives in Istanbul had not been unanimous in condemning Kara Mustafa Paşa. The rather obvious distinction between those denouncing him and those considering him as severe but fair a grand vizier as his predecessor, was whether they were treated as representing allies or foes. This in its turn depended on the geopolitical situation as well as on the manner in which they approached him.

This changed between 1 and 18 January 1678. On that last day, Colyer informed the States General that “every day, we see the maxims of this present government incline more and more to the extreme prejudice of all Christian nations”. The immediate cause of his alarm was an order (*ferman*) issued by the grand vizier:

Now the grand vizier at the beginning of this month had notice given to all Christian public ministers that each of them should hand over to a specially commissioned kadi a list of all his merchants that had got married in these parts, of the names and number of his dragomans, and of the names and number of his indigenous servants; and also that all consuls and dragomans of the entire realm would within the space of three months have to request new berats from the Porte on pains of being considered ordinary subjects; and, regarding the dragomans of this country, that they will have to pay the baraç to which all natives of the realm that are not Turks [i.e. Muslims] are liable, which is in direct violation of all capitulations.³³⁷ And for all these matters no other explanation can be given, except that it is the will of him who holds the power to carry them out. The specific purpose of which is to bring all Christian [i.e. European] merchants that have contracted marriages here under the said baraç, and to gain a good sum of money from the new berats. For fear of new avanias, all public ministers have provided the aforementioned lists to the

³³⁶ The “usual” gifts, to which the English and Genoese had added now added money, consisted in “gold, and woollen cloth, as well as satin and tabby [watered taffeta] vests”. *Ibid.*

³³⁷ Although the existence of this *ferman* is widely attested in both archival and printed sources (but erroneously as having been issued in December 1677), I have so far not been able to locate an Ottoman copy or original. Nevertheless, we can claim with some certainty that it did not order *baraç* to be levied from all dragomans in the service of European ambassadors and consuls regardless (“and, regarding the dragomans of this country, that they will have to pay the *baraç* to which all natives of the realm that are not Turks [Muslims] are liable”). Considering the tendentious nature of Colyer’s correspondence on the matter (see *infra*), it is more likely that what is discussed here, is a further qualification of the previous sentence, and in reference to those dragomans that have upon re-examination not been considered eligible for new *berats* since they were not actually dragomans but only held their posts nominally.

*said kadi, and undertaken to convey orders to their respective consuls and dragomans residing beyond this place [Istanbul] to comply with the notice given.*³³⁸

The *ferman* caused considerable distress among the European communities of the Ottoman Empire and the Ottoman subjects that were under their protection. Not so much because of the measures it dictated, but because of their wider implications. The *baraç* tax was not a financial burden the Europeans and their protégés would not be able to bear.³³⁹ Similarly, obtaining new *berats* – though more costly – was also not an insurmountable financial drain on the embassies since they would be reimbursed by selling them to the recipients.

The real problem was that the plans of the grand vizier, if carried through, would disrupt the entire system that enabled the European merchant communities to conduct their trade through their Ottoman connections. As we have seen, European merchants in the Ottoman Empire conducted their trade through Ottoman wholesalers and brokers with the assistance of Ottoman dragomans and warehousemen, all of them protected non-Muslims (*zimmi*s). These Greek, Armenian and Jewish Ottoman middlemen were drawn to trade with the Europeans by virtue of those articles of the capitulations that offered to Ottoman personnel of European embassies and consulates the same exemption from Ottoman taxes it did to protected foreigners (*müstemin*). Although many of these Ottoman connections were not exactly personnel, they were extended this European protection through nomination to a “nominal” dragomanship or vice-consulship by one of the European representatives in Istanbul, with conferral of their office being effected with a *berat* granted by the Ottoman central administration. In this context, the question of their having to pay *baraç* or not was not merely one of purchasing the protection of the Muslim ruler (here; the Ottoman sultan) for a few dollars, but encompassed further liability to a number of commercial dues and taxes (*tekalif-i örfiyye*) which

³³⁸ The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Justinus Colyer to States General, 18 January 1678 (my translation).

³³⁹ The non-Muslims of Izmir, for instance, are reported to have paid it at a rate of 2 to 4 Lion Dollars annually. On the non-Muslim communities of Izmir and the *baraç* they paid, see Ülker, *Rise of Izmir*, 230-34; Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 135-43; and De Bruyn, *Reizen*, 153. See also Claude Cahen and Halil İnalçık, “Djizya, 1: General; and 2: Ottoman”, *EI2*, ii: 559a-565b, which confirms the amounts. It has to be kept in mind, however, that these were nominal rates; the actual rate at which a given individual paid, could vary considerably, depending on what nation he belonged to and the arrangements that nation made internally to fulfill its fiscal obligations *en group*. Thus, Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 136 and 140-41 tells us it was customary for the Jewish and Greek *taifes* to exempt their religious leaders from the tax and make up for the difference by increasing the burden for others. Similarly, the richer members of a *taife* (among which were the – officially exempt – dragomans) could be expected to contribute in proportion to their wealth to spare poorer ones.

could amount to much more. Liability to those taxes would effectively negate the competitive edge they had gained through European protection.³⁴⁰

But as we have seen, the Ottoman “employees” of the Europeans were not the only ones the *ferman* was aimed at: European merchants that had taken *zimmi* wives were also to be subjected to *baraç*. Such a measure would effectively “naturalize” those merchants and their families to Ottoman subjects. This was not only of great consequence for the merchants themselves, but also for the European officials representing them, since they stood to lose some of their richest subjects.

The articles of the capitulations which Colyer and his colleagues claimed the order was in contravention of (but to which the Ottoman government and its poll-tax collectors no doubt considered it a long overdue specification), ran as follows (in the Dutch capitulation in force at the time):

[art. 32:] *ve anlara tabi' olub memalik-i mabrusemişde mütemekkin olanlar eger evlü olsun ve ergen olsun renberlik edenler anlardan barâc taleb olunmaya* [art. 33:] *ve ilçileri bidmetinde olan kûnsuluslar ve tercümanlar olageldügi üzere barâcdan ve kassâbiyyeden ve tekâlif-i 'örfiyyeden mu'âf olalar* [art. 34:] *ve Iskenderiyye ve Tarabulus-i Şam ve Cezâ'ir ve Tunus ve Cezâ'ir-i garb ve Mısr iskelelerine ve gayrlara ta'yin êtdükleri kûnsulusların tebdil edüb gönderdikede kimesne mâni' olmaya* / [art. 32:] *From the subjects of the [Dutch Provinces] who have become residents in our well-guarded dominions, whether married or bachelor, and exercising trade, tribute (baraç) may not be demanded.* [art. 33:] *The consuls and dragomans who are employed by their ambassador are exempt from tribute, kassâbiye-tax and extraordinary taxes (tekâlif-i 'örfiyye), as has become usual.* [art. 34:] *Nobody may present obstacles when [the Dutch] appoint consuls to the scales of Alexandria, Tripoli of Syria, the Archipelago, Tunis, Algiers, Cairo and other places, change them, appoint men capable of such a task in those places and despatch them.*³⁴¹

The first thing we must conclude from these articles, is that the order was not in direct contravention of them. The capitulations were susceptible to varying interpretations depending on many circumstances, such as the goodwill of local officials or the Porte, the conduct of the European merchants or nations in question, etc..

With regard to article 32, the Europeans claimed they could marry whomever they wished, whether they were subjects of the sultan or not.

³⁴⁰ On the protection system, see, generally, Maurits Hubrecht van den Boogert, “Ottoman Dragomans and European Consuls: The Protection System in Eighteenth-Century Aleppo” (PhD diss., Universiteit Leiden, 2001). For further reference to the protection system and *baraç*, see İnalçık, “İmtiyâzât”; J. Schacht, “Amân”, *EI2*, i: 429a-30a; L. Fekete, “Berât”, *EI2*, i: 1170a-71a; B. Lewis, “Berâth”, *EI2*, i: 1171b; Cahen, “Dhimma”; Cahen and İnalçık, “Djizya”.

³⁴¹ Transliteration and translation: De Groot, *Ottoman Empire*, 241-42 and 255.

Although their assertion had legality beyond the capitulations³⁴², this had always remained a controversial matter and there had been many cases where a tax-collector, *kadi*, or governor had tested the proportionate strength of both principles by trying to levy *baraç* or other taxes reserved for Ottoman subjects such as inheritance-tax (*kassamiye*; *resm-i kısımet*).³⁴³ Such cases then had to be resolved by giving presents and bribes to the officials involved, or to various officials in the central administration to obtain an order confirming the applicability of the capitulary article in question. Since this had to be done with some regularity, the European trade organisations pressed the ambassadors and consuls to discourage and prevent as much as possible such “mixed” marriages.³⁴⁴ That this policy did not succeed we can infer from the frequent reiteration of orders to that effect.

The *ferman* was also not in direct violation of articles 33 and 34, since it did not order all Ottoman dragomans and vice-consuls to be made liable to *baraç*. As indicated above, this would have meant completely lifting their protection, making it virtually impossible for them to exercise their duties.

³⁴² Accord. Khadduri, *War and peace*, a summary of Islamic jurisprudence and Ottoman law on relations between Muslims and non-Muslims: “Once the harbī becomes a musta’min, he is allowed to bring with him his family and children; to visit any city of dār al-Islām except the holy cities of the Hijāz; to reside permanently in dār al-Islām, if he accepted the status of dhimmī and paid the jizya; and to marry a dhimmī woman and take her back with him to dār al-harb (conversely, if the harbī were a woman and married a dhimmī man, she had no right to take him with her to dār al-harb since this might constitute potential power for use against dār al-Islām).” (166) and “If the musta’min, after he returned to dār al-harb, leaving his property in the dār al-Islām, suddenly died; his property could not be taken out of dār al-Islām by his heirs; instead, it would be confiscated by the State. But if the musta’min died while he was in the dār al-Islām, the amān granted was still valid for his property; his heirs could therefore take it out of the dār al-Islām if they wanted to do so.” (168).

³⁴³ See Cengiz Orhonlu, “Kassām”, *EI2*, iv: 735b-6a; and İnalçık, “İmtiyāzāt”. The articles in the Dutch capitulation of 1612 exempting the inheritances of Dutch subjects from *kassamiye*, or from seizure by the sultan if there were no known/recognized heirs, ran; “[art. 7:] If a subject of the Dutch Provinces dies, Treasury officials may not interfere with his goods contrary to the capitulation, saying that they are the property of unknown owners, or on any other pretext.”; “[art. 9:] The dividers of inheritances (*kassām*) and the cadis may not demand the duty on the division of inheritance.”; and “[art. 29:] If a person dies, his goods and possessions must be given to whom he has bequeathed them. If a person dies intestate, they must be given to his local partner by way of his consul. Nobody may interfere”: De Groot, *Ottoman Empire*, 251 and 254, transliteration on 238 and 241.

³⁴⁴ Two such cases are discussed extensively in my “Towards Classifying Avaniās”. Daniel-Jan de Hochepeid tells us that consular protection was henceforth withdrawn from English and Dutch merchants who had taken local wives (The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 49a-50a). For instructions concerning such marriages and the actions to be taken against merchants contracting them, see the States General’s draft regulation of 1673 and order of 1675 in W.E. van Dam van Isselt, “Het ontwerp-geereingsreglement voor de Levant van 1673 en het Formulier van 1675”, *Bijdragen voor vaderlandsche geschiedenis en oudheidkunde*, 4/6 (1907), 407-28; and the Levant Company’s instructions to James Chandos (John Finch’s successor to the Istanbul embassy): Kew, NA SP 105 145, 82-92.

We can be absolutely certain that the Porte had no intention of dislocating the foreign trade of the empire by making it impossible for the Europeans to function within the Ottoman context. Therefore, we may safely discount Colyer's assertion to the contrary as an exaggeration designed to alert the home front to the seriousness of the problem.

As becomes clear from Colyer's further correspondence on the matter (and as is corroborated by a number of other sources), the grand vizier's order was aimed at curbing the practice of the European representatives of selling *berats* (for nominal positions), which was rightly perceived to erode the Ottoman tax-base. However modest the losses might have been when compared to the 19th-century protection system, the phenomenon clearly worried Kara Mustafa. On March 13nd, Colyer further informed the States General about the matter:

More and more each day, they continue to treat the Christian nations here very badly, and to utterly destroy the capitulations with the sole purpose of eventually making not only all our merchants, be they married or bachelor, tributaries of this realm, but also of subjecting them to its laws, thereby extracting their masters' subjects and goods from the jurisdiction of their respective Christian ministers to the total ruin of all commerce. Our and the other capitulations clearly state that married and single Franks [Western Europeans] should not be made to pay haraç, which is tribute. This, the grand vizier has now interpreted to the contrary with regard to those married, and has given strict order to collect the tribute from them. By this they are brought under the law of the land, outside our protection, and their goods in life as in death under the violence of the Turks. All complaints, arguments and remonstrances were rejected, and the requested audiences about this with the grand vizier were refused with threats. All ministers are stuck and stand with their hands tied, and the dragomans dare not raise the matter for fear of being treated very badly. I have several times addressed the Lords ambassadors of England, France, and Venice, and suggested it might be wise to jointly, but separately, submit our memorandums on this serious matter to the grand vizier. They showed willing to do so, but none of them has so far started. ... We have three merchants here, who are married; De Brosses, Van Breen, and Croesen, whom I hope to liberate from the said tribute by giving each of them a title of consul of some small scale hereabouts. At the moment I am attempting this, but success is not assured. But the principle matter meriting your attention, is the consequence and outcome, for it is very clear to us that, if the interested kingdoms and republics of Christendom do not take joint action, all unmarried merchants will with certainty be treated in like manner, and they themselves as well as their effects will be placed beyond the authority of the ministers (as indicated above), which would make it inadvisable for anyone to send his effects here. For a tributary that dies here, whether he has children or not, the Turkish hand is immediately put on his home, and if there are children, it divides the inheritance and collects ten to a hundred for itself; and if there are no children or known heirs of the same blood, the inheritance is kept under the rule of Turkish justice until a legitimate heir appears.³⁴⁵

³⁴⁵ My italics. The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Justinus Colyer to States General, 1 March 1678.

The grand vizier had left Istanbul to join the sultan's hunt shortly after having issued the *ferman*. But since this was a matter of such consequence that it needed his constant support to be enforced (as we will see below), execution of the order was delayed until the signing of the Treaty of Zurawno with Poland and his return to Istanbul in the second week of March.³⁴⁶ Upon the court's return to Istanbul, final preparations for the upcoming Ukrainian campaign immediately started, feeding assumptions of the European representatives that the sole purpose of the *baraç* order had been to raise money for the campaign. And indeed, with Kara Mustafa back in Istanbul, the *voivoda* (district governor) of Galata rather half-heartedly started collecting the poll-tax from some European subjects. In order for us better to understand subsequent events, it is necessary to discuss them in light of their broader administrative and political context.

Galata and Pera, across the Golden Horn from Istanbul proper, were the townships where the majority of Istanbul's non-Muslims and all Europeans resided under the protection of their embassies. Together with the township of Üsküdar, on the other bank of the Bosphorus, they constituted the district of *havass-ı refi'* or *haslar kazası*, which was administratively separate from Istanbul proper and had its own civil and executive governors; a *kadi* and a *voivoda*. The district belonged to the *havass-ı hümayun* (private estates of the sultan; imperial lands) and its tax revenues were assigned to the imperial treasury. In the period under discussion, the treasury annually farmed out the tax revenues from the district as *iltizam* tax farms. The collection of *baraç* from the non-Muslims of Galata and Pera was one of these farms. In 1678, the tax farmer (*mültezim*) that had contracted to collect this *baraç* was Kara Mustafa's client chief customs collector Hüseyin Ağa (I), who had also purchased the post in 1672. For the collection of his revenues, particularly in cases where payment was refused and duress or force was necessary, he depended on the *voivoda* and his irregulars (*sekbân*), who were specifically appointed to safeguard the treasury's interests.³⁴⁷

And so it happened that the *voivoda* of Galata, when confronted with the refusal of the assessed Europeans to pay the desired *baraç*, decided to arrest a

³⁴⁶ A full contemporary Dutch translation of the treaty of Zurawno (or Zarnów as it was known in Europe at the time; Izvence in Turkish), dated 7 March 1678, can be found in *ibid.*, 13 March 1678.

³⁴⁷ Hüseyin Ağa obtained the poll-tax farm in 1672 (Galland, *Journal*, i: 87) and also held it in 1678 (Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 123 and 126). In that last year, he travelled to Izmir with two galleys in his capacity of *baraç*-collector to collect from the English nation there 100,000 Lion Dollars, which was the Ottoman administration's claim on the inheritance of the deceased English merchant (Samuel Pentlow), who had taken a *zimmi*-wife and residence: Van Dam van Isselt, "Avaniën in de Levant", 547; and Olton, "Towards Classifying Avaniës". On *hass*-lands and their administration, see Orhonlu, "Khâss". On *haslar kazası*, also see Halil İnalçık, "Istanbul", *EI2*, iv: 224a.

number of them – only to release them again without any payment having been made upon complaints of their representatives.³⁴⁸ At first sight, this sudden change of heart might seem strange. But it can be accounted for if one considers some of the changes in government that had resulted from Kara Mustafa's departure. Antoine Galland, who had arrived in Izmir on March 8th and followed the matter from there, tells us that;

*... on avait déjà commencé de l'exiger [the haraç] de quelques Français à Constantinople. Mais on cessa de le demander depuis que le Grand Seigneur fut sorti et qu'il eut passé sous ses tentes, hors de la ville, pour se mettre ensuite en campagne. L'on a su que ce fut sur une forte contestation qui se forma sur ce sujet entre le mussahib [gentleman in waiting on the sultan/favourite], le grand vizir et le douanier, Hussein Aga, qui avait mis dans la tête du vizir de faire cette contravention aux privilèges accordés à tous les princes chrétiens comme une invention ingénieuse pour tirer une bonne somme d'argent.*³⁴⁹

This favorite of the sultan, who temporarily managed to suspend Kara Mustafa's order as soon as the Ottoman court and army had left Istanbul (19 to 21 March) was (Musahib) Mustafa Paşa. He had married the sultan's daughter Hatice Sultan in 1675 and was now engaged in a struggle with the grand vizier for ascendancy at court.³⁵⁰ But this was not the only power struggle being fought out over Kara Mustafa's control over the financially important customs and poll-tax farms. As we will see further along, another competitor of the grand vizier (who in the end would cost him his head), Kara Ibrahim Paşa, also got involved.³⁵¹

In the first days of April, with the army and court still encamped at an hour's distance of Istanbul in preparation for the march to the front, the European representatives had sent their dragomans to congratulate Kara Mustafa's newly appointed *kaymmakam* 'Abd al-Rahman 'Abdi Paşa on his high office.³⁵² During these audiences, the new deputy grand vizier had refused to listen to any of their complaints concerning the imposition of *haraç* and had successfully insisted on an enlargement of the gifts usually presented on such occasions, adding "flatly; these are different times now, they should know that the grand vizier is present here, and they should be

³⁴⁸ Colyer mentions the arrest and release of his physician Henning Wolde (The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Justinus Colyer to States General, 23 April 1678), and Galland that of several unidentified Frenchmen (Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 123 and 126).

³⁴⁹ Ibid., 123.

³⁵⁰ †1686. Ibid., 272n4.

³⁵¹ Kara Ibrahim Paşa had started out as a protégé of Kara Mustafa Paşa, but gained such prominence that he became a threat to his patron's position, and eventually managed to persuade the sultan to have him executed. See İ. Parmaksızoğlu, "İbrâhim Paşa, Kara", *EI2*, iii: 1001b; and Richard F. Kreutel, *Kara Mustafa vor Wien: 1683 aus der Sicht türkischer Quellen*, ed. Karl Teply (Graz: Styria, 1982), index and throughout). Also see note 355.

³⁵² On this official, see Fr. Babinger, "'Abdi Pasha", *EI2*, i: 97a.

careful that no complaints are made to him.”³⁵³ Then, on the 30th of April, the campaign was launched and the army and court left the environs of Istanbul. With the commanding presence of the grand vizier out of the way, Colyer immediately detected a change in atmosphere. He had pleaded his cause with Kara Mustafa’s interpreter and advisor Mavrocordato, who had undertaken to obtain the new *berats* for him during the campaign. Colyer had furnished him with the funds to effect the purchase and had good hopes of arranging the matter in the court’s absence by handing out bribes.³⁵⁴

On 6 July, however, the matter was still unresolved and Mavrocordato’s *berats* had still not arrived. But Colyer had been able to make some progress by petitioning Kara Ibrahim Paşa, who had obtained the *sadaret kaymmakamlığı* while also keeping his post of *kapudan* (grand admiral). It appears he had deliberately cultivated this connection and was now reaping the benefits.³⁵⁵ Since the departure of the court the *voivoda* had started apprehending some Englishmen, Frenchmen, and Venetians over the *haraç*. Their ambassadors had thought it too dangerous to resist publicly the execution of the grand vizier’s order and had arranged the matter privately by compensating the *voivoda*, without openly acknowledging their merchants’ liability to the poll-tax. Colyer took a different course and asked Kara Ibrahim to hear him against the *voivoda*. His request was accepted, but it took until 17 August until the hearing actually took place, the reason for the delay in all likelihood being *haraç*-collector Hüseyin Ağa’s preoccupation with the Pentlow-affair (see note 347). During the hearing of 17 August Colyer produced the Dutch capitulation and the *voivoda* a *hatt-ı şerif* (an imperial decree written the sultan himself) to the effect that Europeans who had taken *zımmi* wives were liable to all imperial taxes, after which the *kaymmakam* promised to consider the matter. Over the next couple of days of sending Dutch chief dragoman Theijls to the *divan* to see where matters stood, it became clear to Colyer and his nation that they too would have to

³⁵³ The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Justinus Colyer to States General, 23 April 1678.

³⁵⁴ “Sir Mavrocordato has accepted to advance our cause in the army and has promised to send us the new *berats* and commands [*fermans*] for the consuls, dragomans and merchants. This, on the condition that we provided him beforehand with all the funds necessary to obtain them, which we have done today. Meanwhile, our merchants have in the matter of the *haraç* not been molested any further then with threats, but beyond execution. Every day we can now observe more clearly that it is solely about money.” *Ibid.*, 1 May 1678.

³⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 13 March 1678. The missive describes Colyer’s audience of 7 March 1678 with kapudan Kara Ibrahim Paşa; an audience which he, by his own admission, intentionally had during the court’s absence (when it was on hunting expedition). Colyer tells us that Kara Ibrahim “is a gentleman about fifty years of age, of good appearance, and one of the favourites of the sultan.” The discussion mainly concerned the Western Europe’s navies, their movements and their ships’ technical specifications. Significantly, Kara Mustafa’s and Kara Ibrahim’s tenures as *kapudan* signalled the full adoption of sailing galleons as the basis of the Ottoman fleet: Uzunçarşılı, “Bahriyya”, 948a.

pay off the *voyvoda* if they wanted to keep him at bay. It seemed that even with Kara Ibrahim holding the second and third highest posts of the empire (that of *sadaret kaymakamı* and *kapudan-ı derya*) and presiding over the proceedings, the *divan* could not bring itself to rule against the grand vizier on this matter and commit itself openly to Kara Ibrahim's cause.³⁵⁶

Until Kara Mustafa's return to Istanbul on 20 April 1679 matters stayed as they had stood after all European nations had persuaded the *voyvoda* to stop arresting more merchants. But the grand vizier's return to Istanbul immediately tipped the scales again. With his position very much strengthened after a year in the proximity of the sultan and a successful campaign (³⁵⁷), and after having Kara Ibrahim Paşa dismissed as *kapudan* and *kaymakam* and demoted to fifth vizier (25 November 1678³⁵⁸), he seemed as implacable as ever:

Immediately after the said days of rejoicing [in honour of the victorious return of the sultan and grand vizier to Istanbul] all the Lords ambassadors and other ministers requested audiences with the grand vizier. Those of France and England have had theirs the 7th, and your honours' minister, yours truly, the 14th of the previous [month; June], in the same manner as during the previous audience: namely, the grand vizier sitting above, and the said ministers below the sofa. The aforementioned Lords ambassadors of France and England among other discourses spoke of the haraç or tribute, which had been instituted against their merchants (that had been married here) the previous year, but they were at once repudiated in the most severe terms, which persuaded the Lord Venetian ambassador and myself not to bring up the subject to avoid further embitterment. ... Consequently, nothing out of the ordinary happened during my visit, except for the grand vizier during the giving of the presents inquiring of me, whether it was certain that France had evacuated all the places it had previously conquered in our country.³⁵⁹

The imposition of *haraç* on foreign merchants with local wives was to remain a contended issue until Kara Mustafa's disgrace and execution in 1683. This is interesting in light of the constant exclamations by the European ambassadors and residents that Kara Mustafa had only issued the *ferman*

³⁵⁶ The Hague, NA 1.02.20 1060: Justinus Colyer, Jan van Breen, Gasparo Charelles, François de Brosse, Jan Croesen and Abraham de Vivier in the chancery of the Dutch embassy of Istanbul, 20 August 1678. The *voyvoda* was presented with the relatively moderate bribe of 5 vests of Dutch cloth, 5 vests of silk and 30 Lion Dollars.

³⁵⁷ Heywood, "Karā Mustafa Pasha", 591b.

³⁵⁸ Parmaksızoğlu, "İbrāhīm Pasha, Kara". By the time the Vienna campaign got under way in 1683, Kara Ibrahim had been promoted to third vizier and reappointed *kaymakam* again through the sultan's protection. It was in this capacity that he successfully intrigued against Kara Mustafa when the siege of Vienna failed. After Kara Mustafa's execution (25 December 1683) he succeeded him as grand vizier (December 1683; dismissed 17 December 1685; exiled March 1686; executed June 1687).

³⁵⁹ The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Justinus Colyer to States General, 29 June 1679. The audience is also described extensively in The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 46b-47a.

because he wanted the Europeans to buy him off in the first place. This is the pot calling the kettle black. However convinced they were that the grand vizier was always in desperate need of money with which he could finance his immense household, his campaigns or keep up his standing at court; the fact of this case remains that no matter how much they offered, he never accepted any money to abrogate the order.³⁶⁰ One has to wonder whether this was in fact a matter of principle or part of a larger policy? In any case, with no further arrests being made over it, it appears that this *ferman* had served its original purpose and was now forgotten. But the issue which it had addressed was never definitively resolved; from time to time similar attempts to impose *haraç* on dragomans, vice-consuls, and foreign merchants that had taken local wives, would continue to occur.³⁶¹

After the troubles with the *haraç*, an increasing irritation with Kara Mustafa is discernible in Colyer's correspondence, even if he managed to stay on relatively good terms with him for the remaining duration of his embassy. Things that would have amused him some years before (such as the stool-incident), he now commented on with growing disgust, even if the Dutch ran no risk at all. This change in attitude is very clear in his correspondence on the problems the English ambassador, Finch, and the recently arrived new Venetian *bailo*, Civrano, ran into with Kara Mustafa Paşa and Hüseyin Ağa in October-November 1679 – the former over a large amount of cloth he had imported free of duty under the pretense that it was for personal use, but was now suspected of selling; the latter over a number of slaves that had fled their Ottoman masters and were hiding aboard the two Venetian men-of-war that had carried the new *bailo* to Istanbul.³⁶²

³⁶⁰ The size and functioning of Kara Mustafa's household, which numbered in the hundreds and hundreds even when he was still *kaymmakam*, is minutely described in a memoir appended to Galland, *Journal*, ii: 186-207.

³⁶¹ The Hague, NA 1.02.20 1088, for example, contains a number of Ottoman *fermans* issued specifically in response to attempts to impose the tax on the Dutch and their protégés: one stating that the Dutch are exempt from *haraç* (1690); one stating that the dragomans, their sons and their servants are exempt from *haraç* (1692); one stating that five servants of the consul of Izmir are exempt from *haraç* (1701); one stating that the dragomans, their sons and their servants are exempt from *haraç* and other taxes (1705); and another one stating again that the Dutch are exempt from *haraç* (1709). Kew, NA SP 105 334, which is a register of Ottoman *fermans* concerning the English nation of Izmir during the consulship of William Raye (1677-1703) contains a similar *ferman* "for freeing 5 of the consuls servants from haratch" (27).

³⁶² The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 50a-b. The capitulations stipulated that ambassadors and consuls could import the furnishings, food and drink they needed for private use, free of customs. Although this meant that they were not permitted to sell the duty-free imports, this was of course very difficult for the Ottomans to monitor and transgressions abounded. In the case of the Venetian ships harbouring the runaway slaves, although there were witnesses to the contrary, the Venetians denied having them and refused to hand them over or to have their ships visited by the Ottoman authorities. When things came to a head and they were visited with force, all slaves were quickly rowed ashore or thrown overboard by their saviors.

Colyer's new-found sympathy for the misadventures of his colleagues, was not reciprocated. His old colleagues were all replaced within the space of a few months, and lacking the support and perhaps advice of his old friend Venetian *bailo* Morosini, he fell victim to the jealousy of the newcomers. In December 1679 an alliance of Genoese ambassador Levanto, Venetian *bailo* Civrano, French ambassador Guilleragues and English ambassador Finch (who would be recalled in 1681), out of frustration with the preferential treatment Colyer received from Kara Mustafa while at the same time being the lowest-ranking European envoy in Istanbul, decided to make it clear to the grand vizier that he was not a full-fledged ambassador but a mere resident envoy. They were so successful that the next petition Colyer sent Kara Mustafa was returned with the reply that he should stop referring to himself as *elçi* (ambassador/envoy) and use *kapı kethüdası* (representative of a provincial governor) instead, paired with the imputation that the States General were showing the Porte disrespect by sending an envoy of such low rank to represent them. The upshot was that the States General decided to promote Colyer to full-fledged ambassador (the first since Cornelis Haga had attained that rank in 1612). With the time it took for correspondence to travel back and forth between Istanbul and Amsterdam (approximately 1½ months each way) it was 10 April 1680 before the States General promoted Colyer, and May before he actually received his promotion.

The last years of Colyer's embassy (which ended with his death in Istanbul on 28 December 1682) and Kara Mustafa's grand vizierate (which ended with his execution in Belgrade on 25 December 1683) relations between the two became slightly more troublesome, although never to the extent of becoming as discordial or disrupted as had previously been the case with Colyer's colleagues. We should briefly mention two cases that touched upon the basic principles underlying the capitulations; the physical punishment with lethal consequences of Colyer's secretary François de Brosses in the *divan-ı hümayun*, and the forced renewal of the Dutch capitulation. Despite the seriousness of these issues, they do not seem to have had a profound impact on the way in which Colyer regarded Kara Mustafa Paşa. And since both cases have received elaborate attention elsewhere, we will limit our discussion of them mainly to what they can tell us about Kara Mustafa Paşa and his interpretation of the capitulations.³⁶³

³⁶³ On the De Brosses case, see W.E. van Dam van Isselt, "De mishandeling van den legatie-scretaris De Brosses te Constantinopel", *Bijdragen voor vaderlandsche geschiedenis en oudheidkunde*, 7/8 (1937), which also comprises De Brosses' own description of the event (91-95). On the renewal of the Dutch capitulation, see Van Dam van Isselt, "Avaniën in de Levant", 548-56. For a French translation of the Dutch capitulation of 7 November 1680, see Gabriel Efendi Noradounghian, *Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'Empire Ottoman*, vol. 1: 1300-1789 (Paris: F. Pichon, 1897), 169-81.

On 17 May 1680 secretary De Brosse was tried and convicted in the *divan* in connection with a sum of 1,000 Lion Dollars he had loaned a Greek inhabitant of Istanbul several years earlier. When this original debtor, a woman named Safira, defaulted in August 1679, the debt was taken over by the metropolitan of Chios. However, he denied having incurred it and took his case to the Ottoman authorities. The case was heard by Chief Justice of Rumelia (*Rumeli kadi-‘askeri*) Hamid Efendi, who ruled in De Brosse’s favour and provided him with a *hüccet* (written proof) to the effect that the loan would expire after a further six months (i.e. in February 1679) and would then be settled by the *kadi* of Galata. The agreed date having arrived, De Brosse dispatched a dragoman to the *kadi* of Galata with the *kadi-‘asker’s* and several other *hüccets* and obligations (*temessükes*) supporting his case, as well as with a *ferman* by Kara Mustafa ordering the *kadi* of Chios to collect the loan by force if necessary. The *kadi* decided the claim should be taken to Chios, but the person deputised by De Brosse’s to collect the debt was surprised by four disguised Turks in the stairwell of the metropolitan’s house, severely beaten and robbed of all the documents supporting the case. After this, the metropolitan again denied the debt in front of the *kadi* of Chios, forcing De Brosse to obtain copies of his lost documents from the records of the *Rumeli kadi-‘askeri*. On De Brosse’s request Colyer now successfully petitioned the grand vizier for a *ferman* ordering the *kapudan paşa* and the *kadi* of his fleet to examine the matter. But in the meantime the metropolitan had left Chios and committed himself to the protection of the patriarch of Istanbul, who now filed the case with the *divan-ı hümayun*. There, matters came to such a head that Kara Mustafa saw no other means of getting the truth out, than confronting De Brosse with an actual line-up of twenty possible debtors in the assembled *divan*. Between all the false beards – at least so he claimed in his defence – De Brosse failed to point out his debtor the metropolitan whom he had only met once eight months before, and was punished by being bastinadoed, receiving 200 blows under the feet, eventually resulting in his death on 16 October 1682.

It was unusual – even during Kara Mustafa’s grand vizierate – for European subjects who lost a lawsuit to be sentenced to physical punishment, and particularly one so stark. Nevertheless, neither the hearing of the case in the *divan*, nor the sentence handed down, was contrary to the letter of the capitulations – although they might be regarded as going against its spirit, i.e. the extending of protection (*aman*) to subjects of friendly nations.³⁶⁴ So why did De Brosse receive a punishment normally reserved

³⁶⁴ While lawsuits involving European and Ottoman Muslim subjects were outside their jurisdiction, the consular courts could hear cases (such as this one) between Europeans and *şimmi*s. But if one or all of the parties involved decided to apply to the Ottoman *kadi*-courts, these could also hear them. So as to be better able to protect and represent their subjects in such cases, the European nations had obtained the capitulatory privilege of having cases repre-

for Ottoman subjects? The description of the case Colyer's son-in-law Daniel-Jan de Hochepped has left us, provides us with a possible answer:

About which [treatment] your honours' said ambassador [Colyer] complained to the grand vizier, but never received satisfaction. But the grand vizier did send him answer that he had not known the said De Broses to have been his Excellency's secretary (although it is certain the vizier knew him full well), adding that he could not have imagined a secretary of an ambassador having a long beard and going about dressed a la turca [in the Turkish fashion], as the said De Broses used to do, and even less that he could speak the Turkish language, in which he was proficient, and what's more, that he would come and plea his own case in the full divan, that such was the responsibility of the dragomans, for it has to be noted that even though your honours' ambassador's chief dragoman Theyls had accompanied him, he insisted on defending his own cause against all practice customary there, which was rightly thought to have been the reason that this misfortune befell him, to which the baughty humour of the vizier then in power [Kara Mustafa Paşa], who had long before contemplated the means with which he could taunt and abuse the European nations, will have contributed to no small extent.³⁶⁵

Apparently, Kara Mustafa had found De Broses' "Turkish manners" presumptuous and decided to teach him a lesson *a la turca*. We know from his correspondence on the matter, that Colyer for one agreed. Although it meant the end of his faithful right-hand man, he blamed the event entirely on him and took no further action.³⁶⁶

The last significant run-in the Dutch had with Kara Mustafa Paşa, concerned their capitulation. Although the first Dutch capitulation (of 1612) had been confirmed in 1634, it had never been expanded, because the States General and the Board of Directors of Levant Trade balked at the prohibitive costs involved in such a project. Instead of regularly seeking to have additional privileges inserted in new capitulations at huge costs and with relatively little effect, as the other capitulatory powers were in the habit of doing, the Dutch practice had always been to depend on *fermans* confirming and specifying the articles of theirs. This policy of constantly renegotiating the application of the capitulation on the basis of individual cases and in response to specific needs, had proven to be relatively inexpensive and effective, but had left them with an outdated document and a large number of *fermans* to safeguard its validity and relevance.

sending a value of above 4,000 *akçes* (equivalent to 33,33 Lion Dollars) heard in the imperial *dinan* and then only upon the condition that a European dragoman was present (İnalçik, "İmtiyâzât", 1180b-81a). On the jurisdictions of consular and *kadi*-courts (*mahkemes*) and on their actual functioning in day-to-day practice, see Gerber, *State, Society*; and the case studies in Boogert, "Ottoman Dragomans", 91-174.

³⁶⁵ The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 80a-b.

³⁶⁶ François, or Francesco, de Broses had been secretary to the Dutch embassy since 1664, vice-chancellor since 1665, provisional resident from 1665 to 1668, and secretary again since 1669, and simultaneously treasurer since 1675: Schutte, *Repertorium*, 307.

Then, on 16 August 1680, while hearing a dispute between the Dutch nation of Istanbul and chief customs collector Hüseyin Ağa (I), grand vizier Kara Mustafa Paşa decided he would have no more of this ancient bundle of paper with its “scraped out letters” and confiscated the Dutch capitulation.³⁶⁷ With the capitulation held hostage by the grand vizier, who showed no intention whatsoever of returning it, Colyer was left no other choice then to apply for renewal. He dreaded the States General’s reaction and minutely described all his dealings with the grand vizier to convince them he had acquitted himself of his duties and had opposed as long as possible the forced renewal; in this, he naturally made much of Kara Mustafa’s intransigence. The States General decided in favour of renewal on the condition that the new capitulation should contain various clarifications with regard to articles (of the capitulation of 1612) which had given rise to disputes over the years. After extensive negotiations between Colyer and Kara Mustafa, it was decided that the Dutch were to receive their new capitulation upon payment of the enormous sum of 33,072 Lion Dollars. The new Dutch capitulation was eventually handed over 7 November 1680; it contained some minor additions to the articles concerning ambassadorial and consular duties, the shipping of goods for Muslim merchants, and the conversion of Dutch subjects to Islam.³⁶⁸

Anyone investigating the European presence in Izmir during the grand vizierates of Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed Paşa and Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa, cannot but be puzzled by the seemingly contradicting references to the latter. Kara Mustafa Paşa has gone down in history as a blinded and ruthless xenophobe; yet, his dislike of foreigners did not keep him from having a large residence constructed for himself right next to the English consulate on the main street of Izmir’s bustling European quarter during the first years of his grand vizierate.³⁶⁹ He is credited with little understanding of the empire’s

³⁶⁷ The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 81a: “... replied that our capitulation was very antiquated and that it contained several scraped out letters”.

³⁶⁸ On the taking hostage of the capitulation and the subsequent negotiations for renewal, see *ibid.*, 80b-86a. On the handing over of the new capitulation and the apportionment of the costs of renewal, see The Hague, NA 1.02.22 676, 255b-256b: Justinus Colyer and Dutch Nation of Istanbul to Jacob van Dam and Dutch Nation of Izmir, 21 November 1680. The text of the articles of this new capitulation was almost identical to that of 1612; the above-mentioned additions were made to articles 13, 47, 48 and 49.

³⁶⁹ In the legend to his panorama of Izmir, Cornelis de Bruyn noted that the house he had drawn standing smack in the middle of Frank Street, between the Venetian and English consulates, was “the house of the vizier Cara Mustafa Pasha, which is the largest and most stately of Frank Street”: De Bruyn, *Reizen*, 24. This residence is not mentioned in the list of “les maisons du pacha” in the memoir appended to Galland, *Journal* (ii: 203), which does include those in Istanbul, Edirne, Lârisa, Merzifon, and Galatasaray (Pera). Since this memoir was prepared between March 1675 and October 1676 (Heywood, “Karā Mustafa Pasha”, 589b), and since Kara Mustafa – as we have seen above – spent most of his time between 1670-1676

foreign trade and how to administer it; yet, he completed with his own funds his predecessors large-scale construction effort to facilitate that trade and was closely involved with its administration through his association with customs collector Hüseyin Ağa. His interest in the empire's foreign trade is said to have gone no further than regarding it as supplier of ready cash for his own needs; yet, his administration's handling of international mercantile and political affairs seems rather to betray efforts to impose a consistent and effective set of rules to come to grips with the elusive flow of European trade through Izmir and the assertiveness of its European partners.

The same kind of contradictions are prevalent in the correspondences of the European envoys in Istanbul and in the broader literature dealing with his politics in general or his person in particular – although one has to look for them very carefully between a mass of unanimous condemnations. As Colin Heywood cautiously suggests in his article on Kara Mustafa in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, the history of his rule, and by extension perhaps also his personal character, are susceptible to divergent interpretations.³⁷⁰ The central question here is whether we should regard him as a grand vizier who managed to destroy in a mere seven years (1676-1683) a legacy it had taken Mehmed and Fazıl Ahmed Köprülü twenty years (1656-1676) to build, or as a faithful executor of Köprülü policy doing his utmost to conserve and consolidate that legacy of overextension and overdependence on unstable alliances against the odds.

If we discard for a moment the judgments of his contemporaries and look at the bare facts, they overwhelmingly point in that latter direction: as an adoptive son of Mehmed Köprülü, educated alongside Fazıl Ahmed Köprülü, rising to power through the protection of his adopted father as well as his adopted brother, and successfully serving under both of them, he should certainly be considered a Köprülü grand vizier by pedigree. As for his administration: its make-up shows considerable continuity with that of Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, to a large extent relying on the same men and political households (see Table 15). Related to this are his foreign policies: both his efforts to stabilise the empire's northern frontier, and those to enhance the administration's control over the international trade of the empire, were a direct consequence and continuation of Köprülü policy. Even his treatment of the European envoys to his government was not all that different from his predecessors, in fact only changing slightly in response to pressing issues and specific circumstances. In discussing someone as notorious as Kara Mustafa Paşa, we should mistrust the judgments and accounts of his

in Edirne and on campaign in the Balkans, he most probably had the Izmir residence constructed between his assumption of the grand vizierate in July/November 1676 and De Bruyn's arrival in July 1678; perhaps to oversee the progress of the construction program he was now funding in Izmir.

³⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 591a-b.

European contemporaries, particularly where his reputation as a destroyer of capitulatory rights is concerned.

Previously, we have discussed Mehmed Köprülü's stabilization of the capital and the central lands, and its continuation as a policy of stabilization and incorporation of the periphery by his son Fazıl Ahmed. In the course of his education in the Köprülü-household, and as he climbed through the ranks of palace and government administration, Kara Mustafa must have been imbued with the Köprülü view of the world, of the Ottomans' place in it, of their own place within the empire, and of the policies which ambition, experience and prudence suggested would best serve to reinvigorate and sustain that view. He also inherited and continued (see further below) the Köprülü political household and its wider network, as he did the policy implications with which it grappled and the manner in which it did so. Figuring prominently among these were the Köprülü's strategically placed clients in the hierarchies making up the various components of Izmir's administration, and the policies and controls they were to exert over Izmir's international trade and diplomatic relations. After decades of Ottoman *laissez-faire* the Köprülü had proven very attentive to the fact that Izmir was a place that could both mirror and propell Istanbul's relations with Europe on a daily basis and a practical level. They had in fact recognized that it was not only a place where a lot of money could be collected, but that what went on in Izmir formed an integral part of the looming balance of power with Europe.

Having inherited both the purpose and the apparatus that would allow the Ottomans (and the Köprülü) to keep their footing in that balance, it fell to Kara Mustafa to put them to use and enforce and strengthen military, diplomatic and commercial boundaries and prerogatives with all the means at his disposal. Anything other than that would have meant carelessly doing away with the immense investments his predecessors had made to set up political, administrative and urban structures that would sustain their long-term goals.

How Kara Mustafa handled the first dimension of relations with Europe, the military one, is relatively straightforward: with great success, until the Vienna-debacle. His handling of the second, diplomatic, dimension has taken up most of this preceding section: we have seen how, in this arena, his reputation suffered heavily from a series of steps and measures that, taken collectively, may be viewed as a policy that reaffirmed the unilateral character of Ottoman relations with Europe and the pertinence of Ottoman laws and customs in this arena. Commandeering vessels, restoring disused tributes, and countering the creeping fiscal alienation of wealthy minority subjects; severely punishing smuggling, the illegal export of mixed inheritances, the harboring of fugitive slaves, and illegal selling by diplomats; guarding proper hierarchy and form when challenged by demanding strict adherence to diplomatic protocol (*viz.* the disputed audiences, Colyer's diplomatic status,

De Brosse's punishment, the sequestration of the 60-odd years old Dutch capitulations), and so on and on – these all meant to convey to the empire's European relations that they were in no position to forestall the progression of Köprülü policy or even mitigate its consequences in any way. The diplomatic correspondence of the time makes it abundantly clear that the message was indeed received, which in turn greatly assisted Kara Mustafa in his efforts to bring Izmir back into the fold.

The question as to what shape Kara Mustafa's (re)assertion of Ottoman controls in this third, commercial, dimension of Ottoman-European relations took through the purposefully endowed Köprülü *vakef* will be discussed throughout the remainder of this text. But first we should consider what the Köprülü's successful decades-long Ottoman reassertion vis-à-vis Europe and the making of an Ottoman-European balance of power mean for our various paradigms of Ottoman historical development, the world-systems paradigm in particular.

The Explanatory Value of the World-systems Approach

Most observers have sought an explanation for Izmir's relatively benign atmosphere in administrative neglect. Overlooking arguments of political centrality, economic dependence, and socio-historical or political predisposition (such as suggested in the previous few pages), they have argued that the power (and, hence, freedom) foreigners enjoyed in Izmir was one wrested by them from a weakened Ottoman administration during a century of revolt and decentralization (1550-1650). It is argued that while Izmir's highest official was a mere *kadi*, and not even a high-ranking one at that, Aleppo was the seat of a full-fledged governor-general (*beylerbeyi*) of high military rank (*paşa*) and a high-ranking *kadi*. Consequently, Izmir's European merchants could simply circumvent or overpower local Ottoman administration, while their counterparts in Aleppo were kept in check by the full force of *paşa* and *kadi*. From this – the administration of Izmir by lower-ranking officials – it is concluded that Istanbul must have been unaware of the importance of the economic developments taking place in western Asia Minor – and that, even if and when it became aware, it proved incapable to do much about the irreversible European undermining of the Ottoman economic system taking place there.³⁷¹

³⁷¹ See Daniel Goffman's highly influential work on Izmir in the bibliography. Esp. Goffman, *Izmir and the Levantine World*, 141-42: "Whatever economic and social permutations Izmir and western Anatolia underwent in successive centuries, however great the rise in the volume of trade during the Age of Enlightenment, however profoundly Europeans influenced western-Anatolian society during the Age of Imperialism, the transformation that determined the region as their hub occurred when the settlement developed from a regional port into an international entrepôt at the beginning of the seventeenth century. More can be asserted. Although the ethnicity of its directors varied and its direction fluctuated in the eighteenth and

Frankly, the line of reasoning sketched above is typical of attempts to fill in the Western Anatolian, Ottoman, or Middle Eastern details for a much wider theory – a theory which has developed into the paradigm of developmental modernity *par excellence*; that of Immanuel Wallerstein’s “modern world-system”. Looking back from the 19th-century situation, it argues that an expanding Europe-centered economic world-system absorbed and internally reorganized for its own advantage a number of previously alternative world-systems (American, Chinese, Ottoman) at an increasing rate and intensity from the Middle Ages onwards, and thus defined as well as motivated the evolution to the single Western-based world economy of our modern globalized age. In the language of the paradigm, the process of absorption and reorganization of previously alternative world-systems is designated as their “semi-peripheralization” (that is, into assembly points for raw materials from their own peripheries, providers of menial labor, and consumers of the center’s manufactured goods), their own semi-peripheries being converted into peripheries of the new system.

The presence of increasing numbers of European merchants, combined with the growing volume of their – to a significant degree, contraband – trade and the uninhibited lifestyles they were able to cultivate, then, must signal that Europe’s 17th-century descent on that town was none other than the beginning of a relentless European drive towards economic (in the Arab provinces), political and cultural mastery over the Ottoman Empire, as fully realized in the second half of the 19th century. In a similar feat of history read backwards, the Ottomans’ ultimate failure to stop the peripheralization of their empire must signify that they were never up to the task in the first place: they were not able to formulate a commercial policy to successfully counter or mitigate the consequences of a European penetration that was not to manifest itself fully for a good two centuries: they merely managed conservative reflexes to the superficial manifestations of this deeper longer-term economic reality.

Obviously there are many objections to be raised against such a model-driven application of world-systems-theory, principally that it tends to misread or gloss over effective Ottoman responses as ultimately unsuccessful responses to the tide of history and therefore essentially repressive, which feeds into broader Orientalist prejudices. As a matter of fact, in our discussion of the status of Izmir’s European quarter, of its relations with its Ottoman context, and of the role of Ottoman society and administration in shaping them, the main problem seems to be this particular application’s indebt-

nineteenth centuries, the outlines of a western-inspired, and initially at least western-controlled, commercial network emerged quickly after 1600 and, with it, the demographic, economic, and social alterations associated with such penetration.”

edness to another, cultural, paradigm; that of Orientalism (Edward Said's version at least).³⁷²

Any elaboration or application of the proposition that the Ottoman Empire and its economy were completely overwhelmed by European mercantilism and forever failed to formulate an adequate response to its challenges should preferably be based on analysis of economic data (but always in conjunction with data from other fields!). However, if, as is the case for 16th and 17th-century Izmir, such data is sketchy at best, there should be no objection to relying more fully on other types of data (social, political, legal, or even archaeological, architectural, etc.) for indications of corresponding economic realities. (Incidentally, the relatively abundant evidence for the 18th century does already dispel any illusions about Ottoman merchants and their government not managing a solid response by at least that time.³⁷³) After all, history-writing is much like assembling an incomplete jigsaw puzzle – and is the historian's filling in the missing pieces not vastly preferable to his forgoing the effort altogether? As Wallerstein himself has said:

*World-systems analysts insist that rather than reduce complex situations to simpler variables, the effort should be to complexify and contextualize all so-called simpler variables in order to understand real social situations. World-systems analysts are not against quantification per se (they would quantify what can usefully be quantified), but (as the old joke about the drunk teaches us) they feel that one should not look for the lost key only under the street lamp just because the light is better (where there are more quantifiable data). One searches for the most appropriate data in function of the intellectual problem; one doesn't choose the problem because hard, quantitative data are available.*³⁷⁴

But how carefully we should tread! The more pieces are missing, the greater the danger that a preconceived *idea* of the findings gets the better of the scarce pieces at hand. One can easily imagine how 17th-century Izmir, with its lack of pertinent sources *and* its high potential relevance for world-systems-theory as the floodgate Europe supposedly pried open to gain full access to the Ottoman world-system, might be a bit too tempting.

The principal problem with world-systems-theory as it has been applied to study the variables of the complex equation it attempts to formulate is that the theory's core evolutionary argument is considered established and unassailable. Research into specific centers, semi-peripheries and peripheries oftentimes seems often to want to rewrite the subjects' history as part of the

³⁷² See Edward W. Said, *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient* (London: Penguin Books, 1995).

³⁷³ See Kadi, "Natives and Interlopers".

³⁷⁴ Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis*, 19.

elegant grand model and to fine-tune it, rather than earnestly to falsify it.³⁷⁵ In Middle Eastern studies the world-systems approach has now been dominant for at least two decades. It has in effect become the single most dominant paradigm in the field, even strongly informing/determining the work of non-economic historians. This is why all modern studies on Izmir seem to start from the following inverse chain of assumptions:

Firstly, that by the 19th century the Ottoman world-system had become semi-peripheralized through European mercantilist and capitalist penetration. Secondly, that shifts from Ottoman-controlled trade in luxury goods to European-controlled trade in bulky goods are sound indicators of this European economic penetration. Thirdly, that the boom occurring in 17th-century Izmir is the earliest manifestation of this process. And fourthly, that the Ottomans woke up to this reality too late to be able to counter the trend through administrative and economic adjustments.

Although Wallerstein's theory is neo-Marxian in origin, an indebtedness to Turner's frontier thesis – in a way its ideological opposite – may be discerned. It relates of a less developed (or, "primitive") landscape, society and economy opened up by energetic Westerners of enterprising spirit and cultivated for their own profit. In the process these Westerners not only transformed that "other" landscape, society and economy, but also Western society and economy itself with modernity as the end result. The Western Anatolian coastal area, and Izmir in particular, then, figure as an Ottoman version of the Wild West, and the role of the "native" Ottoman context is limited to being an passive and ineffectual object of Western penetration, at most responsible for the occasional burdensome delay to a linearly progressing modernity. This is overstating the case, but describing it in this vein does show how naturally Orientalist notions (as critiqued by Said in 1978) and the related paradigm of (uninterrupted) Ottoman decline could get a second lease on life through this more refined paradigm of economic modernization.³⁷⁶

³⁷⁵ Cf. Huri İslamoğlu-İnan, *The Ottoman Empire and the World-Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978; 2004), 24, where it is stressed that "The world-systems perspective also stresses the 'historicity' of regions prior to their confrontation with the European world economy. That is, it seeks to delineate their internal dynamic. In doing so, it differs from the Orientalist and modernizationist approaches in the choice of unit of analysis. Instead of the cultural unit of the Islamic civilization, İslamoğlu and Keyder and Wallerstein, Decdeli and Kasaba take as their object of study the social system of the 'redistributive world empire' defined in terms of its internal division of labour or its mode of integration. Hence, in contrast to 'cellular' conceptions of the Ottoman social structure in which discrete parts reproduce their own stagnation, the Ottoman world-empire describes an integrated whole." (8-9).

³⁷⁶ See John M. Hobson, *The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 1-26 and throughout on the relation between Orientalism, Marxism, world systems theory, and their shared assumptions and fallacies. On world-systems analysis, he adds (in his conclusion): "This is not the place to rehearse all the arguments made against

We should hasten to add that this is not entirely to Wallerstein's discredit. His *The Modern World-system*³⁷⁷ is extremely well-researched and very much concerned with varying modes, velocities and directions of development.³⁷⁸ Nonetheless, along the road from (experimental and falsifiable) theory to (received and indubitable) paradigm much of Wallerstein's detailed variance and qualified uncertainty has been lost. Just as happened with Marxian theory, the result has been world-systems-theory *light*, heavy on form and light on substance.

The already noted scarcity of strictly economic data on 17th-century Izmir, the subject's high relevance for world-systems analysis and the abrasive effect of that approach's wide acceptance have resulted in much intuitive reasoning. Looking for early warning signs of the region's peripheralization, research has started from the three available 16th-century *tabrirs* for Izmir (of 1522/23, 1528/29 and 1575/76), which indeed suggest a shift from regional to international production and commerce. This relative wealth of Ottoman economic data is followed by a long silence – not even broken by the 1693/94-*tabrir* (which is highly unreliable due to changes in taxation-units and the 1688-earthquake) or the partial *defters* from the Maliye'den müdevver (which are miscellaneous and offer totals instead of much-needed breakdowns). Only with the appearance of Ottoman yearbooks (*salnames*) from 1847/48 does the kind of Ottoman statistical data needed become available again. By that time the Ottoman economy was fast losing what remained of its independence: from 1850 foreign capital became widely available, by 1875 the empire reneged on its international debt-payments, and in 1881 a foreign (predominantly French-English-German) Ottoman Public Debt Administration took control of large sections of the economy to settle the debts.

The three-century-gap between *tabrirs* and *salnames* is commonly filled with economic data from European sources instead of with truly circumstantial evidence from local non-economic sectors. These sources – correspondences, shipping manifests, account books and the like – offer fine samples of

Immanuel Wallerstein's world-systems theory. The basic point to note here is that it is important to resist the functionalist logic of a global-structural approach." (307).

³⁷⁷ Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Academic Press, 1974); *id.*, *The Modern World-System*, vol. 2: *Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600-1750* (New York: Academic Press, 1980); *id.*, *The Modern World-System*, vol. 3: *The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy, 1730-1840s* (San Diego: Academic Press, 1989); *id.*, *The Modern World-System*, vol. 4: *Centrist Liberalism Triumphant, 1789-1914* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011).

³⁷⁸ "World-systems analysts began to be skeptical about the inevitability of progress. They saw progress as a possibility rather than a certainty. They wondered whether one could even describe the construction of a capitalist world-economy as progress?": Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis*, 18.

early modern business practice, accounting and, not to forget, attitudes, but reveal little on the workings of the economy of the city of Izmir, its region, or the empire of which it was part. It matters little how much European trade narratives and figures are at our disposal; all they can really tell us is that at regular intervals a great many goods went into Izmir and a great many others came out again. Fluctuations in how many goods went in or out, in what goods went in or out and through whose agency they went in or out can of course reveal things about the economy in question, but does it lift the curtain pulled down over the inner workings of the city by the repeated loss of local Ottoman archives? The answer to this question must be “no”.

Studying the Ottoman economy through European sources may reveal a declining Ottoman balance of trade and growing European influence within the Ottoman economy and the empire as a whole – but we should beware that it also completely obscures Ottoman agency.³⁷⁹ How convenient that three centuries of Ottoman economic and (conductive) administrative adjustment are not to be bothered with! Without taking it into account, a straight line can be drawn from 16th-century European penetration to late 19th-century European penetration as if these were manifestations of one and the same process – a perfect illustration of the West’s historical hegemony and a fine playground for world-systems enthusiasts trying to substantiate its inevitability. One could say that, here, shortage of Ottoman data has been relieved by Orientalism, cultural bias providing what evidence could not.

Following the logic of the Orientalist interpretation of world-systems analysis, the “fact” of the West’s uninterrupted and centuries-long rise to hegemony in the East feeds the assumption that Ottoman civilization was blind and/or powerless in face of the European onslaught: being reconstructed as the passive object of Western self-realization, such a civilization’s manifestations and exertions (be they cultural, military, legal, economic, administrative, etc.) are easily, if perhaps unwittingly, regarded first and foremost as impediments to the progression of Western history.³⁸⁰ This tendency towards historical polarization and partiality (“othering”) goes a long way in explaining the seductiveness of the interpretation that European power pried open Izmir in the late sixteenth century and from there proceeded to overwhelm the entire Ottoman economy while the Ottomans stood by power-

³⁷⁹ Compare Blair B. Kling and M. N. Pearson, *The Age of Partnership: Europeans in Asia before Dominion* (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1979).

³⁸⁰ Cf. İslamoğlu-İnan, *Ottoman Empire*, 18: what remains of Ottoman agency in the world systems approach is a “‘resistance space’ that the absence of direct colonization allowed the Ottoman central bureaucracy”. In this respect, incidentally, the very title of Goffman’s contribution to the oft-praised volume of world-systems analysis on Istanbul, Izmir, and Aleppo (Goffman, “Izmir: from Village to Colonial Port City”) illustrates what is so problematic about Goffman’s work on Izmir; namely that, starting in the early sixteenth century, it reasons towards a (non-existent) 19th-century colonial situation.

lessly. The problem with this theory is that it has ignored too many challenges.

Never has it been adequately explained why the peripheralization of the Ottoman world-system would have taken well over three centuries if the territory's administration presumably was so weak and out of touch with early modern realities. And this goes for Izmir and its so-called "weak" administration even more. Should it not have given-in completely long before the 1870s, even with western prop-ups (because of the looming Eastern Question)? Nor has anyone ever successfully accounted for the favorable Ottoman balance of trade with Europe. The Ottomans' making more from exports to Europe than the other way around (a situation that in all likelihood continued into the 19th century), does not exactly signal overwhelming European dominance. Surely, if Europe was that more powerful than the Ottoman Empire, it would have decisively penetrated Ottoman markets to dump its industrial output there? Moving on from the economic to the political and social spheres, how is it to be explained that the Ottomans managed to unilaterally dictate terms of trade to Europe through the capitulations during the 17th and 18th (and, to a lesser degree, even the 19th) centuries if it was simultaneously being overpowered by it? Finally, why was the social standing and power of European merchant communities resident in the Ottoman Empire so incongruous with their supposed economic power? Is this not a useful social reality to take note of in the absence of sound economic data? Furthermore, it is one thing for Armenians, Greeks and Jews (here cast as *compradors*³⁸¹) to have low social standing, but to see the subjects of foreign states beg and grovel before Ottoman officials should make one wonder about the true weight and meaning of their power.

Clearly, any theory that starts from the grand narrative of European dominance – with Orientalism providing the negative and with Hobson's "Eurocentric myths of the West" providing the positive, is not equipped to really deal with these problems – or, more generally, to deal with Ottoman history on its own terms.³⁸² It can only ignore them as long as nobody bothers to confront them for fear of moving beyond accepted academic discourse. And

³⁸¹ On "fringe westernization" and *compradors* in general, see, e.g., Philip D. Curtin, *Cross-Cultural Trade in World History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 247-51. Kadi, "Natives and Interlopers", 1-17 provides a good overview of the *comprador* question in Ottoman historiography, and – through the remainder of this doctoral dissertation – demonstrates its uselessness in that field. Accordingly, in the previous pages we have suggested that the Ottoman intermediaries employed by the European nations in 17th-century Izmir in many respects operated rather as their patrons than as their clients.

³⁸² Hobson, *Eastern Origins*, 283-93. These myths are those of "the centralized and rational Western state, 1500-1900", "the liberal minimalist Western state, 1500-1900", and "the democratic Western state., 1500-1900".

as it is, accepted Western academic discourse concerning the progression of Ottoman history to a large degree is world-systems-theory.

Nevertheless, I would venture to continue on the basic assumption that the balance of power between early modern Europe and the early modern Ottoman Empire was indeed very much a balance. That there existed a delicate equilibrium during most of the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries within which two separate systems – with their own distinct histories, realities, attitudes and policies – continuously and meticulously wrestled each other for influence in all spheres. And that in the end, *but only in the end* (say from 1850), it became most probable that the West would beat the rest. Just as one would expect to see European economic dominance refracted, resisted and transformed in local social, political and administrative realities (with a truly dynamic interplay between world, center and peripheral developments as the result), the development of such an economic balance will have left traces in local society, politics and administration.³⁸³ Next, we will see what traces of Ottoman agency and policy may be found in late-17th-century Izmir.

Developments in the Status of an Alien Quarter

If we continue from the position that the Ottoman Empire was not only an *économie-monde*, but also a civilization, it follows naturally that that realm, economy and civilization operated according to an inner logic that was not strangely deviant from European modes, but rather alternative, and autonomous though overlapping, competitive though cooperating. This may sound abstract, but it is a proposition that has very real consequences for the study of such a civilization. For our infinitely smaller case, that of the significance of Izmir's administrative status, it opens up the possibility that Izmir's low administrative priority and Istanbul's unwillingness to heighten it are not necessarily evidence for the Ottomans' poor understanding of the systemic changes that were occurring in Western Asia Minor. Perhaps interpretations to that effect would have made sense for the Ottoman classical period (1300-1600, or 1453-1566³⁸⁴), or for the modern period of recentralization (roughly from the 1839-proclamation of the *Hatt-ı Şerif* of Gülhane), but it is not very helpful for the early modern period.³⁸⁵

³⁸³ Cf. Edhem Eldem, "Istanbul: From Imperial to Peripheralized Capital", in: *Ottoman City*, 138-39, incl. n13.

³⁸⁴ The first being the commonly used long classical age, from Ottoman beginnings shrouded in legend to the reign of Ahmed I and the Treaty of Zsitvatorok (1606); the second being the shorter (and in my view more apt), from the taking of Constantinople to the death of Süleyman I (the Great/the Lawgiver/the Magnificent).

³⁸⁵ Virgiana Aksan has succinctly made this argument concerning the telescopic danger of analyzing the early modern empire on the basis of paradigms, or even of an understanding of the Ottoman polity that rests on expertise in earlier or later periods: "Decline theorists argue that the Ottomans lost control over their internal resources, manpower as well as taxation systems, as early as 1600, and never recovered it. The empire struggled on for three

In the late classical period the internal unity of the Ottoman system was such that changes in a region's or town's economic importance would have generally predictable consequences for its political importance and its administrative status. Changes in economic importance and value would be gauged through recurring tax surveys (*tabrirs*), with swift consequences for the apportionment of fiefs (*timars* and *ze'amets*) and the calculated value of lands, services and commodities and, hence, for taxation. In general, rising economic value meant rising administrative status, military fiefs being upgraded and reserved for higher officers, judgeships and governorships being promoted and awarded to higher officials, and provincial budgets and fiscal targets being increased. Furthermore, through the *tabrir* and *ibtisab*-systems unwanted economic developments, such as changes in a region's output to satisfy foreign demand, could be signaled and countered effectively. In the modern period the keeping of more or less uniform budgets and the publishing of *salnames* ensured administrative and political awareness of changes in regions' economies.³⁸⁶

In the early modern 17th and 18th centuries, however, the classical Ottoman correlation between economic and political importance and military and administrative status had ceased to exist. By the end of the 16th century it had become undeniable that the semi-feudal *timar*-system through which most Ottoman lands were administered was breaking down under the pressures of the time. Most of these pressures on the *timar*-system were exerted by changes in military organization, of which the system had always been the cornerstone.

The most direct pressures on the classical system were ongoing revolts within the empire (particularly in the Anatolian heartland³⁸⁷) and unrelenting competition with the Habsburg, Safavid and Muscovian empires without. The standoff on three fronts, combined with the deflection of Ottoman forces away from them to combat internal unrest, limited opportunities for conquest and, hence, for the allotment of new cavalry fiefs (*timars*). This in turn caused new revolts and fed into ongoing ones. The conflicts at home and abroad also accelerated an increase in the use of irregulars (instead of semi-feudal cavalry, or *sipahi*), as well as the need to maintain a growing army

hundred more years, motionless and unchanging. Whatever the validity of these assertions, they generally lacked hard evidence, such as an elemental understanding of the budgets of the empire after 1650, or of the profound reordering of the agrarian tax systems that was underway, or of the relation between the military and society, and what the collapse of the military meant to the entire imperial project. ... Ottomanist debates, prompted by those in Europe around the global crisis of the seventeenth century, inaugurated a discussion about the incorporation of the Ottomans into the world economy, which initially tended to focus on challenging the Asiatic mode of production." (Aksan, "Theoretical Ottomans", 113, my italics).

³⁸⁶ See K. Kreiser, "Sāl-nāme", *EI2*, viii: 898b-99a.

³⁸⁷ See W.J. Griswold, "Jalāl", *EI2*, 0: 238b-40a.

of Janissaries and garrisons to secure Ottoman lands and fortify three active frontiers all year round.

This combination of military-strategic necessities decisively limited the relevance of the *timar*-system and the *sipahis* it provided for: the number of available fiefs could no longer support the numbers of new soldiers needed; firearm production and training increased at the cost of traditional cavalry weapons and tactics; more and more infantry was raised to take the place of cavalry that, after all, could not be kept from its semi-feudal administrative obligations at home all year each year. All this meant that the mainstay of the army could no longer be kept up through fiefs and the exaction of taxes and services from tenants. Instead of services, the new army that was evolving needed more and more cash for pay, training and firearms.³⁸⁸ Mainly because of this historical dynamic the Ottoman economy transformed from one primarily organized around the exaction of services (service economy) to one primarily organized around the exaction and payment of cash money (monetary economy).

For the Ottomanist's practice, one of the most important consequences of this economic transformation is the diminishing importance and frequency of tax surveys (*tabrirs*). The primary aim of the *timar*-system had been to support a hierarchically ordered military caste (the men of the sword, or *seyfiyye*) that could be called upon in wartime to join campaigns with groups of retainers and to govern the land in peacetime. Thus, there had existed a firm link between the military, administrative, political and economic domains of the Ottoman polity. Now, the slow but certain demise of the *timar*-system was tearing heavily at this link. As Ottoman government sought new ways to root new military realities in wider Ottoman administration, the old link, though not severed completely, was transformed deeply.

With the direct tie between military service and administration of the lands increasingly ruptured through the reconfiguration from service to

³⁸⁸ In his outstanding work *Ottoman Warfare, 1500-1700* (London: UCL Press, 1999) Rhoads Murphey meticulously identifies and weighs the practical limitations, opportunities and relative strengths of the Ottoman military machine as it confronted these challenges – implicitly critiquing many such blanket statements as are commonly made about this process of fiscal-military adaptation. In the process he arrives at some interesting conclusions concerning the social and fiscal background and impact of the Ottoman military complex, among others that it was relatively light, always kept significant reserves, moved about active troops prodigiously to save those reserves, and that recruitment targets for *sipahi*-cavalry, Janissary troops, garrison troops and irregulars were not set too far in advance as part of a policy to substitute one for the other, but frequently, as fiscal and military-strategic need required. Specifically see chapters one, two and three (“General political framework: the evolving context”, 1-11; “Material constraints on Ottoman warfare: the immutable context”, 13-34; “Military manpower and military spending: an attempt at realistic assessment”, 35-63), and chapter nine (“Conclusion – war and social transformation in the Ottoman empire”, 185-92).

monetary economy, the tasks of the military governors in the provinces were in large part reassigned to commissioners and private tax collectors. Local and provincial taxes originally levied for provincial treasuries (market dues, cattle dues, tolls, etc.) and taxes traditionally levied for the central treasury (*cişme* and various *avarız*-taxes) alike were more and more often collected by tax farmers (*mukata'ar*s and *mültezim*s³⁸⁹) who had acquired their right to collect at (annual or biannual) auctions. In this manner, amounts of collectable taxes, estimated through continuous monitoring by expressly appointed commissioners (*emins*) and local *kadis*, flowed straight into the coffers of the central administration, which could then decide more freely where it was to be spent – though most of it inevitably went towards military conscription, training, equipment and pay – instead of being automatically assigned to a caste of military governors (and their dependents) on which military success depended less and less.

The increasing use of tax farmers entailed the privatization of administrative tasks that had previously been the state's exclusively. This had a profound impact on administrative practice. Not because it eroded the tax base, for taxes were remitted, be it in advance of collection. Nor because tax farmers could and would play the system to lower the apparent value of their farm ahead of the next auction (“to beat down a farm”, in contemporary European parlance). Rather, the impact lay in the implications tax farming had for hierarchy. Where previously there had been *bey*s and *kadis*, sent out from the imperial center and each with their own taxes to administer and remit, there now also existed a host of contracted collectors, often with strong local ties, some of whom might still have been answerable in theory to the *bey*s and *kadis* (in security and legal issues respectively), but whose power could be so entrenched as to place them at considerable distance from these officials' reach. The overriding importance placed on tax collection meant that the classical maxim of balancing a given town, city or region's military-administrative and legal-administrative authority (again, the *bey*'s and *kadi*'s respectively) to limit opportunities for abuse, was subordinated to the acutely important rationale of fiscal maximization. If a locality's circumstances permitted it or called for it, it became very conceivable that a *kadi*'s jurisdiction and power far outweighed a *bey*'s, or – if an area carried special fiscal importance – that both be eclipsed by those of its main tax farmer. Increasingly, whatever setup generated the most income without causing too much unrest seems to have been preferred to classical form, fiscal efficiency winning out from hierarchical authority.

Most of the changes and shifts in administration that later occurred throughout the empire originated in crown lands (*bavass-ı hümayun*). The

³⁸⁹ See F. Müge Göçek, “Mültezim”, *EI2*, vii: 551a-b; and , H. Gerber, “Mukāta'a”, *EI2*, vii: 508b-9a.

sultan could dispose of such lands with relative freedom from interference by classes and groups, who on other (*miri*/state, *mülke*/freehold or *vakıf*/endowed) lands would have rightfully demanded specific regimes and claimed certain entitlements with regard to their uses and revenues.³⁹⁰ Thus, imperial *hass* lands could function as a kind of testing ground for new administrative practices and governing strategies that bypassed existing state structures to experiment with tax farming and, more generally, with government through commissioners (*emins*). In this system, the role of feudal administrators like the *sancak beyi* was limited to purely military tasks like the upkeep and manning of defenses. Although clearly advantageous to court, such government necessarily lacked some of the legitimacy of the classical system; it was, after all, despotic in essence.

Not only did the experimental attractiveness of the *hass* result in the extension of its administrative practices to *miri*-lands, the system was also extended more directly by converting more and more lands to *hass* proper.³⁹¹ Whereas the classical Ottoman state had reserved *hass* status primarily for royal hunting grounds, state monopolies and undercultivated stretches of farmlands suitable for cash cropping, the 17th century witnessed the conversion of more and more lands that had (potentially) high fiscal yields but that did not necessarily fit those earlier categories. This was advantageous for the specific reason that it gave the court more direct access to fiscal yields. But there was also the added general advantage that *hass* administration bypassed the *miri* regime, giving the court much tighter administrative control over the lands involved than could ever be achieved otherwise.

³⁹⁰ See, e.g., the careful discussion on Ottoman land regimes in Kadi, “Natives and Interlopers”, 12-24.

³⁹¹ “The *khavāṣṣ-i humāyūn* and the *khāṣṣ* lands of high officials and administrators formed an important part of the revenues of every province; ..., they formed 277,244,782 akçes, 51% of the total revenue; the other *khāṣṣ* lands and *timārs* comprised 200,186,394 akçes, 37% of the total revenue”; “The value and extent of *khāṣṣ* lands would vary according to the productivity of the provinces and *sandjaks*. Although the most productive lands were already included in the *khāṣṣ* estates at the beginning of the 10th/16th century, their boundaries and the revenue accruing from them tended to increase by a considerable amount”; “As a result of this decrease in agricultural income, the *khāṣṣ* lands of viziers, *beglerbegs* and *sandjak begs* began to be transferred to the *khāṣṣ-i humāyūn*”; “From the 10th/16th century onwards, the term *khavāṣṣ-i humāyūn* started to be used as equivalent to that of *miri mukāṭa’a*. The officials supervising the *khāṣṣ* lands of *sandjak begs* and *beglerbegs* could not therefore interfere with the revenues of *miri mukāṭa’a* or *khavāṣṣ-i humāyūn* in any way ... *Khāṣṣ-i pādīshāhī* or *khavāṣṣ-i humāyūn* and *khāṣṣ* lands were managed by a *voivoda*, who had under their command the *sekbān* soldiers in order to carry out their duties ... In some places the *voivodas* who were in charge of recording the shares of state and of individuals from *khāṣṣ* revenues ... were called *khāṣṣ dābiṭi* or “*khāṣṣ* officers” ... However, the taxes on the *re’āya* living and working on the *khāṣṣ* lands were collected by *emins*, who had nothing to do with the *voivodas*”; “In earlier times permission was not given for the *khāṣṣa* lands to be farmed out on *iltizām* ..., but this was not adhered to in later applications”: Orhonlu, “*Khāṣṣ*”.

The foregoing already suggests that even if it is accepted that the modest rank of Izmir's administrators in the classical system implied Istanbul's indifference to what went on there (and its reliance on local mechanisms of control), it would nevertheless be a great mistake to assume it implied the same in the rapidly changing 17th-century context. As will be illustrated in more detail below, Izmir's conversion from *bass* (of the *kapudan* and his *kethüda*) to *bass-ı hümayun* (c. 1678) not only transmitted its rapidly increasing revenues from the military establishment (in the person of the *tersane-i amire kethüdası*, the second Lord of the Admiralty, the grand admiral's second-in-command) to court (in the person of the *valide sultan*, the sultan-mother) – it also meant that the court was now fully qualified to administer the *bass* directly (all the better if this could be done over the head of a lower-level *kadi* not in any position to challenge the will of the center).³⁹² Suraiya Faroqhi has asserted that “İzmir, the booming port town of this period [1590-1699], was intentionally left a simple district center and not promoted to the rank of a *sancak* capital, so that involvement of high-level officials was avoided as far as possible.”³⁹³ Although the assertion is certainly valid for the position of Izmir's *kadi*, and for the city's wider administration prior to the 1670s, the argument should not be extended beyond those limits: with its conversion to *bass-ı hümayun*, the city proper was taken out of the military-executive hierarchy of the *sancak* system altogether (excluding its external defenses) and brought under direct court rule. When observed through the prism of the fading classical system, its administrative status might seem to have remained peripheral; but within the context of the specifically early modern form of Ottoman administration that was congealing, this was a significant upgrade in status that implied an assertion of power and control by the center.³⁹⁴

Above the intact middle and lower tiers of Izmir's administration consisting of the imported *kadi* and local officeholders, the top tier of district and provincial governors effectively disappeared, leaving a vacuum that was to be filled by various agents deeply indebted to the households enjoying ascendancy at court, committed to their politics and operating under their control. Special commissioners (*emin*) and tax farmers (who had subcontracted on empire-wide farms auctioned and based in Istanbul) were necessarily more dependent on the center than could ever have been the case with governors, who, though always tied to one or other court faction, might at least have retained some sense of their own legally defined claims to military-administrative responsibility, independence and authority.

³⁹² On clerical (*ulema*) hierarchy, and the lower-level rank (*mabrev*) of Izmir's *kadi*, see Halil İnalçık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600* (London: Phoenix, 1973; 1994), 170; F. Müge Göçek, “Mewlewiyyet or Mollalık”, *EI2*, vi: 1030a-b; Kreiser, *Osmanische Staat*, 221; and Madeline C. Zilfi, “The Ottoman ulema”, in: *Cambridge History of Turkey* 3, 216.

³⁹³ Faroqhi, *Economic and Social History* 2, 481.

³⁹⁴ Cf. note 385.

In Izmir, then, the realignment of offices so typical of the Ottoman 17th century came to mean that the jurisdiction of the *bey* (first of Sığla, then of Aydın) was limited to the inspection of coastal defenses while the jurisdiction of Izmir's relatively low-ranking *kadi* far exceeded that usually associated with the office in localities of such importance.³⁹⁵ As the one in charge of day-to-day administration he was not only Izmir's judge, notary, chief administrator and government agent, his duties also included overseeing and enforcing public safety and security in all its aspects, executive duties normally associated with the governorship. Formally within the *kadi*'s jurisdiction, but increasingly competing with him for the retreating competence of the *bey* were the officials operating Izmir's tax collection system.

Those most relevant to our subject are the *gümrükçü* and the *voivoda*. While *gümrükçü* simply means "customs inspector" (or, in the language of the time, "customer"), *voivoda* translates much less readily. The title had its origin in the Ottoman Balkans, where it designated something like "viceroy". *Voivodas* had originally been local Balkan rulers enlisted into Ottoman service and put in charge of the crown lands into which their previous dominions had been converted. Since crown lands had no regular military administration it became their task to ensure smooth and adequate collection of the taxes that accrued directly to governors (*havass*) or the crown (*havass-ı hümayun*). As a corollary, they also assumed charge of the maintenance of public safety and security in the lands under their jurisdiction.³⁹⁶ This is why they are often called "bailiffs" by European observers. In the 17th century the Balkan-variant of the office was increasingly populated by non-Muslim court favorites, most often wealthy Phanariote Greek (and to a lesser extent Jewish) dragoman-doctor-financiers. With the increased incidence of *bass* status in the Anatolian provinces the office became a regular fixture of Ottoman administration and – outside the Balkan lands – the preserve of Muslim occupants.

In 1678, Izmir's *voivoda* collected a stipend for the palace (*paşmalık*), taxes on fruits and wine, on imported market goods (*baç-ı pazar*) and on intestate inheritances (*beytülmal*). The *subaşı* (police inspector) and *gece naiî* (night judge) patrolled the streets day and night on his order to prevent, fine and arrest offenders of all sorts. This effectively made the *voivoda* into a summary judge; the one who dispensed judgment and punishment as violations occurred – the *kadi* figuring almost as a judge of appeal in such non-administrative cases. Since the *voivoda* was so deeply involved in so wide a variety of taxes and matters of public order, he was the first Ottoman official non-Muslims in general and Europeans in particular had to come to terms

³⁹⁵ See Gy. Káldy Nagy, "Kādî", *EI2*, iv: 375b.

³⁹⁶ See F. Adanir, "Woywoda", *EI2*, xi: 215b-16a. Cf. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı devletinin ... teşkilâtı*, 321n3.

with when wanting to make wine, to bring goods to market or to secure the inheritance of a fellow merchant – or, less innocuously, when making or drinking wine, roaming the streets at night without a lantern, engaging in prostitution, and like varieties of lewd or questionable behavior. This most often meant obtaining some dispensation from him, so Europeans were well-advised to stay on this officials right side.³⁹⁷

By 1678, the Izmir-Chios foreign customs farm (*uc gümrük mukata'ası* or “outer” – foreign – customs farm, as distinct from that of the *iç gümrük* or inner – internal – customs) had been under tight control of the empire’s leading political family, the Köprülüs. Reflecting the hierarchy common in other areas of the empire’s administration, most regular customs posts in the empire’s core provinces were operated as subcontracts under one central contract served in Istanbul by the chief customer. Smaller posts were leased out as further subcontracts to those. Thus, the Chios customs was operated under the Izmir customs which was in turn operated under the Istanbul customs (not coincidentally this pattern was repeated in foreign representation: ambassador in Istanbul, consul in Izmir, vice-consul in Chios). Through careful household politics the three consecutive Köprülü grand viziers ruling from 1656 to 1683 managed to patronize and finance the four tax farmers (*mukata'acı*) that dominated the Istanbul and Izmir offices during this period (see Table 15 below).

³⁹⁷ Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 165-68. One of the *voivoda*’s several country houses and cottages was in fact a *köşk* (pavilion) at the far end of Frank Street, as shown under number 4 – “het Tjoske, of speelhuis van Hagmet Aga” – in De Bruyn’s 1678-panorama of Izmir (reproduced here as Appendix 1, Plate 1). This Ahmed Ağa – to whose person and functions we will return – held the office of *voivoda* from at least 1665 to at least 1679. He competed with the *kadi* for the position of Izmir’s main power-broker and was also the single most accessible Ottoman in local administration to Europeans, even letting out his country house in the nearby village of Seydiköy to Dutch merchants. For the year 1665 and this *voivoda*’s control over the *kadi*, see S.C. Lomas and Francis Lawrence Bickley, *Report on the Manuscripts of Allan George Finch, Esq., of Burley-on-the-Hill, Rutland* (London: H.M.S.O., 1913-57), ii: 375. For the year 1668 and his involvement with European merchants and their Ottoman protégés, see The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 64a-65a: Privileges obtained by Dutch ambassador Justinus Colyer during his audience with grand vizier Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa, 6 August 1668. For the year 1671, his charitable endowments, and his general pre-eminence, as well as for the information obtained from the *mubtesib*, see Evliya, *Seyahatname* 9, 89-99. For the year 1674 and his letting out his country house to the Dutch, see note 238 and Appendix 2, Document 4. For the years 1676-1677 and the gift presented to this *voivoda* by the Dutch nation on the occasion of his son’s circumcision, see The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacobus van der Merc to DLH, October 1677. For the years 1678-1679 and his *köşk*, see De Bruyn, *Reizen*, 23-25.

TABLE 15: THE KÖPRÜLÜ HOLD ON CUSTOMS AND POLL-TAX COLLECTION (1668)

	Name	Relevant Offices	Chief Household Relations
1	Köprülü Mehmed Paşa	former grand vizier	father of 2 and 3
2	Köprülü zâde Fazıl Ahmed Paşa	former governor-general of Aleppo former deputy grand vizier grand vizier	son of 1 brother of 3 father (in-law) of 4
3	Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa	former grand admiral deputy grand vizier future grand vizier	(adopted) son of 1 brother of 2 uncle (in-law) of 4
4	Kaplan Mustafa Paşa	grand admiral future governor-general of Aleppo	son (in-law) of 2 nephew (in-law) of 3
5	Mustafa Ağa	former customs farmer of Izmir/Chios former customs farmer of Istanbul former steward of 1	father of 6 father (in-law) of 7 client of sultana-mother
6	Mahmud Ağa	customs farmer of Istanbul steward of 1	son of 5 brother (in-law) of 7
7	Hüseyin Ağa (I)	customs farmer of Izmir/Chios poll-tax farmer of Izmir/Chios future poll-tax farmer of Istanbul future customs farmer of Istanbul	son (in-law) of 5 brother (in-law) of 6 client of sultana-mother client of 3
8	Hüseyin Ağa (II)	future customs collector of Izmir/Chios future poll-tax collector of Izmir/Chios	client of 3 client of 7

Based on Galland, *Journal*, i: 87 and throughout; Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 123, 170-71, and throughout; The Hague, NA 1.03.01 123; Jacob van Dam and Justinus Colyer to DLH, 5 May 1688; and Kreutel, *Kara Mustafa vor Wien*, throughout.

The enduring grand vizieral grip on the empire's foreign customs implied a high measure of control over its conditions, tariffs, collection and proceeds. It has already been noted that both the theoretical height of customs duties and the actual amount paid were decisive for the competitiveness of a nation's trade. Since trade was the *raison d'être* of the nations assembled in Izmir's European quarter, and since the Köprülüs had a special interest in that trade, it would be no exaggeration to claim that for a period of some twenty-five years ending in 1683 that leading family possessed an unparalleled potential to dominate European life in Izmir. Yet the Köprülüs managed to enhance this potential further still, since sometime before 1672 they extended their patronage to the poll-tax farm (*cizye iltizami*). During their remaining eleven years in power the chief customer was also the collector of the poll-tax in Galata, Pera and Üsküdar – the non-Muslim districts across Istanbul's Golden Horn where most of the city's non-Muslims and all its Europeans lived. Just as was the case with the customs farms, the poll-tax *iltizams* were organized hierarchically with Istanbul at the top, Izmir and other important centers of non-Muslim presence just below and smaller and more peripheral ones like Chios appended to those. Although this did

not necessarily mean that the offices of customs and poll-tax collector were always united in one person, this was the case in Izmir as in Istanbul.

In terms of power on the ground, patronizing the poll-tax farms in prime locations of international trade like Galata, Pera and Izmir was of major consequence. From their positions as grand vizier and substitute grand vizier the Köprülüs could already wield an impressive array of formal administrative and diplomatic instruments. Their control and reform of the customs farms added to this the means to gain precise information on, and interfere in, all commercial transactions involving foreigners – most often by invoking suspicions of illicit trading. This pervasiveness allowed them to pursue broader economic policy and to serve their private financial interests through day-to-day micro-management on the local level.³⁹⁸

Now, patronage and reform of the poll-tax added another instrument to the Köprülüs' policy arsenal (³⁹⁹) and expanded opportunities for micro-managing Ottoman-European trade and relations, providing the means to intervene in the Ottoman side of business transactions as well. Shifting poll-tax burdens and manipulating relevant legal procedures in favor of some or other non-Muslim nation (Greek, Jewish, Armenian) or specific non-Muslim merchant (wholesaler, dragoman, warehouseman, etc.) at the cost of another

³⁹⁸ As is apparent in Kara Mustafa's *baraç* order, in the Pentlow avania and the resulting precautions by the other nations, in the controversy with Venetian ambassador Civrano over diplomatic smuggling, in the forced renewal of the Dutch capitulations (upon complaints by the chief customer), as in the many arrests of European goods in the Izmir customs over the years 1675-1688: see, *supra* and, *e.g.*, Appendix 2. The process began in earnest under Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, when the new Izmir customs was taken into operation and maintained by Kara Mustafa Paşa. Cf. The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Justinus Colyer to Jacob van Dam and the Dutch Nation of Izmir, 4 October 1675, where it is recounted how Colyer read Van Dam and the nation's letter of 14 September 1675 on the troubles made by Izmir's customer, who was refusing to expedite the cargo of Dutch national Schregels, upon which Colyer had sent his first dragoman to Hüseyin Ağa (I) to try to hold him to his earlier promise that the new customs regulation would not be enforced – to which the customer had replied that he could no longer guarantee this because the grand vizier had sent a general command to establish and maintain the new customs, and that all nations trading in Izmir now had to regulate themselves according to it. Upon taking his complaint higher up to substitute grand vizier Kara Mustafa, he was (of course!) again politely told that the order had come straight from the grand vizier and was ironclad. The subsequent memorandum to Fazıl Ahmed drafted by the French ambassador and cosigned by all European representatives was also to no avail, so the representatives advised their nations in Izmir to attempt to mitigate the effects of the new regulations through local arrangements with Hüseyin Ağa (II), giving up formal resistance for fear of commercial and diplomatic repercussions.

³⁹⁹ The *âzıye*-reform of 1691, which officially replaced all *maktu'*-arrangements and previous rates with three fixed rates of liability, was introduced by Köprülüzade Mustafa Paşa (1689-1691) but had in fact been prepared by Fazıl Ahmed and Kara Mustafa Paşas. They first tested various incarnations of the system in Crete, the Aegean, and Izmir after the conquest of Crete (see notes 110 and 112).

could after all impact these merchants' competitive edge significantly.⁴⁰⁰ Potentially, the leverage created by control over the poll-tax could also be extended to directly or indirectly include European merchants who were felt to have retreated from consular protection, to have crossed communal lines, or to have simply resided in Ottoman lands for too many consecutive years not to be liable to taxation.⁴⁰¹

Beside the Köprülü's hold on customs and the poll-tax through patronage of its farmers, another line of power led down to Izmir's *voyvoda*. Because of the fluidity of the office, it has proved difficult to uniformly define the *voyvodalık*. Contemporary accounts invariably give many descriptions of his functions and modern scholars have followed in their footsteps styling him "prince", "governor", "bailiff", "chief of police", "tax collector", "market inspector", "head intendant", and so on. The most learned dragomans' dictionary of the time gives "wajwoda: (LA.) palatinus, princeps, praefectus, major pagi, quaestor, tribunus, maleficiorum iudex, praetor, nomarcha; (FR.) palatin, prince, gouverneur, baillif, maire, prevost, receveur."⁴⁰²

Although *voyvodas* could certainly fulfill these and other tasks, we have already seen they can all be traced back to one central duty; that of collecting income from *hass* estates, whether imperial (*havas-ı hümayun*, destined for the treasury) or otherwise (*havass* of sultans, royal consorts, viziers, governors-general, governors, etc.). This was the defining responsibility of the office, but to enable it to be carried out effectively some of the means and agents of force and control normally associated with the governorship had to be brought under the *voyvoda's* competence. As a consequence, within the districts (*kazas*) he was appointed to the *voyvoda* could take on many tasks that were necessary to ensure the generation and collection of the revenue in his charge. Most important among these auxiliary duties were maintaining discipline and public order through the services of a number of lower tier officials like the police and market inspectors (resp. *subaşı* and *mubtesib*) and with the assistance of local Janissary regiments or irregular units.

⁴⁰⁰ The best illustration of this capability and the Köprülü's determination to use it to break European commercial power in their own and their subjects' favor, is their deciding in the Portuguese Jews' favor the controversy surrounding the balance between the formal status of Izmir's Portuguese Jews as Ottoman subjects, Dutch protégés, and/or Dutch subjects, and the commercial privileges and courtesies that were to be accorded to them – a policy decision that was rapidly reversed after their fall. See pages 147-55, and Appendix 2, documents 8 and 9.

⁴⁰¹ See my "Towards Classifying Avantias" on two Köprülü interventions (in the Dutch and the English nations) on poll-tax related questions of subject status and inheritance division. On the *haraç* controversy – Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa's more concentrated effort to push the Europeans and their commerce back in their appointed legal-commercial space, see pages 206-16 and Appendix 2, document 12.

⁴⁰² Meniški, *Thesaurus*, 5423.

Considering the extraordinary amount of commerce taking place in Izmir it is not surprising that Izmir's *voivoda*, Uzun Ahmed Ağa (see note 397), cast a particularly large shadow – all the larger for the fact that he derived his salary as a percentage of the farmed and unfarmed taxes he collected. What's more, the *voivoda*'s local pedigree seems to have made him a power broker with close ties to the city's elite and deep roots in local politics.⁴⁰³ As the strongman behind the customer/poll-tax collector and several more collectors of market taxes and other commercial duties, but also – more directly – behind the guards along Izmir's quays, streets and markets, he was obviously of supreme importance to any Ottoman or European conducting business in the city. The Köprülüs' ties to this personage of significant wealth and local power were twofold: firstly, they were officially charged with overseeing the affairs of the *valide sultan* (the beneficiary of the Izmir *hası*) and in that capacity were the *voivoda*'s direct superiors; and, secondly, they had a more private stake in smooth and effective operation of the office because it was the second leg under their customs and poll-tax interests.

The situation outlined above once more draws our attention to the single most distinguishing feature of Ottoman elite social and political life in the early modern period; the political household (*kapı*), and the politics through which it was supported, expanded and utilized.⁴⁰⁴ The cultivation of large and influential households was not unique to the Ottoman case: it was common throughout the Middle East and Asia, as well as in Europe (though there on a more modest scale). The longevity, size and political relevance of the Ottoman institution were remarkable nonetheless. It was so pervasive because it developed as an integral part of the equally long-lived, large and politically relevant Ottoman Empire where the patrimonial household of the Ottoman dynasty was almost synonymous with the state and commanded emulation throughout elite society. As Ottoman *vezir-paşa*-households, with the *Osmanlıs* and the Köprülüs' as shining examples, started to fill the vacuums left by the early modern multiform reorganization of the military, the land regimes, and provincial administrations, they acquired so much power and expertise that they ended up becoming indispensable to the operation of the Ottoman state and its territories. These miniature states would employ many hundreds of people with further client-patron relations branching out far and wide into Ottoman administration, institutions and society. Although their importance for early modern Ottoman history is established, their fluid-

⁴⁰³ Cf. Evliya, *Seyahatname* 9, 89-99; and Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 165-68.

⁴⁰⁴ On the importance of political households for (the historiography of) the Ottoman early modern period, see Aksan, "Theoretical Ottomans"; Neumann, "Political and diplomatic developments"; Carter Vaughn Findley, "Political culture and the great households", in: *Cambridge History of Turkey* 3, 65-80; and Dina Rizk Khoury, "The Ottoman centre versus provincial power-holders: An analysis of the historiography", in: *ibid.*, 135-56.

ity and informality (though not perceived as such by the Ottomans themselves) have hindered consistent scholarly investigation.⁴⁰⁵

While being aware of the limitations of our current understanding of the phenomenon, it should be possible to appreciate its importance and illustrate its impact on Ottoman affairs. We are fortunate to have relatively many references to the household connections of the three consecutive Köprülü viziers of the second half of the 17th century, and one remarkably detailed description of the household of the third.⁴⁰⁶ The general impression they provide of the Köprülü network is that it was tight yet wide, that it was carried over from generation to generation, and that it tended to mirror administrative hierarchy within its household and wider patron-client relationships. That last addition may seem like a complicated way of saying that this and other such networks purposely and necessarily followed administrative organization. After all, a client only gets appointed to an office precisely because his patron is in a position to procure appointment for him. In this fashion the patron not only dominates his subordinates professionally and formally as a superior within formal hierarchy, but also privately and informally as a patron through his network. But besides reminding us of the fact that there existed many other (e.g. more horizontal, less political) types of households and other networks, stressing this particular one's stability, size, longevity and coincidence with formal hierarchy also serves another purpose: it signals a renewed Ottoman capability for policy-making.

Until now, we have primarily discussed the court's direct involvement in the *bass* of Izmir (and, fleetingly, the *bawass* of Galata, Pera and Üsküdar) and Köprülü dominance in customs and poll-tax affairs in terms of the accumulation of raw power and financial control. We have argued that the light presence and even retreat of classical state structures from these places is not a sound indicator of their real or perceived importance to the Ottomans because from the end of the 16th century onwards the roles and functions of classical Ottoman administration were partly taken over by more effective, if more arbitrary, forms of management. The takeover happened first and foremost in lands reserved for the crown (*bawass-ı hümayun*) and members of

⁴⁰⁵ Although a number of biographic studies on Ottoman statesmen have gone some way towards mapping the unknown terrain opened up by Abou-el-Haj's landmark study on the *vezir-paşa*-household (*id.*, "The Ottoman Vezir and Paşa Households"), his rudimentary study of the Köprülü-household, and those monographs, have yet to prompt a consistent effort to arrive at a (prosopographical) description of the empire's most important households and their relations to each other and the state in the course of the 17th and 18th centuries.

⁴⁰⁶ See, e.g., *supra* under "The Köprülüs, Their Endowment and Its Impact" and "Kara Mustafa Paşa and the Reassertion of Ottoman Control". Also see Dankoff, *The Intimate Life*; *id.*, *An Ottoman Mentality: The World of Evliya Çelebi*; Galland, *Journal*, throughout (the description of Kara Mustafa's household at ii: 186-207); and North, *Lije*.

the royal household, court favorites and high officials (*havass* proper). The fact that such lands were either partly or fully administered for the benefit of private persons implied that their government was also to a certain degree privatized. Considering that most Ottomans invested whatever social and political capital they possessed in their households and that management of the extended family's resources was the primary task of the public (*birun*; as opposed to *enderun* or privy) section of any household, it is to be expected that the administration of *bass* lands was dominated by members of their patriarchs' households. If, then, a patron's household was powerful enough to effectively and consistently develop linkages with the lands under consideration and keep out rival households, we would expect to see the pattern repeated lower down, displaying a hierarchical sequence of household loyalties instead of a tangle of competing ones.

This indeed was how the Izmir *bass* was administered; locally by members of the Köprülü household and centrally by its patrons, the Köprülü grand viziers, who in turn administered it for their own patron, the *valide sultan*. It seems the bonds of power connecting court, central government and local administration in Izmir were at once strong and deep because of the way "formal" and "informal" power coincided throughout hierarchy. The setup not only enhanced the Köprülü's political and financial position by functioning as a power base, it also served as a political and financial insurance whose formal and informal legs kept each other up if either threatened to falter. Deliberate household policies thus served to unite political, financial and social power in the family's hands and to make sure it stayed there beyond one patron's term in office and for as long as possible. The measure of continuity thus achieved, apart from serving private interests, had great significance for general government. The longevity and depth of Köprülü power made possible a level of coordination in state affairs which the eroding classical state structures were no longer able to deliver. After decades of intense turmoil and rudderlessness it provided the means to engage in the development and implementation of unified and sustained government policies.

The Köprülü's directed most of this renewed capability towards "foreign" affairs. It could hardly have been otherwise, seeing their empire's uncomfortable position amidst the encroaching Muscovians, Safavids and Habsburgs and the rapidly increasing volume of Ottoman-European trade. But as our discussion of the capitulations has shown, the distinction between foreign and home affairs would have appeared artificial to the Ottomans to begin with. Short of special Ottoman embassies or outright war, all Ottoman-European relations took place in Ottoman lands and could be considered home affairs – a natural outcome of the absence of reciprocity. Throughout Ottoman history European representatives were confronted with the consequences of this position, namely that their hosts assumed sovereignty under Ottoman law over persons the Europeans considered to be protected and

immune under international law. Nevertheless, the resulting conflicts were rarely more than minor if recurring inconveniences to be smoothed over by diplomacy and money. That is, in the absence of major international crises and so long as the Ottomans did not embark upon any consistent effort to utilize the full potential of this controversy for larger purposes.

In extremis, though, consistent Ottoman utilization of the legal duplicity of capitulatory status for long-term political ends could result in the devaluation of the status of resident European diplomats and their merchant communities. Although it would never declare so unequivocally for the understandable reason that this would catastrophically harm the empire's international relations, a sufficiently ruthless Ottoman logic could dictate that ambassadors, residents and consuls henceforth be treated – *de facto* – as heads (*millet başıs*) of Ottoman minority communities (*millet*s; *taifes*) that lived under their own legal and fiscal regimes just like the empire's other non-Muslim communities. The previously described changes in Ottoman attitude towards foreign representatives, trade and merchants that occurred under the Köprülü could certainly be construed as shifts in that direction. The fundamental reaction to this apparent policy-based shift was an intensified European struggle to safeguard the additional privileges and exemptions that separated its merchant communities from the subjected Armenian, Jewish, and Greek ones. Most visibly, this involved suspending Ottoman imposition of the most eye-catching mark of the *zimmi*, the *cizye* poll-tax, on protected Europeans (*müstemin*).

The extension of Ottoman sovereignty achieved through Köprülü land, household and fiscal politics was crowned by their privately funded 1678 urban development project. In Izmir, its primary function was to bring European trade under Ottoman control, in the process cordoning it off more tightly from the Ottoman economy so as to limit its impact. As such, it was the physical equivalent of the Köprülü's efforts to legally and administratively separate the Europeans more clearly from their Ottoman context in the social and economic arenas and force them back in their assigned legal, social and commercial space – a policy that simultaneously aimed to integrate these discrete communities' more absolutely in the Ottoman system and to control their cultural impact. This it did through legal, commercial and other administrative measures, but now also physically through the creation of an Ottoman-controlled middle ground in Kasap Hazır.

Relocating entrance, storage and sale to Ottoman institutions in the Ottoman part of town served the practical purpose of drastically limiting possibilities for smuggling and other types of tax evasion⁽⁴⁰⁷⁾, thereby raising the value of the *bass* and the income and value derived from it. Politically, patronizing and facilitating Izmir's administrative and mercantile elites

⁴⁰⁷ See pages 136-37 and note 195.

– whether Ottoman or European – served to correct a main irritant in Ottoman foreign affairs, viz. the disproportionate amount of influence individual local Ottoman officials and European merchants could wield in the empire’s affairs against Istanbul’s (or for that matter; home governments’) explicit wishes. Indeed, if one takes a step back and surveys Ottoman-European affairs in Izmir from its beginnings up to 1688, a subtle change becomes visible: one notices how ripples and disruptions in local relations (let’s call them “*avaniyas*”) at first tend to be more frequent and modest, and to originate with demands made by local Ottoman officials *in contravention of Istanbul’s will*, and later on become scarcer, while appearing as *expressions of Köprülü will* to be countered only through petitioning other court factions and households in moments of Köprülü weakness or absence.

With the wide and deep foundation they were laying in the economic heart of Ottoman-European affairs, the Köprülüs gained enough power to have all concerned toe their line. To the Ottomans, politics and trade had always been two sides of the same coin, but the politicization of mercantile affairs that was the result of the Köprülüs’ interest in foreign affairs and their decades-long reassertion of central power was such that any and all chances of counterbalancing it through local alliances were lost from the outset. In a system that was increasingly adept and determined at manipulating their affairs through administrators, middlemen and competitors, Izmir’s European communities did well to recognize that they now operated as an integral part in an increasingly unified Ottoman power structure and to make the most of this given.

The affairs of the Dutch nation of the period afford an unusual degree of insight into this process. I have asserted above (and elsewhere⁴⁰⁸) that the manipulation of factions within Ottoman society and administration to secure optimal commercial conditions and mitigate *avaniyas* was regular European practice – a regular practice, however, that was to be concealed as much as possible from the home authorities. By not allowing their controllers and supervisors too good a view on how the sausage of commercial success was made, European merchants and representatives preserved deniability for when their dealings unraveled and invited Ottoman interference: they could play on European prejudices, blame Ottoman (or Jewish) untrustworthiness, intransigence and despotism, be bailed-out, and still come away with their reputations and prospects intact. Although the Dutch were no exception to this, and although the full extent of their illicit trades and relations will therefore also forever remain hidden, the intense and uninter-

⁴⁰⁸ See also my “Towards Classifying Avaniyas”. Cf. North, *Life*, throughout, but esp. Dudley North’s own contemporary critical account of “diverse *Turkish avaniyas*, since the Government of Cara Mustapha Basha, Vizier Azem”, 71-100.

rupted crisis of authority that plagued their nation from 1668 until 1687 (mainly over arrears in consular and ambassadorial duties⁴⁰⁹) does afford us some added perspective on how the Dutch dealt with the realignment of Ottoman power in Izmir.

Together with the realignment of Ottoman power in Izmir, the rift in the Dutch nation that persisted throughout the first Köprülü-period (as specified in Appendix 3), ensured that the Dutch merchants and combined nation were no longer positioned to utilize national and factional divergences and oppositions within the city's wider administration and society to locally counter or undermine the wishes of an Ottoman center that was in disarray.⁴¹⁰ Instead, Dutch (and other European nations') attempts to conduct factional politics in Izmir against the Ottoman center, although often initially appearing promising at the local level, invariably foundered later on because whatever national and factional divergences and oppositions existed within local society and administration were resolved higher up in the unified household and government hierarchy set up by the Köprülü – its energies being redirected back down to Izmir to ensure compliance.

This change did not end factional politics in Izmir, but the fact that local factions could no longer be played to counterbalance Köprülü orders through local co-optation did limit its relevance for the city's Europeans. Such European involvement in local politics as did occur, now served the purpose of winning temporary and incidental advantages over European competitors, or – as in the Dutch case – within the nation. In their struggle to gain the upper hand over one another, the factions within Izmir's Dutch nation sought and obtained the support of competing institutions back home, and of competing European nations and Ottoman officials in Izmir. The prism of Dutch factional relations therefore affords us some interesting insights into concrete political alignments in Izmir during this time.

The rift in the Dutch nation of Izmir formed and persisted in resistance to attempts by the States General to reassert consular jurisdiction and controls. After decades of underrepresentation, liberty and anarchy (reminiscent of the Wild West) this was regarded by a substantial number of Dutch merchants as an unwarranted and costly infringement in their personal and professional affairs. Although it did not take the form of formal dissent with the States General, the Dutch correspondence to and from Izmir of this period does show that this tendency toward liberty was often viewed more sympathetically by the directors of the chambers of the Board of Levant Trade (DLH), themselves after all not officials but representatives and coordinators

⁴⁰⁹ The crisis figures prominently in all primary and secondary sources on the Dutch nation of Izmir in the 17th century, but see the contributions by Van Dam van Isselt in the bibliography in particular.

⁴¹⁰ Cf., generally, Goffman, *Izmir and the Levantine World*.

chosen from among merchant/burgher communities wary of centralized authority. Overall, the interests of the consul and the obedient faction coincided with those of the resident/ambassador and the States General, while those of the disobedient often found a more understanding audience in the DLH, the cities, and occasionally the provinces.⁴¹¹

The two Dutch factions also sought and obtained support among Izmir's other Europeans. Although that support did not follow national lines completely, the consul's faction often garnered the support of the English consul and nation, while the disobedient faction frequently managed to muster that of the French.⁴¹² Here, it is interesting to note that this alignment had almost nothing to do with world political developments (one will recall that an Anglo-French alliance attacked the United Provinces in 1672, for example), and everything with the organizational, mercantile and cultural style and makeup of these nations (as discussed a few pages further down): within the diverse European cultures of Izmir the French and disobedient Dutch faction represented an older more chaotic and diversified Levantinized mercantile culture than the one represented by the English nation and the obedient Dutch faction.

Completing the triangle of relations supporting European life and trade in Izmir was that of Ottoman administration. For any nation, faction or merchant to survive beyond one trade season, and certainly for as long as the Dutch disobedient faction did, it required not just the support of some home authorities and other European nations, but also that of one or more Otto-

⁴¹¹ See all The Hague-archives listed in the bibliography. Also see Heeringa, *Bronnen* 2; and the articles by Van Dam van Isselt.

⁴¹² Cf., e.g., The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Adriano Groeninckx, Frans de Hartigh, Nicolas Legouche and Philips van de Sande in Jacob van Dam's chancery, 28 December 1671; *ibid.*: Nicolas Legouche to DLH, 2 July 1674; *ibid.*: "discrepant" Dutch merchants of Izmir to DLH, 14 August 1674; and *ibid.*: Nicolas Legouche in Louis Chambon's chancery, 14 August 1674 – where we read that the complainants against consul Van Dam were vacationing in Seydiköy with members of the French nation, and that one of the consul's supporters (Cornelis van Persijn, also a lodger of Van Dam's) violently mistreated French merchant Auguste Rubin in that same village, leading his brother-in-law Joseph Clement Fauré to lodge a complaint with Jacob van Dam, who refused to do anything about it but did consequently had Fauré beaten up by Van Persijn and his domestics, occasioning a lawsuit resulting in depositions with French consul Louis Chambon and with a notary in Rotterdam. As for the advice and support the English lent the Dutch consul and his faction, that is in evidence throughout Dutch correspondence, esp. in The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Jacob van Dam to Justinus Colyer, 21 September 1671; The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacob van Dam to DLH, 6 December 1674; *ibid.*: Jacob van Dam to States General and DLH, 18 March 1675;

The Hague, NA 1.03.01 98: Jacob van Dam to Colyer, 13 February 1676; The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacob van Dam to States General, 2 March 1676; and *ibid.*: Jacobus van der Merct to DLH, 24 November 1678. It is also apparent in the joint Anglo-Dutch excursion to Ephesus of 1678 (The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 23a-b; and De Bruyn, *Reizen*, 28-34). Additional texts in Appendix 2, documents 1, 3, 4, and 5.

man power brokers. It appears that the consul and his faction managed to retain the support of Izmir's *kadi* (and his subordinates), while the disobedient faction garnered that of the *voivoda* (and his).⁴¹³ Surely, it is no coincidence that on this side of the triangle too, the consul and his party aligned with the Ottoman official that most represented the imported authority of the center and its formal procedures, while his opponents could apparently count on the support of a more embedded power broker with whom deals could be struck to mutual benefit. European expense accounts show that the *kadi* ranked above the *voivoda*, also in the eyes of the European consuls. In their official correspondence, what's more, the latter is non-existent. At the same time, Galland and other travelers tell us that he was a person of great power and importance to the Europeans. The resulting image is that of a local power broker who made good his formal position below the *kadi* by using the contacts and means of enforcement at his disposal to become the well-rewarded enabler of the shadier sides of European and inter-national life in Izmir, in a way balancing out the *kadi*'s and the consuls' authority.⁴¹⁴

⁴¹³ See note 397 and Appendix 2, document 4 on the disobedient faction's leasing the *voivoda*'s house in Seydiköy. Van Dam, on the other side, fully depended on the *kadi* for lodging complaints and enforcing his consular authority – cf., e.g., Appendix 2, document 1, which was used as a widely attested and very public demonstration of the disobedient faction's disrespect for the *kadi* and all but the French consul's authority. The *kadi*'s support was also of crucial importance in the controversy surrounding Van Dam's appointment of Johan Calckoen as vice-consul, that is, against the express and rightful will of the disobedient faction: see The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Discrepant Thirteen of the Dutch Nation of Izmir to DLH, 13 December 1677; and *ibid.*: Jacob van Dam to DLH, 29 December 1677; and The Hague, NA 01.03.01 98: Jacob van Dam to Justinus Colyer, 23 December 1677.

⁴¹⁴ See Appendix 2, documents 2, 4 and 11 and notes 238, 356, 397 and 413 (and surrounding text) on Dutch relations with *voivoda* Ahmet Ağa (also in relation to the *kadi*). Accord. Ülker, *Rise of Izmir*, 224n48 on English presents to the *kadi* and *voivoda*. And Dumont, *Nouveau voyage*, 284-93 on *Ahmet Ağa*'s accessibility, his formal relation to the *kadi*, and his actual power over him. *Idem* Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 162-68, where (166-67) it is also explained how the *voivoda* issued permission slips enabling Europeans to visit prostitutes: "Il profite aussi des amendes auxquelles le *kadi* condamne les malfaiteurs et ceux qui font des désordres. Mais un des beaux droits qu'il ait est sur ceux qui se trouvent en débauche avec les femmes, parce que l'amende n'est pas limitée et qu'il peut exiger le plus qu'il peut suivant les richesses de ceux qu'il surprend. Mais il y en a plusieurs, et particulièrement des Francs, qui lui donnent qui 10, qui 20 écus par an pour avoir un billet de lui qui leur donne la liberté de fréquenter celles qu'ils veulent, et pour se mettre à couvert de l'affront d'être menés en prison ou de recevoir quelque autre mauvais traitement. Néanmoins, afin que le *kadi* ne trouve rien à redire à une telle permission qu'il pourrait trouver de mauvais exemple et contraire aux lois, il met simplement qu'il donne la permission à un tel Franc d'aller à la maison ou au jardin d'une telle pour faire blanchir son linge. Cela ne les met pas beaucoup plus en sûreté, parce que comme ils sont connus et que l'on sait les lieux qu'ils fréquentent, il ne manque pas de les importuner souvent et de leur en faire déboursier davantage. Il y a des filles qui obtiennent aussi de ces billets afin d'être visitées par les Francs avec liberté, et l'on en a déjà vu qui par ce moyen sont arrivées à en épouser de bien riches, quoiqu'elles n'eussent aucun bien." Accord. note 235; Dumont, *Nouveau voyage*, 315 and 334; and De Bruyn, *Reizen*, 127.

Rather than pointing towards a European overpowering of an incompetent and derelict Ottoman administrative structure ushering in an era of sustained Ottoman commercial incorporation into the European world system, the aforementioned changes in Ottoman administrative practice and the subtle ways in which the European communities adjusted to them, suggest movement in an opposite direction – that of an increasing European incorporation into a reconfiguring and reascending Ottoman system (at least until the Orlov revolt of 1769 and the Battle of Çeşme of 1770). This is not to say that no Ottoman (semi-)peripheralization took place, but it does challenge us to reconsider time and again that process’ relative timing and strength, and, therefore, also its inevitability. However hard it might be for the modern observer to recognize and appreciate policies and measures that were formulated through sovereign Ottoman knowledge, experience and practice (especially when they do not correspond to our perceptions of what was ideally, classically, Ottoman), it would be wise to imagine that they might have constituted a viable alternative to European commercial prowess instead of a rearguard action against it.

Size and Composition of the non-Ottoman Communities

After our necessarily somewhat philosophical examinations of the causes, perceptions, manifestations and ramifications of the European communities’ changing legal, administrative and social status, the following sections will address a number of more practical questions concerning their size, composition, organization and taxation.

Our first two questions, as to size and composition, do however require some further qualification before we can attempt to answer them. For what did a “nation” constitute? As is to be expected in a time when concepts such as nationality and citizenship were still very much in development, there existed precious little agreement on what constituted national membership. And even if some form of agreement existed, a far from egalitarian worldview would guarantee that insiders and observers often shared a sense that not all members really mattered or counted evenly. Comparison of contemporary accounts confirms this: some observers count only the principal merchants (trading for their own accounts or “factors”), others include clerks and other staff, still others shop- and tavern keepers and the like. And then there is the question of whether female family members and protégés were included in estimates of a given nation’s size. So, although tables of contemporary estimates have been produced and reproduced countless times, the question as to what sections of Izmir’s European population are included or omitted in the figures given for any nation still need to be grappled with. In the end, just as was the case with our figures for Izmir’s non-European population, it comes down to whom to trust most as a source.

Contemporary accounts speak of significant disparities between the various nations. Everywhere, the French nation is listed as the largest by far,

followed at some distance by the English, the Dutch, the Venetian and the Genoese. Though they are not to be taken at face value, the overall picture that emerges from them is confirmed by all contemporary accounts, both narrative and otherwise. It is that of three consecutive waves of foreign merchants washing one over the other, each virtually crushing its predecessors (with the French forming the exception). After centuries of competition among themselves, the merchants of Venice and Genoa were swamped by an inpour of French, particularly Provençals, who started arriving in full force in the second half of the 16th century. Around the turn of the century they were joined by the English, followed on their heels by the Dutch. Far from being haphazard, this sequence of arrivals perfectly illustrates the overriding themes of Braudel's *La Méditerranée*, viz. the capturing of Mediterranean trade by the Atlantic Seaboard states (a theme which would go on to prompt and inform much of Wallerstein's world-system theory) and the ruining of Mediterranean socioeconomic unity.⁴¹⁵

Just like the arrival of Islam and the Turks had an enormous (though not disruptive) impact on the organization and substance of Mediterranean trade (and obviously also on participation in it), the Atlantic seaboard's intrusion in the status quo under Ottoman rule again ushered in many new developments. Neither the arrival of Islam and the Turks, nor that of France, England and the Netherlands, were negative developments commercially speaking (a belief nevertheless still widely held in the case of Islam and, even more so, the Turks).⁴¹⁶ Rather, each new arrival signaled yet another rise in the total volume and value of trade. But in the early modern period the distinctively tolerant Mediterranean way of life so closely intertwined with a highly pragmatic and crosscultural Mediterranean commercial practice developed over ages, was time and again besieged by clericalism, mercantilism, absolutism, nationalism, and a host of other "isms" that eventually altered it beyond recognition. Such medium-term changes in Mediterranean commerce and society were not only expressed through the sequence in which new trading nations arrived in commercial centers, but also of course through who traded what goods under what form of internal administration once they got there. A relatively open and commercially integrated city like Izmir – benignly administered and ideally positioned at the crossroads of the North-South and East-West axes of Mediterranean trade, offering access to the old luxury trade from the Far and Near East *and* to increasingly popular bulk goods (cotton, grain, soap, ore etc.) from Anatolia and Egypt – offers an excellent example of how systemic developments played out locally.

⁴¹⁵ See notes 139 and 373-76.

⁴¹⁶ Cf. Findlay and O'Rourke, *Power and Plenty*, throughout, esp. 71-73 on the Pirenne-thesis.

Venice, Genoa and the Greek islands dominated by them had the oldest claims to trade in Ottoman lands. The city republics themselves obviously lay outside Ottoman borders and were therefore foreign to the Ottomans. Yet, the existence of Genoese and Venetian communities in Thrace, Asia Minor and the Archipelago predated the arrival of the Ottomans, implying they could be considered more domestic to those regions than their overlords. The integral parts of the pre-Ottoman configuration that these communities were, they were complete societies in the truest sense. In Izmir as in Istanbul they once consisted of significant numbers of families occupied in as full an array of trades as might be found in any town, guided by their own clergymen, led and represented by chosen headmen, and under the ultimate jurisdiction of noble families tied to the home city.⁴¹⁷

As the demand for luxury goods from the East was superseded by Europe's increasing demand for Egyptian and Anatolian bulky foodstuffs and raw materials, however, the French managed to supplant them as leading merchants and by 1678 the number of their companies in Izmir had dwindled to insignificance. The city states' networks, honed as they were to the long-distance far-eastern connections of the Silk Road and the Red Sea, and of diminishing political relevance in the Mediterranean arena, had managed only slight resistance against the Marseille merchants, who had an old presence in Mamluk and Ottoman Egypt and whose affairs were increasingly taken in hand by (and absorbed into) a steadily ascending Kingdom of France.

Just like the history of the Italian city states' Levantine communities, that of the French goes back to the Crusades, the primary difference being that the Venetians and Genoese managed to hold on a bit longer to some of their territories in Anatolia and the Archipelago through the 1202-1204 crusade against Byzantium, while further to the South the French relinquished all territory from earlier crusades to the Seljuks and Mamluks. French presence in the Levant, then, was equally old but had ceased to be territorial at a much earlier date. These circumstances, accompanied by the uncoordinated nature of the multiple trade connections between the Provence and Izmir, created a French nation in Izmir that by 1678 was fairly large, but constituted much less of a complete society. It boasted a number of larger companies, or "*raggions*" of several merchants, and a mass of petty merchants, skippers and sailors; a rough and predominantly male society herded by its own priests and monks and supported by its own tavern- and innkeepers, carpenters, rope-makers, barbers, doctors, apothecaries and so on.⁴¹⁸

⁴¹⁷ See, generally, e.g., Lane, *Venice*; Slot, *Archipelagus turbatus*; and Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade*.

⁴¹⁸ See note 234.

These nations were joined, at the close of the 16th century and the beginning of the 17th century respectively, by the English and the Dutch. We have already discussed the scramble for sovereignty and the uniformity of capitulatory practice that accompanied these nations' arrival on the scene. There were corresponding developments with regard to national size, composition, organization and taxation. The feature that most distinguished the newly formed English and Dutch nations from the older and more firmly embedded Italian and French ones, was their leanness. These were small and tight-knit communities comprised almost exclusively of factors and clerks who ran a monopolized trade (fully so in the English case, and *de facto* so in the case of the 17th-century Dutch) between themselves and their principals and trade organizations back home. The result was an exclusively male purely professional business community with narrowly defined interests and minimal ties to the larger population of the city. But as is confirmed by many sources (Colbert and Winchilsea chief among them) these comparatively small communities did represent a trade of such value that it soon eclipsed that of a large nation like the French.⁴¹⁹

In retrospect, there seems to have taken place in the trade of 17th-century Izmir (as in European trade at large) a shift in mercantile power from the large, open and loosely organized commercial communities of the Middle Ages to the smaller tighter professional merchant communities of our capitalist age. The French, part of the old Mediterranean system as much as of the up-and-coming Atlantic one, occupied a promising yet cumbersome middle position. Ideally, France could muster its old, wide and populous Mediterranean base to procure the materials needed to advance its industrial output at home and go on to use that to dominate the Atlantic arena. In implementing the centralized mercantilist state policy that would enable it to achieve this, however, it had to deal with much resistance from the city of Marseilles at home and from its merchant communities abroad. Nevertheless, by the end of the century France had regained its lost ground. It managed to keep up with England and (at least for some time still) the United Provinces, while these nations' combined mercantile power briskly shoved the Italian city states out of the market.

Notwithstanding the insights to be gained through a relative, developmental, perspective, it cannot quite make up for the absence of uniform and reliable data on the composition, size and economic value of Izmir's various European communities. Overall estimates should be attempted nevertheless, be-

⁴¹⁹ Anderson, *English Consul*, 54-55: "... in 1661 Winchilsea had to report that for every English ship in Turkey there were four Dutch." and "In that year Colbert valued the annual Levant trade of the Dutch at ten to twelve million livres, roughly equivalent to their East India trade."

cause rough approximations can at least provide indications of the relative numerical strength (in size and commercial value) of the city's European presence. However tentative the resulting ratio might be, it is instrumental if we want to consider Frank Street as part of a larger Ottoman complex (i.e. the city of Izmir and, beyond that, wider Ottoman society and administration) and in establishing its potential for and against the Ottoman context.

Apart from what it can reveal about the relative size of Frank Street, absolute size could also shed additional light on the question whether Izmir's Europeans might indeed have constituted the isolated and self-sufficient community that emerges from European sources, or must have depended much more on their Ottoman context than they cared to admit openly. Other (social, economic and political) factors did influence Frank Street's capacity to fend for itself, but the first condition for self-sufficiency is mass. Only a community large enough to fulfill all functions its members habitually depend upon can even attempt to fend for itself.⁴²⁰ It would be frivolous to construe our early modern community of merchants as pursuing absolute self-sufficiency as a policy, but the fact that the trade of its members depended heavily on their privileges as foreigners, as well as their repeated claims to such a *status aparte* does indicate that they perceived it to be in their best interest not only to be well-connected to Ottoman society as merchants, but also to maintain considerable distance from it as Europeans.

The questions before us therefore are the following: what would be a reasonable estimate of Izmir's European population and commerce; of what order of magnitude is the ratio between its European and Ottoman populations and economies; and, can we draw any conclusions from this with regard to relative power and the measure of self-sufficiency?

To arrive at a reasonable estimate of Izmir's European population we have to weigh the estimates of several reporters from various nations against each other. This can best be done by first obtaining an impression of the reporters' reliability in other fields, followed by an assessment of the particular politics and idiosyncrasies underlying and coloring their narratives. If, by 1678, the Genoese and the Venetian nations increasingly functioned as consular extended families, the French as a town or miniature state complete with hierarchically ordered estates, and the Dutch and English as a number of competing yet coordinating companies of factors of solid burgher stock, it is to be expected that such differences were not only of consequence for the nations' real size and functioning, but also for their perceived size and functioning.

⁴²⁰ The inherent contradiction of course being that the larger the scale, the more unattainable the ideal of autarky actually becomes – because of the increasing difficulty in maintaining a territory, providing enough consumable goods and enforcing the requisite strict conformity without outside assistance. This is why states that have pursued the ideal have invariably either become oppressive and totalitarian, or have quickly abandoned it altogether.

That is to say, structural as much as political differences between the nations naturally also bore upon the way they perceived and represented themselves and upon the way they were perceived and represented by others. For instance, the account a staunch French observer might give of a sizeable and lively French nation will have differed significantly from the Englishman's, who, proud of his own nation's order, thriftiness and effectiveness, most likely considered this rival nation impractically bloated and overly arrogant while not all that savvy commercially. Furthermore, their accounts of the Dutch nation will again have differed – the French typically stressing its small size, humble origins and lack of social hierarchy; the English its anti-authoritarianism, its extreme frugality and the commercial prowess that enabled so small a nation to claim such a large share of the trade.

What, then, are our preferred sources for the year 1678 and the years immediately preceding and following it? Table 1 has shown that precious few travelers who commented on the size of Izmir's Turkish, Greek, Jewish and Armenian population provided similar information for the European population. Although a good number of relatively open-minded and inquisitive men from all nations visited Izmir in the 1670s and left us fairly accurate narrative accounts of the city, its surroundings and – above all – its European life, few bothered to disentangle and breakdown the multitude of European nationals they encountered on and around Frank Street. Between Jean Chardin (present in 1672) and Antoine Galland (pr. 1672 and 1678) for the French; De Bruyn (pr. 1678) and De Hochepped (pr. 1678) for the Dutch; Rycaut (pr. 1667-1678) and North (pr. 1667) for the English; and, lastly, the Anglo-French collaboration of Spon and Wheler (pr. 1675-1676), Galland, again the best informed and most informative, provides the most detailed breakdown (see Table 16).⁴²¹

Galland's figures may seem rather low when juxtaposed with the many enthusiastic accounts of European life in 17th-century Izmir. Yet, they are consistent with the more fragmentary statements given by the overwhelming majority of his contemporaries. Compare his information, for instance, with the – clearly less thoroughly informed – information provided by Jean Chardin for 1672 (that is, before the English had captured most of the Dutch trade during the war of 1672-1678), or with that provided in 1678 by a young Daniël-Jan de Hochepped, fresh off the boat from Holland and preparing for a long and successful career in Levantine diplomacy (see Table 17).

⁴²¹ Jean Chardin, *Voyages du chevalier Chardin en Perse et autres lieux de l'Orient* (Paris: Le Normant, 1811); Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*; Bruyn, *Reizen*; The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684; Rycaut, *History of the Turkish Empire*; North, *Life*; and Jacob Spon and George Wheler, *Voyage d'Italie, de Dalmatie, de Grece, et du Levant: fait aux années 1675 & 1676* (Amsterdam: H. & T. Boom, 1679).

TABLE 16: ESTIMATED EUROPEAN POPULATION OF IZMIR (GALLAND, 1678)

Nation	Description	Subtotal
French	1 consul, 30 merchants, 40-50 other families constituting more than 160 persons (inn-keepers, doctors, apothecaries, surgeons, barbers, tailors, shoemakers), 2 bachelor doctors, more than 20 further bachelors (doctors, shoemakers, tailors and cooks working mostly for the Dutch and English), 3 Capuchin friars, 1 lay friar	217
English	1 consul, 70 merchants, 15 clerks, 1 minister, 1 doctor, 1 apothecary, 1 surgeon, 3 tavern-keepers	93
Dutch	1 consul, 23 merchants (3 of whom are married to local women), 8 clerks, 2 ministers (one of whom is French)	34
Venetian	1 consul, 4 merchants	5
Genoese	1 consul, 4 merchants and 1 clerk	6
Others	1 merchant and 1 clerk from Florence, 1 merchant from Sienna (all under Dutch protection), 1 clerk from Leghorn (under English protection), 1 tavern-keeper from Sienna (under French protection)	5
EST. TOTAL		360

Based on Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 113-27.

TABLE 17: IDEM (CHARDIN, 1672; DE HOICHEPIED, 1678)

Nation	Chardin's description (1672)	Subtotal	De Hoichepied's description (1678)
French	trade of approx. 400.000 <i>livres</i> a year, 1 consul, more than 100 merchants, most petty	≥101	small trade, largest number of merchants and artisans
English	trade of 6-700.000 <i>livres</i> a year, 1 consul, more than 20 houses [a trading house usually consisted of 2-3 partners plus 2-3 clerks]	±101	large trade, approx. 20 houses
Dutch	trade greater than that of the English, 1 consul, few houses (lacking connections in the Anatolian interior) [10 houses plus clerks?]	[±50?]	previously large trade (recently interrupted by war of 1672-1678, but back on a par with the East Indies trade of the VOC within months of the cessation of hostilities), 13-14 houses
Venetian	1 merchant-consul [plus clerks]	±3	of little consequence, not many
Genoese	1 consul, 2/3 merchants [plus clerks]	±5	of little consequence, 1 vice-consul, 1 house
EST. TOTAL		≥262	plus a couple of tens for French growth between 1672-1678 and subsequent Dutch recovery

Based on Chardin, *Voyages*, 6-21; and The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 23b-38b.

Sonia Anderson, author of an exceptional biography of Paul Rycout (the highly skilled English consul in Izmir from 1667-1678, better known as the foremost English writer on the Ottoman Empire of his day) largely corroborates

rates these figures through her subject's correspondence and numerous other primary and secondary sources.⁴²² She also draws attention to two French censuses conducted in June and November 1670, and provides the totals given in the former as being "101 heads of household, 28 wives, 56 children, and 84 servants or slaves, in all 269 persons".⁴²³

The results of the French census would increase the grand total to about 425 persons. The same census, however, also raises the question whether this would not be too conservative an estimate still. It suggests that certain categories of "voiceless" subjects (wives, offspring, servants, slaves) may have been heavily underrepresented in contemporary accounts of other nations. It seems that on top of the more obvious underrepresentation of anyone who was not a private merchant or factor (i.e. clerks, clergy and craftsmen with little to no vote or voice in their nation), there was a second form of underrepresentation at work in the counting of higher-class, or burgher, heads of household only. In this respect, the problems we come up against resemble those we encountered in "The Ottoman City".

Yet, although it is certain that merchants of all nations made good use of the services of craftsmen, servants and the like, these appear to have been either French or Ottoman non-Muslim and not fellow-nationals.⁴²⁴ Similarly, some English, Dutch, Venetian and Genoese merchants of Izmir indeed also kept families, but their number appears to have been modest and the national status of its members disputed.⁴²⁵ All considered, application of a multiplier such as the one introduced previously or an alternative comparable to the ratio between France's 30 merchants or 101 heads of household and the total of 269 French nationals (multipliers of 9 and 2.66 respectively) is not warranted. Particularly because the exceptionalism of the French case is stressed repeatedly in all sources, their own included.

Rather, all available evidence on the 1670s indicates that only the French nation comprised significant numbers of imported French families and servants, forcing us to conclude that only in that nation the number of nationals differed so considerably from the number of merchants or heads of household. In view of the conspicuous undercounting (in all but the French case) of a nevertheless modest number of imported clerks, clergy, servants and family members, a rough estimate of up to 500 inhabitants fully belonging under European jurisdiction (henceforth "European nationals" will be used by way of historically inaccurate shorthand) seems reasonable – but it could have been a good 100 less. This brings the ratio between the estimated total number of European nationals and our previously estimated Ottoman popu-

⁴²² Anderson, *English Consul*, 49-76.

⁴²³ *Ibid.*, 59.

⁴²⁴ See note 234 and appendix 2, documents 2, 3 and 12.

⁴²⁵ See *supra* for the discussion of Kara Mustafa Paşa's *baraç* order, and see Appendix 2, documents 2, 12 and 14.

lation of Izmir in the year 1678 to a maximum of $(500 / 70,000 =) 0.0071$, i.e. 0.7 % or less.

The above calculations are useful for several purposes. First of all, they serve to provide an appraisal of the number of residents the European consular system was maintained to protect, regulate and govern. In the absence of clearly defined and uniform principles of nationality and citizenship this number should be construed as including only those whose nationality was generally undisputed, i.e. structurally agreed upon by the Ottoman state and their own, as well as by themselves. Secondly, our calculations invite comparison between the size of the overall community and its hard core. We have seen that contemporary accounts are usually – and unsurprisingly – strongly biased in favor of political, social and economic elites (noblemen and other officials, factors and wealthier private merchants). Their number appears to have been about 135, slightly above a quarter of the community's total size. This we should take to be the size of Izmir's European political community, for its members held exclusive right to active participation in community affairs and decision-making. Needless to say, this elite also formed the economic backbone of Frank Street and might therefore be considered the consular systems true *raison d'être*.

It would be a mistake to think of Frank Street as a community of 500, however. That number reflects an official reality rather than an actual one. Without challenging the accuracy of the estimation that some 400 to 500 European nationals occupied Frank Street, we should take the size of Frank Street as a socio-economic complex (and therefore its direct influence as well) to be much larger. Imagine, if you will, a pebble thrown into a pond, a number of concentric circles rippling out across its surface; if the pebble is consular authority and the first ripple marks the boundary of our core community of around 135, the next ripple would represent the entire community of 400 to 500 European “nationals”. Not strictly part of the community, yet part of its communal space just as much, is the next ripple, that of non-European residents of dubious legal status; Greek wives to European merchants, their offspring, slaves, concubines, and native servants. Visiting European travelers and the officers and crews of several hundred European ships calling port twice a year form yet another ripple, this one of visitors. Higher Ottoman personnel spending much of their time in Frank Street could be regarded as constituting the next ripple, this one heavily overlapping with similar circles rippling out from Izmir's Greek, Armenian, Jewish and Turkish pebbles. Within this last category fall the Janissary guards appointed to protect each consul and secure the consulates, the customer's guards along Frank Street's quays, and the Europeans' dragomans, warehousemen (with their porters) and moneylenders.

Even when omitting the many servants employed in the dozens of European country residences in Izmir's vicinity, or those called upon to provide

food and other essentials in recurring times of contagious fever or plague⁽⁴²⁶⁾, it is obvious that our estimate of 400 to 500 European Frank Street residents to a large degree obscures that we are discussing a quarter teeming with additional Frankish, Greek, Armenian, Jewish and Turkish residents, personnel and visitors alike.⁴²⁷ Putting a sensible number to that conclusion is both impossible and impractical. Impossible because these different groupings represent too many constantly fluctuating variables, impractical because they consist of temporary visitors as well as residents already represented in our previous estimate of the Ottoman population (of 70,000). Still, the discussion above suggests some preliminary conclusions with regard to the European quarter's relative importance and its measure of self-sufficiency.

Izmir's foreign commerce-driven demographic explosion, the size of its European quarter, the number and comparative wealth of its inhabitants, visitors and dependents, and the hundreds of European ships calling port⁽⁴²⁸⁾, show it to have been one of the city's major economic hubs. If we take into account the (previously discussed) outdated infrastructure of the older commercial quarters of Han Bey/Pazar and Limon (Liman) and the major 1678-effort to relocate the city's European trade to the rebuilt and newly constituted neighboring Ottoman quarter of Kasap Hazır⁽⁴²⁹⁾, there can be little doubt that in 1678 Frenk Mahallesi had become *the* commercial center of the city insofar as volume and value were concerned. In the absence of precise statistical data on the relative size of Izmir's outer (*uc*, "international") and inner (*iç*, "national") economies, Evliya offers some interesting figures to work with (see Table 18).

Official incomes will have represented half to a third the actual income of these officials (which is probably still a high estimate). Similarly, customs income for goods actually declared (i.e. the official value of the customs tax farm) will have had a comparable ratio to actual imports and exports.⁴³⁰ If we

⁴²⁶ See, e.g., De Bruyn, *Reizen*, 23; and The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 22a-b. Galland, whom the French nation refused to lodge for his and their own safety, took refuge in the Greek *han*: Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 86.

⁴²⁷ See Map 13 and the surrounding paragraphs.

⁴²⁸ Cf., e.g., Evliya, *Seyahatname* 9, 96-97; Alfred C. Wood, *A History of the Levant Company* (London: Frank Cass, 1964), 46-47 and 54-55; The Hague, NA 1.02.22 676, 204b-209b: DLH to States of Holland and West-Friesland, 1676. Also cf. K. Heeringa, *Bronnen tot de Geschiedenis van den Levantschen Handel*, vol. 1: 1590-1660 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1910), 14-17 and 486-87; and Heeringa, *Bronnen* 2, 30, 109-15 and 387-92.

⁴²⁹ In 1677, De Hochieped could already report that many Europeans had warehouses in the newly constructed *Veziirhan*: The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 42b.

⁴³⁰ We have previously mentioned that contemporary and modern estimates are that half to two-thirds of the foreign commerce of Izmir was smuggled (with and without knowledge of its officials). Consider, by way of corroboration, the following calculations concerning Dutch consular and ambassadorial (C&A) duties (which were collected as percentages from the value of goods declared at Ottoman customs) between 1668 and 1671, i.e. in the peak

accept these ratios, we might go on to conclude that Izmir's European economy must have represented about a quarter to a fifth of Izmir's overall economy. It follows that Izmir's European population (of less than 1%) enjoyed influence far beyond its number, although the political and social aspects of that power will have lagged significantly behind the economic aspect due to the lowly place generally reserved for non-Muslims in the Ottoman system, and (more to the point) because of the care the Köprülüs took to keep the Europeans in check.

TABLE 18: OFFICIAL INCOMES OF IZMIR'S PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS (EVLIYA, 1671)

Yearly income	Given Value	In LD	Per office
Paşalık	50 purses	25,000	125,000
Paşa's hass	100.000 kuruş	100,000	
Mevleviyyet	(500*365=)182,500 akçe	2,500	302,500
Kadi's hass	200 purses	100,000	
Kadılık	200.000 kuruş	200,000	
(uc) Gümrük	200.000 kuruş	200,000	200,000
Voyvoda	[similar to kadi's?]	[c.300,000?]	[c.300,000?]

Based on Evliya, *Seyahatname* 9, 88-100.

With regard to the question of self-sufficiency, it is safe to conclude that though a community that size could have probably fended for itself, it did so less and less. This was due to a number of factors, both internal and external. Firstly, the development from a full-blown minority community fulfilling most functions required to sustain it, to a lean merchant community focused almost exclusively on long distance trade, brought with it an increasing reliance on structural labor and assistance from without. Secondly, the whole principle of competition, though here somewhat softened through the limits imposed by Ottoman controls and oversights, is not at all conducive to isolation. Contrary to, for instance, the monopolistic Dutch factory in Japanese

years of Dutch trade with Izmir: The Hague, NA 1.02.22 676, 204b-9b: DLH to States of Holland and West-Friesland, 1676 lists the duties collected by Dutch representatives from convoys and ships that arrived in Izmir under Dutch protection between 1668 and 1671. These amounted to LD 82,000. There were 32 Dutch ships in convoys in approx. 3 years, or 8 Dutch convoys of 4 ships on average p/a. C&A-duties stood at an average 1,5% at the time of Van Dam's appointment, so the equivalent value of the declared trade imported on 8 Dutch convoys of an average 4 ships to and from Izmir from 1668-1671 was LD 5,466,667, or LD 1,822,222 p/a. The actual value (accounting for smuggling, miscellaneous Dutch shipping, and protected foreign shipping) must have been much higher – cf. Colbert's contemporary estimate of 10-12 million livres (equiv. LD 5-6,000,000) p/a for overall Dutch Levant trade. If three quarters of that passed through Izmir (LD 4,125,000 p/a), this would mean that declared imports represented only about 44% of the actual value of the Dutch Izmir trade, the Dutch and Ottoman states and its representatives being defrauded of more than half their due proceeds from it.

Deshima, Europeans in Izmir could hardly limit outside contact to a couple of officials and wholesalers. To do so would have cost them their trade in the face of any competitor that proved more aggressive in his reconnaissance of the hinterland and actively courted and patronized less obvious local merchants and power brokers, especially in the context of the generally limited Ottoman enforcement of Ottoman-European social segregation.⁴³¹

As to the external factors, these all go back to Köprülü policy. That policy was determinedly not aimed at separating the European quarter from the Ottoman city anymore than its Greek, Armenian or Jewish quarters. If anything, the opposite (controlled integration into the Ottoman context) seems to have been the agenda. Consequently, the quarter was managed as a secured but open one and, like all Ottoman city quarters, had its main (south-western) entrance chained off and guarded at night, although traffic within the quarter and across its closure was possible at night.⁴³² Further proof of active Ottoman commitment to Frank Street as an Ottoman-European thoroughfare and trade center is the fact that up until the destruction of much of Izmir in the 1688-earthquake, all real estate along it was the property of Ottoman *vakfs* and notables, its European inhabitants occupying it on the merit of their lease alone.⁴³³

Organization and Taxation

Throughout the 1670s there were present in Izmir five officially recognized European communities, or nations: the French, the English, the Dutch, the Venetian and the Genoese. These differed significantly in size, composition, favored merchandise, commercial acumen and, consequently, success. As the mainstay of the Levant trade shifted from luxury items to bulky goods in the course of the 17th century and as the margins on the merchandise consequently decreased, it became organization and taxation that determined these nations' competitiveness more than anything else. After all, a well-functioning community with lower shipping, handling and tax rates could

⁴³¹ It is no coincidence that those merchants that are often disapprovingly mentioned in consular correspondence because of having invited costly Ottoman interventions through over-familiarity with the non-European quarters and their inhabitants were also almost invariably the most successful. Cf. notes 236, 238, 244, 347, 348, and 397.

⁴³² Cf. D'Arvieux, *Mémoires*, 125-27; The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6912: Jacob van Dam to States General, 11 July 1676; Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 133-34 and 149; De Bruyn, *Reizen*, 138-39; Anderson, *English Consul*, 5, 10 and 13; Dumont, *Nouveau voyage*, 352-53; and other contemporary accounts listed in the bibliography.

⁴³³ See the Köprülü-*vakfs*'s merchants' apartments and *hans* in Table 12, the leases cited in note 181, two similar leases (the second of which by Dutch factor Dionis Housset from the Ottoman officials Hasan Çavuş and Subaşı Mehmed Bey) in Alexander H. de Groot, "An Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Turkish-Dutch Letterbook and Some of its Implications", in: *The Netherlands and Turkey: Four hundred years of political, economical, social and cultural relations: selected essays* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2007), 64-65; and Kadı, "Natives and Interlopers", 149.

capture trade more swiftly, decisively and profitably when opportunities presented themselves. Furthermore, in a commercial setting where Ottoman controls limited opportunities for all-too assertive competition in buying and selling, success depended all the more on a smoothly run organization with the lowest possible overhead.

The key competitive areas of organization and taxation both have local and general components. Since they are also closely intertwined (in that lean and efficient organizations generally incur less costs than bloated and inefficient ones, leading to sharper rates) this complex of factors is perhaps most readily identified and understood by following an imaginary piece of merchandise from the principal merchant in, say, Amsterdam to the receiving and reselling merchant factor in Izmir (i.e. the “factor”; a merchant who buys or sells for another in exchange for a commission). The costs that needed to be recuperated through the sale of the original merchandise in Izmir and that of the return cargo in Amsterdam included the purchasing prize of the goods, local tariffs, the operational costs (incl. salaries) of the principal, export duties, insurance costs, the operational costs of ship and crew, import duties, presents and bribes to officials, and last but not least the operational costs of the factor(s), of diplomatic protection and representation, and of the Ottoman staff. On the return trip a similar chain of costs would be incurred.⁴³⁴

The chain of costs above aptly illustrates the importance to trade of trustworthy yet minimal and therefore cheap government, frugal mercantile management, secure yet affordable passage through sailing in large protected convoys, ships with large hulls and an abundance of guns, small and well-fed yet badly paid crews, optimal contacts with Ottoman officials, modest and hardworking factors and clerks, relatively cheap and low-rank missions, and well-cultivated and formally protected dragomans and warehousemen. It also suggests why “alternative” commercial practices like (legal) carrying for third parties and (illegal) smuggling and under-declaring were so endemic. The former meant additional trade and cargo without round trips and additional income from duties with minimal risk, the latter relatively cheap uninsured cargo and the evasion of customs and diplomatic duties. Since both were relatively easy means of minimizing costs, thereby enhancing merchants’ competitive edge, such practices proved ineradicable.

As we have seen, each of the five European nations of Izmir was predetermined historically, economically, politically and socially to deal with the chal-

⁴³⁴ See also Kadi, “Natives and Interlopers”, 132-33, 157-59 and 193-205, a comparison of the chain of added (handling, insurance and other) costs incurred as merchandise travelled between 18th-ct. Holland and Ankara (through Izmir) in the hands of Ottoman and Dutch merchants.

lenges of the trade in its own way. Since a nation's operational costs were central to its competitiveness, its willingness and ability to adjust its operation when circumstances required was instrumental to its survival and success. In this area the city states of Venice and Genoa were at a disadvantage. Their organizations, both at home and in the factories, proved unable to adjust to a number of structural changes governing the Levant trade: firstly, the loss of sovereignty along the western and northern Anatolian coasts and in the Greek archipelago (which definitively reconfigured the political basis of their relations with the Ottomans); secondly, the shift from luxury trade and fine fabrics to bulk trade and coarser fabrics (as epitomized by the sudden success of the English and the Dutch); and, thirdly, changes in Ottoman administration and foreign policy (chiefly felt as a drive for greater Ottoman administrative and commercial control in the trading ports, or scales).

As mentioned earlier, both Genoa's and Venice's history in the Levant predated that of the Ottoman Turks. Holding a number of sovereign territories across the Eastern Mediterranean put them in the difficult position of not just being commercial partners with the Ottoman Turks, but at the same time also territorial competitors. For Genoa, whose power had been waning since the mid-15th century, this was less of a problem than for Venice. Retreating before the advancing Ottomans, the Genoese managed to mostly keep on friendly terms with them, repeatedly gaining Ottoman privileges in return for their support against sworn rival Venice (yet, incidentally, joining Venice in the Holy Leagues against the Ottomans when it suited them). Still, the loss of its territorial bases in the East, and that of Chios (1566) in particular, exacerbated the Republic's decline. Faced with fierce competition from the much stronger Venetians and French it opted for a subordinate role in Levantine politics and commerce, sending the occasional envoy and conducting business under French protection.

When fortuitous circumstances finally did conspire to furnish the Genoese with their own Ottoman capitulation, Istanbul embassy and Izmir consulate in 1666, it soon became apparent why they had not systematically pursued these previously. Even a favorable Ottoman customs rate of 3% (their previous French protectors would continue to pay 5% until 1673) could not make up for their lack of urgency, resources and merchandise. Genoese ships sailed without escorts or under Venetian ones, unnecessarily raising either insurance or hiring costs. The cargoes they returned for the luxury silks they exported from Izmir consisted mainly in debased and false coinage, which invited complaints, lawsuits and demands for compensation from the other nations and Ottoman officials alike, thereby increasing the nation's overhead even further. When the Ottomans expressly prohibited the import of such moneys in 1669 it became apparent that Genoese cloth and shipping was too expensive to compete with the English and Dutch nations, forcing them to trade out of the Tuscan port of Leghorn/Livorno.

Worse still, neither the consul nor the one Genoese company (of Vincenzo and Francesco Spinola; close relatives of Augustino Spinola, Genoese resident in Istanbul from 1675 to 1679) could muster the force required to deal effectively with French refusals to recognize their independence, or with Ottoman officials' taking advantage of their lack of leverage and power to exact substantial lump sum restitutions (*avantias*) for their import abuses. Unable to settle these matters locally themselves, they all-too often fled to English or Dutch protection, or referred disputes to their resident in Istanbul, both emergency measures further raising the costs of their resolution. Faced with a dwindling trade, heavy financial demands, and deprived of his income and security, the (by that time, third) Genoese resident (Francisco Maria Levanto) decided to slip out of Istanbul in 1683, disguised as a friar and without the necessary Ottoman discharge and permission. Thereupon, Genoese trade reverted to French protection.⁴³⁵

During the short time the position existed, the Genoese consuls in Izmir (Ottavio Doria, 1666-1671; Gian Luigi Gentile, 1671-1674; Langetti, 1675-...) reportedly received a fixed annual income of 600 rix-dollars; a mere pittance when compared to Izmir's other consuls and far too little to advance regular expenses, let alone extraordinary ones.⁴³⁶ The organization of Genoese representation appears to have followed established Venetian practice (see below) in theory, but in reality was largely informal in Izmir, where the number of Genoese merchants and the value of Genoese trade after all remained so negligible as to forbid all too cumbersome and costly an arrangement.

Although Venice's troubles were very similar to Genoa's, it did manage to hold on to a sliver of the trade that it had formerly dominated. The defining difference between the rivals was one of scale. Culminating in the sack of Constantinople in 1204 and continuing with the installation of a series of Latin puppet emperors (ruling until 1261), Venice's heavy involvement in Byzantine affairs provided it with every opportunity to entrench itself commercially. Its commercial communities and networks even successfully survived the resurrection of an independent Byzantine empire from Nicaea and the arrival of the Ottoman Turks.

Still, Venice proved particularly receptive to the temptation of continuing (and perhaps even increasing) territorial sovereignty in the Levant. When Ottoman advances forced it to choose between trade and sovereignty in the Levant, it almost consistently preferred the latter in the hope of eventually

⁴³⁵ Cf. The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacob van Dam to States General, 18 June 1675; The Hague, NA 01.03.01 98: Justinus Colyer to DLH, 9 December 1677; Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 126-27; The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 38b, 49a, 51b-52a and 77a. Also, see Anderson, *English Consul*, 52-54.

⁴³⁶ See The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 38b.

gaining the former on its own terms. Although it did so with the necessary encouragement and assistance from others (the papal state and France primarily), repeated failures to halt the Turkish tide disrupted the trade of Venice in particular. Between 1453 (the fall of Constantinople) and 1699 (the Treaty of Carlowitz) Venetian representation in Ottoman lands was suspended due to war for a total 65 years (in 1463-1479, 1499-1503, 1537-1540, 1570-1573, 1645-1669, 1684-1699).⁴³⁷

Especially the 24-year-long Cretan war (1645-1669) proved very hard for Venetian commerce to make a comeback from. Naturally Venetian trade in Ottoman lands did not cease altogether during this period. It continued under Dutch protection, but this meant that Venetian factors, principals, producers and government had very limited control over the conditions of trade and could not shape them to sustain the political and commercial power of the Republic in a coordinated manner. It was no coincidence that when Venice reentered the trade on its own account, it found that its cloth manufactures could no longer compete against advances in English and particularly Dutch industry. Similarly, the shorter and safer distance from the Levant to Venice (although Venice's merchants successfully resisted sailing under mandatory convoy, the route was constantly patrolled by the Venetian fleet and largely bypassed North Africa's Barbary coast, the Straits of Gibraltar and the Atlantic coast), could not make up for its less effectual merchant fleet and its Ottoman customs rate of 5%. Ironically, Venice had not only supported Dutch Levant trade at its own (future) cost by taking itself out of the diplomatic equation, it had also done so by continuing the trade under the Dutch flag. Logically so, because Venetian-Dutch mutual assistance went all the way back to the arrival of Dutch trade in the Levant and since Dutch terms of trade (capitulatory privileges as well as shipping security and costs) were now the most advantageous in existence. But in this manner Venice did contribute to the undisputed Dutch primacy of the 1660s and early 70s, in the event hampering its own return to the trade in 1669.

Not only Venice's trade in general suffered from the Cretan war. The Venetian community of Izmir sustained a particularly heavy loss of size and influence. As the main naval relay between the Dardanelles and Crete, Izmir was crucial for supplying the Ottoman besiegers. Consequently, the Ottomans seized every opportunity to minimize the liability of Venetian presence and influence in the city, diplomatically and commercially as well as culturally and numerically. By the end of the war, after 24 years without a Venetian consul, there was barely any trade or nation left (see above). Furthermore, the most marked representative of Venetian cultural influence in Izmir – the

⁴³⁷ See De Groot, "Historical Development", 587-95.

Franciscan church under its protection – had been pillaged and sold to Izmir’s Greeks.⁴³⁸

When a new Venetian consul was finally appointed, the position went to one of the very few in Venetian service that had stayed on in Izmir, Francesco Luppazzoli. The new consul, though not from the senatorial order (normally a strict requirement for admission into Venetian diplomatic service) received the appointment nonetheless – a reward for “commendable diplomatic activity” (read; espionage) during the war, which also earned him a state pension. His appointment was not a particularly far-sighted move by the Republic, since the Cretan War and Luppazzoli’s contribution to it had earned Izmir’s resident Venetians the lasting hostility of the ruling Köprülü dynasty (and notably that of Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa). In hindsight it would almost seem as if the Venetians were allowed back into Köprülü-controlled Izmir for the sole purpose of being all the more easily picked clean by them as belated punishment. Still, it had been common knowledge in 1660s Frank Street that Luppazzoli – as chancellor of the Dutch consulate from 1654 until his promotion to consul in 1669 – had not pursued Dutch interests exclusively.⁴³⁹ Interestingly, among Izmir’s Europeans such apparent conflicts of interest formed precious little impediment to diplomatic functioning and Luppazzoli was allowed to continue as Venetian consul until 1702, though with an extended interruption due to renewed Ottoman-Venetian hostilities from 1684 to 1699.

In fact, behavior such as Luppazzoli’s was far more common than most official correspondences of the period would have us believe. However much at odds with the largely fictitious national unity and loyalty home governments wishfully expected from their “nations” in the Levant (and which future generations projected onto them), theirs was in fact a society replete with the tangle of identities and loyalties so apparent in the biography of Luppazzoli. Amidst our account of national differences in organization, the Venetian consul’s Mantuan youth, short-lived papal service, heavily Graecized scholarly and family life (first on Chios, then in Izmir), and lastly Dutch chancellorship *cum* Venetian secret and consular service are a useful reminder of this easily understated historical reality.⁴⁴⁰

⁴³⁸ It was subsequently purchased by Catholic Dutch factor Eduard Blijdenbergh. He reendowed it to the Franciscans, who promptly became Dutch protégés, though they eventually returned to Venetian protection in 1671: Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 126; The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 39a-b; and Johan van Droffelaar, ““Flemish Fathers” in the Levant: Dutch Protection of Three Franciscan Missions in the 17th and 18th Centuries”, in: *Eastward Bound: Dutch Ventures and Adventures in the Middle East*, eds. Geert Jan van Gelder and Ed de Moor (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1994), 81-113.

⁴³⁹ Cf. Schutte, *Repertorium*, 341; and The Hague, NA 1.03.01 123: Dutch Nation of Izmir to Jacob van Dam, 25 May 1668.

⁴⁴⁰ Cf. Anderson, *English Consul*, 50-52; Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 122-26; and The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 38b.

What did initially become an impediment to the freshly minted consul's functioning, however, was his insistence on being awarded precedence over Izmir's other consuls. Questions of precedence were deemed far more consequential than strict national loyalty and the French in particular did not take his unrealistic claim kindly, the more so since Louis XIV repeatedly ordered his diplomats in the Ottoman Empire to pursue unequivocal French primacy as a matter of principle. Eventually Luppazzoli (much like Venice in general) was forced to acknowledge the new realities of the trade and, by 1672, the recognized order was French, English, Venetian, Dutch, Genoese – a diplomatic hierarchy reflecting, firstly, constitutional seniority (of the kingdoms of France and England over the Republics of Venice, Holland and Genoa); secondly, the consuls' descent (noble as opposed to burgher); and, thirdly, the significance of their nation's trade (where the upstart, burgher, Dutch, for the moment, ruled).⁴⁴¹

As it was, appointing a representative of non-noble lineage and accepting lower diplomatic rank were not the only deviations from regular Venetian procedure and organization. According to Steensgaard's comparative analysis of the organization of the European nations in the Levant (⁴⁴²), it dictated that consuls were to belong to the aristocracy, were appointed for three years, were to have no business ties with their station, were appointed by the senate in consultation with the Cinque Savii (the Board of Commerce), enjoyed a fixed salary, could only dispose of consular duties (the *cottimo* for ordinary expenses and the *tanza* for payoffs and *avarias*) in cooperation with the nation's representatives, enjoyed no legal sources of extra income, should have their consular expenditures approved by a Council of XII from the nation pending final approval by the home authorities (the Cinque Savii, nominally the Provveditori ai Cottimi (Commissioners of the *cottimo*) and finally the Council of XII), and enjoyed no formal right to regulate trade.


In a simplified diagram Venetian consular organization might be represented as shown in Figure 1.

Note especially the absence of a structural administrative relation in Venice itself between the principals and the institutions governing the consulates. This absence seems to have contributed greatly to Venice's inability to regulate the trade and come up with viable alternative strategies to cope with mounting English and Dutch competition.

⁴⁴¹ Cf. Anderson, *English Consul*, 50n4. On the importance of protocol, esp. to the French, see pages 199-203.

⁴⁴² Niels Steensgaard, "Consuls and Nations in the Levant from 1570 to 1650", in: *Merchant Networks in the Early Modern World*, ed. Sanjay Subrahmanyam (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1996), 179-221.

FIGURE 1: VENETIAN CONSULAR ORGANIZATION (17TH CENTURY)



Steensgaard, "Consuls and Nations", 50.

Just as was the case with the Genoese consulate, the operation of the Venetian consulate of Izmir was far less formal than would have been the case in a more significant factory. Although the diagram still applies, the relative insignificance (and, hence, low income) of the consulate meant that many otherwise standard restrictions within it were relaxed. This accounts not only for the consul's non-noble lineage and low diplomatic rank, but also for his exceptionally long tenure (instead of for three-year periods), his dependence on consular duties (instead of a fixed consular salary), and his enjoying a state pension and several other sources of income (instead of having no extra-consular income).⁴⁴³ All considered, it would be remarkable if he did not hold extraordinary sway over his tiny nation, in effect regulating what little remained of Venetian trade in Izmir, being very much at liberty to dispose of the consulate's dwindling funds, and enthusiastically pursuing additional sources of income.⁴⁴⁴


If Venice's consul and nation in Izmir had considerable leeway, its measure pales in comparison to that of the French, though for entirely different reasons. In their case it was not small size that was conducive to relaxed organizational behavior, but a dysfunctional organization that made an already unwieldy French nation virtually ungovernable. Here was a large community of Frenchmen, only about half of whom were merchants and therefore could be counted on to let the trade's and home city's best interests – not to be confused with the Crown's interests – prevail. The other half consisted of trades- and craftsmen and, it was suspected, of the dregs of French society (bankrupts, deserters, thieves and the like). Representing and governing them was a consul whose administrative authority derived from a more or less regular administrative hierarchy leading down from the Crown to the com-

⁴⁴³ Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 122-26.

⁴⁴⁴ See The Hague, NA 1.03.01 123: Dutch Nation Izmir to Jacob van Dam, 25 May 1668; Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 122-26; The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 38b; De Bruyn, *Reizen*, 25; and The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacob van Dam to States General, 18 June 1675.

mercial deputies of the Marseille government, but whose financial responsibility was first and foremost to a private person: the proprietor of the tax farm that was the consulship (see Figure 2).

FIGURE 2: FRENCH CONSULAR ORGANIZATION (17TH CENTURY)



Steensgaard, “Consuls and Nations”, 53.

A French consulate was first established in Izmir during the reign of Henry IV (1553-1610; r. as Henry III king of Navarra, 1572-1610; as king of France, 1589-1610). In 1623, the consulship was fiscalized, a result of the transfer of authority from the cities to the Crown. Predictably (because it was necessary for *noblesse de robe* to guard and secure their position at court by being physically present there), the result was increasing absenteeism. Sometimes those acting as consuls were the actual proprietors of the consulship, but more often these tax farmer-consuls had their positions filled by associates fulfilling its duties as their salaried employees or as the deputies of those salaried employees. After several failed attempts to curb this absenteeist practice, it was definitively abolished in 1675.⁴⁴⁵

The French consular system had a number of inherent problems, most importantly a less than clear-cut relation between the embassy and the consulate (since the competence of its two main occupiers belonged to such different spheres), overly slow communication on matters of urgency and importance (Izmir to Istanbul by way of Paris and vice-versa), contestable diplomatic precedence and accreditation, and, last but not least, extensive

⁴⁴⁵ See Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 113n6.

borrowing, smuggling and overtaxation by deputies whose salaries (their own as well as the ones they paid to consular personnel) were insufficient since they were only a fraction of the actual consular duties accruing to the consul proper (the permitted 2% on French goods would have barely covered the consul's and the ambassador's expenses, yet 0.5% was regularly waived so as not to overburden an already fragile trade).⁴⁴⁶

During the personal rule of Louis XIV (from 1661), the problems of hierarchy, authority and finance typically caused by tax farming were exacerbated by pervasive royal meddling. The result of the Crown's efforts to maximize its influence over civic institutions, its behavior of micromanaging the fiscal administration of the realm over the heads of competent lower institutions and officials made the Izmir nation all the more unmanageable. Consular authority became increasingly dependent on the Crown (it reserved the right to assess special duties for instance), yet at the same time it proved reluctant to truly administer the consulate. As a consequence, the consul's hands were tied by the fiscal requirements of the tax farm, by the two consular auditors or "assessors" chosen from among the nation doing their most to represent its own wishes and needs, by underpaid dragomans and watchmen, by royal ambassadors who tried to recoup the excessive expenses of their unrealistic diplomacy from the Izmir nation, by the policies of Marseilles' Chamber of Commerce, and by the Crown's political interests.

It is hardly surprising that amidst this jumble of policies and jurisdictions no one knew exactly who did or did not belong to the French nation of Izmir or what their precise identities were, that conflict was rife between all parties involved, and that the French were hardly in a position to challenge Anglo-Dutch commercial primacy in a concerted fashion.⁴⁴⁷ To remedy this detrimental state of affairs, Jean-Baptiste Colbert (minister of finance from 1665 to 1683) in 1670 launched a policy with the stated ambition to capture the entire Levant trade for France. Notwithstanding very grave and recent ruptures with the Ottomans over French military and logistical assistance to the defenders of Crete, a new ambassador (De Nointel, 1670-1679) was sent to the Porte with instructions to obtain from the sultan a capitulation giving the French a full monopoly over Levant trade. Despite spending vast amounts, the less than brilliant ambassador merely managed (through the capitulation of 1673) to have affirmed and slightly enhanced French protection of Roman Catholic clergy (in Izmir; a Capuchin church with three friars and one lay brother, and a Jesuit one with three friars) and pilgrims in Otto-

⁴⁴⁶ See Anderson, *English Consul*, 62.

⁴⁴⁷ See Steensgaard, "Consuls and Nations", 51-53; Anderson, *English Consul*, 58-65; Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 113-36; and The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 23b-24b.

man lands and to obtain the long-sought reduction of customs from 5% to 3% (already acquired by the English in 1601 and by the Dutch in 1612).⁴⁴⁸

The envisioned monopoly was to be operated by a newly created French Levant Company. Instead of being awarded a full monopoly on French trade comparable to that of its English namesake and example (or a *de facto* one like the much-admired Dutch variant discussed below), this company was set up to lure merchants into government-controlled joint stock by offering export bounties and free loans for exporters of Languedoc cloth and high tariffs and embargoes for foreign trade (a mercantilist import-substituting policy called “Colbertism”). Until French cloth industry and Levant trade really took off in the early eighteenth century most merchants continued to prefer the freedom of their old trade however, especially since French cloth and shipping was still so easily undercut by the English and the Dutch. French Levant merchants must have seen little purpose in giving up their lucrative Greek and Armenian carrying trade and attacking foreign supremacy with their own products for the common good of France (or, rather, of the Crown’s finances), but at the price of personal bankruptcy. Struggling since its inception and having proven itself unable even to profit from the reduction in Ottoman customs or from the Dutch War laying waste to Dutch trade (1672-1678), Colbert’s Levant Company was liquidated in 1678.

The master plan also included changes in the administration of Izmir’s French. To enhance the Crown’s jurisdiction over the nation, the national assemblies which had sprung up (in response to mismanagement or out of sheer independence) were suppressed in 1670. At the same time Colbert instructed biannual censuses (see note 423) of the nation to be conducted by the consul and forwarded to the ambassador in Istanbul and himself in Paris. But even had he wanted to, Colbert himself could not have the all-pervasive and lucrative *Ancien Régime*-practice of tax farming discontinued. (In fact, discontent about its injustices would go on to become one of the driving forces behind the French Revolution.) So instead of doing away with the problematic split administration, his efforts in this area were necessarily limited to imposing a forbidding 10,000-*livre* fine on absenteeism in 1675. Being more than three times the sum he paid to acting consul Chambon annually (his 3,000 *livres* equaled about 1,000 dollars), this duly prompted consul Henri Dupuy (whose family had held the post since 1624) to return to his post. He would stay on there until his death in 1683.⁴⁴⁹

⁴⁴⁸ See Vandal, *Odyssée d’un ambassadeur*; throughout; Duparc’s *Recueil des instructions* 29, i-50; Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 114-16; and pages 199-203.

⁴⁴⁹ See note 445. On tax-farming and the French Revolution, cf., e.g., Gail Bossenga, “Financial Origins of the French Revolution”, in: *From Deficit to Deluge: The Origins of the French Revolution*, eds. Thomas E. Kaiser and Dale K. van Kley (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 37-66.

In the end, Colbert's measures (though laying the groundwork for the 18th-century boom in French cloth production and trade) produced precious little initial effects. In Izmir they merely succeeded in replacing a perfectly good deputy consul, Louis Chambon, with a rather feeble tax farmer. Indeed, the French nation lost little of its unruliness, trade continued to be conducted in a haphazard manner, and France's merchant fleet remained overly light, heavily overmanned and largely unescorted. More fundamentally, French Levant merchants continued to place little trust in French cloth (instead resorting to importing felt caps and currency of often doubtful quality), Armenian merchants continued to load French hulls with Armenian silks, and the trade consequently continued to be outmaneuvered by the Atlantic competitors. In diplomacy, the haughty manners and imperious demands of Louis XIV's ambassadors continued to make them impossible in the eyes of Ottoman officials and French merchants alike. French commerce was far from done suffering for the magnificence of the most Christian king.


The English of course had their own eventful royal history to contend with. Between the commencement of permanent Anglo-Ottoman relations (sealed by the capitulation of 1580) and our year 1678 the English Levant merchant had to navigate a change of dynasty (Tudor to Stuart in 1603), a civil war (1642-1651), a republican period (1649-1660), and a restoration (1660). Although especially the civil war and the republican period had their repercussions in the Levant – rival ambassadors being dispatched to Istanbul, Englishmen attacking each other in Frank Street, insurance rates soaring ⁽⁴⁵⁰⁾ – the English generally attempted to receive news of important events with protest or merriment (as with the Treaties of Nijmegen/Nimégue in 1678-1679⁴⁵¹) only to move on quickly to the more pressing business of making money. In fact, the English maintained the primacy of trade over politics whenever circumstances permitted it.

Instrumental in implementing and guarding this primacy was the English Levant Company. Founded as a chartered joint-stock company in 1581, it became a regulated monopoly in 1588 and continued as a regulated company from around 1595. The Company is regarded by both contemporary and modern observers to be the secret behind English success in the Levant. A glance at Figure 3 will easily reveal the most obvious advantage of organizing the trade through a single company.

⁴⁵⁰ See Wood, *History of the Levant Company*, 80-94; Daniel Goffman, *Britons in the Ottoman Empire, 1642-1660* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998); and Jonathan I. Israel, "Trade, Politics and Strategy: The Anglo-Dutch Wars in the Levant (1645-1675)", in: *Friends and Rivals*, 11-23.

⁴⁵¹ See The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 23b; and De Bruyn, *Reizen*, 151.

FIGURE 3: ENGLISH CONSULAR ORGANIZATION (17TH CENTURY)



Steensgaard, "Consuls and Nations", 51.

Because government stepped back and left a sufficiently chartered company of professional merchants with private interest in the trade to its own devices, the Levant trade could be run in a comparatively rational and professional manner. The Company's operation was fully funded through impositions on imports and exports in London, consular duties ("consulage") in the scales, and fines ("brokes") for violations of its statutes. Government interference was limited to the regulatory framework and general trade policy within which the Company was allowed to conduct its affairs. In the question of safe passage through the waters of the North Sea, the Eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean – infested with the navies and corsairs of the Dutch Republic, France, Italy and Barbary (Ottoman North Africa and Morocco) – national and private interests and responsibilities converged at their fullest.

The merchants of Genoa, Venice and France had successfully opposed the introduction of sailing in regular fleets because of the costs involved. Apart from the costs of organizing, maintaining and enforcing it, they foresaw significant commercial losses. Rightly so, for in their non-regulated trades it would have been impossible to control buying and selling to such a degree that their factors in Izmir would not try to outbid and underbid each other. The wholly foreseeable drop in prices that would result from factors outdoing each other in rushing an entire convoy's cargo to the market and the buying frenzy they would unleash in their competitive quest for return cargo would have annihilated their already weak trades. In the English case, however, the Company monopoly ensured that the organizational costs of organizing, maintaining and enforcing a convoy system remained moderate, while its policy of encouraging cartel formation by the English nations in the Levant avoided uncoordinated flooding of its markets and explosive price rises due to undue competition in buying. English "Smyrna fleets" consisting of fully loaded, lightly manned, well-fitted and large-hulled merchant ships were dispatched under government-paid naval escort twice a year. Any additional costs were generally more than compensated by the resulting drop in English insurance rates and the consequent increase in English and third-party (strangers) trade.

The English nations receiving and returning cargoes in the Levant meanwhile consisted entirely of Company members and candidate-members; factors trading on commission-basis and principals trading on their own account making up the first category, apprentices to either of the previous

making up the second. All had investments in stock or premiums considerable enough to guarantee their abiding by the Company's laws and regulations. And if they did not, the Company was fully authorized to impose damaging fines or boycotts that would quickly return them to the fold.⁴⁵²

With regard to the appointment and instruction of ambassadors and consuls the English followed the practice established by other states; i.e. the right to the former belonged to the highest political body of the central government (here; the Crown in conjunction with the Secretary of State), that to the latter to the highest available body representing mercantile interests (here; the Company). Nor was it unique to have the ambassador receive his salary of 10,000 dollars a year from the Company whose interests he primarily represented, instead of from the government that appointed and instructed him. Although paying for the appointment of an unfit ambassador could cause unrest among Levant merchants, the system did have the advantage of an embassy that was necessarily inclined to balance very carefully the interests of the Crown against those of the mighty Company.⁴⁵³

But it was in the administration of the consulates that the advantages of the Company monopoly were most apparent. The affairs of other nations were often severely hampered by internal strife. For the most part, this was due to their consuls' dependence on consular duties ("consulage"). Consular officials (usually the treasurers) estimated these duties on incoming and outgoing goods of the nation by inspecting the manifests and bills of lading after they had passed customs (or, in case of suspected evasion, through physical inspection of the goods loaded and unloaded), and collected them from their nations. The merchants of the other nations generally proved reluctant to give honest accounts of their transactions or downright refused to pay the estimated duties, declaring with or without reason that consul and treasurer had colluded to unjustly increase them. Precisely because of the temptations for abuse that the consulship would otherwise offer, consuls were universally withheld the near-dictatorial power that would be required to compel full payment of duties.

The Levant Company solved this dilemma by disentangling the financial interests of the consulates (of Aleppo-Alexandretta, Izmir and Alexandria) firmly from the private interests of its occupants. English consuls as well as their treasurers, secretaries and chaplains were all full Company employees. As such, they were prohibited from enjoying any trade-related secondary sources of income and were dissuaded from pursuing them anyway by uniquely adequate salaries: the English consul in Izmir received 2,000 dollars

⁴⁵² On the organization of the English Levant trade and diplomacy, see, generally, North, *Life*; Abbott, *Under the Turk*; Wood, *History of the Levant Company*; and Anderson, *English Consul*. The summary *supra* and *infra* is largely based on these sources.

⁴⁵³ See Abbott, *Under the Turk*, 7.

a year with a 1,000-dollar gratuity (roughly equaling the consulate's total income from consulage), the treasurer 600 dollars with a 100-dollar gratuity, the chancellor 200 dollars plus a 5 dollar bonus at the New Year, and the chaplain 200 dollars with another 200-dollar as gratuity. Because English consular staff did not depend on consulage for its personal livelihood and was rewarded for duties properly fulfilled (that is, irrespective of private or professional conflicts with the consul), English consular administration could function with all internal checks and balances in working order and in relative harmony with the factors it administered.⁴⁵⁴

The professionalism of English consular organization in Izmir extended to the employment of its relatively well-paid native staff of translators and guards. Like other consuls, the English were accorded a two-man guard from the local Janissary regiment to protect the consulate and its officials when they ventured beyond Frank Street. Their basic salary of 136 dollars was augmented with 15 dollars at the New Year, 10 dollars (plus 8 dollars from each of the other consuls) at the Islamic Festival of Sacrifice (T. *Kurban Bayramı*; A. *‘Id ul’ Adha*), 2 dollars in port charges from every English ship, and a horse each maintained at the consul's expense.

Notwithstanding being provided with an adequate guard, European diplomats were expected to minimize direct contact with Ottoman officials. To prevent any unnecessary devaluation of their office they left as much of the daily business of representation to their dragomans. These not only served as translators pure and simple but were interpreters in the fullest sense of the word, also acting as attachés and political advisors. The English employed three to five at regular salaries of 400, 300 and 200 dollars with New Years' bonuses of 25 dollars (and 15 dollars from the other consuls), 12 dollars in port charges, and additional gratuities for various commercial services rendered.

Ottoman Greeks from the Homero family invariably served as chief dragomans of the English, with Ottoman Armenians from time to time filling junior dragomanships. The choice naturally fell on these minorities since Jews – banned wholesale from England until 1654 and overly implicated in Izmir's Turkish affairs – were considered unlikely candidates for positions requiring such a degree of confidentiality and loyalty. As for non-Ottomans, the Levant Company expressly precluded Izmir's Genoese and Venetians from entering English consular service, while experiments with bringing up young boys as interpreters failed due to lack of interest or funding.

⁴⁵⁴ According to De Hochepeid: 3000 eight-reals and free rent for consul, plus a portion of strangers' consulage; the treasurer collects consular duties towards the salary of the chaplain; the treasurer is appointed for two years and receives 600 rix-dollars annually, and a Janissary guard; the Company pays for dragomans and janissaries, and for ordinary expenses (The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 24b-25a).

Even if Ottoman subjects' handling daily diplomatic affairs caused some apprehension, employing local Christians did have important advantages too. Although they might have been more amenable to pressure from Ottoman officials and would prudently water down their masters' more abrasive communications or even give up sensitive information under threat, they were certainly less expensive than specially trained European counterparts could ever be and had a far more intimate knowledge of the local political, economic and social configuration. For these cheaper as well as better interpreters, the 3% customs rate from which they profited as English protégés commanded its own loyalty. Senior dragomans regularly became the wealthiest merchants of their communities and facilitated or handled consignments for many of their coreligionists on the vessels of the nation employing them.

In fact, in the years leading up to 1678 English shipping was so successful that it came to hold a near-monopoly on third-party carrying. Granted by the sultan as the privilege to protect the merchants and goods of nations that held no capitulations, in Dutch and English hands it came to apply equally to the goods of protégés and members of other capitulatory nations that wished to consign by their companies and/or carriers. As more and more merchants from the Ottoman minorities as well as from protected and unprotected European nations chose Dutch and English factors and ships for their low customs, freight and insurance rates, the consulage collected from these "strangers" became an increasingly important source of income. Strangers' consulage also provided them with the means to regulate other nations' Levant trades to their own advantage. Because of this double advantage it became the weapon of choice in the fiscal battle that was waged within the wider Anglo-Dutch war for commercial supremacy (of which the English Navigation Acts of 1651, 1660, 1663 and the Anglo-Dutch wars of 1652-1654, 1665-1667, 1672-1674 were the most conspicuous manifestations).

The fiscal policies the Company adopted in its quest to fully supplant the Dutch followed a typically monopolistic pattern. With the dispatching of Paul Rycout on the heels of the English defeat in the second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-1667) to take up the position of English consul in Izmir, the Company embarked on a consistent if somewhat fitful adjustment of its fiscal regime to capture and incorporate as much shipping as possible. The Izmir consulate over which Rycout was to preside until 1678 was central to the operation since that scale was the undisputed center of Dutch Levant trade. First, in 1668, Rycout was instructed to lower strangers' consulage on exports from Izmir from 4% to 2% at his discretion, in effect bringing it to the same level as regular "national" consulage. Then, in 1670, instructions followed to extend protection not only to English ships and any foreign goods they might carry, but to any ship that chose to sail into port flying English colors – but with the proviso that its actions or cargo would not provoke an Ottoman *avania*, which left foreign captains and merchants to choose between the indisputably low costs of English protection and the

theoretically fuller security of another consul's. Next, in 1671, the Company did away with the penalizing double consulage for private shipping (i.e. English merchants consigning Company goods by private ships instead of by Company, or "general" ships), lowering that to 2% as well, thereby encouraging an overall growth in the volume of English shipping. In 1673, consulage on general ships was lowered even further, to 1% – a record low with which even the Dutch could not compete. And finally, in 1674, the lowering of strangers' consulage from 4% to 2% was extended to include not only strangers' exports from Izmir (since 1668), but also strangers' imports.

In tandem with the very real Third Anglo-Dutch War the English waged against the Republic from 1672 to 1674 (as part of the larger Allied-Dutch War of 1672-1678), these commercial policies succeeded in hindering Dutch shipping to such a degree that Izmir's Dutch factors were compelled to use English carriers to save their trade. By the time of the Treaty of Westminster (ending the Third Anglo-Dutch War, 1674) English trade in the Mediterranean had become larger than that of all other nations combined. At that point, having laid waste to the shipping of all other nations and consequently holding what amounted to a monopoly over the entire Levant trade, the Levant Company could no longer resist its monopolistic impulses and reversed its fiscal policy to extract maximum profit from its advantage in the face of the resurgent Dutch. In 1677 the Company determined that Izmir's foreign merchants, still heavily dependent on English shipping and protection, would henceforth pay consulage at double the rate reserved for English merchants. An additional increase (to 4%) on cargoes shipped to destinations north of Cape Finisterre (on the far northwestern coast of Spain) other than London, also aimed at once to make more money from the carrying trade, to promote English trade and to reduce the commerce of other nations. Both measures appear to have contributed significantly to the strong comeback of Dutch trade from 1677/78 onwards.

The coping stone of a professional English management of consular affairs was the way in which sudden financial shortfalls were met. Even though a shortage of consular funds was dangerous because it hindered or suspended the meeting of Ottoman financial demands, empty consular coffers were never an excuse to levy additional taxes from English shipping, even if the addition concerned came in the form of an advance. Where other nations would all-too-often take recourse to such measures, or borrow the necessary funds from Ottoman (Jewish) financiers against Turkish rates of interest (of 18% and upwards), the Levant Company successfully prohibited both. Instead, it organized a fixed procedure for raising money that was both voluntary, inexpensive and relatively quick. The key was that both the debt and its fulfillment against interest were moved from the Ottoman Empire to England, where it would not unnecessarily impair diplomatic relations: extraordinary expenses were advanced by the factory members (i.e. factors) and notice thereof sent to general court of the Levant Company in London, whereupon

the London merchants (i.e. principals) subscribed to the accumulated debt at a moderate 5-6% rate of interest which was fulfilled by the Company, in effect making it a Company debt.

If there is one aspect to their trade where the Dutch failed miserably, it was this. For all their disinterest in ideology, status or rank, Dutch merchants were interested above all in the one form of competition that truly mattered to them; that for commerce. In their uphill struggle to achieve it against the more legitimate, powerful and centralized states of France and England, loyalty to their nation and deference to their appointed superiors suffered more systematically than in any other nation. Although its trade's loose organization (and the abundant room for individual initiative it afforded) contributed significantly to Dutch success, it also made it exceedingly difficult to organize the trade and respond to challenges against it in a structurally sustainable manner. Most of the time though, some balance between personal and state interests was attained, be it at often great personal cost of the officials caught in-between. It was on them that both sides implicitly counted to unite conflicting interests through mediation and the slight manipulation of rules and laws.⁴⁵⁵

Particularly during the 17th-century heyday of Dutch trade, the pressure put on Dutch consular officials was enormous. In contrast to that of the Dutch East Indies trade or the English Levant trade, the organizational underpinnings of Dutch Levant trade did not predate or coincide with the full establishment of trade. Dutch Levant trade had started in the 1580s under foreign (English and French) protection and had already become considerable enough by the early years of the Twelve Years' Truce with Spain (1609-1621) to merit the States-General's pursuing and acquiring its first Ottoman capitulation in 1612 to the dismay of the English and French. Although the capitulation formalized Ottoman-Dutch relations and called for a proper hierarchy of representation to be established, having a representative in Istanbul and consuls and deputies in the factories did not amount to organizing the trade.

For the duration of the truce Dutch Levant trade was predominantly left to the merchants of Holland and Zeeland, with Dutch diplomatic officials functioning in a supporting capacity rather than in a regulatory one. The resumption of Spanish-Dutch hostilities made this relatively cheap and loosely organized regime untenable, however. The passage along the French and Spanish coasts, the Strait of Gibraltar and through the corsair-infested Mediterranean had been wrought with difficulties even during the truce, but to make it through Spanish waters now required a whole other level of pro-

⁴⁵⁵ Cf. *supra* on consul Van Dam's impossible position as a collector of arrears who was deliberately kept impotent.

tection. Simultaneously, even the States General's practice of sending naval squadrons to patrol the Atlantic and the Mediterranean for corsairs and other enemy ships preying on Dutch merchantmen was no longer tenable, since the Dutch navy was pinned down defending Dutch waters.⁴⁵⁶

A solution for the merchants' increased need for protection and the navy's decreased availability was sought in convoying. In 1623 the States General obliged shipping companies to equip their vessels according to fixed standards checked and maintained by the Admiralty.⁴⁵⁷ Though they had to do so at their own cost, the Admiralty consequently assigned contingents of sailors free of charge. It soon became apparent however that the convoying regulations could hardly be enforced through the Admiralty's power alone. Because a sizeable percentage of companies and ship masters took their chances and evaded the costs of submitting to regulation, they could carry against unfairly reduced rates but at undue risk for consigning merchants and insurers. The dangers posed by rogue traders prompted the Dutch ambassador in Istanbul to request the States General to consider establishing a regulatory body of senior merchants to organize and represent Dutch Mediterranean trade.⁴⁵⁸ Within two months, the resident's missive from April 1625 was followed up with a similar request from the principal merchants of Amsterdam. Though addressed to the States General, the government of Amsterdam's underwriting it preemptively established a central Amsterdam leg, or "chamber", for the projected organization:

Burgomaster and governors of the city of Amsterdam authorize and commission Albert Schuyt, Hillebrand den Otter, Elias Trip, Gerrit Hudden, Marcus Vogelaer, Philippo Calandrini and Jan Bicker, to oversee the equipage of all ships bound for the Mediterranean and the Archipelago, to visitate and examine their patents and consignments, to correspond with the resident and consuls in the Levant and Barbaray, and to procure everything they consider necessary to maintain the basbas and principals of Algiers and Tunis. (Signed 25 June 1625.)⁴⁵⁹

⁴⁵⁶ On the organization of the Dutch Levant trade and diplomacy, see, generally, Heeringa, *Bronnen* 1 and 2. The summary *supra* and *infra* is largely based on these sources.

⁴⁵⁷ See Heeringa, *Bronnen* 1, 838.

⁴⁵⁸ "... eenige van de ervaerenste ende princpaelste cooplydens tot Ambstelredam, op Italia ende Levant handelende, t'authoriseren, om behoorlijk regard te nemen op de uuytrustinge van alle schepen, die nae de Straet vaeren, sorge te draegen voor haere veseeckeringhe met het visiteren ende examineren van de patenten ende cognossemerten, correspondentie te houden met den orateur ende consuls van Levante ende Barbarije ...": Heeringa, *Bronnen* 1, 963; Cornelis Haga to States General, 5 April 1625.

⁴⁵⁹ "Burgermeesters ende regeerders der stede Amsterdam authoriseren ende commiteren Albert Schuyt, Hillebrand den Otter, Elias Trip, Gerrit Hudden, Marcus Vogelaer, Philippo Calandrini ende Jan Bicker, om behoorlijk regard te nemen op de uytrustinge van alle de schepen, die in de Middelandse see ende Archipelago varen, hare patenten ende cognossemerten te visiteren ende examineren, mitten heere orateur ende consuls van Levanten ende Barbarijen correspondentien te houden ende voorts alles anders te procureren, dat sijlyuden

Set up as a municipal board, the “Directie van de Levantse Handel en de Navigatie op de Middellandse Zee” (“Board of Levant Trade and Navigation in the Mediterranean Sea”, commonly abbreviated to DLH in Dutch) in fact acquired national authority upon ratification by the States General. Reimbursed for their efforts and expenses through surcharges on vessels bound for and from the Mediterranean, its directors were to oversee their proper mustering, equipage, insurance and taxation. As its advisory and coordinating role in relations between the States General, the Admiralty, provinces, cities, and other municipal and port authorities on the one hand, and principals, factors and consuls in the Mediterranean on the other, developed in the course of the century, the DLH’s authority evolved into a political and semi-legislative one.


Originally set up primarily to coordinate Levant trade-related affairs in Holland, by the 1670s and 80s the DLH’s involvement with the factories had become so intensive that it was in regular correspondence with consular officials and actively designed, promoted and supervised the standardization of the factories’ commercial, fiscal and administrative practices, the States General increasingly merely signing off on decisions previously made by the directors in Amsterdam city hall. Far from being coincidental, this development (which we would nowadays call “mission creep”) was condoned by the States General. They now had at their disposal a commission that managed Ottoman-Dutch trade, free of charge, yet bound to take full account of The Hague’s diplomatic considerations and needs. At the same time the Levant merchants and their cities and provinces were not unduly provoked by perceived authoritarianism because – officially – the directors were not in the States General’s service and had no authority beyond that which they themselves accorded them.

The resulting organization of Dutch Levant trade is represented in the diagram below. Most conspicuous is the absence of a link between the directorate and the nations. This can be attributed to the fact that the DLH’s jurisdiction over them was indirect at best. The majority of Dutch factors in the scales were deputies of the principal merchants in the Republic and were primarily answerable to those. The DLH’s legal authority over them was limited to commercial practice and regulation (through the consul), and – as we have seen above – even that authority was often very much in dispute.

That the relatively low-powered DLH came to be the central authority in Dutch Levant trade, having to establish itself over, and coordinate from the midst of, a web of institutions and persons over which it could claim little seniority or authority had advantages as well as, obviously, disadvantages.

tot onderhoudinghe van bassas ende principaelen van Algiers ende Tunis nodigh achten sullen. ... Actum den 25 Junij 1625”: Heeringa, *Bronnen* 1, 968-69.

FIGURE 4: DUTCH CONSULAR ORGANIZATION (17TH CENTURY)



Steensgaard, "Consuls and Nations", 48.

On the positive side its establishment as a committee or board (and not a full-fledged government agency or independent company) made its operation far less expensive and cumbersome. At no cost to the States General and the provinces, at minimal cost to the cities housing DLH-chambers, and at fairly modest cost to the trade that provided the DLH with funds, Holland and Zeeland gained a well-organized, secured and insured operation with lobbying and policymaking capacity that was nevertheless still freely accessible to merchants and investors. Beyond the immediate advantages of heightened controls on mustering, equipage, insurance and taxation, these measures also had another (longer term) advantage: to reduce the costs of mandatory mustering and equipage per unit of cargo Levant merchants quickly switched to ships with bigger holds and more guns. These could barely outrun threats, but made up for this defect with relatively small crews that could nevertheless wield enormous firepower. This inadvertent advantage in the development of Dutch Mediterranean shipping would go on to make it so cost-effective and competitive as to form a severe threat to Italian, French and English shipping well into the 18th century.

All consequences on the negative side of the equation were a direct consequence of the almost organic evolution of the DLH as the central authority in Dutch Levant trade. As this fledgling organization tried to assert itself over a trade that predated and outstripped it, its ambassador and merchants can be forgiven for primarily regarding it as a vehicle for their specific wishes and demands, as in turn might the burgomasters of cities housing chambers, the States of Holland and Zeeland, and the States General. In any case, whatever the directors' intentions or the institutional, political and diplomatic merits of their policies, their limited mandate would continue to haunt them for the duration of the 17th century.

But no one felt the very real consequences of the theoretical gap between authority and ambition, loyalty to the trade and subservience to the state quite as keenly as the consul of the largest Dutch Levantine factory; Izmir. He was initially appointed through an overly elaborate procedure: candidacy by the directors, approval by the burgomasters of Amsterdam, final selection

by the States of Holland, confirmation by the States General ⁽⁴⁶⁰⁾ – and all this in contravention of the capitulatory stipulation that the appointment of consuls was in fact the ambassador's prerogative. Plagued with a structural lack of legal jurisdiction, of political authority, of means for enforcement and – most importantly – of personal as well as consular funds (for both of which he was entirely dependent on consular funds, which was collectible only with explicit consent from the consulate's three independently elected assessors) his position was the one where Dutch administrative decentralization came into full contact with the reality of a strong and independent community of expatriates. The nation seemed determined to systematically defraud its consul of his income through chronic under-declaring and endless bickering over consular and national expenses. At the same time the directors adamantly refused to take sole fiscal responsibility for consular affairs (for example, through awarding fixed salaries and reserving funds for extraordinary, emergency, expenses). Yet, he *was* counted on by both parties to act in their best interests, which made fulfillment of the office a high-wire act that required very loyal, skillful, diplomatic yet forceful occupants. As it was, the skills of those found were often insufficient.

After the establishment of the directorate in 1625, the growing importance of the Dutch Izmir trade, coupled with the increasing requirement for its consul to function as a governor abroad rather than as a purely local representative of his merchants' interests, conspired to make hiring foreign locals (from 1618 to 1633 the Venetian Nicolo Orlando and from 1635 to 1657 the Greek Duca di Giovanni) less desirable.⁴⁶¹ From 1656 onward, the consulship would no longer go to foreign incumbents who were highly versed in mercantile matters and well-connected to Ottoman officials, but to patricians, burghers and lawyers brought over from the Netherlands (while members of the Dutch nation from time to time observed it *ad interim*). With little to no connections to the trade or to the Izmir nation, and expected to be all the more faithful to the directors and resident to which they owed their office, Dutch consuls would now be better positioned to gradually establish the home authorities' prerogatives and objectively implement stricter and more uniform rules and principles. Or so it was thought.

After two less successful consulships (that of Michiel du Mortier from 1657 to 1661 and of Gerard Smits from 1662 to 1668) the unlucky task would fall to Utrecht lawyer Jacob van Dam, consul from 1668 to 1687. As he set about attempting to impose consecutive layers of administrative controls on a community that balked at seeing its former liberties diminished by the merchants and governments back home, his long-drawn consulship

⁴⁶⁰ See J.W. Samberg, *De hollandsche gereformeerde gemeente te Smirna: de geschiedenis eener handelskerk* (Leiden: Eduard IJdo, 1928), 29.

⁴⁶¹ Cf. Schutte, *Repertorium*, 331-34.

became entirely marred by the unceasing and oftentimes extreme enmity between his nation and himself.⁴⁶² The way the organization of Dutch trade was made up along the way of its greatest successes had borne a peculiar mixture of mandatory participation and official organization on the one hand, and private initiative and informal organization on the other. It was this failure of the decentralized and heavily factionalized governing institutions of the Dutch Republic to clearly delimit and communicate the jurisdictions and administrative forms involved, to which Dutch commercial and community life in Izmir owed its peculiarly quarrelsome and anarchical character.

This organizational overview of Izmir's European communities concludes our survey of what we have (somewhat misleadingly) called the 'demography' of European Izmir, that is to say; a survey of the various communities (and individuals) of which it was made up, of the specific ways in which these were confronted with, and reacted to, the increasing pressures brought to bear on them from the countries under which they resorted, from their Ottoman context, and from the specific segments of the mutual trade they sought to dominate. It should by now be very clear that this was actually a nationally, culturally, socially and economically diverse collective, whose shrinking yet professionalizing parts were feeling their way through systemic changes – with very different responses to their Ottoman surroundings as a result. Let us next see what we can say about their geographic distribution, along Frank Street, but also in relation to the adjacent Ottoman quarters.

Geography


Despite the abundance of European sources from and on Izmir it is equally challenging to attempt a rudimentary topography of the city's 17th-century European quarter as it has been for the Ottoman quarter. As is to be expected of an Ottoman administration that had a decidedly *laissez-faire* attitude towards the inner workings of its non-Ottoman quarters, it left precious little relevant documents for us to peruse. Nevertheless, European sources do not yield significantly more detailed or accurate information. Delighting in general references to Frank Street's landmarks and cosmopolitan character, it appears Europeans' interest in *their* neighborhood's Greek-Armenian urban hinterland was not significantly greater than that displayed by Ottoman contemporaries. In fact, European observers remain tantalizingly vague even on the more modest and common aspects of life in Frank Street itself.

Our discussion of the geography of European Izmir will therefore necessarily be very limited and highly inferred. Even so, it will yield a topography of the quarter's main structures, as well as roughly delineate the distribution

⁴⁶² See Appendix 2, Documents 4 and 7 and *supra*.

When we insert De Bruyn's numerals in our edited version of Graves' map of Izmir to more readily understand the relative locations of the identified landmarks, the result is Map 15 below.

MAP 15: MAP OF STRUCTURES AND LOCATIONS IDENTIFIED BY DE BRUYN (1678)



Based on Maps 5, 11 and 12.

Galland, our other most instructive 17th-century visitor, has left us no such panorama. Still, the unusual detail of his description of the city, and of its seaside in particular, complements De Bruyn's quite well by also moving beyond the immediate shore, as well as by giving some more general insights into the workings of the European quarter. From his description ⁽⁴⁶⁵⁾ we may add that;

- the *vezirhan* (no. 14) was reserved for Armenian merchants (106);
- the governor's mansion was located on the shore of the inner harbor on a square right behind the lower castle, which also boasted a mod-

⁴⁶⁵ Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*.

- est mosque, an elegant fountain and Izmir's wood market (wood being of particular importance to the fleet building governor, or *derya bey*) (110);
- the Capuchin French parochial church was just across the street from the French consulate (to which it was connected by a traverse) and had its own cemetery (114-116);
 - there was also a French Jesuit "church" (housed in a large house) with garden somewhere along Frank Street's quayside, with ground floor shop- and storerooms being leased out (116);
 - on the landward side of Frank Street there was also a Franciscan Venetian church with cemetery (126);
 - Frank Street counted three officially sanctioned ovens: one in the Greek *khan*, an older English one and a French one established only after the Candian war had ended (the Ottoman authorities had previously refused the French their own oven for fear of its products being employed to sustain the Venetian defenders of Candia) (145);
 - there were a number of bars ("cabarets") on Frank Street, the popularity of which among European as well as Barbary corsairs caused trouble with some regularity (133), and
 - the houses along Frank Street were all on lease from Ottoman owners (since non-Muslim foreigners were not allowed to hold real estate in Ottoman lands) and thus constituted a major source of income for the well-to-do Turks of Izmir (144).⁴⁶⁶

The topographical detail provided by De Bruyn and Galland represent the limits of a feasible topography of Frank Street as it existed in 1678 (as well as adding some interesting details to that of adjoining quarters). A good many other sources provide further information on the street and its inhabitants, but theirs is invariably topographically or generally imprecise and is best employed for added context only.

Our rudimentary topography of Frank Street begs a number of questions; most importantly, what does the distribution of the fully identified structures on the seaward side of the street tell us and, secondly, what, then, was the situation on the landward side of the street?

Distribution

In all descriptions of European Izmir – be they practical or literary – the consulates along Frank Street invariably receive the most attention. This is for a number of rather straightforward reasons: because their size and flagging made them the most visible and recognizable European buildings when approaching the city from the sea; because arriving travelers were expected

⁴⁶⁶ Cf. notes 181 and 433.

and required to seek lodging, patronage and protection at their consulate (i.e. to matriculate); and because the consulates were (or were supposed to be) the main focus of their stay as well as of their national loyalty and pride. Together with the churches (second only in the attention bestowed on them) the consulates constituted the backbone of the respective European communities or nations and as a result are at the center of our understanding of Frank Street.

Being national symbols though, an awful lot of the consulates' (and the churches') more mundane goings on have remained hidden from sight. We have at our disposal many reports of consular and national meetings, a couple of anecdotal references to meals at the consular table, to festivities and to religious services and precious few hints (mostly in descriptions of the extraordinary measures taken to avoid plague infection) at what went on in the consulates' storage and private rooms, in their gardens and on their jetties. One can only guess at the reasons for this, but most likely what went on there concerned the private lives of consular staff and was (alas!) deemed too prosaic to deserve mention, or was indelicate, illicit or plain illegal. What is revealed to us, then, is mostly the public outer shell of the consular institution.

Still, even that outer shell can serve an analytical purpose. Granted, we have no information on the exact lineup of buildings along (sections of) Frank Street. Yet our awareness of the relative prominence and location of the consulates, as well as of what Ottoman quarters with what functions and institutions bordered which section of Frank Street, may be combined to provide a degree of topographical context for otherwise tantalizingly vague references to the clustering of nationalities and professions and to the locations of minor chapels, merchants' houses, shops and bars. The question of centrality is of key importance in attempting this.

Like any city Izmir had parts that were deemed to be more desirable to work or live in than others – i.e. that best suited the specific wishes and purposes of certain groups of inhabitants (and visitors). And like any neighborhood the European quarter had streets and stretches of streets more desirable than others. European sources are very clear on the fact that the most desirable (and, only?) street of the European quarter was Frank Street and that the seaside of the street was more desirable than the landward side. The mansions along the shore had direct, private, access to the outer harbor and their ground level warehouses, gardens and jetties were therefore ideally positioned to move goods from and to ships quickly, easily and – more interestingly – at any hour and under the cloak of darkness. At the same time, the seaward side of the street offered some distance from the stresses of ethno-religious cohabitation and the real and imagined dangers of plague, fire and Ottoman “violence” (read; jurisdiction!) that roamed the indigenous city beyond Frank Street.

Undesirable as we might expect some to have found too close a proximity to the non-Frankish and particularly the non-Christian quarters, not being too far removed from them certainly had its advantages. This not only applied to vicinity to the Greek and Armenian quarters, but certainly also to the Jewish and the Turkish. As the Europeans depended on the former for personal services, industrial production and mercantile mediation, they did on the latter for luxury imports (through the caravan trade) and for financial, administrative, legal and diplomatic services. Their dependence only increased when, between 1675 and 1678 the Köprülüs decisively moved to gain administrative and even physical control over European trade by having it flow through the administrative and commercial institutions of its endowment (see above, and esp. De Bruyn's nos. 12, 13 and 14).

Weighing the various advantages and disadvantages of certain locations along Frank Street against each other, consuls and well-to-do merchants generally preferred to set up house on the southernmost end of Frank Street's seaside. The advantages were several: a private garden and quay, proximity to the Greek center (east and northeast of the Saint George and the Saint Photina), easy access to the *rue des Arméniens* (⁴⁶⁷), and thereby to the Armenian center east of the St. Stephen, as well as to the caravan bridge and the countryside beyond. More crucially, the southern end of Frank Street opened unto the newly renovated Ottoman commercial quarter of Kasap Hazır and lay within carting distance of its customs house, warehouses and markets. How successful the Köprülüs' regrafting of Izmir's international economy, away from the European quarter and onto this Ottoman quarter, was, can be gleaned not just from the rapid establishment, enforcement and acceptance of the new customs house and its procedures in 1675, but also more convincingly from the fact that, in 1678, a freshly arrived De Hochepeid could already innocently remark that...

*near the customs house two large fireproof hans (being closed living and commercial quarters with many rooms) have been contracted for the convenience of the merchants; the first being called the bedestan and the second the vezirhan, the latter containing two floors, where many European merchants have their warehouses, the rest being inhabited by Armenians, Persians and other foreign nations, who use it to keep the goods they direct to Izmir by caravans from Persia and other places.*⁴⁶⁸

Located at the far southern end of Frank Street's seaside, the French and English consulates occupied superior if somewhat exposed positions. Both suffered repeatedly at the hands of drunken and rowdy bands of European and North-African sailors and corsairs, but apparently that was not felt to

⁴⁶⁷ See Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 88.

⁴⁶⁸ My italics. The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 42b.

outweigh the advantages offered by simultaneous proximity to the Greek, Armenian, Jewish and Turkish sections of town.

How then, did the French and English manage to occupy such prime locations? Was it because their presence went furthest back, or because they were the mightier or wealthier nations, or because of any combination of these possible reasons? Not necessarily, or even likely. An explanation should rather be sought in the importance they accorded to the projection of their wealth, status and power *vis-à-vis* their European competitors and their Ottoman hosts, i.e. in consuming conspicuously.⁴⁶⁹ It is no coincidence that precisely the monarchical states went for the most prestigious locations, while those of the merchant republics of Venice, Genoa and the United Provinces were content with real estate on the street's less prestigious northern end. Although the republics were by no means insensitive to matters of precedence, the status it implied and the beneficial social, economic and political effects it could produce, they were equally apprehensive of diverting the best of their efforts away from their commercial *raison d'être*, and of the unwanted attention from corrupt officials and commercial swindlers that too much visibility and pomp could generate.⁴⁷⁰

With the locations of the consulates accounted for it would be consistent to proceed with those of their nations. Unfortunately no contemporary document I know of more than hints at the distribution of communities (or even their senior merchants) along Frank Street – with the exception of the testimony of Christoffel Capoen (see Appendix 2, document 3), from which we learn that the Dutch company of Van Goor & Smout was located next to the French consulate (which, together with apparent French complicity in the hostage-taking, again suggests a certain affinity between the Dutch disobedient faction and the French). In any case, with the protective function of the consular institution in mind, we may accept those hints and assume that the majority of (loyal) nationals will indeed have settled in the vicinity of its consular seat. On the other hand, it is to be expected that a number of merchants did do its utmost to distance itself from consular authority and, especially, fiscal jurisdiction.⁴⁷¹ But their number will have been too small to invalidate the proposition that most well-to-do merchants resided on the seaside in the close vicinity of their consulate, while the less well-off joined the tradesmen and shopkeepers on the other side of the street.

⁴⁶⁹ On “conspicuous consumption”, see Thorstein Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (Charleston: Forgotten Books, 1899; 1965; 2008), 42-61 and throughout. Also see Burke, *History and Social Theory*, 67-69.

⁴⁷⁰ Cf. *supra* on Kara Mustafa Paşa's stalled audiences, and the practicality with which the non-monarchical representatives (Venetian, Genoese and Dutch) efficiently dealt with Ottoman adjustments of protocol that the French and English found unacceptable and halted relations over.

⁴⁷¹ See *supra*, esp. notes 230, 236, 238, 244 and 347.

Boundaries

With the relative lack of sound topographical data for even Frank Street's seaside and its near complete absence for the street's landward side, we are left very much in the dark about the Frank quarter beyond Frank Street proper. Was there such a thing to begin with? Or did all Europeans (except for a few peculiar cases nearly "turned Turk") actually live on that one street? And, if not, did a significant number actually reside in the Greek quarter and under Greek communal organization and authority?

Although the extent to which the Frank quarter can truly be equated with Frank Street is beyond retrieval, the suspicion lingers that the separation between European and Ottoman that most contemporary accounts insist on, is disingenuous. For how are they to be reconciled with the candor displayed throughout Galland's *description*, and many other contemporary descriptions of the generally pleasant European life in Izmir, as they dryly refer to the unhindered social intercourse between Europeans and Ottoman Christians (the stigmatized Greeks, Armenians and Jews) and even Muslims in European and Ottoman bars, theatres, churches, markets, shops, warehouses, courts of justice, lodgings and households? Though formally regarded as somewhat distasteful conduct, which many considered it imprudent to advertise to widely or openly, it could never be covered up entirely.

Particularly in conflict situations the self-preservationist instinct to point a finger would often override prudence, leaving us interesting snippets of the otherwise hidden information discussed in the preceding pages and footnotes. As a result we now have at our disposal the letters of stiff-headed and self-righteous men like Dutch minister Thomas Coenen and Dutch consul Jacob van Dam. In stressing their own good faith and exemplary conduct and pressing the resolution of conflicts over their remuneration and oft-flouted authority, both extensively lamented their flock's wayward manners and in the process described them in informative detail.⁴⁷² It is because of predicaments such as Coenen's en Van Dam's that we can now know about the less than exemplary ways of a number of well-to-do merchants that took up Oriental lifestyles complete with Turkish dress, concubines and slave girls, and with houses beyond Frank Street. Had it been up to more diplomatic men in less desperate circumstances such information would have remained hidden.

For all concerned it was generally more expedient to promote an image of wholesome, obedient and self-sufficient expatriate communities then to soil it with tales of cultural fluidity, opaque jurisdictions and messy interde-

⁴⁷² See *supra*, and Appendix 2; Amsterdam, Stadsarchief 379 (Classis Amsterdam) / 235 (Ingekomen stukken betreffende kerkelijke zaken in Smyrna): throughout, Thomas Coenen to Classis Amsterdam; Samberg, *Hollandsche gereformeerde gemeente*, 1-84; and Joos Vermeulen, *Sultans, slaven en renegaten: de verborgen geschiedenis van het Ottomaanse rijk* (Leuven: Acco, 2001), 259-61.

pendence. And this strategy of silencing not only applied to the Ottoman other, those lower on the social ladder commonly received similar treatment. Apart from the fact that the crosscultural and transcultural messiness increased as one traversed the non-Muslim part of town from the shore to the quarters beyond, most early modern literates will also have found it distasteful to dwell on the lives and livelihoods of “rabble”, be they coreligionists, compatriots, or – worst of all – neither. For over-acknowledging such elements of lesser class, profession and/or religion would implicitly taint and thereby diminish the authority that diplomats and gentlemen-travelers were attempting to establish and project with their narratives.

The boundary between the European and Ottoman city, then, is not just obscured by differences of race and religion, but doubly so by their conflation with class. Consequently, as the “quality” of inhabitants decreased in all respects when one travelled from Frank Street’s seaside toward the city’s interior, the light of our sources also grows ever more faint and we stumble to feel our way forward there. Nonetheless, all of the above strongly suggests that there was no firm boundary between Frank Street and the Greek quarter beyond it, and that particularly Europeans of lesser station freely mingled with the latter’s population, a good number of them in all likelihood residing there as well.

Conclusion

Over the preceding argument, we have attempted to impose on the historical “double city” of Izmir a framework for inquiry that divides that city into its two ideal constituent parts – Eastern/Islamic/Ottoman on the one hand, and Western/Christian/European on the other – only to demonstrate how unworkable this division, tirelessly (though not necessarily consciously) maintained by contemporary and modern observers alike, really is. Not only because the sources for both parts are so disparate that comparison is impossible without major reinterpretation, but even more so because the real lives and activities of their denizens, over the centuries imagined and willed into their presumed identities and proper places from the outside, for a long time managed to challenge such neat divisions, until at last (in the late 19th and early 20th centuries) international aspirations and power politics managed to subdue and destroy their robust heritage of everyday crossculturalism.

If we are to attempt a genuine understanding of Izmir during its early modern boom, at the very time that the Ottoman world system is thought to have been pulled into the European world system through precisely that city and society, we should be acutely aware of the Ottoman and European discourses of segregation and opposition to which the vast majority of sources at our disposal were playing, the differences between them and the purposes they served. To be able to do this, it is not enough to take stock of economic indicators from a variety of disjointed sources. What is needed is a comparative analysis of the cultural, social and political-administrative context of these Ottoman and European sources and an exploration of cultural, social political and administrative realities on the ground, to see whether they indeed correspond to world systemic developments.

In working out the specifics and timing of Izmir’s role in the (semi)peripheralization of the Ottoman world system, world systems analysis has not lived up to its promise. For the most part, its proponents have dealt with the considerable problems arising from the crucial 17th-century’s repeated administrative reorganizations and the scattering of already inconsistent sources by throwing a tightrope across the disconcerting ravine the era can be, and edging across it from the “classical” 16th century to the transformed 18th century without looking down. The balancing act has forced them to glance over the haphazardly documented and purposefully hidden messiness of crosscultural relations as they were lived along 17th-century Izmir’s quays and streets, and in its markets, inns, and houses. In the process, they have neglected the agency of a resilient urban culture averse to ideological purity and always prone to opt for mutual benefit, such as had been formed by centuries of reaching across ethno-religious divisions in search of livelihoods.

We have sought to address this historiographical negligence by taking our eyes off economy for a moment, instead focusing on such other indicators of power in crosscultural relations as the sources will permit us to discern, i.e. legal-fiscal-administrative developments, changes in the distribution of the city's populations (urban demography) and changes in the city's built environment (urban geography). Let us retrace the long and winding argument that has been the result:

In the first chapter ("The Ottoman City – History") we noted that Izmir's history was one of oscillation between East and West, in response to which Izmir's communities and overlords, invested in the continued flow of trade through the city as they were, developed an urban culture and infrastructure that downplayed and contained crosscultural antagonisms in favor of pragmatism. The civic culture that was the result was typical of the frontier: heterodox, tenaciously tolerant and sustained by dogged cultural resistance to the principles and designs of outside powers – all in the quest for riches. This unceasing tug between independence and incorporation left its marks on the city (as it did on the polities that attempted to subdue it), and incessantly played out among a peculiar urban economy, geography, demography and culture, shaped by centuries of reaching across religious, ethnic, linguistic, political, and economic frontiers.

The second chapter ("The Ottoman City – Demography") focused on population and the divisions within it. We confirmed that the common practice of regarding early modern Ottoman communities as relatively isolated and self-sufficient is the result of unwarranted back projection from the late-nineteenth century *millet*-system. In reality, we argued, the universality and uniformity of that system was theoretical (as *zimmel*) before the 19th century (and perhaps even then?): the internal organization and external relations of *zimmi*-communities were determined first and foremost by local circumstances, and for purposes of everyday administration early modern Ottoman administrators did not regard the status of the empire's minorities as fundamentally different from that of the other communities (*tajfes*) under their jurisdiction. As a consequence, seemingly uniform legal and administrative principles, when confronted with reality on the ground, generated widely divergent outcomes; as categorical a refutation of the paradigm of "the Islamic city" as is possible.

Izmir's history as a frontier, combined with the city's meteoric early modern rise, particularly precludes the existence there of a fixed and non-negotiable order to govern all relations between Muslim, non-Muslim and the state. Far from causing an interpretative chaos or void, this recognition of administrative and social diversity (i.e. of local and personal agency) – not only where non-Muslims are concerned, but throughout Ottoman society – allows us to reinterpret the seemingly desperate archival predicament. This

predicament, which has kept historians away from the Ottoman 17th century, turns out to be a consequence of *our* limited understanding (sustained by a somewhat mechanical interpretation of world systems history) of the countless localized adjustments through which Ottoman administration absorbed the shocks of early modernity (instead of *the Ottomans'* peculiarly limited understanding of the challenges of early modernity). If this history and its disjointed sources are approached on their own terms, from their own logic, and are made to relate to each other in a heavily contextualized historical interpretative environment, much more information might be gleaned from them than is often thought.

An important case in point is the notoriously difficult problem of family size, and the derived estimate of population size. Creative new use of sources and measured comparison across time, place and social setting indicate that the size of the average 17th-century Ottoman heartland family unit was far smaller than previously assumed: 3.65 in cities and 4.9 in rural environs. The evidence suggests that Izmir's Turkish, Greek, Armenian and Jewish families were no exception. This brings the population of 1650s Izmir to c. 40,000, and of 1678 to c. 70,000 (from a mere 2,500 in 1575!), with immigration of non-Muslims (Jews especially) disproportionately contributing to the growth of the city and its economy.

The simultaneous boom in population and trade, both moving through the antiquated infrastructure of the city in increasing numbers and volumes, meant that crosscultural contact was pervasive – although well-hidden under a triple layer of ethno-religious, class and fiscal silencing. Because of this silencing, extra care should be taken to include the society's full width and depth in examining the web of crosscultural relations at work in 17th-century Izmir. Yet, in the historiography of Ottoman absorption into the European world system through Izmir, the complicating and moderating agency of Izmir's Europeans and Ottoman Turks, Christians and Jews, of servants, slaves, merchants, representatives and officials, has all too often been neglected. All the same, the historical narrative *is* predicated on many assumptions about their desires and daily interactions. These might well fit the teleology, but not Ottoman history, especially not Izmir's. This teleological narrative of segregation has led to significant misunderstanding of the Ottoman social order as it existed on the ground in the preceding centuries (most particularly in Izmir, as the arguments in Chapter 1 underline) – and as a result, of the social and infrastructural structures and mechanisms (urban, regional, imperial and international) that, through their daily crosscultural goings-on, are thought to have more or less consistently facilitated the 16th-century beginnings and 17th-century consolidation of the process of Ottoman (semi)peripheralization.

The third chapter (“The Ottoman City – Geography”) traced the physical evolution of the city as it exploded onto the international stage, as well as the

development of Ottoman policies attempting to control and utilize the concomitant economic, social and fiscal challenges through infrastructural investment and fiscal-administrative regulation. It argued that the divided or double city of Izmir integrated under the *pax Ottomanica*, and that its primary urban features (commercial, political-religious and military) were redistributed over the unified city. The direction of growth and certain areas' functional concentration, then, were the consequence of interaction between urban and regional geography (the three axes at the city's heart) and the triple trends of Turkification, internationalization and the growth of the non-Muslim economy and population.

1660s Izmir was a focal point of rapid economic expansion and social change. Already underadministered and underfunded, its cultural pragmatism and commercial opportunities would surely end up eroding and challenging the Ottoman social and economic order if left to its own devices and European designs. Into this breach stepped Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed Paşa and Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa. Second and third scions of the Köprülü-line of grand-viziers, they followed their father's policies of severe pacification and consolidation with incorporation and modernization. The upgrade they gave Izmir was at once classical and modernizing: they upgraded the city's infrastructure through a major privately endowed program of public construction, but in so doing focused exclusively on bringing the city's runaway economy under Ottoman control (incorporation), in the process trying to make sure that the booming city's challenges to their updated version of the Ottoman social and fiscal order (i.e. its crossculturality and extraterritoriality) could be decisively dealt with. Their endowment act and the orders and conflicts accompanying its implementation, contain a wealth of information on the (otherwise unknown) 17th-century city's spatial organization and ethno-religious composition.

From it emerges an Ottoman city that was rapidly losing its ethno-religious homogeneity under the strains of growth. In demographic, social and economic terms the center of the city had shifted downhill toward the seaside, degrading the southernmost parts of the city to a parochial Turkish backwater. The lower-lying other two-thirds of the city now had a professionally, ethnically and religiously diverse population. Socio-historical orthodoxy claimed that the pluralism of "the Ottoman city", and of Izmir in particular, was superficial. In this view, its inhabitants led such deeply segregated lives that there could be no joint representation or responsibility, no civic spirit, and therefore no real city; only a group of centrally administered obedient etnno-religious communities. Even on the off-chance that this paradigm (of "the Islamic city") might have been useful for framing the history of the 15th or 16th-century town, it is impossible to fit it around late-17th-century Izmir. This is precisely why the Köprülüs invested so much in bringing it back under Ottoman, and (not to forget) their own, control.

Through their major investment the Köprülüs, by 1680, had managed to transform Izmir from a regional port and smugglers' paradise, into a major Ottoman commercial center and a true focus of empire. The upgrade heralded a drive for increased Ottoman control which, if it was consistently followed up with matching legislation and administrative practices, would significantly curtail the uncommon liberty the European merchant communities of Izmir had become accustomed to, and ultimately even absorb them into the Ottoman order completely (as Ottoman *taifes*). Stabilization and incorporation on updated Ottoman terms were the Köprülüs' answers to the challenges posed by the increasing pull of the emerging economic world-system. They were very successful, until their ambitions were thwarted by the triple blow of the failed siege of Vienna in 1683 (and the consequent execution of Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa and the loss of Hungary), the deposition of sultan Mehmed IV (in 1678, after a reign of 39 years), and the 1688-earthquake (which destroyed significant portions of the Izmir endowment). From 1687, however, a restored line of Köprülüs would take up their cause in Izmir.

The fourth chapter ("The European City – History") discussed the history of the northern, originally non-Muslim, part of the city – with particular attention to the interplay between religious differences and cultural prejudices on the one hand, and the developing capitulatory regime and its varying degrees of fiscal and legal exceptionalism on the other. Undeniably, it argued, many of "European Izmir's" inhabitants and dependents set themselves apart from wider society and administration (and threatened to do the same with the region's economy), but in the unified Ottoman 17th-century city the division was far less hard and far more mediated than they themselves, their neighbors, their overlords and their visitors insisted. This deliberately maintained zone of mediation, which we have here called *the middle ground*, is where the pressures of the European world system were transformed so they could be managed and absorbed to create a specifically Ottoman early modernity. And it was this middle ground and its economy that the Köprülüs worked to relocate and incorporate.

On the middle ground itself, meanwhile, the individual "subjects" (or "partners") in question remained adept at slipping through any national or monopolistic nets European or Ottoman authorities imagined to tie them in. They avoided full incorporation and made sure they were maximally positioned to opt in or out of European or Ottoman legal and fiscal regimes whenever it suited them best – although they always did so as Ottoman subjects first and foremost. The mediation these Ottoman Greeks, Armenians and Jews provided relied heavily on the practice of strategic *dissimulation* (or, the managing of different parties' prejudices and expectations of both the mediator and other parties) to navigate between the demands of the individuals, cultures and states they were bringing together. This independently-

minded dissimulative stance (White's "creative misunderstanding") is typical for frontier societies, for the early modern individual seeking a way from medieval obligations to modernity's freedoms, and for the practice of international trade. In Izmir, its relevance made understanding and living up to its requirements instrumental for anyone wanting to achieve success, whether he or she be European, Ottoman non-Muslim, or Muslim (and failure to do so must have been the root cause of many a merchants' bankruptcy and official's or diplomat's disgraceful recall).

After Europe's Thirty Years' War and the Ottoman "Time of Troubles", both arguably reactions to the shocks of early modernity, the second half of the 17th century saw European and Ottoman drives to expand and intensify sovereignty and to enlarge the economic and fiscal basis of sovereign princes and states. Izmir's once so helpful crosscultural freewheeling became a direct threat to their authority and a liability for their *mercantilist* policies of protectionism and expansion. The marshaling of assets, populations and religions in the service of monetary and territorial expansion not only required further fiscalization and centralization, but also a measure of allegiance and obeisance (a nationalization *avant-la-lettre*) that went against every grain of Izmir's society, putting a heavy strain on its nations and *nationals*, and forcing them to hide their mediation from view even further. The only communities to keep their footing amidst these shifts and rifts were those of Izmir's Jews (Portuguese and Middle Eastern), who had no desire to overly rely on fickle European protection and unequivocally preferred the *status aparte* the Ottomans granted them, and whose independence promptly made them the best, though often reviled, intermediary and buffer between European and Turk.

Meanwhile, the Köprülü viziers and their sultan (Mehmed IV) worked to reassert, codify and institutionalize their new-found stability and might, both internally and externally. In their relations with Europe they did so by reasserting the unilateral character of the capitulations, and by repeatedly enforcing it in diplomatic and mercantile traffic. The concretization of the tributary fiction in Ottoman relations with Europe for a while had the desired effect between 1666 and 1683, as practical relations were reconfigured and European merchants, diplomats, trade organizations and even states and sovereigns became increasingly circumspect in their dealings with Ottoman administration and in mercantile practice.

The fifth chapter ("The European City – Demography") explored Izmir's European communities, individually and as a group, the increasing pressures brought to bear on them by their home authorities and the Ottoman context, and how they responded to these. In the process, we argued that Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa's long series of interventions in Izmir's and wider crosscultural relations (although increasingly represented in Europe as the actions of a crazed madman) was in fact part of a consistent dynastic policy to intensify control and to rebuild Ottoman-European relations from

the ground up by having formal and informal hierarchies coincide under their family's control. A policy nevertheless, whose initial and, especially, ultimate success has gone unnoticed by many historians, blinded perhaps by the brilliant elegance of world systems theory (and sometimes also by their prejudices) amidst the darkness of the disjointed sources left us by all manners of decaying and newly-forming Ottoman bureaucracies.

We began by asking what it meant for Europeans to be living under the capitulations. Almost immediately, we concluded that the capitulations were not uniform, did not govern everyday life, and that the relations they informed must have varied greatly from place to place, from nation to nation, and from person to person – depending on the historical, social, economic, legal (and so on) dynamics steering the parties engaged in crosscultural relations, and on the specific dynamic that resulted from their relations. Among these crosscultural dynamics, we should note that of collusion in particular: transgressions against the capitulations were most often the result of agreements between the parties involved in a transaction (agreements for the making of which Izmir was uniquely suited, as we have seen), and only when they failed to maintain their agreement, did dealing in contravention of the capitulations become relevant and punishable.

We should take care to distinguish the reality of Izmir's Ottoman-European affairs from the capitulatory fiction all parties relied upon in their relations with outsiders. The hidden space afforded by Izmir's benignly administered middle ground, made the city all the more attractive to libertarian (or simply unscrupulous) Europeans, who could create a life of far greater freedom than back home, under full protection of the Ottoman state, but with few obligations for them to fulfill in return – as long as they managed to keep shipping and tax expenses to a minimum.

Izmir's mediative capability had always held great economic promise and would continue to do so, but the degree of collusion it invited as the city's economy and population ballooned, was threatening to undermine the empire's international affairs and to erode its fiscal basis. This threat was registered by the Köprülüs, who responded by seizing control of the entire chain of authorities involved in the administration of Izmir and its international commerce, by constructing a new physical middle ground under their control, and by retracing and policing the divide between European and Ottoman Greek, Jew and Armenian. In their Izmir, there would still be a middle ground, but it was to be physically, fiscally, legally, socially and politically internal to the Ottoman system. From the understanding that Izmir was a place that could both mirror and propell Istanbul's relations with Europe on a practical and daily basis, the Köprülüs worked to include it in their international politics. All the while, they unflinchingly asserted the unilateral character of Ottoman relations with Europe and the pertinence of Ottoman laws and customs in this arena.

The Köprülüs' decades-long policies and their success in dictating the terms on which Izmir's international commerce, society and politics would proceed, begs the question how they were able to do so after a prolonged existential crisis, against staunch resistance by European states and merchant communities alike, with an economy that had allegedly been attuning to European demand since the mid-16th century (i.e. that had a century of peripheralization behind it)? Our answer has been that, even if the process of peripheralization was indeed at work in 16th-century Izmir, it should not follow on the basis of a clearly limited understanding of the problematic 17th-century context and sources that the 18th or 19th-century process was the direct incarnation of that discerned in the 16th century. If this would have been the case, the power relations implied in prolonged and intensifying peripheralization would have dominated not only 17th-century Izmir's economy, but would have permeated its entire administration, politics, culture, and society. In fact, we see the opposite happening, if we forget the model for a moment and start from an Ottoman perspective.

The Ottoman 17th century saw a shift from hierarchical authority to fiscal efficiency and maximization. Many of the roles and functions of classical Ottoman administration were taken over by more effective, if more arbitrary, forms of management. This happened first and foremost in lands reserved for the crown and high officials (*hawass*), which already had a tradition of government delegated (i.e. farmed-out) to clients of the patron and his household. Izmir might appear to have been left to its own and Europe's devices because it did not receive an administrative or infrastructural upgrade in the classical sense. But as *hass*-land, within the context of the specifically early modern form of Ottoman administration that was congealing, its new exclusively commercial facilities and the attention lavished on it by emissaries from the Köprülü household were assertions of new Ottoman interests and powers. Indeed, its being under both formal and informal control of the empire's most powerful political household meant that the bonds of power connecting court, central government and Izmir's local administration and middlemen were exceptionally enduring, strong *and* deep. If anything, there was now so much Ottoman political and economic coordination and pressure in Izmir that European diplomats and their merchant communities were worried that they themselves would one day wake up to find themselves Ottoman subjects.

The economic and political changes in Europe, in the Ottoman Empire, and in the relations between the two, naturally also had its effects upon the make-up of Izmir's European communities; effects that shed still more light on how systemic developments played out locally. What becomes clear from the development and correspondence of Izmir's Genoese, Venetian, French, English and Dutch communities is that there was a historical tendency towards professionalization. Broad village-like communities of individual merchants, artisans and their families creating a livelihood (Genoese, Venetian

and French) were replaced by, or morphed into, much smaller predominantly male communities of merchants and assistants making careers and seeking fortunes (and pleasures) before moving back home (French, Dutch and English). These communities of merchants depended heavily on their privileges as foreigners, and perceived it to be in their best interest not only to be well-connected to Ottoman society as merchants, but also to maintain considerable distance from it as Europeans.

Before thinking too much of this group's economic, political and social power, it would be wise to remember that they served as factors to principals back home, worked on commission, and were heavily dependent on the goodwill and acumen of a small group of Ottoman wholesalers and financiers. But still more sobering is the fact that these 400 to 500 European nationals (about a 135 of whom were diplomatic staff, factors or merchants for their own accounts) made up less than one percent of Izmir's 1678 population. Although this is not a precise reflection of their influence, and Izmir's European population enjoyed influence far beyond its number, the political and social aspects of that power did lag significantly behind the economic aspect. In short, it was impossible for this community to dictate the terms of any Ottoman-European transaction or case.

The sixth and last chapter ("The European City – Geography") explored what can be known about the physical presence and distribution of Izmir's European communities in the Köprülü period. Contrary to what one would expect considering the wealth of European consular correspondence from Izmir, all these archival meters actually reveal curiously little about daily life there, about the physical layout of the European quarter, and about its relations with the adjoining Ottoman quarters and its inhabitants. What *is* revealed to us is mostly the public outer shell of the consular institutions – in much the same manner as these dominated the view of the city from the harbor.

At the same time, we know how dependent Izmir's Europeans were on the resources, services and contacts of their Ottoman connections in these quarters. A dependency that only increased when, between 1675 and 1678 the Köprülü's decisively moved to gain administrative and even physical control over European trade by having it flow through the administrative and commercial institutions of their endowment. The city's French, English and Dutch nevertheless continued, and even intensified their displays of wealth, status and power *vis-à-vis* their competitors and their Ottoman hosts, consuming conspicuously along the upscale seafront to mark the honors of their offices, their princes, their states, their religion and their culture. The suspicion lingers that these and other displays and affirmations of boisterous independence and moral uprightness, were mostly disingenuous – that, beyond, on the modest side of Frank Street and in the even lowlier Ottoman quarters beyond, these same Europeans were firmly ensconced in Oriental

lives. The occasional violent crack in the hard narrative façade of European independence (caused by commercial or private conflicts spinning out of consular or national control), after all offers many a glimpse of merchants taking up *alaturva* lifestyles complete with Turkish dress, concubines and slave girls, and houses beyond Frank Street.

Accepted as such transcultural freedoms might have been within Izmir society, it counted as a double degradation in the Ottoman and European capitals. The boundary between European and Ottoman Izmir is obscured by the politics of race and religion, further amplified by the politics of class. Given all the circumstantial evidence, however, there appears to have been no firm boundary between Frank Street and the Greek quarter beyond it, meaning that Europeans could and would freely mingle and reside there, especially if considerations of class mattered little to them.


It has been my aim to attain a better understanding than was until now afforded of how 17th-century Izmir's several parts related to each other, how they depended on each other for their mutual survival and progress, what kind of specific urban history and culture produced that interdependence and was reproduced through their actions, how Ottoman administration in turn sought to control and shape this culture of interdependence, and to what purpose and with what results it did so. I have attempted to identify the mechanisms that are responsible for our sources' overwhelming silence on crosscultural contact, to demonstrate their politics, and to counter the (often nationalist or eurocentrist) historiography that has sprung from them.

The strategy used for this involved the bringing together a number of accidental references to European crosscultural contact with an analysis of wider early modern and late-17th-century European and Ottoman historical developments, and showing how they interacted and resulted in concrete developments in Izmir. In this way, I hope to have demonstrated that the narrative of segregation and guarded animosity that still dominates descriptions of 17th-century Izmir and its various communities is unrealistic, and to have put in its stead the foundations of a narrative that more realistically assesses the strengths and weaknesses of an urban culture of interdependence typical to Izmir, and the ways in which its resident Ottoman and European participants and individual, as well as institutional, Ottoman and European stakeholders on the outside consciously and methodically attempted to change it to their advantage in the 1670s, in the process severely testing the very urban culture that had brought them the wealth and power to do so.

I hope that the resulting survey has managed to pioneer a fresh and challenging historiographical path that will bring us closer to the lived cross- and even transcultural civic realities of this key city during this crucial period. One that, if taken up by researchers with different strengths and insights, may significantly adjust the received wisdom about Ottoman peripheralization and Izmir's role in it.

Appendix 1: Plates

PLATE 1: SMYRNA (CORNELIS DE BRUYN, 1678)




Cornelis de Bruyn, *Reizen van ...* (Delft: Hendrik van Kroonevelt, 1698), plate 2.

PLATE 2: SMYRNE (JOSEPH PITTON DE TOURNEFORT, 1700)




Joseph Pitton de Tournefort, *Relation d'un voyage du Levant ...* (Amsterdam: n.p., 1718), 2:195.

PLATE 3: CITY OF ISMIR (THOMAS GRAVES, BEFORE 1844)




The Hague: NA 4.MCAL 1824 (Hydrographic Office: London, 1844).

PLATE 4: SMYRNA HARBOUR (RICHARD COPELAND, 1834)



The Hague: NA 4.MCAL 1825 (Hydrographic Office: London, 1844).

PLATE 5: GOLFO DI SMIRLI (ANTONIO BORG, 1760S)



Historic Cities-website (http://historic-cities.huji.ac.il/historic_cities.html).

PLATE 6: IZMIR (RV VERLAG, C1990)



Detail from *Türkei, West 1* (Ostfildern: RV Verlag, n.d.).

PLATE 7: IZMIR CITY PLAN (TR MINISTRY OF TOURISM, 1992)



Detail from *Izmir and environs* (Ankara: n.p., 1992).

PLATE 8: SMYRNE (KARL BAEDEKER, 1914)



Karl Baedeker, *Konstantinopel, Balkanstaaten, Kleinasien, Archipel, Cypren: Handbuch für Reisende*, 2nd ed. (Leipzig: Karl Baedeker, 1905; 1914), between 332-333.

PLATE 9: KÖPRÜLÜ ENDOWMENT DEED (8 APRIL 1678)



Istanbul: SLK MF 4027, 2^v-3^r.

PLATE 10: SUMMARY POLL-TAX REGISTER OF IZMIR (15 JANUARY 1688)

The document is a handwritten summary poll-tax register from Izmir, dated 15 January 1688. It is written in Ottoman Turkish and organized into columns. The entries include names, numbers, and various administrative markings. The text is written in a cursive script, and there are several lines of text across the page, some with numbers and some with signatures or official stamps. The document is divided into sections by horizontal lines, and there are some numbers written in the margins. The overall appearance is that of an official record from the 17th century.

Istanbul, BBA MAD 14888: İcmâl-ı defter-i cizye-'i gebrân-ı vilâyet-i İzmir, 'eşr ve ehed sene 1099 (AH 11 Rebi' I 1099 / AD 15 January 1688)

Appendix 2: The Crosscultural Mess, from the Dutch Archives

DOCUMENT 1: VAN GOOR'S MISCONDUCT IN THE *KADİS* COURT

(The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Dragomans of assorted European nations in the chancery of the English consulate of Izmir, 16 October 1671)

Copia richiaratoria fatta nella Cancelleria Inglese in Smirna

Laus Deo in Smirna adi 16 d.le ottob.re 1671

Comparsero in cancellaria dell' J.U.mo Sig.r Paolo Ricaut console per la maesta della Gran Bretagna et b.re in Smirna il sig. Constantino Amira drog.no Hollandese dichiarando qualm.te havesido bieri stato eol. cadi di Smirne ine.a'l Alba dl giorno il naip del d.o cadi li disse come il Sig.r Van Goor haveva assai pergiuriato al suo residente et al suo console, con parole scandalose dicendo anche che voleva spender seisanta piastre per far monstrar al monde che Asini sono loro in q.to paese et anco al med.mo tempo comparsero similmente nella pred.na cancellaria li ss.ri Isaac Barbinanni, Constantino Amira et Giacomo Sandernara drog.ni Hollandesi et il sig.r Michael Attalas drogomano Venetiano, et il sig.r Spiro di Niccolo drog.no Genovese, et il Porlo Homero drogom.no giovane della Nat.ne Inglese, i quali con commune testimonianza dichiararono, come havendo stati bieri adi 15 d.i ottob.re 1671 in casa del cadi p.r certi negotij delli loro consoli li fudato d' intendere dagli officiali del d.to cadi cioe il naip et il caia come il sig.r Van Goor disse avanti di loro, che ben che lui non poteva resistere al commando del rezid.te per andar in Constant.li non dimeno sapersa bene che cosa si doverda fare contra il suo console & di piu il caia del d.to cadi, disse come i d.ti ss.ri Van Goor & Lespaul havevano ingiuriato al loro J.U.mo Sig.r rezidente et al sig.r console in testimonianza della verita e' sottoscritto la punta con le proprie mani il giorno et anno soprascritto; Era sottoscritto Isaac Barbinanni, le ferma del s.r Isaac Constantino Amira, Giacomo Sandernara, Spiri di Niccolo, Michael Attalas, Paolo Homero, sottoscritto in presenza di me Giacomo Ricaut cancelliere, noi Paolo Ricaut console per la maesta della Gran Bretagna et b.re in Smirne, facciamo ampla et in dubitata fede et attestiamo per la verita achi s'aspetta come l'oltra scritta ...

Geextrabeert uijt de pnate berustende in de Engelsche cancellarie, en nae collatie bevonden daermede te accorderen, ende was onder-teekent Laurens Rigo cleriq

DOCUMENT 2: PRIVILEGES OBTAINED FROM MERZIFONLU KARA MUSTAFA PAŞA

(The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 64a-65a: from the journal of Daniël-Jan de Hochepeid)

No. 1. Den Resident versocht Baratten voor vier Drogemans. Is toegestaan.

No. 2. Den Resident versocht een Commandement op den Cadij ofte oppertsen tollenaer tot Smirna. daer by haer gelast werdt geen Capo over de Makelaers van de Natie te stellen. Is toegestaan.

No. 3. Den Resident versocht een Commandement op de Waivoodens ofte Soubassies tot Smirna. waer by haer gelast wert. die van de Natie. en die haer aengaan. in cas sy op deselve yetwes te seggen sullen hebben. nergens anders daerover als voor haren Consul sullen hebben te betrecken. Is toegestaen.

No. 4. Den Resident versocht een Commandement op den tollenaer tot Smirna. dat hy van de Valonien. ende cattoenen. nu voortaan. niet meer voor tol sal nemen. als van alle andre goederen die volgens de Capitulatie betalen dry van hondert. Is toegestaen.

No. 5. Den Resident versocht een Commandement op den oppersten tollenaer tot Constantinopolen. dat hy van de Natie van alle inkomende ende nytgaende goederen. t sy van wat plaetsen. die soude mogen comen. niet meer voor tol sal afvorderen als dry van het hondert. ende soo hy de goederen te hoog waerdeert. dat de Natie hem met goederen volgens syn Estimatie vermach te betalen. volgens de Capitulatie. Is toegestaen.

No. 6. Den Resident versocht een Commandement op den oppersten tollenaer tot Constantinopolen. dat hy de goederen. comende van Smirna ende andere plaetsen van dit ryck. daervan den toll is betaelt. niet op nieuws sal vermogen t estimeren. en de daervan meerder toll doen betalen. gelyck hy nu eenige tyt herwaerts heeft gedaen. Is toegestaen.

No. 7. Den Resident versocht een Commandement op den oppersten tollenaer van Constantinopolen. dat hy in het ontfangen ende nyt rekenen van den toll. de spetie van het gelt. niet sal vermogen minder t estimeren. als de waerde van dien. ende gelyck hij die selfs aent hoff weder nyt geeft te weeten de Leoni tot 70. asp. ende de wichtige stucken van agten. tot 100. asp. ende niet niet de Leoni tot 70. ende de reale di peso tot 80. gelyck hy nu tegens billickhey is doende. Is toegestaen.

No. 8. Den Resident versocht een Commandement op den voors; opper tollenaer. daer by hem gelast wert. den tol van de Natie t ontfangen. in alle soorten van munt van den Coninck. als in aspers de tura pana. en de paraas. ende dat hy die mede niet minder sal estimeren. als by die weder aen het hof nytgeeft. Is toegestaen.

No. 9. Den Resident versocht een Commandement. daer by de Natie eens van hare goederen. en de Coopmanschappen. tol hebbende betaelt. vry gekent werden van eenige andere onkosten. t sy aen. Serafflyck. Momsij. Capusys. ende Janissari te betalen. Is toegestaen.

No. 10. Den Resident versocht een Commandement. daer by gelast wert. geen Mustery van de Natie af te nemen. gelyck het selve aen de duytschen. ende genouesen is geconcedeert. Is toegestaen.

No. 11. Den Resident versocht een Commandement op den voors; tollenaer ende Cadij tot Smyrna. daer by haer gelast wert. geene scheepen van de Natie. die hare gerechtigbeden hebben betaelt in dienst van den Coninck aen te nemen. als specialyck strydende tegens de Capitulatie. Is toegestaen.

No. 12. Den Resident versocht een Commandement op den Capiteyn Bassa. ende op den Bassa van Scio. waerby haer gelast wert het schip Den ouden Tobias. door ordre van den Coninck inde maent van April laestleden. in dienst genomen. omme koren naar Canea te voeren. ende rechtevoort met het voors; koorn noch leggende tot Scio te doen ontllossen. ende toe te laten. dat het selve syn reys naer Nederlant vervorderen sonder resisitentie van de vracht. Is toegestaen mits betalende de halve vrugt.

No. 13. Den Resident versocht een Commandement op den Bassa ende tollenaer van Aleppo. waer by hem gelast wert geen ankeragie gelt af te doen vorderen. van onse Oorlogschepen. dewelcke tot Scandroen ende alexandrette onse Coopvaardij scheepen comen comvoyeeren. het welcke hij tegens het oude gebruyck nu in den voorledene maent van May ende Junnij heeft getracht in te voeren. Is toegestaen.

No. 14. Den Resident versocht een commandement waerby Agmet Aga, Voyvoda van Smirna, ende desselfs luytenant Ibrahim Cillebij gelast werden haer te comen verantwoorden voor het hof albier over de kracht, gewelt, ende force nu eenige tyt geleden aen de natie gedaen. Is toegestaen.

No. 15. Den Resident versocht een commandement waerby de Armeenders wort belast het consulaetregt tot Smirna volgens het oude gebruyck van alle hare goederen, stammen ende contanten te betalen, naer advenant twee van het hondert. Is toegestaen.

No. 16. Den Resident versocht een commandement daerby een yder ende allen den genen die in de schulden in vorige tijden by de Consuls reggio ende teyls tot Cairo gemaect syn geintresseert, werden gelast den Resident ofte de schale van Smirna daerover niet aen te spreken, ofte lastich te vallen, maer dat die gelden moeten werden betaelt bij diegene, dewelcke die schulden hebben gemaect volgens de capitulatie. Is toegestaen.

DOCUMENT 3: CHRISTOFFEL CAPOEN TAKEN HOSTAGE BY FELLOW NATIONALS

(The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Christoffel Capoen in the chancery of the Dutch consulate of Izmir, 5 October 1672)

... ben ick Christoffel Capoen coomen gaen langs de francke straat omtrent ten vijf uren naer de middagh bij het hujs van de mess:s Cornelio Rugiero van Goor & Pietro Smout ... daerop ter sijnen hujsse binnengegaen, ende boven coomende quam s:r van Goor neffens sijn comp:n s:r Smout, mij te gemoet gaende, s:r Smout naer achteren ende ick met s:r van Goor in de voersael aende straet versoeckende d:tto s:r van Goor om neffens hem te gaen sitten hetgeen ddede, waer op mijn doen vraegen, hoe dat het was geleege omtrent de LD: 500:- die in mijn handen waeren en wat remedie daer wasd om deselve te connen becoomen, en ick gaf tot antwoord, den H: Luppazolo Venetiaenschen consul mijn deselve hadt gesonden met een sijnre dragemans enden Joot genaemt Bayram, neffens een order dat detto: LD: 500:- soo onder hem waeren gearresteert door den ede: H:r Consul Jacob van Dam door mij souden bewaert & behouden werden tot dat detto: ss:s van Goor & Smout hem borge hadden gestelt voor alle naemaeninge, die den Ed:e H:r Consul Van Dam weegens gesijde toegestaene arrest, soude connen coomen te doen, bracht mij een glasien wijn van vrintschap toe waer op hem bescheijt dede ende ick seijde doen ... twelcke gedaen, gincke needer sitten op sijn versoeck in een twee leunde stoel, hij commandeerde doen an sijn knecht Jusuf om wijn en waeter te brengen hetgeen achtervolgt wiert, en detto s:r Van Goor dronck weder op mijn gesontheijt 't geen weder beschijt hebbe gedaen, onder weijlen s:r Van Goor sich door gesijde knecht Jusuf sig:r Fran:co de Hartigh roepen dewelcke aenstonts quam, en naer wijnich woorden eijdschte s:r Van Goor in presentie van d:to s:r de Hartigh LD: 500:- die hij sijde - ick van sijn Joot genoomen hadde, op't welcke ick verlaerde geen penninge van sijn Joot ontfangen nocht veel min enoomen te hebben & indien sijn Joot sulcks sijde dat het valsche luegens waeren & dat het anders con doen blijcken met testimonie en schrift, waer op hij sijde ghij sult mij het gelt geeven dat ghij van mijn Joot ontnoomen hebt, ofte ghij sult hier niet vandaen gaen, ende ick sal u hier houden, ende ick antwoorde ende sijde sig:r Van Goor ick en hadde sulx van U:E: niet vertrouwt, hebbende U:E: mij geroepen, ende ick uijt vrientschap ben bij U:E: gecoomen, ende ghij hout mij hier als gevangen, waer op hij s:r Van Goor antwoordende en seijde, en dat sal ick doen tot dat je mijn gelt geeft. Ick versoecht daer op aen s:r Fran:co de Hartigh daer van getuijgen te neemen, en met mijn antwoord aen sig:r Van Goor bleef bij mijn voorige dat geen gelt van hem noch van sijn maeckelaer hadt, ende dat het gelt dat den H:r Venetiaenschen consul aen mijn in dispositio hadde gegeven weder op sijn ordre soude over leeveren & verder versoeck ick pen en papier om aen mijn contracter te schrijven, dat mijn toegestaen wiert waer op ick een briefje schreef in:za van deesen inboud, contracter s:r Dionisio Houset U:E: geliefte soo aenstonts hier te coomen t'hujsse van ss: Van goor & Smout terwijl detti ss: mij in baer hujsen houden, ... sach ick door een gebroocken ruijt een persoon op den H:r Fransche consuls schael die ick sachies riep en versochte hij geliefde ten hujsse van Capoen te gaen en te seggen aen mijn contracter Dionisio Houset, dat hij hem daer geliefde te doen coomen en alsoo mij den persoon onbekent was dorst het briefjen dat aen mijn contracter hadde geschreeven niet vertrouwen, ... en naer gedaene soeckinge bevonden dat een venster dat op de H:r Fransche consuls schael uijt compt, te openen was, welcke geopent hebbende niet aensiende de booghte soo van de aerde was door den pressanten noot ben daer ten eersten uijt gesprongen, ende drijginge van s:r Van Goor, ende het vervolgende van dien door die middel te ontkoomen beseerde mij wat de beupen ende aen een been ,t geene met de hulpe des Almoedenden wel over sal gaen, 't hujs gecoomen sijnde verbaelde aen mijn compag:n het gepasseerde, de welcke mijn verlaerde, op de indicie hem door een persoon, hem onbecent, gegeven dat ijmant geroepen hadde, hij naest de Fransche consuls hujs most coomen, waer op hij persoonlijk is gegaen met onse cock, draegende de lantarne ten hujsse van de ss:ri Van Goor & Smout voorn:e comende de knecht Jusuf aen de trap dewelcke gegedracht

of sig:r Capoen daer was, waer op ditto knecht int Italiaens antwoorde de patroon eeten in de tuijn daer sijn geen vreemde bier, en - weder 't hujs coomende hij mij niet vindende sont de knecht weder naer het hujs van de ss:ri Van Goor & Smout onderwijle was ick 'thuis gecoomen, ende bracht tot antwoort, dat op de vragh die hij daer gedaen hadde ofte ick daer was, de slaef antwoorden dooreen der vensteren van de voorsael int Italiaens bier is niemant vreemts in hujs, ...

DOCUMENT 4: NICOLAS LEGOUCHE ACCUSES HIS CONSUL OF THEFT

(The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Nicolas Legouche to DLH, 2 July 1674)

Nu het schijnt dat den Consul costly noch veel vrienden heeft onder de Heeren Directeuren, die hem met kragt hier soecken te prolongeren, sullen wij van dien reghter niet weynigh gequelt en getyrannisseert worden als in diverse occasien al is gebleecken. En soo daer niet nader in voorsien wert, sullen der geen cleyne disordres en ongelucken uyt spruyten, gelijk aen volgende occasie cant bespeuren wat onreghuvaerdigh pouvoir hij over de onderdanen van den staet gebruyckt. Eerstelijck heeft hij verleden jaer van mijn, door een van sijn domestiquen een schoonen winthont die ontrent 25 Rijcxdaelders waerdigh was, doen steelen. Naer ick daervan kennis hadde bekomen en den hont selver in des consuls huys vont, en, ick mijn reden daerover doende aen den genen die suspecteerde mijn den selven ondrayt hadde, maer geen satisfactie konnende bekomen, soodat genootsaect was ander middel te gebruycken. Op een tijdt als den consul met sijn suite naer het dorp Sedequi ghingh, den hont daerbij sijnde, dat ick se vervolgende den hont mij wert kennende en met mijn int huys raeckte dat ick voor de somer 't onser vermaeck met s.r Broen gehuurt hadde. Maer den consul soodrae hij den hont vermiste quaem den gemelden Persyn met niet weynigh furie en dreygementen om die weder te hebben, doch hij kreegh (als niet meer als reden is) daerop geen geboor. Op sulcx den h.r Consul sich geaffronteert achtende geboot een van sijn Janitsers ons huys te bestormen en den hont daer per force uyt te halen. Dat int werck stellende, bestont den geseyden Janitsers, welgevapent sijnde met een sabel, halve pieck en pistolen, de muur van ons huys te beklimmen mits de deur geslooten was. Daerop sijnde gecomen begon sijn ordres te demonstreeren, vernattende dat soo wij den hont niet goetwilligh wilden overgeven, hij dan andre middelen soude genootsaect sijn te gebruycken, waerop hem geantwoort wiert, en daer beneffens eenige pistolen welgeladen vertoont, dat hij op sijn propositie maer soude afsomen, en dat men hem soude tracteren als een diergelijcken schelm meriteert. Maer hij was voorsigtiger en ritteerde sich van de muur, gevende aen sijn meester relaes vant gepasseerde, die daer scheen te bersten van spijt dat sijn goddeloos desseyen soo schandelijck gebroocken was. Egther om sijn dulle rasernije, die tot noch toe maer scheen gesmooct te hebben in lichte brant, te blasen, liet hij den Aga of Gouverneur vant dorp met 15 of 20 Turcken voor den dagh haelen om a toute force sijn desseyen uyt te voeren. Welcke hyden door groote beloften haer daertoe gewilligh laten dienen en quamen met bijlen, stocken en andre gereetschappen op ons huys aen aloffer een starck casteel waer te bestormen geweest, maer wij quamen haer dullen iver int gemoet, en openden soodrae wij haer hoorden de deur, soodat sij daer sonder moeyten binnen quamen. Haer vragende wat sij op sulcke wijze begeerden? t Was om een winthont seyden sij, dat den consul haer daer gesonden hadt en dat sij die in aller manieren wilden hebben. Men gaf haer te kennen dat sij het huys van een considerabel Turcq, gelijk de patroon daervan was, die nu tegenwoordigh Wayvode van Smirna was, wel souden wagten te violeren en als sij dat condon goetmaken maer met haer saecken souden voorvaeren. Welcke reden sij beter als onsen consul ter harten namen, mits haer voornemen lieten steecken, en vertracken met goet fatsoen. Ook ten andren, dat sij eenighsints bevreest waren dat wij met een half dosijn pistolen die in haer ogen bloncken, ons mochten defenderen. Eyndelijck wiert er niet uyt gereghet op den selven tijt, dogh den Aga met de gemelde Turcken ons huys weder quamen overvallen, is S.r Broen aenstonts bij den Consul gegaen om of hij sulcx ordre gegeven hadt en wat daermeede voorhadt? Antwoorde dat hij den hont a viva force wilde hebben. Den anderen, te weten S.r Broen, seyde wederom, niet tegenstaende ick kon bewijzen dat den hont mij toebeoorde, of hij die dan nogh pretenderen, dan hij bleef bij sijn stuck van den selven met recht of onregh te willen hebben. Ick laet U.E. en anderen die dit sullen booren eene oordelen, of een Consul die hier van den staet gestelt om ons tegens de Turcken of anderen die ons souden mogen verdrucken, te protegeren, toch staet op sulcke wijsen ons te handelen, en als hij continueert, of wij daervan geen groote swarigheyt te waghten hebben. Te meer, nu wij sien dat in de vergaderinge en andere bijeenkomsten die van sijn creaturen niet sijn, met woorden soecket te captieren, om occasie te hebben van tegen ymant een schelmstuck uyt te vinden en sijn opgecroopt

vergiſt uyſ te braecken. Ick wil U.E. gebeden hebbe dese ſaecke aen de vrienden bekent te maekken en mijnenthalve klaghtigh te weesen of het 'teeniger tijt operatie dede dat hier wytraeckte, alsoo hier niet te harden is bij een Consul die die van sijn complice niet en sijn, soeckſt te ruineren. Ick soude U.E. voor desen als over dese ſaecke ges. hebbe ten ware ick niet gehoopt hadde dit werck soude geaccommodeert worden, en den Consul sulcken ongeneslijcken baet niet souw behouden, maer sien nu dat geen remedie is. Waerover degene die van sijn complice niet en sijn, hebben goetgevonden met dese passage yder van sijn vrienden daerover te schrijven ten eynde datter redres in magh comen.

DOCUMENT 5: AN ENGLISH DRAGOMAN DISCOVERS FRENCH COINER

(The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6912: Jacob van Dam to Justinus Colyer, 9 January 1675)

Mijn Heer

Gisteren is alhier voor den dagh gecomen, dat seker Fransman, genaemt ... Imbert, in sijn huys een persoon heeft, die valsch gelt maect, en't selve tegenwoordich doet in stucken van achten, sijnde daer door ontdeckt door den selven Imbert aenden jongen Dragoman vanden heer Engelsz Ambasszr, die als nu hier is, seker somme gelts in die munte heeft betaalt, welke penngen bij den heer Engelsz Consul sijnde gesien, en voor vals erkent, heeft die aenstonts aenden Fransz Consul gesonden, en versocht, dat ondersoek op dat werck mogt worden gedaen, die daer op aenstonts den voorn: Imbert heeft ontboden, en inde gevangenis geset, naderhant sijn huys selver onvoorsiens besogt, enden valschen munter op sijn werck betrapt, met alle sijne instrumenten, daer onder, soo ik bericht ben, alderhande stem: pels sijn, namentlijk van Leeuwendaalders, Iselotten, Sechinen, Ongers, Quarten die bij alle in sijn eygen huis heeft laten brengen, enden munter inde boeyen doen setten, dan den Fransz Consul gisteren tegens den avont den voorsz Imbert, weder hebbende gerelaxeert, soodat weder doorde straat ginck, en den heere Engelsz Consul 't selve hebbende vernomen, heeft daer op desen morgen met den Fransz Consul geabboucheert, en hem aengeseyt, dat, soo wanneer hij meende dit werck soo stil te laten gaen, en den voorn: Imbert op vrije voeten te setten, hij selfs aenstonts aan den Kadi soude gaen, en aenwijſinge vant werck en personen doen, waer op den Fransz Consul den selven Imbert aenstonts weder inde gevangenis heeft geset, alwaar hij, op't aenhouden vanden Engelsz Consul, sal blijven ter tijt en wijle den heere Fransz Ambassadeur alhier sal wesen gecomen, aemdem welcken den voorsz Engelsz Consul justitie sal versoecken, soo sijn Ed: nu desen morgen heeft laten weten door eene mijner dragomans, die ick expresselijck dese morgen aen hem hadde gesonden, om hem te versoecken, dat deze de goede en stercke handt beliejde te houden ontrent den Fransz Consul, ten eynde dese saake nauw mogt worden naagevorscht, alsoo mij meent en het daer voor houdt, dat de principaelste vande Fransz cooplyden, alhier handtdadigh of participanten daer aan sijn, en wordt ook geseyt, dat dit munten al ontrent de drie jaren soude hebben geduert, den gemelte heere Engelsz Consul sent over dit subieect een expressen aanden heere haren Ambassadeur, vande welcksz U:Ed: des gelievenden, apparent naarder informatie desen aengaende sal connen hebben, middelernwijlen hebb' ick van mijn devoir geacht U:Ed: dit ten eersten voor af met de gelegenbeyt van dese messe te adviseren, en daer bij te senden een monster van een beel en en helf stuck van achten van dat slag, omme sich vant een en ander te dienen, daer ende soo U:Ed: sal weten nodich te wesen, en hebbe met dese occasie hier ook willen bijvoegen twee vandat slag van Leeuwendaalders, als den bewuste Armenier seyde te hebben ontfangen van Charles Amon, waer van voordesen aan U:Ed: hebbe geschreven, onderweyle hebb'ick mijne dragomans mede aanden Fransz Consul gesonden, en hem mede ernstel: te doen versoeken, dat dese sake wel soude mogen worden naagevorscht, en daer over justitie gedaen, als sijne een seer hooch en important point, waer op mij heeft laten antwoorden, dat ick verseeckert moge sijn, dat hij daar inne strenger justitie sal doen, als men licht wel soude dencken, alsoo het een sake was, soo sijn Ed: syde, die hem raackte, t'gene hier:inne verder komt te passeeren, sal ik niet na laten U:Ed: te adviseren, sullende voorts blijven, Ick hebbe de prouwe vande voorsz: stucken van achten laten nemen, en door een mijner dragomans een silver smit sijnde, doen smelten en rafineren, en bevonden daise met 8tich ten hondert of wat meer sijn geaugmenteert

Smirna den 9 ja: 1675

DOCUMENT 6: PIETER SMOUT ACCOUNTS A DUTCH PROTÉGÉ'S DEBT

(The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Pieter Smout in the chancery of the Dutch consulate of Izmir, 11 April 1675)

SS:ri Van Goor & Smout

Galata di Const.pln

Mag:ri SS:ri siamo a 14 Septem.re 1674, het voorstaende os copia van onse jonghste, 't sedert soo bevinde ons met UE seer aengen: van den 15 passato, en neffens de reck.: courant van Abram Meijer particulier, beneffens de procuratie tegen hem perticulier ende extract van UE comp: mer S:r van Goor zali: in antwoordt confirmere de copije vonden hebben 't zeedert met Meijer afgereekent ende sijne maakelaers, neffens hem aen t'werck gehadt, ende bevonden dat van de LD 6830: soo bij UE aenwijzen in haere reck. court: van ult:mo Agosto voor UE reck. uijstaen, niet meer sijn te ontfangen als ine a LD 1568: te weten

<i>Aen Samuel & Juda Levy dat nu met haere falissem.t een quade schult geworden is</i>	LD	850:
<i>Van Joseppo Ventura & Ab:m Valencin</i>	„	66:
<i>Van Haggi Ahy Samoza</i>	„	352:
<i>Van Haggi Ahy Et:a</i>	„	300:
	„	1568:
<i>Soo dat compt en manqueren</i>	„	5262:
	LD	6830:

Welcke gelden door Ab:m Meijer los voor, als naer het opmaecken van de reck.: hierboven gemelt, door Ab:m Meijer bevinden ontfangen te sijn, sijnde daer onder begrepen het 1/3 van de 24/2 laekenen daar UE menti van maeckt in presentie van S:r Eus vergocht te sijn, die door Meijer neffens meerder somme sijn getrocken Et:a

was geteekent

De Broses, De Bois & Van Breen

Copie geextraheert door een derde en gecollationeert door mij ondergesz. met de originele berustende onder S:r Pieter Smout, Smirna den 11 April 1675

Laurens Rigo Vice Cancell:

DOCUMENT 7: JACOB VAN DAM'S MEMORANDUM ON (HIS) LIFE IN IZMIR

(The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6912: Jacob van Dam to States General, 12 July 1676)

Hoogh Mogende Heeren, Mijne Heeren

Den 5 des voorleden maents Juny hebb ick, ter sake tot Constantinopolen, een barck op Marseille gereet lagh, over dien wegh aen Uw Ho:Mo: onderdanigh gesz. den brief, waer van de nevengaende duplicata is, oft mocht wesen dat den eersten niet terecht ware gecomen, daer aen al wat te twijfelen is. Ick sal mij dan, met UW Ho:Mo: permissie, tot denselven brief met alle schuldigh respect gedragen, en haer favorable resolutie daer op (in't reguarde van mijn ootmoedigh versoeck, rakende het genot der consulaet rechten, van ons vertrocken convoy onder d'heer Schout bij Nacht De Ruyter) met de vereyschte onderdanige gelatenhey, afwachten, waer toe ick reverentel vertrouwe, dat mede veel of het sijne sal hebben gecontribueert, of, bij ontstentnisse vandien, noch veel of het sijne sal contribuieren, dat Uw Ho:Mo: goedertierentl, en nae hare gewoonlijcke clementie, sullen hebben gelieven, of noch sullen gelieven te considereren, het landt, daer wij hier in wonen namentl bij de Turcken, een violent, wreedt, en hardt volck, alsse beginnen, of iets bij de handt nemen, voorts de vele en verscheyde schrickelijcke, periculouse, en moeylijcke accidenten, die wij daerinne onderworpen sijn, als namentl de aertberingen, pest, hete koortsen, brandt, en haveryen, of beurs en hooft brekeryen, breder bij mij opgesteld inde nevengaende memorye of notitie, omme UW Ho:Mo: in hare vergaderinge door de lancheyt van dien, niet te diens te vallen,

waer toe mij derbaven mede onderdanig gedrage, en vertrouwe ick oock reverentel, dat de consideratien van dese voorverbaelde, en in mijne memorye geannotteerde accidenten, en dreygende of nakende periculen, die in dese Turksche landen dagelijcx connen voortvallen, en oock inderdaet voortvallen, de oorsake is geweest, dat Uw Ho:Mo; voor desen de goetheyt en consideratie hebben gelieven te gebruycken, ende consuls in dese gewesten meer toe te leggen als in andere quartieren, en gevolgel deselve te laten genieten de rechten, bij deselve Uw Ho:Mo: gestelt op de goederen, en coopmanschappen, die met de schepen harer onderdanen, te deser plaetse gebragt en weder van hier vervoert worden, waer mede den gemelten consul sich wat rijckelijcker heeft connen onderhouden, als hij nu wel sal connen doen met dit sijn toegeleyde tractement soo wanneer Uw Ho:Mo: daer bij sullen gelieven te persisteren, dan tsij soo 'tsij. Ick dorve mij selfs, met hare gunstige permissie, van derselver gewoonlijcke clementie en equiteyt beloven, dat Uw Ho:Mo: haer tot die favorabele resolutie sullen hebben gedaen of noch wel sullen doen permoveren, met welck eerbiedich vertrouwen eyndigende, en voorts Godt de heere dagelijcks voor Uw Ho:Mo: hooghwijse regeringe en personen biddende blijve altijt,

Hoogh Mogende Heeren, Mijne Heeren

Smirna den 12 July 1676

Uw Ho:Mo: onderdanigsten en
gehoorsaemsten dienaer

J. van Dam
1676

Memorie of notitie opgesteld bij den jegenwoordigen en ondergesz consul van de Nederlantsz Natie tot Smirna, vervattende de schrickelijcke, periculouse, en moelyjcke accidenten, die de consuls te dier plaetse, soo met ende neffens de gemene inwoonders aldaer, als ten reguarde van hare functie, onderworpen sijn, mitsgaders desselvs consideratien, ontrent het jugieren van sijn persooon, als consul, alles dienende tot onderdanige informatie, vande Hoogh Mogende Heeren, sijne gebiedende heeren, de Staten G:rael der Verenigde Nederlanden, bestaende inde volgende te weten:

Eerstel: de aertbevingen, die een mensch de haynen te bergen doen rijzen, en voornamel als men overdenckt, dat dese stadt 3 of 4 malen daer door is versoncken, of te gronde gegaen en datter hier noch een prophetie is, dat deselve stadt noch twee malen door aertbevinge sal of moet vergaen, welke aertbevingen alle jaren drie of vier reysen, niet en manqueren, en wel degel bij hem met grote schrick en ontsteltenisse gevoelt sijn en worden, mitsgs hem alsdan, noch meer met beven doen gedencken aen die overschrickelijcke, en schier noyt geboorde aertbevinge tot Ragousa in den jare 1667, dewelcke hij consul alsdoen mede heeft bij gewoont en geproeft op sijne penible reyse herwaerts, inde welke hij al het sijne heeft verloren, en ter contraraye met over grote moeyten, iae selfs met peryckel van sijn leven, vele ende verscheyden goederen heeft gebergt die de h=ren Directeuren vanden Levantsz Handel, door haer Ho:Mo: ordre aen wijlen den heer Resident Croock hadden mede gegeven tot presenten voor den Turkschen Keyser, en desselvs ministers, en welke gebergte presenten, door desselvs vijlantie, en onvermoeyden erbeyt, oock tot nut en voordeel van 't gemeen gecomen en besteeft sijn.

Ten tweeden: de pest, die meest het gansche jaer door regneert, nu jegenwoordich noch hier, niet meer als twee huysen van hem consul is, alle vier of vijf jaren seer vehement domineert en ettljicke duysenden van menschen weghsleept, gel noch over twee jaren te deser plaetse is gebeurt.

Ten derden: de heete koortsen, die preys en sonder fout alle jaren inde maenden van septemb en octob grasseren, en al immers soo quadt iae quader worden geoordeelt als de pest, alsoo aen de eerste sieckte al meer, immers al soo veel van de cristen of francennatien sterven als aen de leste, gel aen onse eygen natie wel te degen gebleken is, alsoo bij sijnen tijt meer als de helft vandien en onder deselve mede onsen predicant aen deselve is overleden en bij consul oock selfs twee verscheyden reysen swaerl en dodel daer aen vast is geweest.

Ten vierden: den brandt, die wij hier 20 of 25 dagen geleden, noch hebben gehad, inde straet waer alle of de meeste van onse coopl wonen, en oock niet verre van sijn consuls huys, welcken brandt soo schrickel en vreesel was, dat men niet anders dachte of gansch Smirna immers althans het quartier, daer alle de cristene coopl

wonen soude inde assche geraect hebben, sijnde daerenboven het accident van den brandt noch onderworpen, of met sich slepende, dat die gene in niens huys deselve eerst ontstaet, door de Turcken wordende geatrappeert int vuur wort geworpen, behalven noch de schade die men van het vuur selfs heeft, alsmede van de selve Turcken, die onder een schijn, van te comen helpen, de ommestaende huysen met gewelt comen opslaen, en alles roven en stelen, sonder dat men sulcx, immers seer beswaerl en met grote moeyten en peryckel can voorkomen.

Ten vijfden: de havanyen of beurs en hoof brekerijen, die ick in mijn functie dagelijks hebbe te verwachten, en mij overcomen, soo vande ministers, als van het gemene volck, alsmede vande Turcksche corsaren die van Algiers, Tunis en Tripoli met hare schepen en voort vande leventen, die met de gallijen van alle quartieren comen, en seer grote moetwil bedrijven alsmede seer dickwils valsche of opgeraapte avanien of gelt pretensien maken diemen dan met grote schade en veel moeyten moet afcopen of men lijdt peryckel van bij de cop gevadt en int gevangen huys gesmeten te worden, gel hij consul daer van een levendigh exempel heeft gebadt, ruym twee jaren geleden van seker Algeriens cap:n, dewelcke hier met een groot schip leggende en een sijner slaven sijnde van geboorte een brabantse of een vlamingh door de vlucht quijt rakende, denselven slaef met kracht ende gewelt begeerde te hebben, dat ick hem soude betalen, om dat hij quansuys nae sijn sustenne of voorgeven, van onse natie soude wesen, hoewel het echter oock niet waer was of anders wilde hij met sijn schip aende waterkant vlack voor sijn huys comen leggen, en tselve met sijn geschut pladtschieten, sonder dat den cadi of regeringe alhier (voor dewelcke hij die sake noch quansuys in rechten ventileerde of urgeerde hem consul daerinne conde of wilde maintineren, niettegenstaende hij door sijne dragomans alle bedenckelijcke redenen die voor hem militeerden hadde gedaen allegeren eysch (selfs volgens het seggen en de bekentenisse van den voorsz cadi) onrechtmatig, en tegens de capitulatie was, en hij cadi hem consul geen andere hulpe toebragt als sijn raedt daerinne bestaende dat hij den voorsz slaef most betalen, en dat hij most dencken dat hij inde handen van rovers was, en dat die hem niet uyt haer gewelt wilde laten gaen, of sij wilden hem dwingen sodanigen somme gelts aen haer te geven, veggende denselven cadi noch daerbij dat hij geen voocht over dat volck was, en geen justitie over haer conde doen, also se in dienst vanden groten heer hier waren sulcx dat hij consul wel genootsaect was, bon gne mal gne ordre te stellen dat den voorsz slaef aen den cap:n vierde betaelt, belopende te samen vier hondert Rijcxdaeld:rs of duysent Gls: wilde hij anders niet afvachten, dat men hem in sijn huys hadde commen dootschieten, immers althans dat se selve met geschut hadden connen ruyneren, en meer schade gadaen hebben.

Noch is het ontrent denselven tijt geschiet, dat hier eenige Tripolische schepen ter rede leggende, het volck daer op varende soo veel moetwil en gewelt aende Cristen Natien bedreef, dat alle de consuls haere huysen mosten fortificeren, met alderhande schiet geweer voorsien en bij nacht en bij dagh macht laten houden, om niet onvoorsien van hetselve volck overvallen te worden, waer mede sij haer gestadigh dreygden, en sijl oock door den cadi wierden gewaerschoont op hare hoede te wesen, met bijvoeginge, dat de regeringe selfs geen meester was, of tselve volck niet conde dwingen.

Jegenwoordigh leggen hier ter rede weder seventien gallijen met leventen of Turcksche matrosen, die mede geen cleyne vrese en moeylijckheyt, veroorsaecten soo datmen schier niet als met groten schroom dorft rytgaen, alsoo het seer dickwils gebeurt is, dat se die van onse natie op de straeten hebben aengerandt.

Ten tijde van des ondergesz consuls voorsiet is mede voorgevallen die over grote, doch in ons regardt ongefondeerde, en onrechtmattige avanie, van 't schip de Ceyser Octavianus, dewelcke met in circa achtentseventich duysent realen of leeuwendaeld:rs inden beginne heeft moeten worden afgemaect, in welcken tijt den consul oock geen cleyne peryckel liep, van aengetast en gebonden en naer Constantp:n gevoert te worden, daer mede hij sterck wierdt gedreygt.

Den Engelschen consul tot Aleppo is jegenwoordich deselve of diergelijcke avanie of pretensie, mede te beurt gevallen, die derhalve aldaer genoegsaem wordt gevangen gehouden.

De gemelte en andere avanien connen nogh dagelijks voorvallen die dan alle op de schouderen vanden consul moeten afstuyten.

Hier bij compt, sijns nedrigen gevoelens, mede in grote consideratie dat inden jare 1670 den heere resid:t Colyer hem consul hebbende gelieven te ontbieden tot Constantinp:n om met hem over gnale en particuliere saken te

abboucheren, en bij om dien heer als sijn super intendent in dese gewesten te geboorsamen en om de saken van bet gemene best of het publicq te bevorderen, de reyse derwaerts hebbende aengevangen, onder wegen een goet getal rovers hem hebben besprongen, genoegsaem naecht nytgetrocken, alles mij ontnomen, en wel degel met slagen, van piecken, lanssen is onthaelt, mitsg op drie plaetsen swaerl gequetst hebben, mitsgs noch daerenboven, sijn broeders soon die hem op die tocht accompaneerde, mede sodanigh hebben gewont dat hij vijf of ses dagen daer nae noch op de wech en eer sijl tot Constantij:n waren is gecomen te overlijden.

Buyten en behalven alle 'tgene voor verhaelt staet, is bet kennel boe haer Ho:Mo: den 9 janry 1671 hebbende gelieven te nemen een resolutie, waer bij den heer Resident Colyer en den ondergesz Consul van Dam onder anderen expressel worden belast en geauthoriseert, omme met onderlinge communicatie en correspondentie over de fraudatie van de ambassaet en consulaetreechten, ten tijde van 't overlijden van den heer resid:t Warnerus voorgevallen, een exacte reberche te doen, en 't verswegene te doen betalen, en, den lesten dien hem opgeleyden last en ordre van sijne heeren en meesters, volgens sijn schuldigen plicht, getrouwel en gehoorsaeml hebbende willen uytworeen, en ter executie leggen, is daermyt voor hem gesproken een seer gevaerlijcke dissentie hooftbreecken en moeylijckhey (blijkende nyt vele en verscheyde brieven, bij hem aen haer Ho:Mo:, en aende H:rn Directeuren van den Levantsz Handel is gesz) alsoo die geene der natie die aen die defraudatie, mede schuldigh waren, een nytermaten groten haet en picq, ter oorsake vande selve sijne getoonde gehoorsaembeyt, en vigilantie op hem consul hebben genomen, dewelcke ruym vier jaren heeft geduyrt, en waer nyt mede allenl en eerstel is voortgecomen, dat de bewuste elf klaegh poincten tegen hem consul aenden staet sijn overgegeven, bij denselven staet aen hem consul sijn gesonden en waer tegen hij oock sijn provisioneel debath of verabtwoordinge den 15 septemb: des voorleden jaers 1675 ingevolge van haer Ho:Mo: last met alle schuldige onderdanighey albereyts heeft opgesteld, en aen haer gemelte Ho:Mo: gedaen afgaen, onderdanigl vertrouwende dat daarmede contentemen:t sullen hebben, en nyt het selve desselfs onschult en oprechten wandel blijcken.

Dewijle nu dese vorenstaende poincten bij den gemelten consul van Dam sijn opgesteld, met eerbiedich vertronwen dat daer door den meergemelten staet te meer gepermoveert sal worden ten eynde die goetheyt en equiteyt believen te hebben, om hem noch toe te leggen, de consulaet rechten verschenen of vervallen met of in het laest van hier vertrocken convoy, onder den heer Schout bij Nacht J:r Engel de Ruyter, soo sal hij sich vorder met alle onderdanighey gedragen aen de xxxxxxxx redenen vernat in sijne brieven over dat subject aen haer Ho:Mo: gesz sub datis 15 novemb, 14 janry 5 feb: en 5 junij alle lestleden cortel inde naervolgende bestaende:

Eerstel: dat hij consul, geduyrende den tijt van over de drie jaren dat hier geen convoyen sijn geweest, weynich of geen profjiten of revenues hebbende gebadt, echter deselve grote oncosten van paerden, dienaers en huyshoudingh, als Janitzars, dienende tot bescherminge en wacht van sijn persoon en huys, dragomans of tolcken, cancelier, onder cancelier, clerquen en huysdienaers gesamentl het getal van twintich ytmackende, voorts presenten en vere: ringen aen den cadì en andere hoge ministers albier, alle om bet respect van den staet en watie te maincineren, en twelck albier soo moet wesen, wil men anders crediet en respect bij de Turcken hebben en van haer geacht sijn, alsoo sijl op die yterlijcke pompe seer sien, belopende de voorsz oncosten, tesamen in dien tijt al ontrent of over de vijftien drysent Realen van Achten en sulcx achtentertich drysent Gls:.

Ten tweeden: dat haer Ho:Mo: resolutie vanden 4 octob des voorleden jaers 1675, op 't stuck van't provisioneel salarieren vanden selven consul eerst is genomen, soo veel maenden nae 't nytlopen van ons convoy onder d'heer Schout bij Nacht de Ruyter, en oock albier eerst gecomen is langh nae 't vertreck van 't selve convoy van dese plaetse en sulcx nae 't eerbiedich gevoelen van hem consul, soo langh nae de tijden respectivel, dat de rechten vandien albereyts aen hem waren vervallen.

Ten derden: dat bij de H:rn Directeuren vanden Levantsz Handel, ingevolge van haer Ho:Mo: autorisatie, tot noch toe de behoerlijcke ordre, op den ontfangh der ambass:et en consulaet rechten niet en is gestelt, immers althans noch niet in handen of ter ooren van hem consul gecomen.

Ten vierden dat hij consul met den ontfangen vandien, om die reden albereyts alle de moeyten en hooftbreken heeft gebadt.

En ten rijfden dat noch het landt, noch het gemeen eenige de minste schade of beswaernisse hier bij sal comen te lijden, dat hij consul met de rechten van 't voorsz convoy sijne excessive gedane onkosten en geleden schade, een weynich come te soulageren, of goet te maken, willende hij consul onderdanigh verwachten, dat de voorsz redenen een favorabele ingressie sullen vinden, te meer alsoo hij in goeden conscientie niet beter en weet, of hij heeft sich in alles geduyrende, of rakende sijne functie gequeten, als een getrouw genereus en neerstigh minister schuldigh is te doen, daer ter contrarye soo dese sake tegen sijn verwachten mocht comen uyt te vallen, hij meent reden te sullen hebben, om sich hoogh te bedrouven, of hij den staet aen d eene sijde geen beboorl genougen hadde gegeven, en aende andere sijde, dat sijne getrouwighyheit en genereusheyheit hem soo costel soude vallen, mitsgs sult hem last en ongelegentheyheit veroorsaken, en voorts mede dat bij ontstentnisse van dit sijn versoek hem benomen worden de middelen, van de Cristelijcke liefde te bewijzen, int verlossen van Cristenslaven, en meest van onse eygen natie, die alhier in seer groten getale, swaer geboeyt te coop worden gebracht, en waer door men seer qualijck can naerlaten commiseratie met die ellendige geketende menschen te hebben, waer van den ondergesz consul (sonder roem gesproken) bij sijnen tijt al een goet gedeelte heeft gelost, en het hem seer veel gelt heeft laten kosten, 'twelck opgerekent sijnde, lichtel duysent Rijxdaelders, of meer voor sijn hooft soude comen te monterren.

Tot een beslyt van dese memorye sal den meergemelten consul met haer Ho:Mo: gunstige licentie, hier nogh eerbiedighl bij vougen en deselve onderdanighl berichten, dat hij, op de expresse last en aenschrijvens, van haer gemelte Ho:Mo: vanden 1 septemb: 1670 in sijne consideratie, die hij in meert 1671 desselve met alle onderdanighyheit heeft toegesonden, heeft laten insluieren, dat sijns oordeels het gagieren van sijn persoon seer dienstigh soude wesen, eens deels om dat hij alsdoen meende, dat het 'tselve veel soude contribuieren tot meerdere rust van haer Ho:Mo: en van de H:rn Directeuren vanden Levantsz Handel (dewelcke andersints met brieven en klachten, door den resident, consul en natie alhier gestadigh moeyl gevallen souden worden) als oock tot meer vrede en enighyheit tusschen den gemelten residt, consul en natie alhier; en andersdeels om dat hij alsdoen niet anders conde sien, of het gemeen soude daer bij proviteren, en door dat middel voorgecomen en uyt de wegh geleyt connen worden, eenige havanyen en andere nootsackelijcke onkosten, die veeltijts ten besten vande navigatie en negotie in dese landen moeten worden gedaen, want als des gemelten consuls oogmerck, en sentiment niet derwaerts heen hadde gelopen, soude hij noyt het voorsz gagieren hebben geinclineert en geadviseert alsoo het niet anders conde uytvallen, en strecken, als tot sijn over grote schade, die hij echter (als een getrouw minister toecomt, en altijt moet doen) liever in sijne prive heeft willen lijden, en het voordeel voor het gemeen laten, dan alsoo de saken deser werelt, en voornemel ontrent de navigatie en negotie, haere veranderingen dagelijcx onderworpen sijn, soo heeft ondergesz consul sedert het opstellen van deselve sijne consideratien, mede bevonden, dat ontrent dit werck al mede eenige veranderingen en andere speculation sijn voorgevallen, en siet hij alsnu uyt de dagelijckse discoursen en contencances van de coopl sijner natie gevolgel te gemoet, dat het selve werck sijns oordeels niet sal strecken, tot meer rust van Uw Ho:Mo: en vande H:rn Directeuren noch tot meerder vrede en enichyheit, onder den resident, consul en natie alhier, maer vreeset ter contrarye, dat meer moeyelheden en dissentionen respectivel sal causeren, alsoo die van sijne natie gewoon sijnde, voor desen altijt een goede courtoisie of quijtscheldinge in't betalen harer rechten van hem consul te genieten, en alsnu bevindende datse naer alle apparentie, daer van niet alleen niet meer sullen hebben te verwachten maer dat se daeren boven lichtel de manifesten noch sullen moeten beedigen, heeft sulcx in haer een seer grote misnoegen en degonst gebaert, pretenderende alsnu voor af, dat de tariffe of estimatie der waren en coopmanschappen, wel een derde te hoogh is gestelt, diese begeren verlaecht te hebben, en alsdan volgens die verlagingsh te betalen, om soo doende, en door dat middel, de voorsz courtoisie uyt te vinden, en te genieten, en belangende den eedt datse daer toe geensins gehouden sijn sulcx dat hij consul al vrij becommert is, dat uyt het een en 't ander nogh grote vervarringen, onenicheden en disputen sullen spruyten, en dat het gemeen daerenboven oock wel sijne recke:re daer bij niet soude connen vinden, wandt bij aldien hij consul door Godts genade, en haer Ho:Mo: gunst in de goede jaren niet wat hadde overgegadert, waer mede soude hij inde quade jaren hebben connen subsisteren, en sijne dienaers soo ten dienste vant publicq, als int prive betalen, mitsgs: de Turcksche ministers haere presenten geven? Wandt de dagelijcksebe ondervindinge leert datter altijt is een vicissitudo rerum, sulcx datmen de tijden niet in sijne handen heeft, en ondertusschen moet het gemeen of de directie alle de te doene onkosten en vervallen tractementen, volgens haer Ho:Mo: resolutie betalen, daerenboven heeft hij consul altijt selfs in loco geweest, en heeft sijn oogh over sijn eygen interesse connen laten gaen, en echter hebben eenige noch soo veel van sijne rechten geweten achter om te halen, waer uyt licht is af te meten, hoe het sal gaen als die rechten bij een derden ongeinteresterden of gegagieerden sullen worden ontfangen soude derhalven, onder het gunstigh welnemen van haer Ho:Mo: volgens sijns consuls nedrigh oordeel,

om die redenen wel sijne consideratien meriteren, of deselve niet soude connen goet vinden het subject vant ontfangen, der ambassaet en consulaet rechten te laten of weder te brengen op den ouden voet

Tgene voorsz is heeft den meergemelten consul gemeent van sijne onderdanigen plicht te wesen, haer Ho:Mo: met alle eerbiedige schuldige termen, voor te dragen, met ootmoedich versoeck van excuse soo bij daerinne te importuyn is geweest, en niet te min sijn geringh oordeel geboorsamel onderverpende het hoogh wijs verstant en goet vinden van haer Ho:Mo: dervelcker hooghwijsse regering en personen Godt de heere meer en meer ten dienste vanden lande wil segenenen voorspoedigh maken.

Aldus opgesteld int consulaire huys tot Smirna
den 11 July 1676

J: van Dam
1676

DOCUMENT 8: THE DUTCH NATION'S JEWISH CREDITORS DEMAND PAYMENT

(The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Haim Algranate, Jehuda Amatto and Nisim Amatto to Jacob van Dam, 1677)

Avante di Ss-a Ill-ma Sig-re Jacomo van Dam Console dela Nazione Hollandesa

Compariscanno,

Abraham Leon et Efraim Arditte, Nisim e Jenda Amatto, et Haim Algranatte figliolo dil.q.m Isbac Algranate, Hebrei negozianti in questa piazza, e con ogni devotione li naranno qual m.fe, erendo che sotto il giorno di -30- genaro de 1671-, li comparente diedero a cambio alli sig-ri mercanti di la nazione holandesa, li nome di qualle, saranno in piedo notatti, una somma di Leone efetive, numero nove mille sette cento settanta et peze quatro cento di pesso di mess.co e sevig.a, con obligo di detti sig-ri, che p.r interesse di ogni messe, li pagare benno a ragione di uno e mezzo p.r.cento, et che ogni tre messe doveva seguire il pagamento del cambi scadutti et non facendolo, si obligorno detti sig-ri a capo sei mesi di pagare il principalle e cambi scadutti, senza litte cezione, ne contradictione alcuna, come il tutto aparisce dala scritta de obligo originale, la copia dela qualle, sara inclusa, alaqualle ha et avendo detti sig-ri mercanti obligatti, fatto pagamento alli comparente, sotto li -30-marzo-1672-, di peze quatro cento di pesso, con piu il interesse di dette peze quarto cento, et sotto li -31- detto, di Leone cinque mille otto cento settanta, con piu il interesse cadutte fino al detto giorno di tutta la somma di Leone nove mille sette cento settanta et sotto il di p-mo di settembre de 1673 -, fecero pagamento detti sig-ri alli comparenti di Leone cinque cento sette mezzo, a conto del interesse tra corsi, fino dal giorno -31-marzo-1672- delli Leone tre mille nove cento restorno di principale devitori, come dila receipta apare; et sendo, che li comparente piu volte, ano fatto istanza p.r ottenere il pagamento di loro principale, e cambi in vertude ne dila obligatione di detti sig-ri, ala qualle ha, p.r ilche, non erendoli si no al presente sodisfatto cosa alcuna di prin cipalle e cambi; et sendo che questo interesse, apartiene a pupille, ve dove, e pobere gente assistente in Jerusalem, dale qualli li comparente sono molestatti p.r ottenere loro avere p.r loro sominations, et non potendo li comparente piu resistere al o covere ali detti di loro propio, come anno fatto sin o al presentte; sono forzatti a ricorrere ala clemenza e benignitta di ss-mo ill-ma, acio, covecta giustitia, faccia ali comparente restar imborsatte di loro avere, che alere m-fe facendo, sara no costretti a ricorrere ad altre giustitie, e cercare diversi modi p.r ottenere il suo, pregandola, inquesto negotio operare dala sua solitta recitudine; et la somma, che li comparenti, sono creditore dalli sig-ri mercanti holandesi, sono di principalle, Leone efettive tre mille nove cento proximo a venire, che importtano Leone tre mille cinque cento e dieci, di cambia, sieme con il principalle, sono in tutto Leone sette mille quatro cento e dieci, a conto deli qualle ano solo receipto Leone cinque cento, e sette e mezzo, con che restanno li comparenti creditore 6902 1/2 di Leone sei mille nove cento e dua e mezzo, lequalle, con ogni devotione, preganno a Ss-a Ill-ma afarli imborsare, che ditt al favore, tanto li comparente, quanto le pobere vedove, e pupilli, restaranno pregando al sig-re Dio p.r sua felicitta et enri al sam.do ha

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Nisim e Jenda Amatto

DOCUMENT 9: JACOB VAN DAM'S DEFENSE AGAINST HIS JEWISH CREDITORS

(The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6912: Jacob van Dam to States General, 20 April 1677)

dat. 20. Apr.
/ 1677
rec. 23. Jug.

Extract in
brieven uit Sm:
aan D.L.H.

Hoogh.Mogende.Heeren, Mijne heeren

... foly 532.

Door die van de Joodsche natie alhier is mij wel geworden Uw:Ho:Mo: missive en resolutie, beyde respectivelijck geschreven en genomen den 21 decemb. des voortleden jaers, opt gene de heeren gedeep-den van de Provincie van Hollant & Westvrieslant ten selven dage in Uw:Ho:Mo: vergaderinge hebben believen te representeren en voor te dragen, wegens 't gunt de onderlingen van de Portugesche Joodsche natie, wonende tot Amsterdam, mitsgaders Jacob de Pinto aen de heeren Staten van Hollant en Westvrieslant bij reqre hadden te kennen gegeven, bebel-sende de voorsz: resolutie in effecte dat, mij de goederen coopmanschappen, ende effecten, die bij, vanwegen, ofte voor reeckeninge van de voorsz: Joodsche coopplyden, ingesetenen onser landen, naer Smirna souden mogen werden gesonden, ofte die oock van daer voor, vanwegen, ofte ten behoeven van de Joodsche coopplyden, ingeste-nen onser landen, souden mogen werden versonden, niet anders sullen hebben te considereren, aen te sien, te handelen, ofte te tracteren, directelijck of indirectelijck, meenigerley wijse, ende sulcx soowel ontrent het tauxeren van de voorsz: goederen, als de betalinge van de ambassaet ende consulaetreechten, als de waeren, goederen, coopmanschappen ende effecten van de andere ingesetenen onser landen, professie van de Christelijcke Religie doende, t sij dan dat de voorsz: goederen soewel in't gaen, als in't komen, aen ofte van de Christenen, Turcken, Joden, of andere natien alhier souden mogen sijn geadresseert ofte geconsigneert. En denijle het Uw:Ho:Mo: wille en goede geliefte is, mij bij haren voorsz: brief expresselijck te gelasten en ernstigh te bevelen, dat ick mij naer den inhouden van de voorsz: resolutie precise sal hebben te reguleren ende te gedragen, sonder daerontrent enigins in gebrecke te blijven, soo sal ick 't selve, nae mijnen onderdanigsten plicht gehoorsamelijck nacomen en achtervolgen, als deselve daerbij sullen believen te blijven persisteren. Ondertusschen versoecke en bidde ick onderdaniglijck, dat Uw:Ho:Mo: ten besten believen te duyden, dat ick, met derselver gunstige licentie, mij de vrijmoedighbeyt sal aenmatigen, van aen de ene sijde te seggen, dat ick eerbiedelijck vertrouwe, dat Uw:Ho:Mo: lichtelijck over dat subiect hare gedachten en deliberatie naerder souden hebben laten gaen, of hare mesures anders genomen, als deselve hadden geweten hoe en wat eygentlijck van die saecke is, en in welke maniere het gepasseerde en de proceduren tusschen mij en de Joodsche natie alhier van tijt tot tijdt sich hebben toegedragen en aen de andere sijde, om mijn debat of defensie een weynigh int brede, op en tot refutatie in eeniger wijse van het voorsz: reqre der Joden met ten aenkleven van dien, te doen en op te stellen, sullende Uw:Ho:Mo:, des believende, het een en het ander ten merendele vinden vervat in de copie missive, bij mij op hetselve subiect den 10 feb: lestleden geschreven aen de heeren Directeuren van den Levantsche handel & die ick ten dien eynde, tot Uw:Ho:Mo: speculatie en eerbiedige informatie, hierbij hebbe gevoegt, mij daertoe met alle vereyschte onderdani-gheyt gedragende, met ootmoedigh versoeck, dat op den inhoude van dien soodanigen regard moge worden genomen als Uw:Ho:Mo: volgens hare gewoonlijcke boge equiteyt, altijt gewoon sijn te doen, alsmede opt gene ick, met derselver permissie, int corte noch hierbij sal voegen, daerinne bestaende: eerstelijck, dat ick verscheyde waren van de Joden minder hebbe geestmeert, als onse Tariffa of waerdemootitie medebrengh, waernaer onse natie selfs betaelt, en onder anderen mede de stammen of Turcsche garens, die ick haer maer hebbe doen betalen tegen twee Leenwendrs. de ocke, sijnde twee en een half pont hollants, en 't welck wel het voornaemste is, en het meest importeert, daer onse natie die moet betalen tegen drie Leenwendrs. sulcx dat het in die waer alleen een beel derden deel scheelt, en andere waren naer advenant, breder blijckenende bij het nevensgaende memoricken, daertoe mij reverentelijck gedrage. Ten tweeden dat ick die estimatie of Tariffe niet hebben ge-maect, maer gevonden, en gevolgt, soo als se bij mijne predecessours altijt is gepractiseert geweest. En ten

derden, dat het, onder reverentie, versiert is, dat ick de coopmanschappen met een half pcto meer hebbe belast, sullende Uw:Ho:Mo: het vordere, des believende, connen sien nyt de voorsz: mijne copie missive, aen de voorn-beeren Directeuren geschreven, en onder anderen daerint mede, dat onse natie niet anders wenschte, als dat die van de Joodsche natie, om de daerbij gevoegde redenen, niet een stuck op onse schepen int comen en gaen mochten laden, mitsgaders dat ick de Joden niet hebbe laten betalen nae het Concept-Tariffa bij de beeren Directeuren herwaerts gesonden (soo als bij de voorsz: Joden is gepretendeert) eens deels omdat deselve Tariffa niet bij Uw:Ho:Mo: was geappoebert, en gearresteert (gelijck se lichtel. noch niet sal wesen geappoebert en gearresteert) en anderdeels omdat in volle vergaderinge van consul en natie is goetgevonden, dat de voorsz: Joden noch na de oude Tariffa sullen betalen, blijkende bij de copie authentycq Resolutie, daerover genomen, en, tot derselver contemplatie, hiernevens gaende. Daerenboren sal nyt deselve missive, mijns geringen erachtens, oock evidentelijck blijcken, hoe ondanckshaerlijck, stoutelijck, en informelijck de voorsz: Joodsche natie haer tegens mij hebben gedragen, onaengesien de grote courtoisie en afslag, hiervoren gemelt, die ick aen dat volck hebbe bewesen, twelck, in't generael gesproocken, voorwaer gene de minste beleeftheyt of goet onthael meriteert, als vooreerst haer uysterste best doende, om de Christenen allenthalven te duperen en te misleyden, waer se maer connen of mogen, en voornamelijck in dese landen, daer se in sulcken menichte sijn, en al vrij eenigh pouvoir omtrent de regeringh alhier hebben, en, om die reden, oock in velen bij deselve regeringh al vrij ontsien worden. Ten tweeden omdat se seer onbeschaemt sijn, in hare eijsschen en voorstellen, onversettelijck in hare concepten, en insupportabel in hare maeniere van gouverneren onder haer tegen de Cristen-natien, en voornamelijck mede tegen Uw:Ho:Mo: Consul en Coophlyden te deser plaetse, die se alle seer geern soo subiect en dependent van haer soecken te maecken, als se haer eygen volck, doen, waervan ick Uw:Ho:Mo: vervolgens eenige notabile exempelen sal verhalen tot welcken eynde Uw:Ho:Mo: onderdagelijck believen bericht te wesen, dat alle den handel, die hier ter plaetse, door onse coophlyden en van outs is, en egenwoordigh noch wort gedreven, alijt is geschiet, en alsnoch geschiet, door Joden die deselve onse coophlyden voor makelaers dienen, sonder dewelcke men niet van importantie can verrichten, of eenige basaren, dat is coop en verwoopsbuysen, alsoo die luyden seer ervaren sijn in de waren, maximes, en manieren van tracteren met de inwoonders deser landen, t welck hierop een gansch andere wijze geschiet als in ons landt. De voorsz: Joden nu wel wetende, dat den Francken of Christen coophlyden aen haer volck, voor sooveel die haer als makelaers dienen, merckelijck is gelegen, en, sonder haer, in't stuck van de negotie niet connen uytrichten, soecken en weten haer daarvan seer wel te dienen, en door dat middel haer personage te spelen, en sich te doen valeren, alsoo sij Joden in de minste saecke of gelegenheyt, die der maer voorvalt tegen de Christenen, en waerinne sij sustineren, dat haer van deselve ongelijck geschiet, doch, om beter te seggen, als sijhyden maer sien, dat se met hare pretensien tegen de Christenen, nae haer welgevallen, tot haer oogmerck niet connen geraecken, soo laten se aenstonts een exco-icatie in hare sinagoge afsondigen, dat niemant van haer volck sich sal hebben te verstouten, om eenige negotie of handel te doen voor, met, of in dienst van soodanigen Christen coopman, waertegen iemant van haer eenige pretensie of questie moveert, al hebben se alschoon met malcanderen tevoren in negotie gestaen, of besigh geweest eenige parthije tesamen te sluyten, jae selfs niet om met hem te mogen spreecken, waerdoor dan soodanige coophlyden in seer grote verlegenheyt worden gestelt en deselve merckelijcke schade can toe gebracht worden, alsoo haren ganschen handel alsdan ledigh moet staen, 't welck een onlijdelijcke saecke voor een coopman is, en voornamel: in dese verre Turcx landen, alwaer de commissaris met sooveel periculen en oncosten moeten comen, om harer meesters interesse waer te nemen, en derselver costelijcke effecten te verhandelem. Vier diergelijcke excommunication of battelation soo men se hier noemt, hebben de voorsz: Joden, geduyrende mijn aenwesen alhier, tegen Uw:Ho:Mo: onderdanen, coophlyden te deser plaetse, op de wijze als voren gedaen en laten verondigen, alleen! maer, om, gelijck ick hiervoren mede hebbe geseyt, dat se sustineerden dat haer ongelijck was geschiet, of omdat se niet sagen anders, als doordat middel, so se meenden, tot haer oogmerck te geraecken, boewel se echter haer seer in hare opinie hebben bedrogen gevonden, geconsidereert ick mij alijt met force en vigeur tegen dese hare schadelicke en verderffelijcke maxime en maniere van procederen hebbe moeten stellen, en oock effectivelijck gestelt hebbe, alsoock weder contrarie middelen nytgevonden, waardoor ick haer tot reden en tot het desisteren of revoceren van de voorsz: exco-icatie of battelation hebbe gedwongen, en voornamelijck noch in de laetste, die nu, niet meer als 8 a 10 dagen gelden, is voorgevallen, tegens seker Florentijns coopman, die alhier onder Uw:Ho:Mo: protectie is, op't versoecke, t welck den heer Groot Hartogh van Toscanen, bij een expressen brief aen mij heeft believen te doen, in welcke saeck de voorsz: Joden in't eerst soo bartneckigh sijn gebleven (onaengesien ick haer vele notoire onwaerheden en informaulteyten daerinne hebbe aenwesen) dat met gene redenen, persuasien, of inductien condon worden verset, soo dat ick eyndelijck genootsaect soude sijn geweest, 't sij dan haer, met weten en toestaen van onse natie, mede te

doen batelleren, en te verbieden hare voeten in eenige huysen van onse coophuyden te setten, of wel den tollenaer alhier in banden te geven de manifesten der goederen, die deselve natie met onse schepen heeft ontfangen en versonden, om te sien of se hem sijn tol daervan hebben betaelt, die se ordinaris of t'enemaal slycken, of op de naam van Christenen doen lossen, om in plaets van 5: 6: en 7 ten hondert, die de voorsz: Joodsche natie wegens deselve hare goederen aen tol moet betalen, vrij te wesen met 3 ten hondert, soo als de Christenen betalen, welke laetste saecke bij aldien bij mij ware geschiet, soude haer sulx geen kleyne schade hebben toegebracht, alsoo den tollenaer haer 't selve wel rijckelijck soude hebben doen betalen, en daer en boven noch wel seer qualijck laten tracteren. De voorsz: Joden nu borende, dat ick haer sulx hadde laten aensseggen, en daermede dede dreygen (om dat se andersins doch ganschelijck niet tot eenige gevoelijckheyf of reckelijckheyf wilden verstaen) sijn daerdoor soodanigh geintimideert en verstelt geworden, dat se aenstonts de voorsz: batellatie hebben te niet gedaen, en daerenboven bij mij sijn gecomen om pardon en vergiffenis vant gepasseerde te versoecken, met bijbrenginge van eenige telle quelle excusen, die vrij wat blauw waren om haer vorige geprocedeerde quansuys soo wat te verschoonen of te vergoelijcken, welke excusen ick oock so danigh hebbe laten passeren, omdat ick in desen doch tot mijn oogmerk was geraeckt, en de voorsz: batellatie gerevoceert of te niet gedaen was, waertoe ick mene wel verseekert te wesen, dat sijn. geensins souden hebben verstaen, soo wanneer ick haer met dien capesson niet hadde bereden en adinbe gebracht, onder tusschen heeft bet de voorsz: Joden seer verset en is het haer seer bynuten hare gissinge gegaen, dat sijlieden hebben benonden dat Uw:Ho:Mo: resolutie geensins in faueur van die joden is, die hier wonen (omme namentlijck deselve, in't stuck van de estimatie en consulaetrechten, te tracteren, als Uw:Ho:Mo: andere ingesetenen professie van de Christelijcke religie doende) maer alleen ten voordele van die Joden die ingestenen onser landen sijn also se niet anders hadden verwacht, als dat sijlieden mede, in't reguarde van de goederen en coopmanschappen, die se voor haer eygen reeck:e ontfangen en versenden soodanigh souden worden aengesien en getraceert, en om die reden en alleen: so se mij selfs hebben geseyt, aen de Joden in ons vaderlant hebben geklaegt of geschreven, 't welck sij seggen dat anders niet souden hebben gedaen, als se hadden geweten dat hare brieven van geen andere operatie of effecten souden sijn geweest, also se haer hier seer weynigh laten gelegen leggen aen het voordeel van de Joden in ons vaderlant, als sijlieden alhier geen profijt daerbij hebben soo als se mij mede opentlijck hebben te kennen gegeven, soo dat die arglistige menschen soo doende haer salfs met hare eygen arglisticheyt hebben gevangen. Nu geve ick Uw:Ho:Mo: met alle onderdanicheyt in bedencken en te considererem, of de voorsz: Joodsche natie ter saecke van de vorige hare informele comportementen tegen Uw:Ho:Mo: onderdanen alhier, wel eenige de minste courtosisie hebben gemeriteert, en deselve courtosisie echter effectivel: in velen, meer als onse eygen natie, hebbende genoten, soo als hier voren hebbe aengwesen, of se niet van de grootste ondancckbaerheyf, dat se deselve niet en erkennen, te beschuldigen sijn, en noch meer van onbeschaemtheyf en stoutheyf, dat se haer niet hebben ontsien Uw:Ho:Mo., mitsgaders de Ed Groot Mog: beeren Staten van hollant en Westvrieslant in hare req:e importante besoignes met hare onware en arglistiglijck geinventeerde voorgeringe te importuneren; en, waert mogelijk geweest, te seduceren, dat se daer en boven noch in hare req:e hebben dorven laten insluieren die hatelijcke en onverdragelijcke termen, namentlijcke, van exactionen, extravagantien en enorme taxatien, die bij mij souden sijn gedaen, dat se wijders, om dat werck noch quansuys te schoonder schijn en glimpte te geven, in't selve hare req:e seggen, dat se, naer genomen behoorlijcke informatien, onder vonden hadden, dat de voorsz: klachten berustende waren op de puyre en suwvere waarheyf, daer bet, onder reverentie, pure leugenen of veroraeysselen sijn, en tot een besluit dat de ouderlingen van deselve natie, geassisteert met Jacob de Pinto, 'tselve re':e hebben overgegeven, of haer daer mede hebben bemoeyt, om haer voor stel en versoeck, door de veelheyf en achtbaerheyf harer personen en, quansuys mede soo veel te meer geloof te doen geven, en door te dringen, sijnde nu desem, bij de voorsz: Joden ten naesten bij even eens geprocediert (doch, onder Uw:Ho:Mo: welnemen, sij bet met de vereyschte eerbiedige termen en sonder comparatie gesproocken) gelijk de schrijfgeleerde en onderlingen van't selve volck onsen salighmaker voor den wereltlijcken rechter hebben getraceert en beschuldigt, seggende mede met deselve smeriteyt quansuys, dat het de waarheyf was, dat bij Godts lasteringe hadde gesproocken, daer bet nochtans soo verre vandaen was, sulcx ick, voor soverre, bij provisie daerinne oock beter patientie can moet hebben, alsoo het een volck is, welckers wet toelaet, dat se op soodanige arglistigen wijze tegen de Christenen mogen aengaen, als se maer haer voordeel bij sien: Maer 'tgene mij bet vreemste daerontrent voorcomt, en waerover ick niet can laten mij ten hoogsten te verwonderen, en oock seer te beklagen, bestaet daerinne, dat de heeren Directeuren van den Lanvts: handel en navigatie in de middelantsche zee, mede soo lichtelijck en aenstonts hebben gelieven geloof te geven en te favoriseren bet stout en onwaer voorgeven van dat hartneckigh volck, dat deselve heeren voorts van sich hebben connen en believen te verkrijgen, tot dien eynde in hare naerdere consideratien (rakende het subiect van de Ambassaet & Consulaet-

rechten van het convoy onder den heer Schout bij Nacht Joncker Engel de Ruyter geconcedeert) aen de Ed' Groot Mog: heeren Staten van Hollant en Westvrieslandt overgegeven als een point van beschuldiging: en tot onsen laste te laten influeren de volgende gesublimerde woorden: maer nyt de grote begeerlijckheit die sij (waermede den heer resid:t Colyer en mij denoiteren) in desen betonen en de exactien NB die sij plegen ontken niet alleen de Duytsche maer oock de Joodsche natie NB (waerover sij hare klachten particulier sullen aen U.F. Groot Mog: doen) confirmeren sij hun ooghwit te sijn haer in corten quoris modo per fas et nefas NB te willen verrijcken, ende tot laste en ruïne van anderen NB haer opproppen sijnde voornvaer termen, die mijns oordeels, doch onder reverentie, geen eerlijcke hyden, ick swijge den enen Christem van den anderen, behoorde te dencken of te seggen, ick late verstaen op't papier te setten, en noch aen sulcken Illusteren vergaderingh, als die van de Ed' Groot Mog: heeren Staten van Hollant en Westvrieslant is, over te geven, j'ae dat meer is, soo als ick bericht ben, deselve boven dien noch te doen drucken, alle 'twelcke, mij onder reverentie, al te hard'en onsmakelijck dunckt, en dat soodanigen oordeel al te voorbarigh bij haer is gevelt, en dat noch in faveur van Joden, tegen haren mede Christen, die publicque professie van de Gereformeerde religie is doende, en op dat point avoren niet eens is gehoort, en sulcx parte mandita gecondemneert is, alsmede tegen den genen, die d'er heeft gebadt van de voorn- heeren Directeuren als Secret-s den tijt van ontrent ses jaren te dienen, en als doen en namaels oock altijt het geluck heeft genoten, dat hem de reputatie hebben nagegeven te wesen een eerlijck en reckelijck persoon, en eyndel: tegen een van Uw:Ho:Mo; ministers, hoewel van de minste, tegen welke termen, alsmede tegen andere diergelijcke, die haer Ed' Ed' mede in deselve have nadere consideratien hebben believen te laten influeren, mij wel geen stoffe soude ontbrecken om met deselve of noch wel met harder termen, hoewel echter met en nae de waarhey, aen te gaen, dan aen de ene sijde wederhout mij daarvan, dat ick Uw:Ho:Mo; niet gern met diergelijcke stoffe of materie in hare hoogwichtige affaires soude interrumpren, aen de andere sijde de besadichtheyt en bescheydenhey, en ten derden bij respect, 'twelck ick noch voor deselve heeren hebbe, onaengesien haer Ed. Ed mij soo smadelijck en onsmakelijck in de meergemelte hare nadere consideratien believen te tracteren, en daerom soo sal ick oock alles met onderdanige gelateneyt vooraf gedefereert laten aen Uw:Ho:Mo;; als mijne vaders in desen, hoedanigh sij sullen goetvinden over dese saecke te oordelen, en deselve te redresseren, mitsgaders haren Minster te maintineren, want Uw:Ho:Mo: gelieven onderdaniglijck bericht te wesen, dat die termen mij seer hard'en sensibel vallen, mitsgaders niet weynigh raken, alsoo ick niet anders can sien, of deselve krencken mijne reputatie, immers althans dat men deselve daarmede tracht te krencken, en mijn persoon bij Uw:Ho:mo;; soo men maer conde, als oock bij de heeren Staten van holland en Westvrieslant, en voort, daer men meent voordeel te sullen connen doen, verdacht en odieus te maecken, mitsgaders een preoccupatie te causeren en aen te brengen, en om die reden hebb'ick oock met en onder Uw:Ho:Mo: welnemen en permissie, aen de ene sijde gemeent, niet te connen stille staen, om't gene voorsz: eenigszins met rede te deduceren, en Uw:Ho:Mo: onderdaniglijck voor oogen te stellen, hoewel ick aen de andere sijde mij oock soo veel te meer verplicht vinde Uw:Ho:Mo: vooraf met de vereyschte submissie te bedancken, dat het deselve heeft belieft, dat werck, nae haere gewoonlijcke hooge wijshey en equiteyt, in soodaniger voegen te termineren en af te doen, soo als de voorsz: hare resolutie is meldende, sonder in de conclusie van dien eenige reflexie te nemen op, of mentie te maecken van de voorsz: hatelijcke en onbehoorlijcke termen bij deselve Joden, buyten twijffel, tot geen goet eynde en oogmerck gebruyckt, 'twelck mij oock soo veel te meer moet en hope geeft, dat, als Uw:Ho:Mo: bij dese mijne eerbiedige informatie sullen sien, dat het met dit werck in geen den soodanigh is gelegen, alser wel wort of is voorgegeven, maer dat het genoegsaem contrarie is, en dat ick gevolgelijck in desen t'enemael ten onrechte worde geinsimuleert en beschuldigt van saecken, die mij worden te laste geleyt (gelijck mede met de vorige klachten is geschiet, die het Uw:Ho:Mo: heeft belieft mij voor desen toe te senden, en die echter naderhand, of versiert of ongefondeert, of arglistelijck geinterpreteert sullen wesen bevonden deselve daerdoor te eer en en meer sullen worden gepermoveert, omme haer te laten welgevallen en te embrasseren, mitsgaders te arresteren het rapport van de Ed: Mo: heeren hare Gedep-s den 18 Augusti des voorleden jaers aen Uw:Ho:Mo: gedaen, bestaende daerinne, namentlijck: Dat sij heeren Uw:Ho:Mo: gedep:den, onder't welnemen van Uw:Ho:Mo;; meynden, dat Uw:Ho:Mo: souden connen verclaren, dat de tartementen van den voorn- Residnt en Consul, in derselver Resolutie van de 7 Octob: 1675 breder vermeld, sullen ingaen a tempore mora, dat is van die tijt af, dat daer geen convoyen in Smirna sijn geweest, twelck is van de maent Juny 1672, ten minste sonder d'interesten van de onbetaelde Jaren, ofstewel simpelijck dat d'Ambassaet en Consulaetreechten van het voorsz: eerste Convoy onder de Schout by Nacht de Ruyter, noch als voor desen voor den Residnt en Consul sullen blijven, ende dat de voorsz: tractementen sullen ingaen met het vertreck van tselve convoy, waerover ick aen Uw:Ho:Mo: voor desen verscheyde brieven met alle onderdanighhey hebbe geschreven, en tselve bij desen weder met deselve onderdanighhey bidde en

3 April	Voor	Een wisselbrief te betalen aen	s:r Abraham de Mons	„	500: –
4 May	Voor	Een wisselb: te betalen aen	Nissim et Juda Amatos	„	1600: –
- detto	Voor	Een wisselb: te betalen aen	Haim Peyno	„	200: –
- detto	Voor	Een wisselb: te betalen aen	Belmonte	„	150: –
- detto	Voor	Een wisselb: te betalen aen	Isac Attias	„	50: –
7 Juny	Voor	Een wisselb: te betalen aende	ss:ri Groenincx et Broen	„	320: –
- detto	Voor	Een wisselb: te betalen aen	ss:ri Charelles et Vande Sanden	„	500: –
- detto	Voor	Een wisselb: te betalen aen	ss:ri Van Laer et Vande Poel	„	589:40
26 detto	Voor	Een wisselb: te betalen aen	ss:ri Charelles et Vande Sanden	„	590:60
	Voor	Een assignatie te betalen aende	s:r Schregels	„	2500: –
1 Septeb	Voor	Eene wisselb: te betalen aen	Nissim et Juda Amatos	„	500: –
	P:r	Aggio bij den heer Consul	betaelt op Leoni 2000:-	„	5:50
	P:r	Contanten bij den heer Consul getelt, ende	aen Een onser Janitzaren een Post	„	11: –
	Noch	Daer nae aen Een post bij	den heer Consul verschoten	„	6: –
	Voor	Eene Rimesse bij	sig:r Calcoen gedaen	„	71:63
22 X-ber	Voor	Eene assignatie op de	ss:ri Capoen et Honset	„	151:42
6 Maert 1677	Door	ordre vande	ss:r Cosson alhier ontfangen	„	451: 40
<i>Salvo Errore</i>					LD 9719:59

*Pera di Constant:pli
den 28 May 1677* *Justinus Colyer
1677*

Copie

*De heeren Directeuren vanden Levantschen handel Ende navigatie
Inde Middellantsche Zee, ende voor haer Ede: der selver Thesaurier
Jacobus vander Merct in Smirne*

Debit

Voor 18 Maenden ofte drie halve Jaren tractament beginnende met den 21 augusti 1675, als wanneer het Convoy onder den heer Schout bij Nacht Engel de Ruyter in Smirna is gecomen, tot den 21 february 1677. Volgens den Inhouden van haer booch mog: Resolutien in dato den 24 Juny ende 7 octob: 1675. Mitsgaders 4 feb: 1677 tegens Realen van achten 2500: voor yder half Jaer Noch voor Guldens 8000 bij hare ho:mo: ons toegeleyt in gevolge van der selver Resolutie in date den 4 feb: voorsꝰ: maecken

Rs: 7500:–

„ 3200:–
10700:–

Reali

Voor aggio vande voorsꝰ: 10700: tegens 7 1/2 p:r cento omme de selve In Leoni te Reduceren

„ 802:50
LD 11502:50

Voor een reeckeninge van Presenten hier nevens gaende

„ 2044:58
LD 13547:38

Credit

Voor so veel volgens de nevens gaende reeckeninge bij ons op de heeren Consul ende Coophuyden vande Nederlantsche Natie in Smirne, zedert het arrivement van het convoy onder den heer Schout bij Nacht Engel de Ruyter, aldaer, getrocken, ende bij haer betaelt is

LD 9719:19
„ 3828:19

F 13547:38

*Pera di Constant:pli
den 28 May 1677*

Reeckeninge Van Verschot Bij den Resident Colyer zedert d'aemcompste van het convoy onder den heer Schout bij Nacht Engel de Ruyter in Smirna, gedaen, over ordinaris Ende Extraordinaris presenten, beginnende den 19 Decemb: 1678 Ende Eyndigende den 27 Septemb: 1676, opgesteld den 28 May 1677, ende aen den Thesaurier ende Sijne assessores den 31 dito P:r Smirna toegesonden

1675

19 xber	Voor Bairamlyck aen Ibrahim Pascia Caymacam van Constantinopolen		
	3 Vesten bollants laecken piecken 15 @ LD 3 de pieck	LD 45:-	
	3 Vesten satijn piecken 30 a Leoni 1 5/8 de pieck	LD 48:75	
	Aen sijn Kiahaia		
	1 Vest bollants laecken piecken 5 @ LD 3	LD 15:-	
	1 Vest satijn piecken is a LD 1 5/8 de p:re	„ 16:25	„ 31:25
	Aen den Rais Effendi van Constant:pln		
	2 Vesten als boven		„ 31:25
	Aen den Cians bassi		
	2 Vesten als boven		„ 31:25
	Aen den Grooten Teskeregi		
	2 Vesten als boven		„ 31:25
	Aen den Cleyne Teskeregi		
	1 Vest bollants laecken		„ 15:-
	Aen den Capigiler Kiaiasi		
	1 Vest bollants laecken		„ 15:-
	Aen den Salam Cians		
	Een brouck van 2 piecken holl: laken		„ 6:-
	Aen den Kiahaia van Cians bassi		
	Een brouck als boven		„ 6:-
	Aen den Buluckbassi		
	Een brouck als boven		„ 6:-
	Aen den Beiluckzi		
	Een Brouck p:r Gratia		„ 6:-
	Per spese minute aende Dienaers vant hof, Janitzars vande Respective heeren Representanten, als andere Turcken	„ 32:25	305:-
detto	Aen Osman Aga Bostangi bassi op sijn versouck p:r Bairamlyck		
	1 Vest bollants laecken		
	1 Vest satijn		LD 31:25
	Aenden Kiusckbeczi volgens usanse		
	1 Vest laecken	„ 15:-	„ 46:25
detto	Aen den Rais Effendi ofte Grootte Cancellier vant Rjck, in Adrianopolen wesende, Voor sijn Bairamlyck, Volgens usanse		
	2 Vesten als boven		LD 31:25
	Aende Schrijver van Commandam:ten		
	1 Vest bollants Laecken	„ 15:-	„ 46:25
	Aende Turcx Meester ende Schrijver vant hof p:r Bairamlyck		
	1 Vest Engels Laecken		„ 10:-
			LD 407:50
27 xber	Voor Presenten aenden Nieuwen Cayemacam van Constantinopolen genaemt alman Pascia gewesen Bostangi bassi, ende voo:namen vrient van onse Natie:		
	3 Vesten bollants Laecken @ LD 3 1/2 de Pieck	LD 52:50	
	2 Vesten Gout Laecken a LD 3 de pieck	„ 60:-	
	3 Vesten Satijn		„ 48:75
	Aen sijn kiahaia		

	1 Vest bollants Laecken	LD 17:50	
	1 Vest Satijn	„ 16:25	„ 33:75
	<i>Aen den Rais Effende van Constant:pln</i>		
	2 Vesten als boven		„ 33:75
	<i>Aenden Ciaus bassi</i>		
	2 Vesten als boven		„ 33:75
	<i>Aenden Grooten Teskeregi</i>		
	2 Vesten als boven		„ 33:75
	<i>Aenden Cleyne Teskeregi</i>		
	1 Vest bollants Laecken		„ 17:25
	<i>Aenden Capigiler kiahaia</i>		
	1 Vest bollants Laecken		„ 17:25
	<i>Aenden Caftaengi</i>		
	1 Vest Laecken als boven		„ 17:25
	<i>Aenden kiaia van Ciaus bassi</i>		
	1 Brouck van 2 piecken bollants Laken		„ 7:–
	<i>Aenden Buluckbassi</i>		
	Een brouck als boven		„ 7:–
	<i>Aenden Salam Ciaus</i>		
	Een brouck als boven		„ 7:–
	Per Spese Minute aen sijn Volck ende barck gelt	„ 24:50	„ 393:50
	<i>Aende Chiansen ende hassakies gegeven, die dagelijcx vande Poort, aen ons hof werden gesonden</i>		
			„ 25:60
28 d:to	<i>Per Presenten Gegeven aenden Nieuwen Bostangi bassi Veli Aga, die Inde Plaets van alman Pascia gecomen is</i>		
	3 Vesten bollants Laecken	LD 52:50	
	3 Vesten Satijn	LD 48:75	
	<i>Aenden kioskebeczi</i>		
	1 Vest bollants Laecken		„ 17:50
	Per Spese Minute aende Dienaers Ende barcgelt	„ 16:25	„ 135:–
<hr/>			
1676			
1 January	<i>Per buona mane op Nieuw Jaersdach aende Janitzars vande Respectire hcen Representanten, waivoda ende wachters van Pera, mitsgaders Portiers ende andere turcken volgens usanse</i>		
			„ 19:75
27 d:to	<i>Voor Een Present aenden tweeden Dragoman Jan battista op sijn bruyloft Volgens usanse</i>		
	2 Vesten bollants Laecken	LD 35:–	
	2 Vesten Satijn	„ 32:50	„ 67:50
26 feb:	<i>Per minute Speses aende turcx onder officieren vande Poort, ende Janitzaren etc: gegeven op den Cleynen Bairam Volgens usanse</i>		
			„ 32:–
7 Maert	<i>Aenden nienwen Waivoda van Galata volgens usanse</i>		
	1 Vest bollants Laken a LD 3 1/4 de p:æ	LD 16:25	
	1 Vest Satijn	„ 16:25	
	<i>Aen sijn kiahaia</i>		
	Een brouck van 2 piecken holl: Laken	„ 6:50	
	<i>Aen sijn dienaers</i>		„ 2:10
			<hr/> „ 41:10
			1121:95
15 april	<i>Per buona mane aende turcken als vooren op onsen Paeschdach Volgens usanse gegeven</i>		
			„ 20:25
10 d:to	<i>Aen Een aga vanden Caymacam, ende Vrient vande natie, Een brouck Laecken</i>		
			„ 6:66
- d:to	<i>Aenden kiahaia vanden Ciaus bassi als boven</i>		
			„ 6:66
14 d:to	<i>Aenden Bostangibassi op sijn Versouck verveert</i>		
	2 Vesten van Laken ende Satijn		„ 32:50
19 d:to	<i>Voor Een Present aenden Eersten Dragoman Theijs op sijn bruyloft gegeven</i>		

	1 Vest Gout Laecken	LD 40:–	
	2 Vesten bollants Laecken	„ 35:–	
	1 Vest Satijn	„ 16:25	„ 91:25
22 Maert	Voor Presenten Gegeven aenden Nieuwen Capiteyn Pascia, Cyd Oglu, die gecomen is Inde Plaets vanden overleden kinsse ali Pascia		
	2 Vesten bollants Laecken	LD 33:32	
	2 Vesten Gout Laecken	„ 80:–	
	2 Vesten Satijn	„ 32:50	
	Aen sijn kiabaia		
	1 Vest Laecken		
	1 Vest Satijn	„ 32:50	
	Aen den Tershanna kiaiasi		
	2 Vesten als boven	„ 32:50	
	Aen den Capigiler kiaiasi		
	1 Vest Laecken	„ 16:25	
	Per minute Spese aen sijn volck ende barcq gelt	„ 24:25	„ 251:32
1 Juny	Op d'aen Compste van het hof buyten Constantinopolen in Dawat Pascia aen den kiaia vanden Vesier		
	2 Vesten van Laken ende Satijn		„ 32:50
	Voor Een Grootte Verrekkijcker door den Grooten heer gedaen vorderen van yder Representant		„ 10:–
8 d:to	Aenden Segel bewaerder vanden p:mo Vesier		
	1 Vest laecken op sijn versouck		„ 16:25
	Voor 8 andere verrekkijckers aende Ministers gegeven		„ 20:80
25 d:to	Voor Confitueren ende verschedene Curieusiteyten aenden Grooten favoryt, ende schoonsoon van den G: heer gesonden		„ 53:80
8 july	Aenden Bostangibassi op sijn Versouck in verruw Vereert; gelijk d'andere Representanten mede gedaen hebben		„ 49:30
3 Augusti	op het Versouck vanden Cayemacam Osman Pascia, aen sijne Excellentie, voor sijne nieuwe fabrica in verruw Vereert, gelijk d'andere Representanten mede gedaen hebben		„ 33:50
10 d:to	Inde Visite aenden kiabaia vanden Vesier Gegeven		
	2 Vesten bollants Laecken	LD 32:50	
	2 Vesten Satijn	„ 32:50	
	p:r spese minute aen sijn volck ende barcq gelt	„ 15:40	„ 80:40
16 7ber	Voor spese ende oncosten gedaen met Goet Vinden vande Natei albier, wegens seecker Rumoor In Galata gepasseert, mitsgaders het afsetten van den kiaia ofte Luytenant Gouverneur van Galata volgens Reeckeningh		„ 170:70
27 d:to	Voor diverse minute spesen als anders aen Ciausen ende Agaas die dagelijcx vande Poort aen ons hof werden gesonden, tot nu toe		„ 47:40
			<u>LD 2044:88</u>

Justinus Colyer

1677

DOCUMENT 11: DISPUTED 'GENERAL' EXPENSES BY JACOB VAN DAM

(The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacobus van der Merct to DLH, October 1677)

Coppe

Spes door den Heer Consul van Dam gedaan, die niet behoorden het gemeijn ten laste gebracht te worden.

1677:	12 October	voor een hogietto van de zijde	LD 100:--
1676:	p:mo febr:	voord dry vesten die niet konnen voor't geneyn gebracht werden, alsoo deselve maar draeghyden van den heer consul sijn	„ 37:50
	10 may	voor een vest aan den cady als rakende den heer consul in't particulier	„ 13:75
	16 ditto	voor een vest als den naip trouwde	„ 13:75
	21 ditto	voor de schaal	„ 70:--
	12 ditto	voor een prsent aan Dervis Aga meede niet voor't gemeen	„ 18:--
	17 ditto	voor presenten aan de soons van Mostaffa Bassa	„ 12:--
	2 9ber	voor spes door een levent die doot gevonden is, omtrent de deur van den consul, 't welck men seckerlyjk seght door de dienaars van den heer consul gedaan te sijn	„ 270:--
1677:	p:mo Januari	voor dry vesten aan de draaghyden die maar sijn om den heer consuls statie te helpen vergrooten	„ 37:50
	12 Juny	voor een vest aan den weynoda over't besnijden van sijn soon	„ 13:50
		voor presenten den 22 April 1668, met co-icatie en goetvinden, van de natie gegeven aan den techtiche of examineur baschie, 't welck de selve natie moet betalen, agbtervolgens de acte daar van gegeven bij den heer resident Colyer den 3 may 1668 volgens reekeningh	„ 384:--
		Voor presenten, als boven gegeven volgens reekeningh	„ 384:--
		Het tractement van den cancellier, dewijl den heer consul haar E. formulier niet heeft connen aprobeeren, en soo trekt daar alleene iyt 't geene tot sijn E. voordeel strekt, dat niet behoorden goetgevonden te worden	„ 430:--
		Voor Agio van Leeuwendaalders 9600: a 1/2 p.c.to soo te veel -telt	„ 48:--
			<hr/> LD 1832:--

Mits den heer consul de reekeninge aan haar E. gesonden heeft, soo oordele onnodigh de coppe te senden, bij aldien maght badden of geauthoriseert waren om de reekeninge van den heer consul naar te sien soude veel beter geweest sijn, haar E. sullen iyt de reekeninge van de presenten wel konnen sien datter parten in sijn, die van selfs spreeken dat het niet tot het gemeen kan gebracht werden.

*Notitie van de posten die den Consul van Dam in reeck. brengt, en door den Thesaurier van de Marct wordem gedisputeert a. 1677
Bo 1832-*

DOCUMENT 12: JUSTINUS COLYER ON THE EXECUTION OF THE *HARAÇ* ORDER

(The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Justinus Colyer to States General, 18 January 1678)

*Date 18 januarij
Receipt 11 maart 1678*

Hoogh Mogende Heeren, Mijne Heeren

De maxime van dese jegenwoordige regeringe siet men dagelijcx meer ende meer tenderen tot extreme prejuditie van alle de christennationen; den heer Engelschen Ambassadeur heeft, niet tegenstaende de gepresenteerde ses duysent Leenwendaelders in den mijne vanden 9 passato gementioneert, sijne visite bij den Primo Vesier niet kunnen optineren, als noch daer en boven gevende de gewonelijcke ordinairisse presenten recht tegens het gemaecte accoort aen.

Omdat de Resident van Genova de beloofde acht duysent Leenwendaelders op den tijt, volgens d'obligatie, niet heeft betaelt, so wert nu van hem geeijst Leenwendaelders vijftien duysent, ende een Genovees schip alhier volladen, ende op sijn vertreck sijnde, daer voor in arrest gehouden.

Den Primo Vesier de heeren Ambassadeurs van Ragusa gedreycht hebbende (so sij de Poort over de genoten toll geen satisfactie en gaven) den adel aldaer te sullen extirperen, ende alle de ingestenen tot slaven te maecken; heeft eyndelijck verclaert, dat den Grooten heer voor alle pretentien contentement sal nemen, met drie hondert en vijftigh beursen, sijnde hondert, en vijf en t'seventich duysent Leenwendaelders, te betalen tot Ragusa voorn: in dertigh daegen, ende bij faulte van dien, dat den Kayser weet wat hem te doen staet; men seydt voor vast, datter albereyts aen alle de Pasciaas van Bossina, ende de quartieren dicht aen Ragusa gelegen, ordres sijn nytgegaen, omme in cas de voorsz gelden op haer tijt niet werden betaelt, de voorsz plaets terstont onder het gebiet van den Grooten heer te brengen.

Den Primo Vesier heeft nu mede in het begin van dese maent alle de publicque christen ministers doen aensegen, dat yder vande selve, aen een Caddi, daer toe gecommiteert, op ene lijst soude doen overleveren de namen van hare coopluynen, die hier te lande getrouwt sijn, de namen ende het getall van hare drogheuyden, ende de namen ende het getall van hare dienaren de welke van dit lant sijn, mitsgaders dat alle de consuls ende drogheuyden het gebeele rijk door binnen den tijt van drie maenden nieuwe Baratten van de Poort sullen hebben te versoucken op peijne van geconsidereert te sullen worden als particuliere personen, ende ten reguarde van de drogheuyden van dit Lant, dat die het Garaz, op het welke alle ingeborenen vant rijk, geen Turcken sijnde, sijn getaxeert, sullen moeten betalen, strijdende recht tegens alle capitulaten aen; ende van alle welke saecken geene andere reden te geven is, als dat het is de wille van die geene, de welke de macht in handen heeft, om de selve saecken nyt te voeren; de welke specialijck tenderen omme de christen coopluynen, die hier huwelijcken hebben gecontracteert onder het voorsz Garaz te brengen, ende van de nieuwe Baratten een goede somme gelts te consequeren; uijt vreesse van nieuwe havanien, so hebben alle de publicque ministers de voorsz lijst aen den voorn Caddi over doen leveren, ende aengenomen aen hare respective consuls, ende drogheuyden, buyten dese plaets residerende in conformité van de voorsz aenseyginge hare ordres te sullen laten afgaen.

...

DOCUMENT 13: INVENTORY OF JAN VAN BREEN'S HOUSE AND FURNISHINGS

(The Hague, NA 1.02.20 1060: Willem Theijls in Justinus Colyer's Chancery, 18 November 1681)

Staet het inventaris van de meubele, goederen, ende boucken van negotie, dewelcke bij mij onderget.de Gug.mo Theijls Cancell.r van den wel Ed.en Achtb. heere Justinus Colyer Ambasad.r van den Staat der Verenichde Nederlanden aen het Ottomanische hoff, uijt crachte van eene appostille van sijne Ex.tie in date den 17 deses, op heden sijnde den 18 novemb. 1681 ten huijse van Jan van Breen, Nederlants coopman alhier, staende in het eijnde van Pera di Constantinopoli, vermits d'absentie van dito Van Breen, in het bijwesen van sijn huijstvrouw genaemt Elisabeth Violier, ter presentie van signori Gio. van Ris ende Gio. Croesen, insgelijcx coopluijden onser natie in dese plaetse, gemaect ende aengeteijckent is, als te weten;

In de groote camer op de straat;

14 ordinarij Turcxse kussens met wol gevult;

- 5 menderen met wol gevult, en met root Engels laecken overdeckt;
- 1 groote tapijt op de soffā, van Salonica;
- 2 spiegels;
- 1 groote porcelainen schotel;
- 1 tafel met 3 uijttreckladen;
- 2 ordinarij turcxē pestachtaas;
- 1 ijseren ladekant van Venetien, behangen met gestreept sijden stof, op dewelcke lagen twee bedden, een hooftpeul, en 2 ordinarij deeckens;
- 2 glasen fenalen van Venetien;
- 3 schilderijē, sijnde 2 portretties, ende het derde dien van nichtie Maria;
- 1 cipressen kist met gesneden figuren, met goet van gem.te Juff.r Elisabet Violier;

In de bedsteede van deselve camer;

- 3 stromatten;
- 2 hooftpeulen;
- 4 overdeekens;
- 1 hooftkussen;

In een dolap ofte cas benefens de voorsz. bedsteede;

- 1 silveren schenkbord;
- 1 silveren serbetcom;
- 2 kokers met 12 messen;
- 3 silveren matten ofte heften;
- 1 silveren lepel;
- 1 silveren tafel vurchuen;

In een andere dolap;

- 40 witte aerde schotelties en tafelborden;
- 1 Haerlems aerden commetien;
- 1 detto canetien;
- 1 porcelainen schoteldrielingh;

In de zijdelcamer op de straet;

- 10 roode fluwelen kussens met woll;
- 4 menderen met wol, ende met groen Hollants laken in 5 lappen overdeckt;
- 1 gebroocken spiegeltien;
- 1 portret ofte controfeijtsel van detto Van Breen, sijn huijsvrouw en 6 kinderen;
- 1 detto controfeijtsel van d.o Van Breen int cleijn
- 1 cabinetten van peerenhout met sijn voet;
- 1 out Turcx coffer daerin was het naervolgende goet;
- 1 gebloemde zijden deecken met sijn slaepplaken;
- 2 roode fluwelen kussens sonder woll;
- 13 linnen overtrecksels tot kussens met sijd gestickt;
- 1 gestreept behangsel tot een bed;
- 5 witte cottoenen ondervesten;
- 3 oude vesten van root satijn, geel damast en groen dimit;
- 1 regenrock;
- 1 kierekie of spahijsrock van Holl.s laken caneelcolour met sijd gevoert;
- 2 hemden;
- 2 linnen broucken;
- 1 messineesche borsrock;
- 1 feregie van camelot;
- 1 oude lakense brouck;

- 2 paer oude cottoenen ondercousen en drie paer voetsocken;
- 1 oude lakense rock muscuscoleur;
- 1 witte borsrock;

In de winterkamer;

- 9 ordinarij cottoenen kussens met woll;
- 4 menderen met woll, overdeekt met Salonicxe kietsees;
- 2 spiegel'tjes;
- 8 porcelainen fingiannen;
- 1 tandoer met 2 oude deeckens;
- 1 oude houten kist daerin waren;
- 14 slaeplaeckens;
- 2 cleijne linnen overtreckselties van menderen;
- 10 servetten vant lant en drie tafellakens;
- 1 kist met kinderegoet;
- 1 kissien, en een cleijn coffertien met goet van het dochttertien;
- 1 vloertapijt;

In de slavinnekamer;

- 1 groot bed met sijn deeckens ende hooftkussens voor deselve;
- ... kisten met het goet van de slavinnen;

In het gewesen cantoir;

- ... menderen, ende een hooftkussen met woll gevult sonder overtrecksels;
- 1 oudt coffer, leegh;
- 1 weeftou, met garen tot linnen daerop;

In de camer op de tuijn;

- 1 groote ijseren geltkist toegesloten, waervan de sleutel niet te vinden was;
- 1 houten tandoer;
- 1 lijst, van een grote spiegel;
- 5 houten stoelen;
- 2 carpetten;
- 3 oude sepetten;
- 1 grootbouck beginnende met mercantie in monte an.o 1665 @t junij, eijndiegende f.o 170 an.o 1670 @ 20 augusti;
- 1 detto, begginende an.o 1670 @t 1 april Ab. de Leon, Ali Cohen, Ab. Rosales et Samuel Eskenagi, eijndiegende f.o 199 an.o 1675 @ 4 julij;
- 4 copijboucken van brieven, beginnende an.o 1670, p.mo maert, eijndiegende an.o 1674 @ 20 augusti;
- 1 facteurbouckien, beginnende an.o 1665 p.mo maij, eijndiegende an.o 1675 adi 9 novemb.;
- 1 memoriael van alles, beginnende an.o 1669 @ 7 maij, eijndiegende @ 1670 @ 23 maert;
- 1 casbouck beginnende an.o 1665 @ - junij, eijndiegende an.o 1676 @ 15 n.ber;
- 3 particuliere copijboucxkens van brieven beginnende an.o 1667 @ 7 feb. eijndiegen- de an.o 1675 @ 7 octob.;
- 2 notitieboucxkens van de jaren 1665 tot den jare 1675 @ 18 novemb. toe;
- 1 boucxken van coopmanschappen tot Adrianp.len an.o 1674;
- 2 musijckboucken;
- 1 sepet vol oude brieven;
- 1 bondel met schrifturen dienende tot het proces tegens Sologne, ofte Justo van Eijck;

1 quintern italiaensche cognoscementen;
1 clavesimbal;
3 vlasharken;
2 matten;
2 canowetties ijder met 9 flessies;
1 coperen bedpan;
1 zeekaert;
verscheijde gedruckte boucxkens;

Op de gelderij;

1 Rustbed met oud root laken overtrocken;
3 tafels;
2 tafeltapijties;
5 houten stoelen;
2 Venetiaensche g;asekisten, daerin;
1 tapijt van Salonica;
1 vloertapijt;
4 hooftkussens met veeren;
eeniege oude canefassen tot menderen;
1 cleet van engels laken voor een knecht;
4 hoofupeulen met wol, oudt;
2 kilimen;
1 oude portier;
4 schilderijen sonder lijsten, van vruchten;
1 Venetiaensche scheepskist, met brieven en boucken;

In een cas op de voorsz. gelderij;

18 florentijnsche leege flessen;
1 silveren soutvatien sonder voetien;
7 Engelsche bottelties;
1 tinnen mostertpot;
1 seijn en ibruk van caser;
1 een Venetiaensche kist met oude klederen van de vrouw en de kinderen;
1 coperen lanteren;
1 tafellaecken;
2 servetten;

In het comptoir;

26 diversche gedruckte boucken met Franse banden;
1 bijbeltien in quarto met silveren sloties;
1 bouck in quarto Corn.o Tacitus;
2 wandelstocken, met tinnen knoppen;
1 canowettien met 4 flessies;
2 laties met gewicht;
2 oude houten lessenaers;
1 groot ront Duijts slot;
1 friscadoor;
1 rotte val;
1 handspiesien;
1 signet van coper;
1 stoel;
1 brievepersien;

In het tuijnhuijsien;
3 stoelen en een tafeltien;

In de keucken;
6 coperen ketels, en 2 ijseren pannen;
8 tinnen schotels, en 34 tafelborden;
5 coperen schotelaties;
1 tinnen com, met een gate ofte vergietschotel;
1 oude kiste met clederen van de kockinne;
4 coperen candelaers;
2 braedijsers;
1 rooster en tangh;
1 cinijceijn van coper;
4 aerden schotels;
1 houten moud, en 1 stenen mortier;

Aldus geïnventariseert in het bijwesen, ende ter presentie als boven;
bij mij Gug.mo Theijls Cancell.r

Den 21 maj 1682 is dese voorstaende inventaris geaugmenteert met 2 tafellakens ende 24 servetten Hollants linnen, dewelcke den 21 octob. 1681 door de s.ri Roots et Van de Cruijs uijt Marseille, herwaerts, aen Gio. van Breen sijn gesonden; Ende vermits sig. Jean Croesen, Nederlants coopman alhier, voor de goederen in de voorsz. inventaris gespecificeert borgh gebleven is, ten eijnde deselve niet souden werden vervreemt, so sijn de voorsz. tafellakens ende servetten onder hem gelaten;

Qoud attestor;
Gug.mo Theijls Cancell.r

DOCUMENT 14: LIST OF ORDERS REGARDING THE DUTCH NATION, 1690-1709

(The Hague, NA 1.02.20 1088)

1690:

- dat de Hollanders vrij van Haratz sijn
- dat de Tollenaer geen Toll kan eijschen van de Ambassadeurs, Consuls en Draaglieden, etc.
- dat alle de Privileges aen de Franssen, Engelschen etc. toegestaan ook aen de Hollanders toe komt

1692:

- dat van de Holl. laekens niet meer als LD 125,- per stuk Toll mag gevraagd werden soo als de Franse en Engelschen
- dat de Zeijlscheepen die in Const. haer Tol eens betaeld hebben en met Teskerée vertrekkende aen de Dardanelle niet moogen gevisiteert worden
- tot permissie der opbouw vant consulaire huijs tot Smirna
- tot het huijs der heeren van Laar &c.
- dat de Draaglieden en hare kinderen en knechts geen haraz hoeven te betaelen
- dat de goederen welke in de aerdbeving op scheepen gelaeden sijn en reets te vooren Toll hadden betaeld, verder geene te betaelen hebben
- dat Hollandse Scheepen hier eens haer regt betaelt hebben en Teskerée genome, niet kunne verhindert worden elders te gaan en een ander regt gepretendeert worden

- dat de Hollanders goederen van Const., Alep, Aleppo en elders kunnen laeten koomen en dat de Tollenaer die niet booven haer waerde Estimeeren mag

1693:

- dat de Franken de Wagters van den Tol niet kunnen wijgeren &c.
- dat de Hollanders niet kunnen g'incommod.t worden, met valsche pretentie contrarij de Capiyulatie &c.
- dat de Venezianen de Hollanders niet kunnen verbieden goederen koomen te laeten, welk na venetiaense Contrabande gelijken

1694:

- dat geen dubb. Toll sal mogen gevordert nog bet. Worden
- dat den Tollenaer de goederen niet booven haare Tariffa mag estimeeren
- dat de Portugeese Jooden nadat een Jaer zijn hier geweest, regt en tol moeten betaelen, als onderdaans vant land
- dat alle de privilegies der Fransen ook de Hollanders moogen gelden
- dat de Sloepen van oorlogsscheepen niet geforzeert mogen werden aen den Toll te gaan
- dat de Tavernes bij de Hollandse huijsen sullen geslooten werden
- dat de Hollandse scheepen haere provisie sonder obstacelen mogen maeken
- dat de Differenzies meer als 4000,- aspers, in Const. moeten aftgedaan worden

1700:

...

1701:

...

- dat 5 knechts van den Consul vrij sijn van de Charatz

...

1705:

...

- dat de Draaglieden, haere kinderen en bedienden vrij sijn van de haraz en andere belastingen

...

- dat de Consuls in Scio en Ciprois I.la geen Raijaas moogen zijn

...

1709:

...

- dat de Hollanders van Haraz vrij zijn

...

Appendix 3: The Dutch Nation Divided (1668-1677)

TABLE 19: DUTCH *RAGGIONS* (TRADING HOUSES) IN IZMIR, 1668

	large	medium-large	medium-small	small
1	Blydenberg &c.			
2	Delespaul & Eijghels			
3	Van Goor			
4	Van Aelst			
5	Charelles & Vroombrouck			
6	Gubert &c.			
7	Laurens			
8	Popta			
9	De Hartog & De Weert			
10	Van der Sande			
11	Schreygels & Davids			
12	Groenincks			
13	Kloppenburch			
14	Capoen			
15	Meeuwels			
16	Persyn & Rigo			
17	Heusch			

Based on The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 73a.

TABLE 20: THE RIFT IN THE DUTCH NATION OF IZMIR (1671)

	Disobedient	Obedient
1	Broen, Marco Pietersz	Capoen, Christoffel
2	Delespaul, Anton	Dam, Jacob van (consul)
3	Delespaul, Gaspar	Mesteecker, Hendrik
4	Eijghels, Johan	Persijn, Cornelis van
5	Goor, Cornelis Rogier van	Rigo, Johan
6	Groeninks, Adriaan	Rigo, Laurens (chancellor)
7	Hartigh, Frans de	Schregel, François de
8	Legouche, Nicolo	Schregel, Galenus de
9	Moll, Jacob de	Slagmulder, Daniël de
10	Popta, Yunes	Sneeuwaert, Hubert
11	Sande, Philips van der	
12	Tol, Marinus van	

Based on The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913; and *id.*, 1.03.01 124.

TABLE 21: THE RIFT IN THE DUTCH NATION OF IZMIR (1675)

	Disobedient	Obedient
1	Broen, Marco Pietersz	Calckoen, Johan
2	Charelles, Johan	Capoen, Christoffel
3	Cosson, Abraham (assessor)	Craijesteijn, Jacob
4	Delespaul, Gaspar	Craijesteijn, Hendrik
5	Eijghels, Johan	Dam, Jacob van Dam (consul)
6	Groeninks, Adriaan	Glück, Benedict

7	Leppla, Johan	Heuvel, Frederik van den
8	Moll, Johan de	Houset, Dionis
9	Popta, Yunus	Laer, Cornelis van
10	Sande, Philips van der	Merct, Jacobus van der (treasurer)
11		Mesteecker, Hendrik
12		Mozses, Abraham de
13		Persijn, Cornelis van
14		Poel, Pieter van de
15		Rigo, Laurens (chancellor)
16		Schregel, François de (assessor)
17		Schregel, Galenus de
18		Slaers, Willem
19		Slagmulder, Daniël de (assessor)
20		Sneeuwaert, Hubert

Based on The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6912; *id.*, 1.03.01 124; and *id.*, 1.02.22 684, 31a-34b.

TABLE 22: THE RIFT IN THE DUTCH NATION OF IZMIR (1677 AND ONWARDS)

	Disobedient	Obedient
1	Bourgeois, Jacob	Broen, Johan van
2	Charelles, Johan (assessor)	Calckoen, Johan
3	Cosson, Abraham	Capoen, Cristoffel
4	Cosson, Daniël	Dam, Jacob van (consul)
5	Delespaul, Gaspar	Groeninks, Adriaan
6	Eijghels, Johan (assessor)	Houset, Dionis
7	Gluck, Benedict	Laer, Cornelis van
8	Kerckbrinck, Hendrik	Mesteecker, Hendrik
9	Marcquis, Willem	Mons, Abraham de
10	Merct, Jacobus van der (treasurer)	Poel, Pieter van de
11	Pradelis, Willem van	Rigo, Laurens (chancellor)
12	Sande, Philips van de	Schregel, François de
13	Slaars, Willem	Schregel, Galenus de
14		Slagmulder, Daniël de (assessor)
15		Sneeuwaert, Hubrecht
	Factional Alliances and Loyalties	
	Voyvoda of Izmir	Kadi of Izmir
	French consul	English consul
	DLH	States-General

Based on The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6912; *id.*, 6913; *id.*, 1.02.22 676; *id.*, 684, 23b-25a.

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Summary in Dutch

Het onderliggende betoog behandelt de vroegmoderne geschiedenis, demografie en geografie van de West-Anatolische internationale havenstad Izmir. Het doet dat, ogenschijnlijk in navolging van vrijwel alle contemporaine en moderne bronnen en studies, door de stad te beschouwen als een dubbelstad bestaand uit twee delen; één Osmaans, en één Europees. Echter, hier is het nu eens niet de bedoeling deze verdeling te bevestigen, maar te laten zien hoe slecht deze in staat is de loop van de geschiedenis van de stad, de regio en het rijk waar het deel van uitmaakte, en van het fundamentele belang daarvan voor de wereldgeschiedenis, te verklaren.

Er zijn hoegenaamd geen succesvolle uitzonderingen op de regel dat men deze geschiedenis begint vanuit het aloude, door ideologie en bronproblemen ingegeven, discours van Osmaans-Europese tegenstelling en Europese economische penetratie van een Osmaans Rijk in structureel verval, om van daaruit de speurtocht naar de vroegst mogelijke stadia van Osmaanse periferalisatie aan te vangen. Aan de hand van nieuwe bronnen, van de herinterpretatie van bekende bronnen, en van een substantiële herevaluatie van de Osmaanse worsteling met de vroegmoderne tijd en de cruciale rol die de Köprülü-dynastie daarin speelde, verleggen wij de aandacht naar de geschiedenis van interculturele uitwisseling in Izmir; de stad die vanaf eind 16de eeuw als hoofdgeleider van het proces van periferalisatie zou hebben gefungeerd – en dan met name naar de formele en informele sociale en fysieke ‘tussenruimte’ die deze interactie in 17de-eeuws Izmir opleverde.

Er blijkt dan geen sprake te zijn van een haast absolute scheiding en een sociaal en ruimtelijk niemandsland daartussen, maar vooral van strategische verhulling van de interculturele tussenruimte in de correspondenties uit Izmir (vanwege herhaald verlies van lokale archieven de belangrijkste bronnen). Deze politiek van dissimulatie was verre van eenvormig, maar slaagde er doorgaans in de handelingsruimte van alle lokale partijen te beschermen tegen de pogingen van Osmaanse en Europese centrale overheden om Izmir's interculturele ruimte te beheersen. Er was, met andere woorden, sprake van een lokale dynamiek die externe krachten zodanig insloot en vervormde dat zij vooral lokale partijen dienden. Izmir was daarmee dus niet het verder lege veld waarop Europeanen en Osmanen elkaar via lokale vertegenwoordigers om hegemonie bevochten, maar een historisch ‘actor’ op zichzelf. Deze studie wil daarmee een uitdaging zijn aan het adres van de teleologische (veelal Eurocentrische en soms triomfalistische) geschiedschrijving van stad, rijk en wereldsystemen, en een aanzet geven tot een historiografie waarin de Osmaanse beschaving niet toeschouwer of dwarsligger is, maar een actief en eigenmachtig deelnemer.

Curriculum Vitae

De auteur van dit proefschrift werd geboren op 9 oktober 1972 in Amsterdam. In 1993 behaalde hij het diploma Voorbereidend Wetenschappelijk Onderwijs aan het Hervormd Lyceum Zuid in Amsterdam en begon hij zijn studie Turkse Talen en Culturen aan Rijksuniversiteit Leiden. In de loop van zijn studie deed hij onderwijsondersteunende en onderzoekervaring op in het kader van verscheidene meerjarige student-assistentschappen en universitaire dienstverbanden. In 1998 behaalde hij met zeer veel genoegen (gem. 8,5; scriptie 9) het doctoraal Turkse talen en culturen en de lesbevoegdheid 1ste graad. Na een onderzoeksverblijf in Londen en Cambridge met beurs en inwoning van het Skilitter Centre for Ottoman Studies (Newnham College, Universiteit van Cambridge) volgde deelname aan een internationaal symposium en publicatie van de daaruit voortvloeiende bijdrage in een bundel bij uitgeverij Brill. In dat jaar begon ook zijn buitenuiversitaire werk met meerjarige dienstverbanden als vertaler Turks voor Arrondissementsrechtbank Amsterdam en als onderzoeker en beschrijver van Osmaanse manuscripten voor Oosters Antiquarium Smitskamp. In 1999 vond zijn academische opleiding een vervolg met toelating tot het Advanced Masters' Programme van de Research School of Asian, African and Amerindian Studies van Universiteit Leiden met een volledige beurs. Na het bijbehorende diploma in 2000 *cum laude* te hebben behaald, werd hij datzelfde jaar op basis van een individuele aanvraag voor de duur van vier jaar als AiO aan de Universiteit Leiden aangesteld. De resultaten van het onderzoek dat in het kader van deze aanstelling en in de daaropvolgende jaren werd verricht, zijn in dit proefschrift beschreven. Na afloop van zijn aanstelling als AiO was de auteur onafgebroken voltijd werkzaam als boekhandelaar (Athenaeum Boekhandel), en daarnaast als universitair docent (Universiteit Utrecht), schrijver-redacteur-organisator (freelance, Spui25 en De Gids). Gedurende deze jaren heeft de auteur met enige regelmaat gastcolleges verzorgd en een tiental wetenschappelijke bijdragen en internationale artikelen (bij Brill, NINO en Peeters, en in *Oriente Moderno*, *Bibliotheca Orientalis*, *De Zeventiende Eeuw*) mogen publiceren.