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# Jola inventing their past and future

*Ferdinand de Jong*

To create the nation, therefore, it is not enough simply to mobilize compatriots. They must be taught who they are, where they came from and whither they are going.

A.D. Smith<sup>1</sup>

## Introduction<sup>2</sup>


Ethnic conflicts seem to arise everywhere in the contemporary world. The mass media only pay attention to the highlights, often focusing on the most terrifying violence that seems to accompany the emergence of ethnic politics. Ruanda and Burundi offer the most recent examples in the African context but many more African cases could be mentioned. The emergence of a Jola ethnic separatist movement in the West African Republic of Senegal is one of these.

The Jola live in the southern part of Senegal, in the Casamance region. This region is an enclave, separated from Northern Senegal by the tiny state of Gambia, and is inhabited by Jola along with many other ethnic groups. Since 1982 a separatist movement - dominated by Jola - has striven for an independent Casamance. Considering that at the beginning of the nineteenth century no tribe or *peuple* was known by the name of 'Jola', one is tempted to question how this ethnic identity emerged and became so firmly established in such a short span of time. How does one explain that the Jola regard themselves as the indigenous people of the Casamance, claiming rights which they deny 'strangers'? And why have they turned to violent guerilla-warfare, carrying out raids on both the Senegalese army and 'strangers'?

Looking to the anthropologists and historians who have written about Jola society does not provide us with answers to these questions. In general, they have considered the ethnic group of Jola as a matter of fact and, in scholarly respect, an adequate unit for analysis. To them this ethnic group appears to be a clearly demarcated entity. The ethnic identity is perceived as a primordial attachment. Even in the more recent studies which have been conducted, the Jola are considered to be an ethnic group with a long history.<sup>3</sup> Although historians such as Mark and Bühnen have acknowledged that ethnic identities are social constructs, this insight does not dissuade them from using contemporary ethnonyms to analyse historical processes. Notably Mark, in his recent study on Senegambian masks, has explicitly stated that the dynamic process whereby cultures are created and recreated should be taken into account.<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, he only mentions that the ethnic group of Jola is a product of the colonial period, without telling us why this ethnic group actually emerged. How then did the Jola come to existence?

Since the 1980s the deconstruction of ethnic identities has become general practice among social scientists. In the West African context Amselle and M'Bokolo have made an important contribution to this frame of analysis.<sup>5</sup> Today it is common sense that ethnic identities have often emerged as

reactions to political and economic changes.<sup>6</sup> In this article I shall analyse how 'the Jola' have been constructed. My hypothesis is that the making of this identity can only be understood by an analysis of the way in which the Casamance region has been incorporated into wider political and economic structures. The processes that have rendered the population of the Casamance region inhabitants of the global cultural economy have contributed to the construction of a Jola identity. However, we can only reach an understanding of the construction of this identity if we take into account the actual participation of the future Jola in this process. They themselves have selected symbols to represent their new identity. A past and a future were invented to embellish this symbolic construction. Understanding the emergence of the Jola is in fact only possible if we examine the symbolic construction of this ethnic identity.<sup>7</sup>



Lower Casamance in Southern Senegal. Source: P. Pélissier, *Les Diola: étude sur l'habitat des riziculteurs de Basse-Casamance* (s.l. 1958).

### **The separatist movement**

During the 1970s several clashes occurred between the inhabitants of the Casamance region and the state. These disorders reached a climax in 1982 and 1983, when demonstrations were held in Ziguinchor, the regional capital.<sup>8</sup> The demonstrations were conducted by a movement which called itself *Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques Casamançais* (MFDC), and, as some of the demonstrators were armed, they clashed violently with the police. During the rebellion and its suppression hundreds of people lost their lives. The movement demanded the immediate independence of Casamance and the departure of all 'strangers' or *nordistes*, i.e. people originating from other, mostly northern, parts of Senegal. The movement presented itself as an organization of *Casamançais*, the indigenous inhabitants of the Casamance region. Nevertheless, the government and other inhabitants of the Casamance region considered the rebellion to be an affair in which only Jola were involved. Indeed most of the demonstrators had been Jola.<sup>9</sup> The movement itself, however, claimed a regional footing and tried to escape accusations of 'tribalism'.<sup>10</sup> Various authors have provided explanations for the uprising. Darbon for example suggested that the uprising was a spontaneous expression of discontent. In contrast, Geschiere and Van der Klei have made a convincing attempt to show that it was instead cautiously organized. Secret meetings were held in the sacred groves around Ziguinchor.<sup>11</sup> The demonstrations had been organized in these sacred groves.

The rebellion in 1982 and 1983 was not a one-off event; it has lasted until the present. With its camp set up in a forest on the Guinea-Bissau border, the movement regularly attacked divisions of the Senegalese army that had surrounded the forest.<sup>12</sup> For its supply of arms the separatist movement has established connections with Mauretania, possibly even with Libya. The movement also boasts of its connections with Amnesty International and has even threatened to bring its case before the International Court of Justice in The Hague. It is clear that the conflict has transcended the national level in many ways. In order to reach an acceptable solution to the problem international organizations would have to participate in the negotiations.<sup>13</sup>

During the past decade periods of violent clashes have occurred during which hundreds of people, both soldiers, 'strangers' and insurgents, have been killed. During the general elections of 1993 several assaults took place. The violent clashes alternated with periods of peace in which treaties were signed and captives granted amnesty.<sup>14</sup> The Jola separatist movement, which since the 1980s has so violently expressed itself, is rooted in a widespread dissatisfaction with the politics of the Senegalese government and the privileged position of Wolof in the administration and commerce of Ziguinchor.<sup>15</sup> In this respect the ethnic fervour has to be explained as the Jola's protest against their subordination in political and economic matters. Yet, this explanation still leaves the question of how this ethnic group came to existence unanswered. Until the nineteenth century, no ethnic group or *peuple* named Jola had been heard of.

### **Ethnonyms in a historical perspective**

The present-day Jola live in Lower Casamance, on both shores of the lower reaches of the Casamance river. However, the boundaries of their habitat do not correspond with the actual state borders. The Jola are therefore also to be found in Gambia and in Guinea Bissau. Nowadays many Jola live in Dakar, the capital of Senegal, and in Paris, the metropole that ruled over *France outre-mer* of which Senegal was part and parcel. Estimations of their number vary from 200,000 to 400,000. Lower Casamance is part of a geographic area sometimes called Southern Senegambia to which the Gambia river to the north and the Rio Corubal to the south form the natural boundaries. Southern Senegambia is often considered to be a culturally homogeneous region. It is inhabited by many ethnic groups, several of these participate in wet rice cultivation which provides the most important means of livelihood.

The first Europeans to arrive on the Senegambian Atlantic coast were the Portuguese. In 1645 they established a trading post on the southern shore of the Casamance river: Ziguinchor. The Portuguese used various names to refer to the inhabitants of Lower Casamance. For example, the population on the southern shore was called the Falupos. French accounts of a later date call these people by a similar name: Floups.<sup>16</sup> Through his etymological research Bühnen succeeded in translating this name into 'swamp people', which is an adequate description of their mangrove-dominated habitat.<sup>17</sup> In general, the Jola are considered to be the successors of these Falupos. The inhabitants of the northern shore, all along the river, were called Bañuns by the Portuguese, and would later be named Bagnouns by the French. The Bañuns dominated the trade along the arms of the Casamance river and were highly valued partners in the slave trade with the Portuguese.<sup>18</sup> In written accounts of the seventeenth and eighteenth century one could indeed look in vain for a mention of 'Jola'. For then they simply did not exist.

It seems that the Falupos of the southern shore expanded to the area north of the Casamance river, at the expense of Bañun territory. This expansion took a long time to be accomplished. It has therefore been argued that it was a process of cultural assimilation rather than conquest through warfare. Groups of Falupos which established themselves on the northern shore achieved a position of cultural dominance, and probably incorporated members of earlier groups by means of marriage, adoption and assimilation.<sup>19</sup> The assumption that one ethnic group fought another should be rejected. The reasons for the Falupos expansion are not known. But we do know that by the end of the seventeenth century the Falupos had almost entirely replaced the prior Bañun inhabitants.<sup>20</sup> Thus, towards 1800, almost all the inhabitants of Lower Casamance were considered to be Falupos by the Portuguese traders, which suggests that these people were all considered to be members of a homogeneous population. By the nineteenth century though, many cultural and economic differences were observed among the populations of the various regions in Lower Casamance. Yet, the French called all its inhabitants Floups.

As the Portuguese trade declined, the French tried to establish commercial relations with the inhabitants of Lower Casamance. In 1837 they set up a trading post on the small island of Carabane, in the Casamance estuary. Within a couple of months of its establishment inhabitants of neighbouring villages arrived to participate in the trade.<sup>21</sup> This trade was not only conducted by the French tradesmen but also by so-called Wolof *traitants*, originating from Northern Senegal. These Wolof, employed by the European trading houses, regularly left the island and travelled through the Lower Casamance to trade with the inhabitants who were not willing to make the trip to Carabane.<sup>22</sup> It is very likely that these Wolof *traitants* were the first to call the inhabitants of Lower Casamance 'Jolas'. In the Wolof language the word means 'all the visible living'.<sup>23</sup>

As far as we know, the ethnonym 'Jola' or 'Yola' was written for the first time in a French account dating from 1828. In 1837 the name was still used inconsistently. Sometimes it was used to distinguish the 'Yolas' from the Floups, on other occasions to describe all inhabitants of Lower Casamance: 'Les Yolas des deux rives'.<sup>24</sup> In 1849, a resident of the trading post on Carabane, Bertrand-Bocandé, tried to shed some light on this confusing use of different names by writing about the 'Floups' or 'Jolas':

Le premier nom leur a été donné par les Portugais; c'est par celui de *Jolas* que les désignent les matelots jolois de Gambie et de Gorée; dans leur langue ils se nomment presque tous *Aïamats*. Ainsi les *Floups*, les *Jolas*, les *Aïamats* (et non *Araïates*), sont le même peuple.<sup>25</sup>

To what extent did a people or *peuple* of Floups or Jolas exist in the mid-nineteenth century? Bertrand-Bocandé believed that the inhabitants of Lower Casamance called themselves *Aïamats*, suggesting that they considered themselves to be members of one nation. This, however, is not a convincing hypothesis. Bérenger-Féraud, a doctor engaged by the French Navy, made a more refined distinction between the inhabitants of the region. In 1879 he distinguished the Vacas, Kaïamantés, Jigouches, Karônes on the northern shore, and the Bayotes, Foulouns, Bangiars and Ayamats on the southern shore. On both sides of the river Yolas could be found.<sup>26</sup> We therefore may assume that the inhabitants of Lower Casamance did not yet consider themselves to belong to a single nation of Aïamats or Jolas. An all-embracing Jola identity did not yet exist.

Yet it may be true that the inhabitants of Lower Casamance shared some cultural traits which distinguished them from their neighbours. In this respect we should be careful since nineteenth-century ethnographic observations are not only scarce, but unreliable. It is certain though, that the inhabitants of Lower Casamance supported themselves by means of wet rice cultivation. Along the creeks and river tributaries lay the paddy fields, enclosed by dikes, in which rainwater was gathered during the wet season. Although this type of rice cultivation was considered characteristic of the

Lower Casamance, it was also practiced by the neighbouring Balanta.<sup>27</sup> From a commercial point of view the region was also not homogeneous; whereas southern shore inhabitants traded with the French trading post on Carabane, many inhabitants of the northern shore went to the English establishment of Bathurst in Gambia.

The religious practices in Lower Casamance were all focused on the shrines that were managed by priests. Similar practices could also be found among the Manjaks and Bagnuns. Moreover, the institution of sacral kingship existed among some communities in Lower Casamance but not among all of them, and this institution was also to be found among the Papel, living south of Lower Casamance. Apart from this homogeneity, a striking heterogeneity existed from a linguistic point of view. The dialect spoken in one region - none of them was written - was incomprehensible to inhabitants of other regions in Lower Casamance. On the other hand, linguistic research proves that dialects of Floups and Manjaks showed important similarities.<sup>28</sup> Finally, it should be mentioned that all villages in Lower Casamance were autonomous and did not acknowledge any authority transcending the village level. The political decision-making was in the hands of a council of male village elders which only met when a special necessity arose. Only now and then would villages unite to resist a common enemy, for instance the muslim Manding *marabouts* who waged a *jihad* against the inhabitants of Lower Casamance towards the end of the nineteenth century.<sup>29</sup>

In short, whereas the French administrators thought that they were dealing with a single *peuple*, the above clearly demonstrates that the population of the Lower Casamance was very heterogeneous from a linguistic point of view and showed important similarities to the surrounding populations. This certainly does not imply that an ethnic identity could not have existed. Even very heterogeneous populations can still make up an ethnic group.<sup>30</sup> But this was not the case. The imposition of French colonial rule was needed to provide the population an ethnonym that would transcend the village boundaries.<sup>31</sup> By means of the introduction of the 'Jola' ethnonym, derived from a language alien to the region, and due to its use in the colonial administration, the French offered the possibility for an ethnic identity to be constructed. In the course of this century, the inhabitants of Lower Casamance would appropriate this new name. In the following sections, we will examine the process that eventually led to the emergence of this ethnic identity.

### **Colonialism, capitalism and the Manding**

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, several processes were well under way that would incorporate the village societies more firmly into wider political and economic structures. The transformation of society resulted in radical disruption. The processes referred to here comprised of the establishment of colonial rule, the growing importance of the market economy, and the introduction of the world religions.

The era of modern imperialism was to leave its mark on the history of Lower Casamance. The Berlin Conference (1885) allocated the trade monopoly in the Casamance region to France. A year later, Portugal ceded its trading post Ziguinchor to France. This marked the beginning of serious French attempts to subject Lower Casamance. But the pacification would take some time to be accomplished. One of the decisions taken by the French to subject the villages of Lower Casamance was the introduction of a *chef de village*. The French correctly assumed that these villages were segmentary since they lacked central authority. As noted earlier, the villages were ruled by a council of elders. The French administration therefore appointed *chefs de village*. The *chefs* were often of Manding origin for in many villages Manding had settled as tradesmen, known as *dyula*.<sup>32</sup> These itinerant traders maintained relations between the village and the outside world. They often monopolized these relationships and made themselves indispensable, both to the village people and the French administration. Their position allowed them to behave badly towards the villagers, which was acknowledged by the French. However, the administration completely depended on them. By order of the authorities a *politique de contact direct* was encouraged, but in daily practice the administration did not succeed in bypassing the Manding intermediaries and continued to make use of them.<sup>33</sup>

Towards the end of the First World War, the Lower Casamance had been 'pacified'. In every village, the French administration was represented by a *chef de village*. The pacification greatly encouraged production for the market and participation in trade. The exploitation of forest products resulted in a considerable increase in trade between the village people and the *dyula*, the Manding tradesmen.<sup>34</sup> Wild rubber was collected in Lower Casamance and subsequently sold in the small town of Bignona or in Bathurst, the principal city in British Gambia. However, trade in other forest products such as palm kernels and palm oil, required a long sojourn in Gambia. The entire process, from harvesting to sale, took place in the British colony. Men left their villages in Lower Casamance in January, immediately after the rice harvest - and remained in Gambia during the dry season. They settled as the guests of a Manding host.<sup>35</sup>

The migrants participated not only in the production of palm produce but also began to offer their labour for groundnut cultivation. Since the 1850s, the Manding living in Gambia and Middle Casamance, had grown this new cash crop. After pacification, travelling through the region had become less dangerous. Thus seasonal migrants began to increase in numbers and made the trip to Gambia or Middle Casamance to participate in groundnut cultivation. By the 1920s seasonal migration had become part and parcel of life in Lower Casamance. The administration characterized the migration as 'a perpetual coming and going'.<sup>36</sup> The economy of northern Lower Casamance - although part of the Senegambian commercial network for centuries - was more intensively integrated into the world economy. The peasants not only produced groundnuts and palm produce for the world market, but they also migrated to

the regions north and east of Lower Casamance, and offered their labour to Manding hosts.<sup>37</sup>

The increasing significance of the market economy had its corollary in a religious re-orientation. During the first decades of the twentieth century the Muslim faith gained a growing number of adherents among the inhabitants of Lower Casamance. This spread of Islam occurred in several ways. One of them was the regular exodus to Gambia and Middle Casamance. As mentioned before, the regions north and east of Lower Casamance were inhabited predominantly by Manding who, by the turn of the century, had already been converted to Islam. The migrants originating from Lower Casamance, who spent some time among them, were the first to convert to Islam.<sup>38</sup> Apart from migration, other causes can be mentioned for the spread of Islam among the inhabitants of northern Lower Casamance. The introduction of *chefs de village*, for instance, contributed to the spread of the new faith. As the French preferred chiefs who were able to speak French, Wolof or Manding, they chose their mediators among the men who had travelled. These men had often accepted Islam during their trips.<sup>39</sup> The French had certainly not envisioned the propagation of Islam but the expansion of the faith was one of the consequences of their politics.

What is most striking about the shift to Islam is that the inhabitants of Lower Casamance relied exclusively on the Koranic verses taught by the Manding. Thus far, we have not paid any attention to the unequal relationship between the inhabitants of Lower Casamance and their Manding neighbours. But this relationship lies at the root of the making of a Jola identity. The inhabitants of Lower Casamance had not only been dependent upon the Manding for trade, they were also forced to accept that the colonial administration was exercised by Manding in many villages. By the time the region had been pacified and labour migration provided an opportunity to earn a cash income, the Lower Casamance migrants had also been dependent on Manding hosts in Gambia and Middle Casamance. It is therefore not surprising that their religious re-orientation was also guided by the Manding.

The northern shore population's conversion to Islam should therefore be understood as an expression of Mandinkization. Several processes had led the village society into severe disruption. Apparently, the population of the northern shore lost confidence in their customary ritual practices and the Manding appeared to offer a cultural model more appropriate for the modern world. Pélissier was probably correct in noting that these people had no other ambitions left than 'se faire Manding', to assimilate the concepts and customs of a civilization deemed superior.<sup>40</sup> A sense of inferiority among the inhabitants of Lower Casamance resulted in a full acceptance of Manding culture. Mandinkization consisted of the introduction of a new religion and new food regulations, sometimes also of the Mandé language, and even a Manding style of dress.<sup>41</sup> The Manding circumcision ritual spread throughout the region and *kankourangho*, the related Manding masquerade, was also accepted. Linares shows that the relationship between the sexes, notably their division of labour, was altered due to Manding influence.<sup>42</sup> But not all customs

related to the old *awasena* religious forms were abandoned.<sup>43</sup> The *bukut* for instance, the initiation ritual for young men which was performed in every village once every twenty years has been maintained. It is well known that pious muslims were opposed to it and that some of them even refused to participate, but its performance was not to be prevented by them.<sup>44</sup> Other aspects of the *awasena* religious forms have been maintained, although not without adjustments.

### **Missionaries and Alinsiitowe**

Thus far, our attention has been focused on the historical changes on the northern shore of Lower Casamance. What were the results of the establishment of the colonial rule on the southern shore, the region called Casa? Did pacification result in a similar growth of the market economy in this region? And were these processes just as disrupting as in the northern part of Lower Casamance, leading to religious re-orientation?

Towards the end of the First World War, the colonial administration was established in Casa, just like on its northern counterpart. The independent villages of Casa had also offered fierce resistance to the levying of taxes and the imposition of colonial rule. But in other respects the developments diverged. For instance, groundnuts were cultivated in northern Casamance but the inhabitants of Casa refused to grow this cash crop. They would participate in the market economy in another way. During the dry season they left for the city of Ziguinchor or Dakar to look for temporary employment.

Apart from divergence in economic respect, the religious re-orientation in Casa differed from the direction taken in northern Casamance as well. The Manding were not as numerous in Casa as they were north of the river. And the labour migration of the inhabitants of Casa was not directed towards the groundnut cultivation of these Manding. Thus the impact of Islam remained insignificant in Casa. Christianity, on the other hand, had been preached in the region since the 1880s. Baum shows that the inhabitants of Casa were very interested in the possibilities that the newly available spiritual knowledge offered. However, they were not inclined to give up their *awasena* practices. The turn-out to confirmation classes was sizeable, but the number of converts remained very small. Catholic communities were few and isolated among the practitioners of *awasena* rituals.<sup>45</sup> Undoubtedly, this was related to the unconciliatory attitude taken by the French priests, vis-à-vis the customs which they considered pagan. Participation of christians in circumcision rituals or *awasena* funerals, and mixed marriages of christians with non-christians, were all rejected by the missionaries. This may explain why *awasena* religious forms in Casa were more flexible than in the region across the river, and why they proved more tenacious. The prophetic movement conducted by Alinsiitowe illustrates this point very well.

During the Second World War, the colonial administration in Lower Casamance turned to requisitioning rice and cattle. Moreover, the recruitment

of young men for military service was intensified. The emergence of the prophetic movement should be understood against the background of these politics, and the increasing tension between the Lower Casamance inhabitants and the administration. The movement was conducted by a young woman, Alinsiitowe, from Kabrousse, a coastal village. She had worked in Dakar as a labour migrant. In visions she was urged to return to her native village. There she had several revelations in which she was encouraged to call to prayer. Indeed, she started to organize sacrifices of cattle for shrines that she had erected herself. This religious practice was an innovation in several respects. The priests of these new shrines were elected by revelation, which meant that the office was open to all villagers, not only the male elders. Alinsiitowe also summoned the catholics to return to the *awasena* ways. So, the charismatic movement was an important innovation of *awasena* religion. The administration however, conceived of this movement as a threat to its politics and arrested the prophetess. She was deported and her fate is hitherto unknown. The religious movement was suppressed.<sup>46</sup>

The charismatic movement certainly testifies the flexibility of *awasena* religious forms. But the available evidence also demonstrates that the movement was a regional phenomenon of limited range. It is true that the charismatic movement attracted pilgrims from many parts in Casamance, but the major part of Alinsiitowe's adherents came from the vicinity of Kabrousse. The movement clearly had no ethnic footing.

In summary, the establishment of colonial rule led to labour migration to the cities and the areas north and east of Lower Casamance. The pacification made possible a larger geographic mobility in Lower Casamance. The travellers thus could become acquainted with *other* communities. Yet, this did not result in a wider conception of their *own* community for they continued to identify with their own village of origin. During the first decades of the colonial era a Jola identity had not yet emerged. However, the economic and social changes certainly did affect the *Weltanschauung* of the local population. On the northern shore of the Casamance river many people had converted to Islam, assimilating many Manding practices. A sense of inferiority characterized the attitude of the inhabitants of the northern shore vis-à-vis the representatives of the Manding civilization. The religious innovations on the southern shore had their roots in a pre-existing frame of reference: the *awasena* religious forms. A prophetess summoned her adherents to return to 'authentic' values. An appeal which already announced a longing for 'authenticity'.

### **A Jola identity and the separatist movement**

Towards the end of the 1950s more and more inhabitants of Lower Casamance began to settle in cities.<sup>47</sup> This urbanization marks the emergence of a Jola identity. The population of Ziguinchor, originating from all parts of Casamance, was no longer divided by village boundaries and related

conflicting interests. A common language emerged: a sort of Jola pidgin.<sup>48</sup> Rooted in a common language, an ethnic consciousness could easily develop.<sup>49</sup> We may assume that in Ziguinchor a process of categorization took place, just like the process described by Mitchell in his classic, *The Kalela Dance*.<sup>50</sup> Mitchell showed that urbanites in Copperbelt towns applied tribal categories in order to categorize the very heterogeneous urban population which originated from different parts of Northern Rhodesia. People originating from different regions would thus have been lumped together in a single tribal category which encompassed people who, in their region of origin, did not belong to the same tribe. Like in former Northern Rhodesia, the categorization in Ziguinchor was based partly on the geographic origin of the urbanites. Thus, the cultural heterogeneity of the migrants originating from different regions of Lower Casamance was dismissed by the production of one single identity: the Jola. In an urban, heterogeneous situation the ethnonym 'Jola' was appropriated and gained significance for its bearers.

The distinction between ethnic categories did not only give the urbanites a new identity, the process of ethnic categorization also had a subordinating character, establishing a hierarchy of ethnic categories. Very important in this respect was the time of the Jola's arrival. They established themselves in Ziguinchor rather late in the city's history. Although Ziguinchor is located in Lower Casamance, the initial growth of its population was caused by the influx of migrants originating from Middle Casamance.<sup>51</sup> Consequently, Jola settled mainly on the outskirts of town. And, in economic respects, their position was also marginal. Whereas the French trade houses had employed Wolof right from the start of the colonial era, the informal trade was largely dominated by Manding and Pular from Middle Casamance. After decolonization, the administrative positions were held by the Wolof as well. In fact, the Wolof dominated trade and administration of Ziguinchor. Trincaz even suggests that they made up the dominant caste.<sup>52</sup> Not surprisingly, the Jola started to perceive them as the new colonizers. And indeed one could say that the Wolof progressively replaced the former colonizers.<sup>53</sup> They would now be referred to as *nordistes*. This new name clearly denied the Wolof an indigenous status. The Jola began to feel discriminated against by these so-called *nordistes*, of whom many had lived in Casamance since the beginning of the colonial era. Nevertheless, the Jola frequently complained that the Casamance region was colonized and exploited by the North or *Sénégal*.<sup>54</sup>

One of the causes that strongly contributed to this sense of neglect was an increasing state interference in land use in Lower Casamance. This interference was based on a national land reform act (*Loi no. 64-46 du 17 juin 1964 relative au Domaine national*). That act gave the government rights in the redistribution of land. In the 1970s the act was used to grant land to large scale development projects intended to direct the Jola's rice cultivation towards the market economy. Hotels were also erected on land that the Jola considered to be their own. In addition to this the official reallocation of land in Ziguinchor resulted in expropriations, allocating many lots to 'strangers', many of whom were Wolof.<sup>55</sup> These reallocations affirmed the sense of

neglect that already existed among the Jola and contributed to the emergence of a Jola ethnic movement.

The feelings of inferiority that were common among the inhabitants of Lower Casamance during the first half of the century gradually gave way to a sense of neglect in the late 1970s. The sense of inferiority had motivated the inhabitants of Lower Casamance towards an orientation to Manding culture and religion. However, the feelings of neglect vis-à-vis the Wolof led to dissatisfaction with these people, and hostilities would occasionally be directed against them.

The Jola separatist movement, which has so violently expressed itself since the 1980s, was rooted in a widespread dissatisfaction with the politics of the Senegalese government and the privileged position of Wolof in the administration and commerce of Ziguinchor. In this respect, the ethnic fervour can be explained as a Jola protest against their subordination in political and economic matters. Scholars like Geschiere and Van der Klei correctly consider these causes to be important. In this respect Amselle noticed that 'tribalism' always veils: it is 'toujours le signe d'autre chose, le masque de conflits d'ordre social, politique et économique.'<sup>56</sup> Yet, there is more to it. Scholarly deconstruction of ethnic identities is certainly needed but attention must also be paid to the ways in which people actually construct their identities. We do not only have to grasp what is hidden behind an ethnic veil, but we must also take into account the symbols that appeal to the consciousness of the people involved in ethnic mobilization. Which symbols did the Jola choose to be signs of their identity?

### The construction of an ethnic identity

One of the leaders of the *Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques Casamançais* is the priest Diamacoune Senghor. In 1980 he addressed the public of the Chamber of Commerce with a lecture entitled *Message de la Reine Alinsiitowe Diatta ou hommage à la résistance Casamançaise*. The lecture was published and should be considered a eulogy on the Casamance resistance to the colonial administration. In that sense it contained a clear warning to the post-colonial government. The prophetess Alinsiitowe was chosen to symbolize the Jola's resistance. Considering the lecture's title (*Message de la Reine Alinsiitowe Diatta*) the right for an independent Casamance is even presented as a revelation that the prophetess bestowed on the priest. The pamphlets of the separatist movement that were published later on also referred to the prophetess. The leaflet which was distributed during the 1982 riot even demanded her return.<sup>57</sup> As a matter of fact, the priest's attempt to deliberately turn Alinsiitowe into a symbol, establishes him as a culture broker. It is well known that intellectuals have often contributed to the formulation of ethnic ideologies.<sup>58</sup> The priest certainly succeeded in this attempt.

In pamphlets distributed during and after the 1982 insurgency, a historical and social justification is given for the demands of the separatist

movement. In a text dating from 1985, that should be considered the movement's manifesto, the government is reminded of her obligations to the Casamance region and the many ways in which she has been negligent.<sup>59</sup> The text clearly demonstrates ways in which the region has been exploited by *Sénégal*. The text is a diatribe in every respect, for instance in its characterization of Casamance resistance 'qui dure depuis 1645, et qui n'est pas sans analogie avec la "Reconquête" de la péninsule Ibérique de 732 à 1492.'<sup>60</sup> A brief picture explains how Casamance has become part of Senegal during the colonial period and how Senegal's first president, Léopold Senghor, 'betrayed' the region. Most importantly, this pamphlet tries to give a historical justification for the Casamance region's right to autonomy. It is a generally accepted point of view that the emergence of a historical consciousness is part of the cultural package of an ethnic ideology. The publication of a written 'tribal' history often marks the emergence of such a historical consciousness, as well as an idea of the rights that can be derived from the course of history. Undoubtedly, the mobilization of Jola was one of the aims of these pamphlets. Their past becomes a symbol of future resistance: 'La Casamance a été, demeure et restera toujours le pays du refus.'<sup>61</sup> Pamphlets have been written with the purpose to create a historical consciousness; a consciousness that expresses the Jola's historical particularity, no matter how arbitrary that may be.

The construction of a Jola identity has been worked out deliberately. But have any specific cultural elements been used to assemble a cultural package that the Jola consider their own? A very striking part of the package consists of the young men's initiation ritual or *bukut*. Every twenty years a village organizes its *bukut*. Through this ritual a complete generation of young men is initiated into the secrets of the sacred grove and obtains the status of adult man. Not only young men living in the village itself participate in the ritual. Sons of migrants, who have settled elsewhere, also take part in this *rite de passage*.<sup>62</sup> Years of preparation precede the ceremony and the wealth saved throughout the years is to be consumed during this *potlatch*. Days of dancing, eating and drinking highlight the festivities. In the present day, the *bukut* is an outstanding expression of the Jola identity.<sup>63</sup>

A visitor attending the festivities would certainly believe that he was observing an 'authentic' ritual. However, during this century many changes have occurred in the ritual. These modifications are all related to the increased incorporation of Jola into the market economy and their conversion to the world religions. Nowadays, the impact of Islam, for instance, is easily traceable in the ritual. Before the spread of Islam, pigs were often sacrificed in the *bukut* whereas in muslim villages today only cattle are sacrificed. Formerly, palm wine libations were made to the *awasena* shrines. Nowadays, the libations are not executed or palm wine is replaced by mere water. Another modification of the ritual concerns the standards of admittance to the initiation. During this century, these have been changed so that all young men can be initiated by their mid-twenties. The time of seclusion in the sacred grove has also been cut drastically. The period of seclusion used to last



*Participants in a Jola bukut, 1992 (photo: John Eichelsheim).*

between two and three months. However, novices can no longer afford this as they have to attend school or participate in labour migration. As a result the period of seclusion has been cut down to a couple of weeks.<sup>64</sup> In many other ways the ritual is unmistakably part of the market economy. Hundreds of cattle are killed during the ceremony and tons of rice supplied to the village. Without revenues from participation in the market economy this would all be impossible.<sup>65</sup>

Despite these changes - or because of them - the Jola identity is expressed in this ritual. But why particularly in this ritual that formerly used to be a cause of wars between villages?<sup>66</sup> One of the reasons was mentioned earlier: the standards of admittance to the initiation have been changed. Nowadays, young men from other Jola villages are allowed to participate in the initiation of a village in which they were not born.<sup>67</sup> Another illustrative

fact is the participation of migrants who return home to their village, all the way from Dakar, and even from Paris, so as not to miss the festivities. Among them we also find the higher educated, so-called *intellectuals*, who show themselves to be the most vigorous proponents of the preservation of this 'tradition'.<sup>68</sup> Van der Klei mentions their hostility towards outsiders, expressed on the day of circumcision:

This hostility was expressed predominantly by a group of *intellectuals* originating from the city. Curiously, these people always speak disdainfully about the backwardness of the village and its inhabitants. However, on the day of circumcision they behave even more 'authentic' than the villagers.<sup>69</sup>

Undoubtedly, the *bukut* of today also is a performance; a cultural display.<sup>70</sup> On the one hand, many guests are invited to enjoy the festivity. On the other, articles on the *bukut* and Jola 'tradition' appear in national papers. The *other*, whether or not physically present, is invited to become acquainted with this cultural expression. And this exhibition of culture is not simply limited to a national public, even tourists flying in from Europe include this expression of *couleur locale* in their travel schedule.<sup>71</sup>

Why though has the *bukut* become a symbol of the Jola identity? It is beyond doubt that this initiation has always been an important element in the Lower Casamance cultural history. In this respect it is a matter of continuity. More importantly, the ritual stresses the significance of the sacred grove. It is therefore potentially at odds with the adhesion to a world religion. We remarked earlier that the first muslims protested against the *bukut* and even today imams turn against this 'pagan' ritual.<sup>72</sup> The missionaries on the southern shore also vehemently rejected the ceremony. I assume that, due to the severe rejection of the initiation ritual by the propagators of the world religions, it increasingly came to be considered as the 'authentic' expression of Jola cultural heritage. Jola on both shores of the Casamance river were united by the common disapproval of their initiation by the representatives of Islam and Christianity. It is one of the rituals which the inhabitants of both shores of Lower Casamance have in common and by now, have turned into their central symbol. However, even this 'authentic' symbol had to be invented. Mark has not fully recognized this. He states that *bukut* represents a tradition preserved in a modern context: 'This balance between tradition and the demands of contemporary Muslim and urban culture typifies the ability of the Jola to adapt to the present without sacrificing their identity.'<sup>73</sup> Would Jola have ever lived in the past? Probably not. The 'Jola' are themselves a recent invention. Therefore, the continuation of *bukut* is not a merit but a precondition for their existence. *Bukut* is one element of a cultural package selected by the Jola to embellish their identity with symbols without which an identity cannot be created and maintained. As such, it is an *invented tradition*.<sup>74</sup> Furthermore, it represents a recently acquired pride in a Jola cultural 'heritage'. The meaning of *bukut* has been changed and it now constitutes a symbol of the Jola identity.

The *bukut* is part of a cultural package that has been selected during the 1970s to symbolize and represent an ethnic identity. Moreover, the entire lifestyle of Jola has in fact become the object of a performance. Scattered over ten villages in Lower Casamance, tourist camps have been established. These facilities enable tourists to spend a couple of days in Jola villages to become acquainted with 'authentic' village life. This form of 'ethnic tourism' has turned the Jola into a tourist attraction.<sup>75</sup> Yet, at the same time, it allows the Jola to display their culture and identity at a global level.

## Conclusion

The Jola identity has been firmly established by now, but its symbols remain subject to negotiation and internal contrasts can no longer be veiled. The re-orientation towards *awasena* traditions contains the seeds of conflict. Initially, the missionaries were opposed to all *awasena* rituals. During the 1960s these missionaries were replaced by priests who showed themselves to be open to expressions of *awasena* religious forms. Missionaries even pressed christians to participate in the *bukut*.<sup>76</sup> Not only have christians orientated themselves to the 'traditional' religion, muslims also appear interested in *awasena* practices. According to Mark some Jola even began to turn away from orthodox Islam.<sup>77</sup> This seems to go hand in hand with dissatisfaction with Islam. For instance, the latent anti-islamic tenor of the separatist movement, which has been present since 1982, has become more overt in recent years. At least, this is apparent from the pamphlets published by Glaise.<sup>78</sup> The difference in religious orientation now appears to be an important reason for the recent discord within the separatist movement.<sup>79</sup> The islamic northern shore supporters of the movement take a different position towards the central government than their southern compatriots. 'The Jola family' shows the first cracks in the varnish. Rumours of bribery and betrayal freely circulate. In the end, ethnic mobilization shows itself to be a many-headed monster.

Ethnic identities are social constructs. The scholar's task is to deconstruct these identities and their apparent a-historical character, to show that these identities have been historically created. The demythologization might take the sting out of the appeal of ethnic mobilization. Violent attempts in the name of the ethnic cause might then lose their justification. But we should also examine why the ethnic cause has so strongly appealed to its participants. We need to *understand* what motivates people and in which symbol's name people kill and commit assaults.

I have tried to show that the Jola ethnic identity has been recently constructed. It has been argued that its construction is only understandable if we situate Lower Casamance society in the emergent global cultural economy. With the subordination of Lower Casamance society to the colonial administration, and the penetration of the cash economy - in short, the integration into the global cultural economy - the villagers have become aware of the inadequacy of their way of life. The Manding, on whom they were

dependent for every step into the modern world, served as a model for their behaviour; their way of life was embraced as a guide. A sense of inferiority vis-à-vis these muslims characterized the consciousness of Lower Casamance inhabitants in the beginning of the twentieth century. Their inability to resist the colonial administration resulted in a re-orientation to Manding religious practices. This sense of inferiority vis-à-vis the Manding was gradually discarded. It was replaced by a sense of neglect vis-à-vis the Wolof who dominate trade and administration in Casamance today. The sense of inferiority lies at the root of the making of a Jola identity. The gradual recovery of pride in the 1970s was coupled with a re-orientation to 'authentic' values; an authenticity which was called 'Jola'.

Culture brokers have forged a historical consciousness that has contributed to the making of a Jola identity. The Jola sense of neglect was given a historical dimension. Rituals like the *bukut* have been incorporated into the cultural package that today symbolizes the 'authentic' Jola cultural heritage. In many contexts, this heritage is now displayed to a global public: during soirées in local hotels, in the national papers and in the leaflets of travel agencies. Today, the Jola are real. Their identity has been symbolically constructed.

However, the rather innocent manipulation of the cultural heritage goes together with more harmful expressions of xenophobia and political demands on the national government. The separatist movement requires independence. How should the national government react to this? So far, the government's answer has consisted of a refusal to assign independence, or even autonomy. But the government has tried to give in to Jola objections to some degree. Young *Casamançais* have been recruited to administrative positions and a new plan for the economic development of Casamance has been presented.<sup>80</sup> These gestures were rejected by the separatist movement as attempts to mislead the people. In 1990 the government symbolically recognized the Jola. A new ship was granted to the ferry service that maintains the connections across the sea between Dakar and Ziguinchor. It was a beautiful ship, white, with three decks. Significantly, it was christened 'Joola', but for safety's sake the crew consisted of soldiers.

#### Notes:

1. A.D. Smith, 'Towards a global culture?' in: M. Featherstone, ed., *Global culture: nationalism, globalization and modernity* (London 1990) 171-191; there 184.
2. This article is part of a Ph.D.-research project on ritual and the construction of ethnic identities in Casamance, Senegal. The research is being conducted at the Amsterdam School for Social Science Research, University of Amsterdam. Previous versions of this article were read by Dmitri van den Bersselaar, Wim van Binsbergen, Jos van der Klei and Bonno Thoden van Velzen. I am indebted to them for critical remarks and useful suggestions. I thank Jo Swabe for her help in editing the English translation.

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3. For example: S. Bühnen, 'Place names as an historical source: an introduction with examples from Southern Senegal and Germany', *History in Africa* 19 (1992) 45-101; D. Darbon, 'Le culturalisme bas-casamançais', *Politique Africaine* 14 (1984) 125-128; O.F. Linares, *Power, prayer and production. The Jola of Casamance, Senegal* (Cambridge 1992); P. Mark, *A cultural, economic, and religious history of the Basse Casamance since 1500* (Stuttgart 1985); P. Mark, *The wild bull and the sacred forest. Form, meaning, and change in Senegambian initiation masks* (Cambridge 1992).
4. Mark, *The wild bull and the sacred forest*, 17.
5. J.-L. Amselle and E. M'Bokolo, ed., *Au coeur de l'ethnie. Ethnies, tribalisme et état en Afrique* (Paris 1985).
6. It should be acknowledged that these identities are social constructs. Nevertheless, the ethnic identity is experienced by its bearer as ineluctable and timeless. The ethnic identity is 'real' for the participant. On the one hand, the researcher should acknowledge this. On the other, he should also be aware of its constructed character and examine the structural and situational circumstances that have led to its creation or contribute to its recreation.
7. For an introduction into the significance of symbolism for the construction of community: A.P. Cohen, *The symbolic construction of community* (London 1985).
8. Darbon, 'Le culturalisme bas-casamançais', 125. The following description of the rebellion is drawn mainly from the article by P. Geschiere and J. van der Klei, 'Popular protest: The Diola of south Senegal' in: P. Quarles van Ufford and M. Schoffeleers, ed., *Religion and development* (Amsterdam 1988) 209-229; in which they give an extensive account of the events.
9. Darbon, 'Le culturalisme bas-casamançais', 126; Geschiere and van der Klei, 'Popular protest', 214.
10. This is very well shown in the pamphlet *La voix de la Casamance* published by Darbon: D. Darbon, 'La voix de la Casamance ... une parole Diola', *Politique Africaine* 18 (1985) 125-138.
11. These sacred groves, that can be found in every Jola village, are the sites where ceremonies are enacted related to the traditional *awasena* religion. The shrines of this religion are located in the midst of these groves. Each Jola village has one central grove for all the men of the village and one for all of the women. The men's groves used to be only accessible to the men initiated into the secrets of a particular grove. However, in Ziguinchor they became accessible to all initiated Jola. Apparently, the institution of the sacred grove had been transformed and made accessible to all initiated members of the Jola ethnic group; Geschiere and Van der Klei, 'Popular protest', 219-220. These authors thoroughly analysed the 1982 and 1983 uprisings and the central role that the sacred groves played in its organization. Following Bayart, they analysed the Jola uprising as a popular mode of political action. The sacred grove, being inaccessible to the non-initiated, still provides the Jola with a domain of organization which remains elusory to the state. Cf. J.M. van der Klei, *Trekarbeid en de roep van het heilige bos. Het gezag van de oudste en moderne veranderingen bij de Diola van Zuid-Senegal* (Nijmegen 1989) 138-140. In this study Van der Klei states that the Jola movement is led by an urban elite, using symbols associated with the authority of the Jola elders.
12. Van der Klei, *Trekarbeid en de roep van het heilige bos*, 138-140.
13. J. Glaise, 'Casamance: la contestation continue', *Politique Africaine* (37) 1990, 83-89.
14. Linares, *Power, prayer and production*, 221-222, 240-241.
15. These Wolof are conceived of as members of an ethnic group which lives in the northern part of Senegal. In that respect, the members of this ethnic group are not indigenous to the Casamance region, although individual Wolof may have lived there

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- since the nineteenth century. The inhabitants of the Casamance region tend to conceive of the Wolof as 'strangers'.
16. Mark, *History of the Basse Casamance*, 1-25.
  17. Bühnen, 'Place names', 73.
  18. Mark, *History of the Basse Casamance*, 1-25.
  19. *Ibidem*, 11; 17-19.
  20. *Ibidem*, 31.
  21. *Ibidem*, 55-56.
  22. *Ibidem*, 63,66.
  23. A. van Stel, *Etniciteit in de strijd. Een onderzoek naar de etniciteit van Diola in Basse-Casamance, Senegal* (unpublished MA-thesis, Free University Amsterdam 1987) 28.
  24. Mark, *History of the Basse Casamance*, 55-56.
  25. M. Bertrand-Bocandé, 'Notes sur la Guinée Portugaise ou Sénégalie Méridionale', *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie*, 1849 (XI) 265-350; 1850 (XII) 57-93; 327.
  26. L.-J.-B. Béranger-Féraud, *Les Peuplades de la Sénégalie* (Paris 1879) 288-9.
  27. Mark, *History of the Basse Casamance*, 12.
  28. *Ibidem*, 9-10.
  29. *Ibidem*, 68-70.
  30. J.-L. Amselle, 'Ethnies et Espaces: pour une anthropologie topologique' in: Amselle and M'Bokolo, ed., *Au coeur de l'ethnie*, 11-48, there 37.
  31. According to Amselle, many ethnic groups came to existence as a consequence of colonial rule: 'Les ethnies ne procèdent que de l'action du colonisateur qui, dans sa volonté de territorialiser le continent africain, a découpé des entités ethniques qui ont été elles-mêmes ensuite réappropriées par les populations.' Amselle, 'Ethnies et espaces', 23. This appropriation probably also occurred in Lower Casamance.
  32. P.A. Mark, *Economic and religious change among the Diola of Boulouf (Casamance), 1890-1940; trade, cash cropping and Islam in southeastern Senegal* (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University 1976) 109-116. The *dyula* were itinerant traders who spoke the Mande language and adhered to the muslim faith. Networks of *dyula* traders existed in a large part of West Africa. Note that *dyula* and Jola refer to different people. Confusion about these terms has been frequent.
  33. Mark, *Economic and religious change*, 113-114.
  34. Mark, *History of the Basse Casamance*, 68, 93.
  35. *Ibidem*, 97-100. In order to be consistent, the ethnonym 'Manding' would also have to be deconstructed. However, the Manding ethnic identity has existed in Casamance and Gambia for centuries. In this paper it will not be subjected to scrutiny.
  36. Mark, *Economic and religious change*, 138.
  37. Van der Klei, in his *Trekarbeid en de roep van het heilige bos*, analysed this process as an articulation of modes of production. According to Van der Klei, the lineage mode of production of Jola was articulated to the capitalist mode of production through the participation of young men in labour migration. The elders forced their sons to earn a cash income which was subsequently appropriated by the elders.
  38. P. Mark, 'The rubber and palm produce trades and the islamization of the Diola of Boulouf (Casamance), 1890-1920', *Bulletin de l'I.F.A.N.* 39 [sér. B, no 2] (1977) 341-361; 354-356; Mark, *History of the Basse Casamance*, 100-101.
  39. Mark, 'The rubber and palm produce trades', 357.
  40. P. Péliissier, *Les paysans du Sénégal. Les civilisations agraires du Cayor à la Casamance* (Saint-Yrieix 1966) 798: 'Affrontés directement aux Manding, les Diola furent pénétrés d'un grave complexe d'infériorité à leur égard et prirent pour modèles ces commerçants instruits et habiles, ces marabouts secrets et cultivés [...] Non seulement les Diola acceptèrent alors d'abandonner leurs fétiches et d'embrasser l'islam, mais ils n'eurent bientôt d'autre ambitions que de "se faire Manding",

- d'assimiler totalement les conceptions, les moeurs et les techniques des représentants d'une civilisation supérieure.' Note that Pélissier as well anachronistically uses the ethnonym 'Diola'.
41. Mark, *History of the Basse Casamance*, 100.
  42. Linares, *Power, prayer and production*.
  43. I owe the term *awasena* to Baum who used the term to indicate the complex of religious practices and beliefs of the Jola. Literally *awasena* means: the person who executes rituals. R.M. Baum, 'The emergence of a Diola Christianity', *Africa* 60 (1990) 370-398.
  44. Mark, *History of the Basse Casamance*, 113.
  45. Baum, 'The emergence of a Diola Christianity', 370-398.
  46. R.M. Baum, 'Diola land/European country: religious representations of the French in twentieth-century Senegal', paper presented at the Seminar on 'African Representations of the Colonialist Other (1910-1940)' (Boston University 1990) 1-7.
  47. At the beginning of the 1950s a couple of thousands of 'Jolas' had been registered in Ziguinchor and Dakar. Only a few years later they numbered 14,000 in Ziguinchor. Between 1951 and 1971 the proportion of 'Jolas' in the total population of Ziguinchor increased from 30 to 42 percent. This increase in terms of percentage should be related to a growth in absolute numbers from 15,700 (1951) to 70,000 (1971); Trincaz, *Colonisation et régionalisme*, 58, 67.
  48. Linares, *Power, prayer and production*, 6.
  49. Geschiere and Van der Klei noticed before that ethnic *élan* and the notion of the Jola as a group emerged in an urban context, as has been shown for the emergence of many ethnic groups: Geschiere and Van der Klei, 'Popular protest', 219.
  50. J.C. Mitchell, *The Kalela dance. Aspects of social relationships among urban Africans in Northern Rhodesia* (Manchester 1956). Mitchell elaborated his argument in 'Perceptions of ethnicity and ethnic behaviour' in: A. Cohen, ed., *Urban ethnicity* (London 1974) 1-35.
  51. J.-C. Bruneau, *La croissance urbaine dans les pays tropicaux. Ziguinchor en Casamance* (Bordeaux 1979) 131.
  52. Trincaz, *Colonisation et régionalisme*, 166.
  53. Bruneau, *La croissance urbaine*, 133.
  54. Geschiere and Van der Klei, 'Popular protest', 217. Another dimension of the relationship between Jola and Wolof is its gender specificity. Jola women in Ziguinchor generally prefer Wolof husbands instead of Jola husbands. The ethnic mobilization of the Jola vis-à-vis the Wolof therefore tends to be stronger among men than among women (pers. comm. Irene van de Laar). This dimension certainly needs further elaboration.
  55. Geschiere and Van der Klei, 'Popular protest', 218; Van der Klei, *Trekarbeid en de roep van het heilige bos*, 131-140.
  56. Amselle, 'Ethnies et espaces', 40.
  57. Van Stel, *Etniciteit in de strijd*, 80.
  58. L. Vail, ed., *The creation of tribalism in Southern Africa* (Londen, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1989).
  59. Darbon, 'La voix de la Casamance'.
  60. Darbon, 'La voix de la Casamance', 131.
  61. *Ibidem*, 134.
  62. Van der Klei, *Trekarbeid en de roep van het heilige bos*, 148.
  63. *Ibidem*, 181; Mark, *The wild bull and the sacred forest*, 48.
  64. Van der Klei, *Trekarbeid en de roep van het heilige bos*, 147-186; Mark, *History of the Basse Casamance*, 121-124; Mark, *The wild bull and the sacred forest*, 56-58.
  65. Van der Klei, *Trekarbeid en de roep van het heilige bos*, 148.

66. Nowadays, the cattle consumed during this potlatch can be bought with revenues from participation in the market economy. Formerly, they used to be acquired through trade or theft (from neighbouring villages). Besides this, the future novices were expected to show their courage by waging war against neighbouring villages.
67. Van der Klei, *Trekarbeid en de roep van het heilige bos*, 181.
68. *Ibidem*, 189; Mark, *History of the Basse Casamance*, 123; Mark, *The wild bull and the sacred forest*, 54.
69. Van der Klei, *Trekarbeid en de roep van het heilige bos*, 168.
70. Cf. A. Appadurai, 'Disjuncture and difference in the global cultural economy', *Public Culture* 2,2 (1990) 1-25; 18: 'As group pasts become increasingly parts of museums, exhibits and collections, both in national and transnational spectacles, culture becomes less what Bourdieu would have called a habitus [...] and more an arena for conscious choice, justification and representation, the latter often to multiple, and spatially dislocated audiences.' Cf. W. van Binsbergen, 'Kazanga: Ethnicité en Afrique entre état et tradition', *Afrika Focus* 9 (1993) 16-41.
71. Mark, *The wild bull and the sacred forest*, 38.
72. Van der Klei, *Trekarbeid en de roep van het heilige bos*, 172. Resistance against the *bukut* is particularly strong among the members of the *Tijaniyya* brotherhood that has few adherents in Lower Casamance.
73. Mark, *History of the Basse Casamance*, 123-124.
74. E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger, ed., *The invention of tradition* (Cambridge 1983). An interesting example of the invention of tradition in an African context is given by W. van Binsbergen, 'Kazanga: Ethnicité en Afrique'. Van Binsbergen shows that the *Kazanga* festival among the Nkoya people of central western Zambia is in fact an invented tradition. The author highlights the role of ethnic brokers and modern electronic equipment in his analysis of this festival. The commoditified performance functions as mediation between tradition and the state.
75. C.H. Bras, *De Diola als attractie. Het geïntegreerd ruraal toeristisch project in de Basse-Casamance, Senegal* (unpublished MA-thesis, University of Amsterdam 1991).
76. Baum, 'Diola Christianity', 392.
77. Mark, *The wild bull and the sacred forest*, 151.
78. Glaise, 'Casamance: la contestation continue', 83-89.
79. Personal communication Jos van der Klei.
80. Darbon, 'La voix de la Casamance', 125; Geschiere and Van der Klei, 'Popular protest', 226; Linares, *Power, prayer and production*, 241.