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DIE PHILOSOPHIE

IM 14. UND 15. JAHRHUNDERT

IN MEMORIAM KONSTANTY MICHALSKI (1879-1947)

VERLAG B. R. GRÜNER — AMSTERDAM — 1988

Die Philosophie im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert

In memoriam Konstanty Michalski (1879-1947)

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VORWORT

KONSTANTY MICHALSKI hat auf der Grundlage umfangreicher und eingehender Erforschung der handschriftlichen Quellen zum ersten Mal die philosophischen Strömungen des 14. und 15. Jahrhunderts herausgearbeitet. Dabei verband er «historische Detailforschung mit philosophischer Fragestellung auf exemplarische Weise»¹. Seine Beiträge zur Philosophie des späten Mittelalters, die er in den Jahren zwischen dem Ersten und dem Zweiten Weltkrieg veröffentlichen konnte, sind noch heute für die Forschung wegweisend.

Der Überfall Hitlerdeutschlands auf Polen beendete Michalskis Lehr- und Forschungstätigkeit. Am 6. November 1939 sollte im *Collegium Novum* der Krakauer Universität um 12 Uhr ein Vortrag stattfinden über «Das Verhältnis des Deutschen Reiches und des Nationalsozialismus zu Wissenschaft und Universität». Eingeladen waren alle Professoren, Dozenten und Assistenten der Jagiellonischen Universität. Der als Referent angekündigte SS-Obersturmbannführer Dr. Bruno Müller, Leiter der Krakauer Gestapo-Abteilung, führte vor Augen, wie die nationalsozialistischen Machthaber ihr Verhältnis zu Wissenschaft und Universität in Polen in Zukunft zu gestalten gedachten: er ließ sämtliche Angehörigen des Lehrkörpers verhaften und in das Konzentrationslager Sachsenhausen deportieren. Ähnliche Aktionen folgten in Warschau, Lublin und später in Lemberg.²

¹ Kurt Flasch: Einleitung zu *Konstanty Michalski, La philosophie au XIV^e siècle. Six études*, Frankfurt 1969 (Opuscula philosophica. Abhandlungen zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte, 1), S.XI.

² Zur nationalsozialistischen Kulturpolitik in Polen vgl. Christoph Kleßmann: *Die Selbstbehauptung einer Nation. Nationalsozialistische Kulturpolitik und polnische Widerstandsbewegung im Generalgouvernement 1939-1945*, Histor. Diss. Bochum 1969, Düsseldorf 1971 (Studien zur modernen Geschichte, 5). Zur «Sonderaktion Krakau» und zur Geschichte der Jagiellonischen Universität während des Zweiten Weltkriegs vgl. insbesondere Stanislaw Gawęda: *Die Jagiellonische Universität in der Zeit der faschistischen Okkupation 1939-1945*, Jena 1981 und Józef Buszko/Irena Paczyńska (Hrsg.): *Universities during World War II. Materials of the International Symposium Held at the Jagiellonian University on the 40 Anniversary of «Sonderaktion Krakau»*, Cracow, October 22-24, 1979, Warszawa/Kraków 1984. Frau Gabriele Lesser, die an einer Dissertation über die Jagiellonische Universität im Zweiten Weltkrieg schreibt, gab zahlreiche Literaturhinweise zu diesem Thema und stellte auch Teile ihrer unveröffentlichten Arbeit zur Verfügung. Dafür danke ich ihr sehr.

a conjunction in virtue of having granted all its conjuncts, and (b) One need not grant any part of a disjunction in virtue of having granted that disjunction.³⁶ Without entering the details of the contemporary discussion of this theory, it is easily realized that instead of operating with the intuitive idea of one matrix of answers, Swyneshed thinks that there are two columns, one for the *positum* and relevant propositions, and one for irrelevant propositions. There is no traffic between these matrices, although an irrelevant proposition already discussed during the disputation can be given by the opponent as a second *positum* and added into the *positum* matrix.³⁷ Like Kilvington, Swyneshed had in his mind the idea of an *a priori* fixed model or models which push the obligational disputations into the direction of real truth-seeking dialogues. Neither of these different approaches was very influential. Most writers accepted the old rules. It seems that one philosophically valuable aspect of *obligationes* was seen just in their capacity to treat questions of semantical relativity and other related topics, explicable by referring to the significance of the order in which propositions are discussed.

³⁶ «Propter concessionem partium copulativae non est copulativa concedenda nec propter concessionem disiunctivae est aliqua pars eius concedenda.» Spade 1977, p. 257; see also Spade 1982, pp. 335-341, Spade, *Three Theories*, pp. 28-31, Stump 1981, pp. 135-143, 164-171.

³⁷ Swyneshed often realizes that contradictories are admitted in the same disputation. The idea that the members of a contradiction are in different matrices is easily seen from passages like as follows: «Et sic contradictoria infra tempus obligationis forent concedenda. Et hoc est verum dum tamen nullum contradictorium repugnans posito concedatur infra tempus obligationis.» Spade 1977, p. 274.

EGBERT PETER BOS

Two Sophistria-Tracts from about 1400

(Ms Cracow, *Bibl. Jag.* 686, ff. 1ra-79rb; ms Vienna,
Österreichische Nationalbibl. VPL 4785, ff. 233v-280v)

I. Introduction

One of the great merits of Konstanty Michalski's numerous books and articles was to bring to the attention of the scholarly world manuscripts containing texts that are relevant to the history of logic. Michalski studied the development of logic as part of the history of epistemology, and fourteenth century epistemology was one of his main interests. Medieval logicians whose works to this day have scarcely been edited or studied, e.g. Richard Brinkley (who was active as logician about 1350-1360)¹ or Richard Billingham (Fellow of Merton College in 1344-1361)², were brought to life by the pioneering Polish scholar³.

In the present contribution I would like to describe and discuss two tracts each preserved in a different manuscript, viz. one tract preserved in ms Cracow, *Bibl. Jag.* 686, ff. 1ra-79rb (henceforth: manuscript C) and the other in ms Vienna, *Österreichische Nationalbibl.* VPL 4785, ff. 233v-280v (henceforth: manuscript V). It must be noted beforehand, however, that my descriptions and discussions are not definitive and primarily meant to stimulate further research.

The two tracts I shall discuss seem to belong to a specific genre, viz. the so-called *sophistria*-tracts of the late fourteenth and early fifteenth century. The conclusion of this paper will be that this genre consists of collections of questions on various well-known topics of the *logica moderna* such as the *suppositio*, *significatio*, *significatum propositionis*, *complexe significabilia* etcetera. These kind of *sophistria*-tracts aim, so the text say themselves, to construct and solve sophistic arguments.

¹ in «Le criticisme et le scepticisme ...», 1925, pp. 39-40 (also in: *La philosophie au XIV^e siècle ...*, ed. K. Flasch, 1969, pp. 107-108). On Richard Brinkley, see also below, § II. 2.5.

² in «La physique nouvelle ...», 1928, pp. 19-20 (also in: *La philosophie au XIV^e siècle ...*, ed. K. Flasch, 1969, pp. 215-216).

³ F. Corvino, «Konstanty Michalski (1879-1947)», 1959.

The tract of manuscript C probably originates from the University of Prague; that of manuscript V can not be located with any precision, but the University of Vienna would be a good guess. Both tracts contain a profusion of information about logicians and the life of logic in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries in Central-Europe and about life in the arts-faculties.

After this introduction (section I) I shall describe (to a limited extent) the manuscripts containing the two *sophistria*-tracts: in section II manuscript C, in section III manuscript V. Of each of these manuscripts I shall discuss the *sophistria*-tracts in particular: of each I shall give the *implicit* and *explicit*, I shall give a list of the questions contained in the texts and systematize them, I shall discuss the organization, or structure, of the questions, I shall try to determine (tentatively) the dates of origin of the tracts with the help of indices of the medieval authors mentioned in the tracts, and I shall try to determine their place of origin. Finally, in section IV, I shall consider the tracts together as members of a genre: I shall discuss how the tracts themselves conceive of *sophistria* as a science; next: what is the form of the genre; then I shall enter the problem of the function of a *sophistria*-tract in the university curriculum, and, ultimately, I shall try to determine the place of the *sophistria*-genre in the history of medieval logic. A conclusion (section V) winds up this contribution.

II. The *sophistria*-tract of manuscript C

As has been said, I shall first describe, to a limited extent, the two manuscripts that are the basis of this paper. It should be noted that I had no access to the manuscripts themselves, only to microfilmcopies. A first-hand inspection of manuscripts will, among other things, help date the copies and, a fortiori, the tracts themselves. I shall describe each of the two manuscripts separately, without entering into codicological and palaeographical problems.

1. Description of the manuscript C

Ms Cracow, *Bibl. Jag.* 686, ff. 1ra-79rb⁴

1. ff. 1ra-79rb: The *sophistria*-tract discussed here

⁴ There is not yet a catalogue description. The catalogues we have end at volume III (1984).

2. ff. 81va-87vb: Questions on the first book of Aristotle's *Metheora*⁵
3. ff. 88r-100v: blank
4. ff. 101ra-134va: Questions on the four books of Aristotle's *Metheora* by Albert of Saxony⁶
5. ff. 135ra-146vb: Three questions on physics
6. ff. 147r-158r: Various questions from Prague on logic, ethics, natural philosophy etc.
7. ff. 158va-b: Index of questions contained in ff.136ra-158r.
- F. Smahel⁷ notes some questions on universals contained in this part of the manuscript by Albertus Engelschalk, Conrad of Soltau, Nicolaus of Luthonyssel and Nicolaus Prowin.

According to Markowski⁸ the manuscript dates from the last quarter of the fourteenth century. Without giving details Smahel says the same⁹. Apparently, Markowski's dating should also be applied to the first tract of the manuscript, viz. the *sophistria*-tract, which is called by him: «Praskie disputata sophistriae» («*sophistria*-tract from Prague»). I shall try to adduce further evidence to date our *sophistria*-tract by drawing a conclusion from a list of the medieval authors mentioned in the text (§ II. 2.5 below).

2. The contents of the *sophistria*-tract of manuscript C

2.1. The incipit and the explicit¹⁰

The incipit:

⁵ M. Markowski, *Buridanizm* ..., 1971, p. 411.

⁶ *ibidem*, p. 410.

⁷ F. Smahel, «Verzeichnis der Quellen ...», 1980, p. 34 (his nr. 96/A), p. 44 (171/A-B), pp. 47-48 (191/A, 192/A, 193/A and 194/A).

⁸ M. Markowski, *Buridanizm* ..., 1971, p. 405.

⁹ See Smahel's list.

¹⁰ My transcriptions of the manuscripts are in classical Latin.

<QUAESTIO I>

Utrum quattuor sint quaestiones scibiles

Quoniam quattuor sunt quaestiones scibiles, ut patet secundo *Posteriorum*, ideo procedendo iuxta ordinem istarum quaestionum circa principium 5 pium sophistriae quaeritur primo

UTRUM SOPHISTRIA SIT.

DICITUR QUOD SIC, ut patet primo *Elenchorum* et communiter auctoritate omnium logicorum.

IN OPPOSITUM: scientia cuius ly <argumentatio sophistica> est subiectum 10 adaequatum, non est; igitur <etcetera>. Consequentia tenet: quia talis debet dici <sophistria>. Antecedens probatur: quia aliquae eius conclusiones sunt formandae et demonstrandae; igitur illarum scientia non est, et per consequens totalis sophistria non est.

Nota: sophistria totalis simpliciter est habitus aggregatus ex notitiis 15 omnium conclusionum demonstratarum vel demonstrabilium habentium attributionem ad argumentationem sophisticam, et certum est quod talis habitus non est, ut patet per rationem post oppositum.

Alia est sophistria totalis respective et est aggregatum ex pluribus notitiis plurium conclusionum, non tamen omnium, habentium attributionem 20 ad argumentationem sophisticam, et talis est.

(APPARATUS CRITICUS: 2) Utrum ... scibiles] *litterae pingues in C.* Sint] sunt C. scibiles] ut pr (?) *add. C. 4* procedendo] precedendo C. 6) sit] est C.

NOTAE: 3) Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, book II, i, 89 b 23-35. 7) Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations*, esp. ch. 1)

The explicit:

f. 79rb UTRUM ALIQUA CONSEQUENTIA SIT MALA

ARGUITUR QUOD SIC: aliqua consequentia mala est; igitur etcetera. Consequentia tenet: quia nomina et verba transposita idem significant. Et antecedens patet: quia aliquis parallogismus est.

5 Item, aliqua consequentia est bona, igitur aliqua est mala. Consequentia tenet: quia bonum <et malum> sunt opposita contrarie vel privative, quae habent fieri circa idem successive.

Item, aliquis bene respondendo negat consequentiam et non tamquam bonam; igitur tamquam malam.

10 Item, consequentia mala <habet antecedens> et antecedens et nota consequentiae; igitur est consequentia. Consequentia tenet ex diffinitione consequentiae.

Item, consequentia mala est materialiter consequentia; igitur est consequentia. Consequentia tenet a parte in modum ad suum totum.

15 Item, aliqua argumentatio est sophistica; igitur etcetera. Consequentia tenet ab inferiori ad superius a parte praedicati. Et antecedens probatur: quia argumentatio dividitur in sophisticam et demonstrativam etcetera. Et hoc non esset verum, si nulla esset mala.

Item, omnis conditionalis affirmativa aequivalet consequentiae, sed 20 consequentia mala est conditionalis affirmativa; igitur etcetera.

I note here that the text ends with \therefore : does this mean that, according to the scribe, the tract has ended here? On f. 56rb it is said that *propositio probabilis* is the *subiectum proprium et adaequatum* of the second tract, so no other subjects of the kind discussed in tract II, questions 1-18, should be expected (see the next section), perhaps only more of the kind.

2.2. The list of questions

At first sight the text can be characterized as a collection of questions. The question-titles are clearly written in the manuscript in minuscule-letters of a larger size than the rest of the text. I shall first give the list of questions, which are divided into two *tractatus*, so tracts within the tract. It is not certain whether these tracts are complete, as has been pointed out above.

Ms Cracow, *Bibl. Jag.* 686, ff. 1ra-79rb

<TRACTATUS PRIMUS>

1. f. 1ra Utrum sophistria sit
- f. 1va Utrum sophistria sit scientia
- f. 2rb Utrum sophistria sit scientia demonstrativa
- f. 2rb Utrum sophistria sit pars logicae.

5. f. 2vb Utrum sophistriae divisio in veterem et in novam sit bona
 f. 2vb Utrum sophistria naturalis utens et docens realiter distinguan-
 tur (*no discussion*)
 f. 2vb Utrum sophistria sit ab aliis scientiis partialibus novae logicae
 distincta
 f. 3ra Utrum sophistria debeat sequi alias scientias partiales logicae
 f. 3rb Utrum sophistria sit communis vel specialis
10. f. 3vb Utrum sophistria sit scientia realis vel rationis
 f. 4ra Utrum sophistria sit speculativa vel practica
 f. 4rb Utrum argumentatio sophistica sit subiectum sophistriae
 f. 4vb Utrum scientiae sophistriae sint quattuor causae
 f. 5vb Utrum significatio sumatur ab actu intelligendi vel aliter <ab
 re> ad extra
15. f. 5vb Utrum divisio in communem et specialem sit bona
 f. 6ra Utrum divisio signi sit bona, scilicet signorum aliud naturale,
 aliud ad placitum
 f. 6va Utrum divisio ista sit bona: signorum ad placitum quoddam
 primae impositionis, quoddam secundae
 f. 6vb Utrum ista divisio sit bona: signorum quoddam est impositio-
 nis, quod<dam> intentionis
 f. 7ra Utrum ista divisio sit bona: signorum naturalium quoddam est
 intentionis primae, quoddam est secundae
20. f. 7ra Utrum ista divisio sit bona: signorum quoddam est ultimum,
 quoddam non-ultimum
 f. 7rb Utrum ista divisio <sit> bona: significationis <alia est> essen-
 tialis et <et> accidentalis sit bona
 f. 7vb Utrum divisio significationis essentialis in univocam et aequi-
 vocam sit bona
 f. 8ra Utrum divisio significationis essentialis in absolutam et re-
 spectivam sit bona
 f. 8va Utrum divisio significationis essentialis respectivae in mate-
 rialem et formalem sit bona
25. f. 8vb Utrum divisio accidentalis in concretam vel abstractam sit bo-
 na
 f. 9ra Utrum ista divisio sit bona: significationum alia primaria, alia
 secundaria
 f. 9rb Utrum divisio ista sit bona: signorum aliud complexum, aliud
 incomplexum

- f. 9vb Utrum ista divisio sit bona: signorum complexorum quoddam distans, aliud indistans
- f. 10ra Utrum ista divisio sit bona: signorum quoddam ponibile in propositione, sicut terminus vel dictio, aliud non, sicut res ad extra
30. f. 10va Utrum illa divisio sit bona: signorum ponibilium in propositione quoddam est mentale, aliud vocale et aliud scriptum
- f. 10va Nota: hic consequenter potest quaeri, utrum voces significant conceptus et scripta voces. Huius determinatio<nem> quaere circa principium *Perihermeneias*, utrum ista divisio sit bona: signorum ponibilium in propositione quoddam significativum per se, sicut categorumata, aliud est est consignificativum, sicut syncategoreumata
- f. 11va Utrum ponibile sit syncategoreuma esse partem subiecti vel praedicati
- f. 12va Utrum syncategoreuma significet actum animae vel conceptum vel rem ad extra
- f. 12vb Utrum syncategoreumatum quae sunt partes accidentales propositionum quaedam consignent singulariter et quaedam communiter
35. f. 13vb Utrum quaelibet negatio infinitans quemlibet terminum possit infinitare
- f. 14ra Utrum terminorum communium quidam <sint> pertinentes, quidam impertinentes
- f. 14rb Utrum in scientia suppositionum suppositio sit subiectum
- f. 14vb Utrum possibile sit terminum supponere
- f. 15ra Utrum terminus supponens sit non supponens
40. f. 15rb Utrum suppositio sit terminus supponens
- f. 17va Utrum suppositio et significatio differant
- f. 17vb Utrum ly <suppositio> sit superius ad ly <significationem>
- f. 18rb Utrum terminum extra propositionem supponere sit possibile
- f. 18rb Utrum quilibet terminus categorumaticus pro quolibet suo significato possit supponere
45. f. 18vb Utrum nomina obliqua supponere sit possibile
- f. 19ra Utrum aliquod syncategoreuma supponere sit possibile
- f. 19va Utrum copulam supponere sit possibile
- f. 20va Utrum suppositio naturalis sit ponenda
- f. 22ra Utrum diffinitio suppositionis materialis *Maulfelt* sit bona
50. f. 23ra Utrum conceptus posset supponere materialiter
- f. 23rb Utrum quilibet terminus posset supponere materialiter

- f. 23va Utrum in diffinitionibus suppositionis ly <terminus> extendat se ad omne signum quod sine nova impositione potest esse pars propositionis
- f. 23vb Utrum alicuius propositionis subiectum supponat materialiter cuius quaelibet pars supponit personaliter
- f. 24ra Utrum suppositio simplex sit ponenda
- 55. f. 25rb Utrum in omni propositione cuius praedicatum est terminus secundae intentionis vel impositionis, subiectum debeat supponere materialiter vel simpliciter
- f. 26ra Utrum divisio suppositionis personalis in formalem et personalem proprie dictam sit bona
- f. 26rb Utrum idem in numero in eadem propositione supponat materialiter et personaliter
- f. 26rb Utrum ista divisio sit bona: suppositionum alia communis, alia discreta
- f. 27ra Utrum subiectum istius <Sortes est nomen proprium> supponat discrete
- 60. f. 27rb Utrum cuiuslibet propositionis subiectum supponat discrete
- f. 27va Utrum sub termino stante discrete contingat descendere materialiter et non formaliter
- f. 28va Utrum cuilibet indefinitae et particularis subiectum supponat determinate
- f. 28vb Utrum cuiuslibet particularis affirmativae praedicatum stet determinate
- f. 31ra Utrum divisio suppositionis confusae distributivae in mobilem et immobilem sit bona
- 65. f. 31rb Utrum quodlibet confundens sit syncategoreuma vel includens syncategoreuma (*this question is much longer than the others*)
- f. 41ra Utrum terminum ampliari sit possibile
- f. 41vb Utrum de ampliationibus sit scientia
- f. 43ra Utrum quilibet terminus supponens sit ampliativus
- f. 43va Utrum copula existente praesentis temporis subiectum ampliari sit possibile
- 70. f. 45va Utrum terminus ampliet ante se et post se
- f. 45va Utrum terminum ampliari ultra possibilia, scilicet et imaginabilia vel intelligibilia sit possibile
- f. 46ra Utrum restrictio sit ampliationis privatio
- f. 46rb Utrum quilibet terminus sit restringibilis

- f. 46vb Utrum quaelibet copula propositionis restringat praedicatum eiusdem
75. f. 48ra Utrum omnis determinatio restringat determinabile positum secum in eadem propositione cathgorica
 f. 48va Utrum subiecta talium propositionum <omne quod erit, est>, <omne quod potest esse, est>, <omne quod fuit, est> sint restricta
 f. 49rb Utrum ampliatio sit necessaria ad salvandum aliquarum propositionum veritatem et aliquarum falsitatem
 f. 51ra Utrum quilibet terminus substantialis sit appellativus formae
 f. 51rb Utrum quilibet terminus appellativus formae sit connotativus
80. f. 51vb Utrum possibile sit aliquem terminum appellare rationem in una parte propositionis et in alia non appellare
 f. 52vb Utrum solum termini ad placitum instituti sint appellativi rationis
 f. 53va Utrum ponendo propositionem de praeterito, futuro vel possibili in esse oporteat praedicatum manere in propria forma et subiectum quandoque variari
 f. 54ra Utrum terminus complexus sit appellativus
 f. 54vb Utrum complexe significabilia sint ponenda
85. f. 55rb Utrum complexe significabilia quae sunt modi rerum distincti a substantia et accidente sint ponenda
 f. 55vb Utrum significatum propositionis vere affirmativa sit compositio mentis et non res extra animam
 f. 56ra Utrum significatum propositionis affirmativae vere de praesenti <et> non de terminis ampliatis sit omnino idem cum significato subiecto
 f. 57va Utrum quodlibet verbum subiectum sit mediatum
 f. 58ra Utrum ly <potest> sit terminus immediatus quia non sequitur <hoc potest esse, igitur hoc est potens esse>
90. f. 58rb Utrum quodlibet verbum non ampliativum sit resolubile in ly <est>
 f. 58vb Utrum haec sit immediata <hoc est>
 f. 59ra Utrum istae propositiones sint immediatae <hoc fuit>, <hoc erit> et <hoc potest esse>
 f. 60rb Utrum ista regula <ab inferiori ad superius affirmative etcetera> sit fundamentum syllogismi expositorii affirmativi, et ista <ab inferiori ad superius negatione postposita cum constantia subiecti etcetera> sit fundamentum syllogismi expositorii negativi

- f. 60va Utrum contra negantem syllogismum expositorium sit disputandum
95. f. 61rb Utrum quilibet terminus importans officium mentis circa propositionem sit officiabilis
- f. 61va Utrum quilibet terminus determinativus alicuius complexi sit officiabilis
- f. 62ra Utrum quilibet terminus determinativus ratione alicuius universalis sit officiabilis
- f. 62va Utrum idem terminus sit resolubilis, exponibilis et officiabilis

< TRACTATUS SECUNDUS >

- f. 62va Circa secundum tractatum determinatur de probationibus propositionum, circa quam primo quaeritur utrum aliqua propositio determinativa seu immediata possit probari
100. f. 62vb Utrum quaelibet propositio indefinita probetur per duo demonstrativa
- f. 63vb Utrum iuxta exigentiam ampliacionis termini resolubilis debeant variari copulae determinativae propositionis
- f. 64ra Utrum ad veritatem indefinitae requiratur veritas propositionum demonstratarum eiusdem
- f. 64rb Utrum indefinita possit esse scita sine scientia demonstratarum eiusdem
- f. 64va Utrum quaelibet propositio de termino communi non limitato sit resolubilis et indefinita
105. f. 64vb Utrum adverbium positum cum unico verbo in propositione praecedens vel sequens ipsum immediate teneat cum verbo et non cum alio termino
- f. 64vb Utrum adverbium positum inter duo verba semper teneat se cum priori
- f. 64vb Utrum particularis affirmativa debeat probari sicut sua indefinita
- f. 65rb Utrum haec sit falsa <A non potest esse>
- f. 65va Utrum haec sit vera <homo homo non est>
110. f. 66rb Utrum secunda exponens universalis affirmativae sit negativa

- f. 66va Utrum quaelibet universalis affirmativa de subiecto ampliato vel restricto debeat exponi sicut universalis de subiecto existente in statu
- f. 66vb Utrum universalis affirmativa de subiecto complexo debeat probari sicut ista de subiecto incompleto
- f. 67rb Utrum universalis negativa non possit probari per duo demonstrativa nec alio modo, sed sit probanda per suum oppositum
- f. 68ra Utrum propositio universalis ratione universalis inclusi debeat probari sicut universalis ratione signi expresse positi
115. f. 71ra Utrum propositio ratione ly «non-idem» debeat eodemmodo exponi sicut propositio de «differt»
- f. 79ra Utrum aliqua consequentia sit mala.

(APPARATUS CRITICUS (note: the numbers in this critical apparatus and in the notes added to the list of questions, refer to the numbers of the questions) 1) sit] est C. 4) sit] est C. 13) sint] sunt C. 21) accidentalis] sit bona *add.* C. 21) univocam] unificam C. 24) significationis *corr. al. man.* 33) significet] significat C. 34) quae] qui C. 38) sit] est C. 41) differant] differunt C. 43) terminum] spp (?) *add. sed del.* C. 44) possit] potest C. 51) quilibet] quaelibet C. 60) discrete] significat *add. in margine* C. 62) supponat] discrete *add. sed del.* C. 63) stet] stat C. 70) ampliet] ampliat C. 73) sit restringibilis] *inv.* C. 77) veritatem] veritas C; falsitatem] falsitas C. 81) rationis] rationem C. 82) variari] sit rationale *add.* C. 83) appellativus] ampliatus C. 84) sint] sunt C. 87) propositionis] praepositionis C.

NOTA: 31) Aristotle, *On interpretation*, 16 a 4-9)

This long list of 116 questions can be systematized as follows:

TRACTATUS I

1. Sophistria as a science	qq. 1-13
2. De significatione	qq. 14-31
2.1. De syncategorematis	qq. 32-36
2.2. De suppositione in general	qq. 37-47
2.2.1. De suppositione naturali	q. 48
2.2.2. De suppositione materiali	qq. 49-53
2.2.3. De suppositione simplici	qq. 54-55
2.2.4. Division of suppositio in general	qq. 56-58
2.2.5. De suppositione discreta	qq. 59-61
2.2.6. De suppositione determinata	qq. 62-63
2.2.7. De suppositione confusa	qq. 64-65
2.2.8. De ampliatione I	qq. 66-71

2.2.9. De restrictione	qq. 72-76
2.2.10. De ampliacione II	q. 77
2.3. De complexe significabilibus	qq. 84-85
2.4. De significato propositionis	qq. 86-87
2.5. De terminis immediatis	qq. 88-92
2.6. De terminis exponibilibus	qq. 93-94
2.7. De terminis officiabilibus	qq. 95-98

TRACTATUS II

1. De probationibus propositionum	qq. 1-18
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2.3. *Specimina of the questions*

As specimina of the Cracow-text I shall present here three questions. In fact, I have already given a question in the *explicit* above.

My examples are a) question 48 and b) questions 84 and 85. The *sophistria*-tract in manuscript C contains many other interesting texts, as can easily be seen in the list presented above. I have selected a question on natural supposition (question 48) and two closely related questions on the *complexe significabile* (questions 84 and 85) because these subjects are often discussed in modern studies on medieval philosophy.

a) Qu. 48 (ff. 20va-21ra)

QUAERITUR UTRUM SUPPOSITIO NATURALIS SIT PONENDA

UTRUM SUPPOSITIO NATURALIS SIT PONENDA

ET ARGUITUR quod non: quia, si sic, sequitur quod possibile sit verbum absolvi a tempore. Consequens falsum: quia contra diffinitionem 5 verbi. Consequentia probatur: si sic, tunc ly <est> non importaret praesens tempus, nec praeteritum, nec futurum. Igitur <etcetera>.

Confirmatur: si esset ponibilis suppositio naturalis, sequitur vel quod aliquod verbum non significaret cum aliqua differentia temporis, et quod praeteritum esset verbum logicale. Probatur: quia vel ad esse verbi sufficitur generalis significatio temporis limitabilis ad aliam differentiam temporis, et sic per primum significabit cum tempore, et erit verbum; vel

propositio erit sine verbo; vel numquam in aliqua propositione verbum supponeret naturaliter.

Item, vel solum terminus <generalis> potest supponere naturaliter; et
15 huius non est ratio, ex quo terminus singularis potest supponere in ordine ad copulam non limitatam quantum ad esse vel fieri. Vel etiam terminus singularis. Et sic sequeretur quod propositio singularis similiter esset necessaria, et per consequens singularium esset scientia mansiva, quia haec est necessaria similiter: <Adam est, erit vel fuit homo>.

20 IN OPPOSITUM arguitur: quia in ista propositione <homo intelligitur> animal significat<ur>, et subiectum supponit pro eo quod est, fuit, erit et potest esse; igitur supponit naturaliter. Consequentia II (f.20vb) videtur tenere <per> suppositionem naturalem. Antecedens patet per communem regulam, quod ista verba <intelligo, significo, imaginor> et sic de aliis am-
25 pliant subiecta pro possibilibus.

Item, in ista propositione <omne quod est, fuit vel erit vel potest esse, est genitum vel ingenitum>, subiectum iterum stat pro suppositis omnium differentiarum temporis. Igitur <etcetera>.

Item, illi termini <semper, aeternaliter, perpetue> confundunt <termi-
30 nos> pro omni differentia temporis. Alias haec esset credenda: <semper Sortes currit>, quia haec est vera <Sortes omni tempore praesenti currit>: quod est absurdum credere. Igitur <etcetera>.

Item, scientiae demonstrativae utuntur suppositione naturali; igitur <etcetera>. Antecedens probatur: quia scientia naturalis dicens tonitrum
35 esse omnem sonum factum in nubibus, non loquitur solum de tonitru qui nunc est, quia forte talis nullus est, sed loquitur de quolibet qui est, <fuit>, erit vel potest esse; alias ista propositio non est necessaria, sed mere contingens.

Item, sicut intellectus potest concipere hominem et animal sine diffe-
40 rentia temporis, ita verisimile est quod potest facere actum complexum istorum conceptuum sine differentia temporis. Et tunc erit propositio mentalis omni tempore praesenti, praeterito et futuro indifferens. Ideo etiam termini pro omnibus suppositis supponunt indifferenter, et tunc supponunt naturaliter. Igitur <etcetera>.

45 Item, possibile est primam causam omnia conservare sine motu. Ponatur ergo in esse <nullum est tempus>, ettamen adhuc ista conceditur: <animae beatae intelligunt Deum esse bonum>. Igitur non oportet copulam conservare tempus determinatum.

Et confirmatur: sicut possibile est omnia alia indifferenter concipi con-
50 ceptu aliquo, similiter hoc nomen <animal> absque hoc quod concipiatur

conceptibus specialibus aliquibus, <potest indifferenter concipi>. Similiter ista nomina <homo>, <asinus> etcetera <conciuntur>. Ita possibile est omnia tempora concipi absque hoc quod concipiantur conceptibus specialibus aliquibus. Similiter ista nomina <praesentia>, <praeteritio>, <futur-

55 tio> concipiuntur. Tunc posito in esse subiecto secundum istam rationem generalem temporis, tunc extrema supponunt naturaliter suppositione naturali.

NOTA: istae rationes sufficienter persuadent suppositionem naturalem esse ponendam.

60 SED AD RATIONEM primam ante oppositum: negatur antecedens. Ad probationem dicitur: quamvis ly <est> in propositione cuius termini supponunt naturaliter, non importat tempus sub ratione praesentiae, importat tamen tempus sub ratione generali temporis secundum quam se habet indifferenter || (f. 21ra) ad praesens, praeteritum et futurum. Ad con-

65 firmationem: ab aliquibus negatur antecedens pro prima parte. Ad probationem dicunt: quamvis ly <est> suppositione naturali consignificat omne tempus, tamen solum sub ratione praesentiae. Sed hanc responsionem intelligit una ratio post oppositum, quae probat quod verbum generaliter potest consignificare tempus. Et ergo alii respondent ad confirmationem

70 concedendo <pro> prima parte, et negando pro secunda. Ad improbationem primae partis dicunt quod *Philosophus* non dicit quod verbum debet significare cum differentia temporis, sed consignificare tempus, sive generaliter sive specialiter. Sed quando tunc arguitur: si significatio generalis sufficit, tunc per primum erit verbum, negant consequentiam, quia ad

75 esse verbi non sufficit consignificatio, sed etiam requiritur consignificatio actus copulandi subiecti cum praedicato.

Ad secundum argumentum respondet *Thomas de Clivis* quod termini singulares etiam supponunt suppositione naturali.

Ad *Philosophum* dicitur quod ipse loquitur de propositionibus contin-

80 gentibus.

(5 lines blank)

(APPARATUS CRITICUS: 1) ponenda] et ar *add.* C. 9) verbi] verbo *add. sed del.* C. 19) similiter] est *add.* C. 23) suppositionem naturalem] suppositionis naturalis C. 27) iterum] itum C. 46) esse] tunc *add.* C; ista] iste C. 47) intelligunt] intelliguntur C. 48) tempus] et *add.* C. 51) concipi] concepi C; concipiatur] concipiamur C. 53) concipi] concepi (?) C. 54) praeteritio] praeterito (?) C; futuritio] futuro C. 55) concipiuntur] concipitur C; posito] posita C. 63) quam se iter. C. 67) hanc] rationem *add. sed del.* C. 70) prima parte] primam partem C.

NOTAE: 71) Aristotle, *On interpretation*, III, 16 b 6. 77) On *Thomas de Clivis*, see below, § 2.5.)

Though it is not my intention to discuss the content of this question in detail, I shall give some remarks which may add to a fuller understanding of the genre. The question arouses interest, because we learn that *natural supposition* is upheld in the University of Prague (I shall give some arguments for Prague as the place of origin of this *sophistria*-tract below (§ 2.6)).

In the question there are some opponents who defend the thesis that *natural supposition* should not be accepted: they say that a verb can not be separated from its tense (see the first argument (lines 3-6); they give other reasons, too). In his extensive research on this member of supposition, De Rijk¹¹ has concluded that in the fourteenth century *natural supposition* was upheld (in different ways) by some realists (e.g. Vincent Ferrer) and by some nominalists (e.g. John Buridan), though not by e.g. Marsilius of Inghen¹² and Albert of Saxony.

According to some people, it is said (argument 1 *in oppositum*, lines 25-32) that in e.g. <homo intelligitur> (<a man is understood>) the term <homo> has *natural supposition*: it supposits for men of past, present, future time, and for men who will possibly exist. The same is true (argument 3, lines 42-48) for propositions of a demonstrative science, e.g. <tonitrus est sonus factus in nubibus> (<thunder is a noise in the clouds>). As is often said in the fourteenth century, *natural supposition* is appropriate to science, because scientific propositions do not depend on things existing in a particular time. In argument 5 (lines 57-61) *natural supposition* is defended by reference to God's omnipotence: God can preserve everything without its movement in time. This position can be defended from a realist point of view, it seems.

The five arguments, three of which I have referred to here, are accepted by the author of the question in the section which begins with <nota> (<note>) (line 58). (It should be noted that very often in the tract the author's opinion is introduced by <nota> or <respondetur> (<it is answered>)). The author considers the arguments given *in oppositum* sufficiently persuasive, as he expresses it.

Finally, I wish to draw attention to the name <Thomas de Clivis> (or: of Cleves (Western Germany)). This master says that even singular terms, that is: terms referring to individuals, can have *natural supposition*. So individuals apparently can be considered without their existence in time. This is

¹¹ L.M. de Rijk, <The Development of suppositio naturalis ...>, part I, 1971; part II, 1973.

¹² E.P. Bos, *Marsilius of Inghen, Treatises ...*, 1983, pp. 247-253.

both an interesting and extremely realist position and adds to De Rijk's investigations. I shall return to this Thomas de Clivis below (§ 2.5).

b) Qq. 84 and 85 (ff. 54vb-55vb).

Two other interesting questions which discuss the same subject and follow each other logically in our *sophistria*-tract are those on the *complexe significabile*. The text runs as follows (question 84, ff. 54vb-55ra):

UTRUM COMPLEXE SIGNIFICABILIA SINT PONENDA

ARGUITUR quod non: quia complexe significabile nihil est; igitur etcetera. RESPONDETUR quod est significabile per complexionem, id est: orationem.

5 SED CONTRA: sequitur quod complexe significabilia sint incomplexa significabilia. Sed hoc implicat quod sic probatur: hoc est significabile incomplexum, ergo hoc est significabilia vel significabile non-complexum, et per consequens non est significabile complexum.

Et confirmatur: sequitur quod ens simplicissimum, scilicet 11 (f.55ra) 10 primum, sit significabile complexum: quia significatur per istam orationem: <Deus est Deus>. Falsitas probatur: quia tunc talis propositio esset falsa, quia significaret complexum <quamvis> res non haberet esse complexum. Igitur significaret aliter quam esset.

Item, nulla similiter aeterna aliquo primo sunt ponenda; sed dicuntur 15 esse complexum significabilia; igitur etcetera. Maior probatur: quia, si essent ponenda, tunc falsum esset quod Deus quandoque fuisset solus, et falsum esset quod Deus produxisset omnia alia a se, et falsum esset quod Deus posset annihilari omnia alia a se. Cuius oppositum concedunt communiter theologi.

20 Item, nulla quorum nullum est substantia vel accidens sunt ponenda; sed talia dicuntur esse complexum significabilia; igitur etcetera. Maior patet ex hoc quod ens sufficienter dividitur in substantiam et accidens.

IN OPPOSITUM: significabilia complexum sunt ponenda; igitur etcetera. Consequentia tenet: quia cuilibet signo potest correspondere significatum. 25 tum. Quod probatur.

Item, aliqua propositio affirmativa de inesse de praesenti de terminis non-ampliatis est vera; ergo sibi correspondet aliquod significatum in re. Consequentia tenet: ex eo quia res est vel non est, propositio dicitur vera vel falsa, ex *Praedicamentis*.

- 30 Item, <animal> est complexe significabile: quia per istam suppositionem significatur: quod significatur per partem, significatur per totum categorematice. Igitur etcetera.

Item, incomplexum significabile est ponendum, igitur et complexum. Consequentia tenet: quia quod est significabile complexum, hoc est significabile
35 per orationem in qua ponitur istud complexum, ex quo oratio sumit significationem a suis partibus.

NOTA: veritas quaestionis in se non est dubia, ut patet per rationes post oppositum, et per B. in prima quaestione primo *Physicorum* (utrum generare sit generans), sed dubium <est> de modo ponendi eam.

- 40 Ad primum argumentum dicitur quod in tali <aliquid est significabile non-complexum>, totum praedicatum non est infinitum, et ergo ex ea non sequitur negativa.

Ad confirmationem: negatur consequentia: <ista propositio significat aliter quam est, ergo est falsa>.

- 45 Pro aliis argumentis dicitur quod concludunt istam: <significabilia complexa non sunt ponenda>, et ista est vera loquendo de significabilibus complexis quae non dicuntur esse entia, sed solum modi rerum vel entium. Et cum hoc stat quod significabilia complexa quae sunt entia sint ponenda.

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Now follows question 85 (ff. 55rb-55vb):

- 50 UTRUM SIGNIFICABILIA COMPLEXE QUAE SUNT MODI
RERUM DISTINCTI A SUBSTANTIA ET ACCIDENTE,
SINT PONENDA

QUOD SIC, probatur: quia homo et albedo sunt complexa significabilia, et paternitas et intentio sunt modi rerum, et nec sunt substantiae nec
55 accidentia. Igitur etcetera.

NOTA: argumentum probat quod quaestio de virtute sermonis est vera, sed in sensu improprio in quo Biligam et alii eam concesserunt, est neganda, scilicet in isto: <utrum significabilia complexa quae sunt modi rerum quarum nullum est substantia vel accidens, sint ponenda>.

- 60 Item, haec est vera: <nulla chimæra est; igitur nullam chimæram esse est>, et haec nec est substantia, nec accidens, igitur <est> modus rei. Prima consequentia tenet ex *Praedicamentis*, quia ab eo <quod> res est oratio dicitur vera, et ab eo quod non est, dicitur falsa.

Item, per *Commentatorem* primo *Caeli*: omnia quae sunt, aut <sunt>
65 substantia, aut accidentia aut <viae> ad esse istorum sunt, sed tres viae
sunt modi rerum. Igitur etcetera.

Item, equum esse mortuum est verum, et non est equus, nec aliud ab
equo. Igitur est modus rei.

Item, <chimaera non est> significat adaequate chimaeram non esse, et
70 istud chimaeram non esse non est res. Igitur est modus rei.

Item, Antichristus erit, igitur ita est quod Antichristus erit, sed istud
<ita esse> non est Antichristus, nec aliqua substantia, nec aliquod accidens.
Igitur est modus rei.

Item, ante creationem mundi ita fuit quod Sortes non currebat; vel er-
75 go istud <ita fuisse> fuit Deus, vel modus. Sed non primum. Igitur secun-
dum.

NOTA: ponentes talia significabilia complexe omni<no> hoc trahunt
ex auctoritatibus *Philosophi* et *Commentatoris* allegatis. Et prima aucto-
ritas secundum B. exponitur quod propositio mere affirmativa categorica
80 de praesenti de inesse et de terminis non-ampliativis dicitur vera ex eo
quod res est, id est: ex eo quod ita est in re sicut per eius totalem proposi-
tionalem significationem designatur.

Ibi additur <affirmativa>: quia ad negationem non requiritur ita esse,
sed requiritur ita non esse si est de praesenti. Et additur <categorica>: quia
85 ad veritatem conditionalis non requiritur rem esse, ut si chimaera currit,
ipsa movetur. Et additur <de praesenti>: quia ad istam de praeterito suffi-
cit rem fieri. Et additur <<de> inesse>: quia ad istam de possibili sufficit
rem posse esse. Et additur <de terminis non-ampliativis>: quia ad istam
<Adam est mortuus> non requiritur Adam esse, sed sufficit ipsum fuisse et
90 iam non esse.

Secundo NOTA quod *Commentator* per <substantiam> intelligit res
substantiales existentes II (f.55va) in esse completo, et per <accidentia> in-
telligit res accidentales permanentes, et per <vias ad esse illorum> intelli-
git actiones per quas producuntur substantiae aut accidentia.

(6 1/2 lines blank)

95 Item, illius propositionis <tu es> significatum est ubique, sed nihil est
ubique nisi prima causa vel modus rei; sed significatum illius non est pri-
ma causa. Igitur etcetera. Maior probatur: ubicumque scitur quod tu es,
ibi est verum quod tu es, sed nullum est ubi<que> quin staret absque mu-
tatione tui et loci in quo nunc es, esse verum quod tu es. Igitur etcetera.

100 Item, Deum esse nullum ens est: quia non est Deus nec aliud ab eo; igitur est modus rei. Antecedens probatur: quia si est Deus, tunc Deum esse esse est, et deum esse est, et sic in infinitum.

Item, sequitur quod propositio mere contingens habet significatum necessarium: quia ista <Deus creat> est mere contingens, et si significat De-
105 um, tunc eius significatum est necessarium.

Item, significatum adaequatum istius <Deus creat Antichristum>, nec est Deus, quia ipse significat Antichristum, nec est Antichristus, ut notum est, nec aliquid aliud. Igitur etcetera.

Item, sequitur: haec est vera: «Sortes est Pragae», igitur Pragae ita est
110 sicut ipsa significat, et eadem est vera Romae, igitur Romae ita est, sicut ipsa significat; sed haec <ita esse> non est Sortes, cum Sortes non sit simul Romae et Pragae. Igitur etcetera.

(10 lines blank)

IN OPPOSITUM arguitur: si sic, sequeretur quod Deum esse non est Deus, sed esset modus Dei. Vel ergo iste modus esset in Deo, et hoc <est>
115 contra *Commentatorem* duodecimo *Metaphysicae*, qui dicit quod nihil est in Deo quod non sit convertibiliter et adaequate Deus; vel est aliud ab eo, et sic vel esset creator, vel creatura. Si primum, tunc esset Deus; si secundum, tunc esset annihilabile, et sic quandoque Deus non esset.

Item, Deus est suum esse, ut patet per *Philosophum* duodecimo *Meta-*
120 *physicae* et *Commentatorem* secundo *Caeli*.

Item, si talia significabilia essent ponenda, vel ergo essent corruptibilia, et sic quandoque omnes propositiones necessariae fierent falsae, si destruerentur ista significabilia; vel essent aeterna, et sic quaelibet propositio semel vera, perpetue esset vera et necessaria, et sic non esset mutatio
125 de contrario in contrarium, nec aliqua esset propositio contingens: quod est contra *Philosophum* in pluribus locis.

Item, si talis modus esset ponendus, vel II (f. 55vb) consequitur rem vel propositionem essentialiter, et sic non potest esse ista propositione vel re non existente; vel ubi ista propositio vel res non existit: sed quia nec ista
130 propositio est ubique nec res significatae per terminos eius, igitur nec iste modus est ubique. Cuius oppositum dicit ista opinio. Vel consequitur accidentaliter: tunc ista propositio et res significatae per eius terminos possunt esse sine isto modo; ergo haec potest esse vera: <Sortes est> sine isto modo.

135 Item, circumscripto secundum imaginationem quolibet tali modo adhuc ista propositio <Deus est> significat praecise quod Deus est, et Deus <est>; ergo ista est vera sine modo rei.

Item, vel iste modus rei est, vel non est. Si primum: vel seipso, et sic res ad extra debet dici esse se ipso; vel per alium modum, et sic erit pro-

140 cessus in infinitum in illis modis.

(8 lines blank)

(APPARATUS CRITICUS: 1) sint] sunt C. 14 sed] co-la (?) add. C. 16) esset] et f. add. C. 23) complexe] complexiva C. 31) quod] ex eo quod C. 33) complexe] complexum C. 34) quod] quid C; complexe] complexum C. 39) ponendi eam] ponende ea C. 46) complexe] complexa C. 47) complexe] complexis C. 48) complexe] complexa C. 55) accidentia] accidentie C. 58) scilicet] sed C. 65) viae] lacuna trium linearum C. 71) ita] ista C. 84] praesentij quia ad istam add. sed exp. C. 100) est] eo C; ab] ad C. 101) si] est add. sed del. C. 104) est] esse C. 106) Deus] iter. C. 109) Romae] (1)] ratione C; Romae (2)] ratione C. 111) Romae] ratione C. 112) si] corr. C. 120) essent] sint C. 121) quandoque] Deus non esset add. sed del. C. 128) ubi] vibi (sic) C. 139) infinitum] infinitus C.

NOTAE: 29) Aristotle, *Categories*, V, 4 b 8-10. 38) Is this reference to an up to now unknown commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* by Richard Brinkley? On this Brinkley, see below, ad 79. 57) Richard Billingham, *De significato propositionis*, in ms Worcester, *Cathedral* F. 35, ff. 109vb-110va, esp. f. 110va (cf. the note on Billingham in N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny and J. Pinborg, *The Cambridge History* ..., 1982: p. 880); a transcription of this text was kindly put at my disposal by Prof. F. del Punta (Pisa). 62) Aristotle, *Categories*, see my note ad 29. 64) Averroes, *In De caelo*, Book I, ch. 1, t. 1, in *Opera omnia* V, f. 2rb. 78) See the notes ad lines 62 and 64. 79) The reference is probably to Richard Brinkley. The arguments for this assumption are: 1) our author speaks of *complexe significabilia* as *entia*, so the significate of a proposition is the thing, or are the things, referred to by the components (subject, predicate, copula) of the proposition; in this connection, our author speaks, just as Brinkley, of the total signification of a proposition; 2) On f. 55vb, 'Brinkel's' view on the significate of a proposition is explicitly approved of; 3) Richard Brinkley seems to have been influential in Prague: at least he was influential on John Wyclif. Brinkley's *De significato propositionis* forms part of his *Summa nova de logica*. I must confess that I could not find the text of our tract in Brinkley's *De significato propositionis* word to word. 115) Averroes, *In Metaphysicam*, XII, ch. 3, t. 39, in *Opera omnia* vol. VIII, f. 151vb. 119-120) Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, XII, 6, 1072 a 30-34; Averroes, *In De caelo*, Book II, 2, t. 17, in *Opera omnia*, vol. V, f. 50rb-va. 125) E.g. Aristotle, *On interpretation*, ch. IX.)

As Nuchelmans points out¹³, it was lively debated in the fourteenth century whether or not a proposition or declarative statement possesses a meaning if its own. Is there something else that is not a substance or accident in the outer world that serves as an entity to which a proposition refers and that is its meaning? The most famous defender of such a view is the Augustinian Heremite, general of his order, *Gregory of Rimini* (lived 1300-1362) who says that the meaning of e.g. the proposition 'God exists' is *that God*

¹³ G. Nuchelmans, *Theories of the Proposition*, ..., 1973, p. 241.

exists, not God itself. The same is true of the meaning of <Sortes currit>, which is that *Sortes runs*. Gregory was fiercely attacked by e.g. *Marsilius of Inghen*¹⁴ (born shortly before 1340-1396) who says that the meaning of a proposition is the thing, or things, the terms in the proposition refer to. So the meaning of <God exists> and of <Sortes exists> is God and Sortes respectively.

Another interpretation of the *complexe significabile*-theory current in the fourteenth century was that the meaning of a proposition is a *modus rei*: e.g. in the true proposition <a horse is dead> (see the third argument, lines 67-68), the thing referred to is not the horse, nor something other than the horse, but a state, or condition of the horse. This view is defended a.o. by *Richard Billingham*, fellow of Merton College (Oxford) (*floruit* 1344-1361)¹⁵.

Our anonymous author rejects Billingham's thesis in favor of a thoroughly realist opinion, according to which a *complexe significabile* should be accepted as an *ens* (see lines 45-49) and that the proposition is true if it is such in reality as is indicated by the *total* signification of the proposition (lines 81-82). Our author does not elaborate his view in due detail, but he seems to be an adherent of Richard Brinkley in this respect (this Richard compiled his *Summa nova de logica* ca. 1350-1360, according to Fitzgerald's edition and introduction (see the note to line 79)). Brinkley fiercely criticised Billingham in favour of the view that the significate of a proposition are the things signified. E.g. of the proposition <Sortes videt Platonem>, the significate is the thing Sortes, the thing Plato and the vision by which Sortes sees. Those things are signified, and when duly put into order the total and proper (<*adaequatum*>) significate results¹⁶.

2.4 The organization of the questions

From the three questions edited above we can learn as well how the questions of the tract preserved in manuscript C are organised. They are not built up in the traditional way as in e.g. Thomas Aquinas', Buridan's, Albert

¹⁴ See for discussion esp. H. Elie, *Le complexe significabile*, 1937, pp. 56-64; G. Nuchelmans, *Theories of the Proposition*, ..., 1973, pp. 253-254; E.P. Bos, *Marsilius van Inghen, Kennis* ..., 1987, pp. 38-43.

¹⁵ See for Billingham's life esp. A. Maierù, <Lo speculum puerorum sive ...>, 1969, esp. pp. 300-302.

¹⁶ Richard Brinkley's *Summa nova de logica* (the chapter on *De significato propositionis*) edited by Dr. M. J. Fitzgerald (see note to line 79, above) pp.1-2: 44 (lines 192-194).

of Saxony's or Marsilius of Inghen's writings, where a question (<Utrum ...>) is followed by some arguments by opponents, the *in oppositum*, the *corpus quaestionis* (where the author presents the outline of his opinion) and the solutions of the problems raised by the opponents (where the author has the opportunity to work out his solution to the problem in details). The questions in our text are not even organised as in e.g. Duns Scotus' or William of Ockham's works, where they are less formal than in the works of the masters mentioned earlier: the various articles within the *corpora quaestionis* dominate the structure of the question itself.

In the questions of our tract the problem itself is stated (<Utrum ...>), then arguments *pro* and *contra* succeed each other in a way, which makes it sometimes difficult to trace the line of thought the author apparently wishes to defend. The authors' opinions usually start with: <nota> or <respondetur>, as has been said. Arguments to support a position, whether the author's or his opponents' are introduced by <item>, which can be translated by marking new sections in the translation. Objections are marked by <contra>.

As elsewhere, the question-titles are useful to indicate the contents of the text. They do not exactly coincide with the demarcations of the different subjects in the tract of manuscript C. E.g. the subject of *significatio* is already introduced before the first question on this item (question nr. 14) comes up, beginning with <nota> (f. 5ra), and in q.63 confused supposition is discussed as well.

The text of manuscript C is interrupted by blank spaces of various length, sometimes of 5, sometimes of 10 lines, sometimes even more. They often mark an interruption of the argument, as is clear from the questions transcribed above.

2.5 The date of the tract on basis of the authors mentioned

The number of authors mentioned in our *sophistria*-tract is fairly large. I shall give a list of the authors, as accurately and exhaustively as possible. This survey is primarily meant to find a *terminus post quem* of the tract. However, it also gives us an opportunity as well to learn which authors were considered important at the university of Prague.

Sometimes, I could not exactly determine the author: often only the Christian name (e.g. <Iohannes>) is mentioned and sometimes only a letter (e.g. <B.>); sometimes, the context helps to determine the author. If so, I have noted my interpretation within brackets.

Two Sophistria-Tracts

- Albertus (probably: de Saxonia) ff. 11ra, 12ra, 40rb
 Alexander (probably: de Villa-Dei) ff. 12vb, 34va, 34vb, 44ra, 45va, 69ra (2x)
 Auctor tractatum ff. 5rb (=Petrus Hispanus), 16ra (= Petrus Hispanus), 18rb, 21va, 23ra, 32va (3x), 24vb, 25vb, 42rb, 56vb, 62ra, 76ra, 76va (2x), 77va, 78ra.
- B. ff. 45va, 47ra, 48va, 49ra, 54rb, 54rb, 55ra (= Brinkley?? (see also above)), 55rb (= Brinkley? see also above), 55vb
 Guillelmus Hesbrus (=Heytesbury) ff. 29vb, 37ra, 47ra, 75ra (2x), 76va, 77ra
 Guillelmus de Ockham ff. 15vb, 30ra, 75ra
 Gualterus Burleius (=Walter Burley) ff. 15va, 29rb
 Hugo (which Hugo?) ff. 16va, 41vb, 42ra (2x), 75rb, 75va
 Johannes Buridanus ff. 8vb (<By-ni>), 10vb, 11ra, 11rb, 15va, 16va, 17vb (2x), 20ra, 20vb, 20vb, 21va (2x), 23va, 24va (2x), 26rb, 37ra, 38ra, 38vb, 40rb, 45va (B.)?, 47ra (2x, of which 1x <B.>), 50va (B.), 64ra
 Johannes de Gola (= de Glogovia??) f. 30vb
 Johannes Venator ff. 37ra, f.48rb, 49ra
 Johannes Wyclif ff. 24ra (3x), 24rb, 71rb, 71vb
 M. ff. 48rb, 48va, 49ra
 Marsilius de Inghen ff. 15va, 16va, 17va, 21va, 24va, 29vb, 31rb, 37ra, 39ra, 39va, 41vb, 43vb, 47ra (=M.), 50rb (=M.), 75ra
 Petrus Hispanus ff. 5rb, 11rb (3x), 16ra, 17vb, 18ra, 19vb, 23va, 42rb
 Ricardus Biligam (= Billingham) ff. 35vb, 37ra, 56ra, 56vb, 60ra, 60vb, 62rb, 68rb, 71vb, 73va, 73vb, 74va, 75ra, 75vb, 76vb, 77va
 Ricardus Brinkel (= Brinkley) ff. 11rb, 11vb, 15va, 17vb, 24ra, 24rb (2x), 29rb, 33ra, 37rb, 55vb
 Ricardus Climiton (=Kilvington) f. 34ra
 Thomas (which Thomas?) f. 47vb
 Thomas de Clivis ff. 9vb, 10vb (Thomas), 12vb, 15va, 17rb, 20vb, 21ra, 21va, 22vb (2x), 24rb, 26ra, 28ra, 28vb, 29rb, 30rb(2x), 30vb, 31ra, 35vb, 36vb, 37ra (3x), 38ra, 38rb (Thomas, 3x), 38va, 38vb (Thomas?), 40rb, 41rb, 42ra, 42rb, 52rb, 53va, 53vb, 54ra, 54va (2x Thomas), 73ra
 Thomas Maulfelt (=Manleveld) ff. 12ra, 15vb, 19vb (Thomas = M.), 22ra, 22vb, 24va, 25rb, 26rb, 29rb, 31ra, 75r

This index of the masters which were considered important or at least worth mentioning at the University of Prague may be useful to assess the date of composition of the tract. Apart from John of Glogovia, whose sur-

name should perhaps be transcribed otherwise, (unless Billingham, Brinkley or Buridan is meant), <M.> (unless Marsilius of Inghen or Manlevelt is intended), Hugh, Thomas (unless Thomas de Clivis is referred to) all logicians can be more or less accurately dated:

Albert of Saxony was active in the arts faculty at Paris in 1351-1360, active in Vienna from 1365 onwards; Alexander de Villedieu's *Doctrinale* dates 1199; William of Heytesbury was active in arts ca. 1330-1347; William of Ockham's activity as philosopher and theologian was until about 1333; John Buridan lived not long after 1358; a John of Glogovia compiled a commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* about 1300; John Hunter composed his *Logica* in the early 1380; John Wyclif was active as master of arts in 1356-1372 (he died 1384); Marsilius of Inghen probably did not compose works on arts after 1386, but this is not certain; Peter of Spain is a well-known 13th century master: he wrote his *Tractatus* about 1230; Richard Billingham was fellow of Merton college from 1344 till 1361; Richard Brinkley wrote his *Summa nova de logica* about 1350-1360, as has been said; Richard Kilvington died 1361; For Thomas de Clivis, I refer to my remarks in the next paragraph; Master Thomas Manlevelt can not be dated with much accuracy: he was perhaps an English logician of the mid-14th century; was he also a reader in Louvain in 1368? Perhaps he taught already in Paris in the 1330s.

In the preceding paragraph I have pointed to *Thomas de Clivis*, who is primarily significant for dating the tract¹⁷. This master Thomas de Clivis is hardly known up till now¹⁸. According to a private communication by Dr. St. Read (Scotland) there seem to have been two Thomas de Clivis: One, Thomas Zeghenans (or Segeland), also known as Thomas de Berca (Rheinberg), later Canon of the abbey of Cleves, determined in Paris in 1364, was a master by 1365, and taught in Paris from then until 1375. He then left and became schoolmaster at St. Stephen's in Vienna until the University was re-established in 1383. He is listed as a master there in 1385. He died in 1412. The other Thomas, possibly nephew of Thomas Zeghenans, matriculated at

¹⁷ Thomas de Clivis is mentioned more than other authors, as is clear from the list: about 1 1/2 times as much as Peter of Spain (even the latter is the same as the 'auctor tractatum', which is probable, because they are identified on f. 5ra of manuscript C) and as Buridan, more than twice as much as Billingham and Marsilius of Inghen. Exact numbers are hard to give because the references are sometimes not precise.

¹⁸ Thomas de Clivis is referred to in the anonymous commentary on the first and fourth tract of Peter of Spain, and on Marsilius' *Parva logicalia*, Basel, 1487, sign. r4r-r5v (Hagenau 1495 (reprint Frankfurt/Main, 1967)) and 1503, sign. q6r-v (information by Dr. St. Read, Scotland, who, as he told me, owes much to a private communication from Dr. Gorissen of the Stadtarchiv in Kleve (Western Germany)).

Vienna in 1383, incepted in 1388, and taught there until 1397. One Thomas has written a *Speculum logicale* (preserved in Ms Munich, *University Library* 20.102, ff. 141r-161r, and in Ms Göttingen, *University Library*, Lüneburg 20, ff. 2r-29v¹⁹).

If the *Thomas de Clivis* we are looking for is to be identified with the second Thomas distinguished by Dr. Read, our *sophistria*-tract should be dated after about 1397. All other authors named were active earlier than this Thomas. If this second Thomas is not the one our author means, then another of the authors mentioned may help to find a *terminus post quem*, primarily *Johannes Venator* (= John Hunter) who completed his logic in the early 1380s²⁰.

To my knowledge, all other masters were active in an earlier period than John Hunter. I cannot, however, make further guesses at this moment. Further study should determine which authors and which works our anonymous writer exactly refers to in the tract. Because all authors mentioned were active in the last quarter of the fourteenth century, I suggest that our tract dates from this period, let us say, from about 1400, but, again, this suggestion is very tentative.

2.6 Place of origin

The name <Prague> is frequently mentioned in the manuscript C in examples: e.g. on ff. 15vb, 25va, 30vb, 37rb, 46va, 55va (2x), 64ra, whereas in other examples <Rome> and <Paris> are mentioned, that is: more <international> examples and not significant, I think, for establishing a place of origin. The reference to Prague in the examples may be an indication that the manuscript originates there.

III. The *sophistria*-tract of manuscript V

Before evaluating the tract preserved in manuscript C as an example of a *sophistria*-tract of about 1400, it seems best to describe the tract preserved in manuscript V in the same way as I have done with the tract handed down in manuscript C.

¹⁹ I intend to edit Thomas' *Speculum logicale*.

²⁰ L.M. de Rijk, 'Semantics in Richard Billingham and Johannes Venator', 1980, p. 168.

1. Ms Vienna, *Österr. Nationalbibl.* VPL 4785 (Lunae. O 150), ff. 233v-280v (8^o)

The nineteenth century catalogue that describes this manuscript is not very precise²¹. The catalogue gives as date for the whole manuscript: s. XV (1448). The latter year can only be applied to the first texts contained in this manuscript, as I hope to show below.

First I shall list the different tracts of manuscript V in the same way as I have done with manuscript C²². Again, I can not give any codicological or paleographical details.

1. ff. 1r-43r: Johannes de Werdea, *Concepta parvorum logicalium*, part I (= commentary on Peter of Spain's *Tractatus* I; (the commentary is identical with that in ms Graz, *University Library* 1039, ff. 1r-31v))
2. ff. 43v-67r: Idem, Commentary on Peter of Spain's *Tractatus* IV (= ms Graz, *University Library* 1039, ff. 32r-40r)
3. ff. 67r-108v: Idem, Commentary (*quaestiones*) on Marsilius of Inghen's *Suppositiones* (=ms Graz, *University Library* 1039, ff. 48v-78r)
4. ff. 109r-121r: Idem, Commentary (*quaestiones*) on Marsilius of Inghen's *Ampliationes* (=ms Graz, *University Library* 1039, ff. 78r-87r)
5. ff. 130v-169r: Idem, Commentary (*quaestiones*) on Marsilius of Inghen's *Consequentiae* I (= ms Graz, *University Library* 1039, ff. 95r-120r)
6. ff. 169r-201r: Idem, Commentary (*quaestiones*) on Marsilius of Inghen's *Consequentiae* II

The *explicit* of this text is: *Explicitiunt Concepta parvorum logicalium reverendi magistri Johannis de Werdea composita in alma universitate studii Wiennensis sub rectore eiusdem universitatis Jodoco de Hailprunner (= Heilbronn) doctore sacrae theologiae, finita per me, Caspar de Knechner de Herbipoli (=Würzburg) tunc temporis existens (sic) studens eiusdem studii praenominati sub anno 1448. Laudetur Deus. De quo finito sit laus et gloria Christo, Virgini Mariae et toto (sic) throno Angelorum per infinita saecula saeculorum, Amen.*²³

7. ff. 201v-210r: blank

* Now a completely different hand starts:

8. ff. 210v-219r: De terminis

²¹ *Tabulae codicum* (...) in *Bibliotheca Palatina Vindobinensi asservatorum*, vol. III, 1869, pp. 386-387.

²² I wish to thank Prof. De Rijk for his information about this manuscript.

²³ John of Werdea: John (or Hieronymus?) Faber de Werdea was regent in Vienna in 1445.

9. ff. 219v-225v: De suppositionibus relativorum
10. ff. 225v-232v: De ampliacionibus (this text starts with: <Ampliatio secundum Marsilium sic describitur...>). The text is incomplete
11. f. 233r blank
12. ff. 233v-280r: The *sophistria*-tract, which I shall examine here in more detail.

2. The *sophistria*-tract of manuscript V

2.1. The incipit and the explicit

The *incipit* runs as follows:

(f. 233v)

Circa materiam sophistriae est primo notandum quod sophistria nihil aliud est nisi habitus mediante quo scimus facere aliqua sophisticalia circa quamlibet materiam, sicut patet per *Philosophum* sexto *Ethicorum*, et etiam sexto *Metaphysicae*, ubi dicit quod habitus intellectuales dicuntur per se
5 nes eius formam.

Notandum: duplex est sophistria, scilicet utens et docens. Et docens est qua docemur scire prompte aliqua sophismata et ea dissolvere. Sed utens est qua utimus in formando aliqua sophismata etiam in quacumque materia.

- 10 Sequitur etiam quod istae duae non multum distinguuntur: quia omnis talis vel est utens, vel docens, etiam quia idem est habitus docens et utens.

(NOTAE: 3) Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, VI, 1, 1038 b 33-35; Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, V, xii, 1019 b 5-6)

The *explicit*:

(f. 280v)

Aliter dicitur quod istae medietates sunt infinitae syncategorematicae, id est: non tot quin plura, et non categorematicae. Nam infinita syncategorematicae et finita, ista non opponuntur. Sed solum infinita categorematicae et finita, ista opponuntur.

- 5 Item, <nullum> est distributivum pro locis, ergo etcetera. Probatur: quia nec pro locis continuis, nec discontinuis. Non primum: quia nullus talis est. Quia, si sic, tunc haberet infinitas partes, et eo quod est in diversis locis et quaelibet pars loci est locus, ergo est in infinitis locis etcetera.
- Item, <nullum> est distributivum pro temporibus. Probatur: quia si
10 aliquod, maxime ly <quicumque> || the text breaks off.

(APPARATUS CRITICUS: 1) istae]iste C. infinitae]infinita C. 4) ista]isto C)

2.2 List of the questions

The tract is divided into the following questions:

1. f.234v Utrum sophistria sit scientia.
 f.237v Utrum differentia in categoreuma et syncategoreuma sit bene data
 f.238v Utrum syncategoreuma positum a parte subiecti sit pars subiecti
 f.240v Utrum syncatemoreuma positum a parte praedicati sit pars praedicati
5. f.241r Utrum syncategoreuma positum a parte praedicati non sit pars praedicati sicut probabile diceretur
 f.242 Utrum syncategoreuma et categoreuma veniant penes significare, id est: an quodlibet syncategoreuma sit significativum vel con-significativum
 f.244r Utrum syncategoreuma importet modos vel dispositiones in signis et non in rebus ad extra
 f.246r Utrum syncategoreuma importet actum animae
 f.248r Utrum divisio syncategoreumatum, scilicet aliud est formaliter, aliud virtualiter sit bona
10. f.249r Utrum diffinitio signi universalis sit bona, scilicet signum universale est signum universaliter consignificans
 f.250r Utrum possibile sit signum universale addi praedicato absque hoc quod propositio falsificetur
 f.251v Utrum signum universale exigit plura supposita in termino cui adiungitur
 f.253v Utrum diffinitio distributionis data a P<etro> H<ispano> ubi dicitur: < distributio est multiplicatio termini communis facta per signum universale>, < sit bona>
 f.254v Utrum quodlibet signum universaliter affirmativum sit distributivum
15. f.255r Utrum signum universale affirmativum additum termino generali posset ipsum distribuere quandoque pro singulis generum et quandoque pro generibus singulorum
 f.257v Utrum hoc signum <omnis> quandoque teneatur divisive, quandoque <collective>

- f.259r Utrum signum universaliter affirmativum aggregatum ex recto et obliquo distribuat totum subiectum aggregatum
 f.260v Utrum in propositione aggregatum ex obliquo et recto praecedente solum obliquo sit subiectum, vel totum praedicatum
 f.263r Utrum totum disiunctum possit super se recipere distributionem signi universalis
 20. f.265v Utrum totum copulatum per signum universaliter affirmativa posset distribui
 f.267r Utrum totum aggregatum ex restringente et restringibili sit distribuibile
 f.269v Utrum signa interrogativa per geminationem vel per syllabicam compositionem sicut <quisquis>, <quicquid> sint distributiva
 f.271v Utrum subsumere sub hoc signo distributivo substantiae <quicquid> alium terminum alterius praedicamenti faciat fallaciam figurae dictionis
 f.273r Utrum ly <quicumque> distributivum tantum denotet sequelam
 25 f.274r Utrum aliqua sint syncategoreumata pura et aliqua impura
 f.275r Utrum omne syncategoreuma equivalens orationi compositae ex signo universali et termino communi habeat virtutem respondendi
 f.276v Utrum ly <totus> syncategoreumatice captum sit distributivum pro partibus integrantibus
 f.278v Utrum divisio signi distributivi in distributivum substantiae et accidentis sit <bona>
 * (end of f. 279r, 3 lines blank; the same hand starts again)
 f.279v Utrum sint aliqua distributiva qualitatibus, quantitatis, ubi et sic de aliis praedicamentis accidentium
 f.280v end (the text breaks off, end of page)

(APPARATUS CRITICUS: 8) actum] actus C. 21) restringibili] restringibile C. 25) faciat] facit C.

NOTA: 13) Petrus Hispanus, *Tractatus*, ed. De Rijk, 1972, p. 209, lines 4-5)

As to the subjects discussed, these questions can be roughly divided as follows:

- nrs. 1- 2: on the nature of *sophistria* and its relation to other sciences
 nrs. 3-11: de terminis syncategoreumatibus
 nrs. 12-end: de distributione terminorum.

2.3 *Specimen of the tract*

As an example of a question preserved in this *sophistria*-tract I shall present question nr. 18. This question is representative for the author's interest in the problem of distribution of terms, in the collective use of <omnis> and <suppositio collectiva> of terms, and, finally, for the way in which this *sophistria*-tract makes use of notions originating from grammar.

(f. 257v-259r)

UTRUM HOC SIGNUM <OMNIS> QUANDOQUE TENEATUR
DIVISIVE, QUANDOQUE <COLLECTIVE>

ARGUITUR: hoc signum <omnis> numquam tenetur collective, igitur etcetera: quia solum in plurali numero tenetur collective; sed <omnis> non 5 praedicatur in singulari numero, ut dicit *Alexander*: <distribuit, si vim etcetera>.

Arguitur: ista divisio praesupponit inconveniens: quia praesupponit solecismum, quia praesupponit unum signum officio alterius. Probatur: quando una species nominis ponitur pro alia specie nominis, tunc com- 10 mittitur illa figura, et hoc est <fungi officio alterius>.

Nota: quidam grammaticorum disputant de hoc, an <omnis> in singulari possit teneri collective. Et dicunt quod solum in plurali numero secundum istud metrum *Alexandri* distribuit <etcetera>.

Sed tamen hoc non est simpliciter verum: immo in singulari numero 15 potest teneri collective. Ratio est quia in singulari numero potest sibi sumere verbum pluralis numeri sive figuram, quod non potest facere aliud nomen collectivum. Exemplum, sic dicendo: <omnis terra plaudite manibus, iubilare Deo>. Nota: hic non stat nisi ibi ly <omnis> tenetur collective.

Ad secundum respondetur quod *Donatus* in libro *De barbarismo* dicit 20 quod <solecismus> habet dupliciter fieri: uno modo pro partibus orationis, alio modo pro parte accidentium partium orationum.

<Procidencia> habet fieri quando constructio non combinatur eo modo sicut secundum accidentia deberet fieri. Sed solecismus pro parte orationis habet fieri dupliciter: uno modo quando una pars orationis generalis 25 ponitur pro alia, ut quando nomen ponitur pro adverbio. Secundo <modo> quando una species orationis ponitur pro alia specie partis orationis, sicut nomen subiecti ponitur || (f. 258r) loco nominis adiectivi. Modo dicitur: quando ly <omnis> capitur collective, non fit nomen collectivum, eo

quod tunc non fit collectio, nec significat collectionem, sicut <turba> vel
30 <plebs>, sed aequae manet nomen distributivum.

Per hoc ad alia argumenta respondetur. Arguitur: sequitur quod aliquod nomen esset quod sub nulla specie comprehenderetur. Probatur: quia hoc nomen <omnis> tantum collective est nomen et sub nulla specie nominis comprehenditur: quia nec est nomen collectivum, nec divisivum.

35 Quod non primum, probatur: quia ei non convenit diffinitio nominis stricta: quia nomen collectivum est quod infiniti numeri significat collectionem; sed hoc non convenit isti signo <omnis>. Probatur: quia istud signum tantum collective nec significat multitudinem nec collectionem; igitur etcetera. Similiter: si sic, sequitur quod variatio acceptionum faceret
40 fallaciam in argumentis; sed hoc est falsum. Falsitas probatur: quia si aliquem, maxime fallaciam aequivocationis. Probatur: quia nullum agens, propter <hoc> quod exercet de se officia, dicitur aequivo cum, sed propter hoc quod ly <omnis> tenetur collective vel divisive, exercet diversa officia; ergo propter hoc non debet dici aequivocum.

45 Regula: hoc nomen <omnis> quocumque modo tenetur, sive copulative, sive divisive, semper est nomen distributivum apud grammaticum, et communiter species specialissima nominis quae dicitur distributivum, quia, ut dicit argumentum: quando tenetur collective, tunc non continetur sub specie nominis collectivi.

50 Sed pro secundo sciendum quod hoc nomen <omnis> non dicitur <divisivum> quia semper dividit sic quod numquam colligit, nec dicit <collectivum> quia colligat sic quod non dividat, sed ideo dicitur <divisivum> quia ipsum dividit terminum cui additur in partes, et denotat praedicatum in qua sic ponitur, inesse subiecto pro omnibus istis partibus divisi. Sed tunc
55 dicitur teneri <collective> quando dividit terminum in partes et denotat praedicatum propositionis in qua sic sumitur convenire subiecto pro suis subiectis collectivum vel coniunctim et non divisim, ut hic: <omnes apostoli Dei sunt duodecim>. II (f. 258v)

Nota: illud nomen <omnis> in hoc quod tenetur collective et divisive,
60 tenetur aequivoce, scilicet pro ratione secundum quod dicitur, ideo tenetur aequivoce quia significet divisionem et collectionem aequivoce. Sed ideo variatis illis actibus variatur eius significatio quod est <omnis>, sicut patet in simili: pronomen demonstrativum si capitur aequivoce et demonstrative, tunc capitur aequivoce, et tamen non significat demonstrationem et relationem aequivoce, sed illa quae significantur per ipsum secundum istos diversos actus, ista significantur aequivoce.

Sed quando dicebatur: «nullum agens propter <hoc> quod etcetera», respondetur quod ista maior est falsa, sed potest habere veritatem si ad variationem istorum actuum non sequitur variatio significationis. Nam
 70 quod ignis lucet et calescit propter hoc uno tempore non magis prodit (?) vel tenet unam significationem quam aliam; non sic autem est de ly «omnis». Per hoc respondetur.

Arguitur contra: si ly «omnis» tenetur collective, sequitur quod aliqua sit «suppositio collectiva», et per consequens divisio auctoris mala, ubi di-
 75 citur: in confusam tantum, distributivam et determinatam. Sed quod non sit ponenda, probatur: quia sub quolibet termino stante determinate valet descensus disiunctivus, sed sic non fit hoc.

Arguitur: quia <si> ly «omnis» aliquando tenetur divisive, vel ergo ubique consignificaret universaliter semper, vel aliquando <sic> et ali-
 80 quando non. Quod non secundum, probatur: ubique consignificat universaliter: probatur, quia quando tenetur collective, tunc consignificat universaliter collective et etiam universaliter quando tenetur divisive. Sed si non tenetur universaliter collective, tunc sequitur quod aliquod frustra in arte sequatur. Et supponatur quod terminus categorematicus pluralis nu-
 85 meri etiam teneatur collective. Tunc arguitur sic dicendo: «omnes apostoli Dei sunt duodecim», capiendo «apostoli Dei» collective, et si adderetur tunc «omnes», fieret frustra.

Pro primo sciendum quod *Thomas de Clivis* dicit quod «apostoli» supponit confuse tantum collective, et ponit tertiam suppositionem confu-
 90 sam, scilicet confusam distributivam, confusam tantum et confusam collectivam. Et sic secundum ipsum in propositione indefinita subiectum supponit confuse distributive.

Sed istud dictum non est II (f.259r) commune. (D. ??) tenendo commune dictum dicitur quod supponit determinate illud subiectum. Sed ad pro-
 95 bationem, quando dicitur: «quomodo debet descendi?», respondetur quod sic debet descendi: «ergo isti omnes apostoli Dei sunt duodecim vel isti omnes apostoli Dei sunt duodecim etcetera» et non absolute ponendo ly «omnis».

Ratio quia in ista «omnes apostoli Dei sunt duodecim» denotatur collec-
 100 tio, ita exprimitur in descensu, quando additur istud signum «omnis». Alia ratio est: quia, si sic non descenderetur, tunc fieret dubium cuius propositionis fieret descensus.

Pro secundo argumento sciendum quod, si ly «omnis» <ali>quando tenetur divisive, sicut dicit *Hugo*, aliqui volunt quod signum universaliter
 105 collective sumptum universaliter actum distribuit. Et dicunt isti: tenendo

ly <omnis> collective non est pars subiecti sicut tenetur divisive. Et dicunt etiam quod ista sit universalis: <omnes apostoli Dei sunt duodecim> et hoc tenendo ly <omnis> collective.

Et licet ista sunt probabilia, tamen communiter non tenentur. Et ergo
110 dicatur quod, <si> ly <omnis> tenetur collective, quod tunc sit pars subiecti, et quod sit propositio indefinita, et quod non consignificat universaliter <si> consignificatio est collectiva.

Uterius dicitur quod addendo signum universaliter collectivum non sit frustra, sed additur sibi ad designandum quod praedicatum inesset subiecto
115 to pro suis suppositis collectim vel coniunctim, et quamvis hoc potest designari alias per totam propositionem, non tamen ita expresse sine signo sicut cum signo.

(APPARATUS CRITICUS: 5) praedicatur] prae (a ? del.) -tur V. 7) inconveniens] inconvenire (?) V. 23) deberet] deberent V. 35) ei] si V. 36) numeri] numero V. 44) aequivocum] aequivocatio V. 43) divisive] dissive (?) V. 47) specialissima] specialissimae V. 49) collectiv] collective V. 52) dividat] sed ideo dicitur divisivum ideo quod semper dividat add. V. 55) terminum] in (nomen (?) add. sed del.) tantum V. 59) tenetur] teneatur (?) C. 61) quia] quod V. 66) actus] actos V. 70) propter quod etcetera] etcetera propter quod V. 71) autem] non add. sed del. V. 71-72) omnis] propter add. sed del. V. 78) tenetur] collective add. sed del. V. 79) ubique] acceptibus (?) V. 89) tertiam] tertem (?) V. 100) ita] et ita V. 101) tunc] et tunc V. 105) distribuit] distributum V. 109) ista] iste V. 111) non] sit add. sed del. V. 112) collectiv] collective V.

NOTAE: 5) Alexander of Villedieu, *Doctrinale*, part I, ch. ii, ed. D. Reichling, 1893, p. 31, line 432. 13) *ibidem*. 17) Cf. *Psalm* 46, 2 (where the vulgate text *iuxta vulgatam Clementinam* has <omnes gentes> in stead of <omnis terra>!) 19) Donatus, *Ars maior*, ed. L. Holtz, Paris, 1981, book III, 1, 2, p. 655, lines 15-16. 88) On *Thomas de Clivis*, see above, II, 2.5. and below, III, 2.5. 104) Which *Hugo*?)

First, it is noted by the anonymous author of the *sophistria*-tract that not only universal but also singular terms can be used collectively. Some logicians deny the latter, but our author states that e.g. <omnis populus plaudite manibus, iubilate Deo>, a phrase supposed to be found in the Psalms, should be accepted as a correct statement. This does not imply, our author continues, that <omnis> is a collective *noun*. It is what in modern terms is called a *functor*, which, according to our text, functions either *divisive*, as in e.g. <omnes homines sunt albi>²⁴, in which all men to which the subject term refers, possess a part of whiteness, or *collective*, e.g. in <omnes apostoli Dei sunt duodecim>. In the latter case, so the text says, <omnes> indicates that the predicate belongs to all parts of the subject <collectim vel coniunctim>.

²⁴ The example is mine.

Our author notes that *Thomas de Clivis* divides <suppositio confusa> into three parts, viz. <confusa tantum>, <confusa distributiva> and, what is interesting with regard to our question, in <confusa collectiva>. According to *Thomas de Clivis*, this collective supposition is a property of the subject-term. The author of our *sophistria*-tract does not accept this member of supposition, however: it is not commonly accepted, he says. Indeed, it is not accepted by e.g. John Buridan, Albert of Saxony, Marsilius of Inghen etcetera. It seems to be an acceptance of a term characteristic to *Thomas de Clivis*.

2.4. *The organisation of the questions in manuscript V*

Next a remark about the presentation of the questions in our manuscript V. Other than in manuscript C, the text of the questions are not interrupted by empty spaces that interrupt the line of thought as well. Just as in manuscript C, the question-form here is not classical as in e.g. Thomas Aquinas, Marsilius of Inghen and others, but arguments pro and con succeed each other in such a way that author's opinion is sometimes hard to follow.

2.5 *The date of the text*

I shall attempt to determine the date of the tract preserved in manuscript V in the same way as I tried for the tract of manuscript C.

First of all, the date of our tract can *not* be 1448. As has been noticed, this date applies only to the commentaries of John of Werdea (see above § III, 2). Our tract is written in a completely different hand.

Again, an index of the authors mentioned in the tract may be helpful to some extent:

Albertus (de Saxonia)

ff. 240v, 241r (2x), 259v (<Albertus in Sophismatibus sui>), 261r (2x <Albertus in Sophismatibus sui>), 261v (2x), 262r (2x), 262v (2x), 263r (2x), 265r, 267r, 267v (2x), 271v, 272v, 273r

Alexander (de Villa Dei??)

f. 257v

Hugo (which Hugo?)

f. 259r

Iohannes (which Iohannes ??)

ff. 270r (2x), 274r

Iohannes Buridanus

f. 242vm 261r, 261v (4x), 262v, 263r

Lincolniensis (=Robert Grosseteste) (lived 1168/75 - 1253) f. 236v

Marsilius (de Inghen)

f. 276v

Petrus Hispanus

ff. 251v, 252r, 252v, 253v, 255v, 267r

(Richardus) Billingham

ff. 243 (2x)

Robert Grosseteste

(vide: Lincolniensis)

Thomas de Clivis
William of Ockham

ff. 248v, 249v, 254v, 258v
f. 243r

From this list it may be concluded once again that on of the *Thomas de Clivis's* serve as a *terminus post quem* in the same way as regards the other *sophistria*-tract discussed in this paper.

2.6 The place of origin of the tract of manuscript V

The fact that Albert of Saxony is mentioned most (20x) suggests that the University of Vienna, where Albert was prominent from 1365 onwards, was the place of origin. I can not give any definite conclusions on this score, however.

IV. The *sophistria*-genre in the late fourteenth century

Now we have described (to a limited extent) the contents of the two tracts, I shall consider them together to give an answer to the following questions:

1. How do the texts themselves conceive of *sophistria* as a science?
2. What is the form of the genre?
3. What was the function of a *sophistria*-tract in the university curriculum?
4. What is the place of the *sophistria*-genre of the kind discussed here in the history of medieval logic?

Ad 1 (how do the texts conceive of *sophistria* as a science?): As in many other tracts of medieval philosophy, the tracts themselves give a definition of the kind of science of which they form part. The accounts of theology as a science in the prologues to the Commentaries on the Sentences are well-known. The two tracts discussed here give a definition of the science *sophistria* in their initial questions. The text in manuscript C is more elaborate than that of manuscript V: the former tract devotes 12 questions to the subject-matter, as we see from the list of questions given above. The text of the manuscript C is shorter.

It is possible to take the two tracts together in that they describe the science of *sophistria* principally in the same way. They differ in details, but these can be omitted for the moment.

As a preliminary remark, it should be said that in several places the tract of manuscript C calls the science it belongs to *sophistria*, not *sophistaria*: so e.g. on f. 3rb, f. 4ra, f. 4rb. The handwriting of manuscript V is not clear as to the exact orthography of the word. The term *sophistaria* is also used for the genre, as I shall point out in my solution of the last problem (4) raised in this section IV.

Both tracts understand the knowledge which they represent as a science (ms C: q. 1, ms V: q. 1). This conception is problematic, however, for various reasons; this is clear from the discussion in the tracts.

It should be noted that according to both tracts *sophistria* as a science can be interpreted as *sophistria docens* and *sophistria utens* (ms C: q. 1, f. 1va; ms V: q. 1, f. 235v). In the latter sense *sophistria* is the knowledge in so far as it is used; then it is not a science in the strict sense. Only in the former sense is *sophistria* a science with all the characteristics that other sciences possess.

The *subiectum*, or: first formal object of science, is *sophistical argument*; the science *sophistria* studies all objects which are in some way or other related to this *subiectum* (ms C: q. 12). *Sophistria* is a knowledge according to which someone knows the causes of the objects studied by the science.

Sophistria is the disposition (*habitus*) by which one can *construct and solve* sophistical arguments. This is the definition to which the tract of manuscript C arrives in question 2 (f. 1vb), and this is the one with which the tract of manuscript V (q. 1, f. 236v) agrees with.

This definition gives rise to another problem: how can there be a science about errors (ms C: q. 8, f. 3rb)? Science can only be about positive things, it is argued, i.e. about correct inferences. The answer in both tracts is that, first, the science *sophistria* aims to protect the student of logic against errors²⁵; it is not meant as a means to make fallacious reasoning. It can help the student of all other parts of logic, be it in the study of terms, propositions or inferences. For in all these parts of logic, one can make mistakes or be deceived. Secondly, the science *sophistria* can be reduced to logic in the positive sense.

Ad 2 (what is the form of the genre?): As can be seen from the descriptions given above, the form of the tract is a collection of questions. This is especially clear from manuscript V. For the tract preserved in manuscript C

²⁵ Cf. A. Maierù, *Terminologia* ..., 1972, p. 573.

I have made some reservations above (§ II,2.4). Here the sections beginning with <nota> often mark a change of subjects.

Ad 3 (the place of the *sophistria*-tract in the University-curriculum): A. Piltz has noted in his *Studium Upsalense*²⁶ that <possibly the aggregate of logical questions and sophisms known as *sophistria* was originally something studied exclusively by students of the *via moderna*. In Prague, a decision was taken in 1387 to the effect that *exercitia in sophistria* should be held three times a year>²⁷.

Piltz has noted, too,²⁸ that the Greifswald-statute of 1456 determined that in order to receive his bachelor's degree, a student in arts should familiarize himself by way of *exercitia* with the *logica nova* for half a year and then with Peter of Spain's *Tractatus* with *sophismata* for another half a year. In the *cedula* of about 1440 of the University of Leipzig, a student was required to <exercise> in the *parva logicalia* and *sophistria communis*, and in the notes of 1486 of the University of Uppsala the *sophistria* is mentioned again in the same respect²⁹.

My suggestion is that the two *sophistria*-tracts described above may be of the kind intended in the statutes of the Prague university.

Ad 4 (What is the place of the *sophistria*-genre of the kind discussed here in the history of medieval logic?): The kind of *sophistria*-tracts discussed in this paper is not the only one, nor the first as far as we know. In the introduction to his forthcoming edition of some *sophistaria*-tracts³⁰, which he kindly put at my disposal, De Rijk discusses the *sophistaria*-litterature of an earlier period: his edition comprises three thirteenth-century tracts which should be considered as fore-runners of the *sophistria*-tracts (it may be noted, again, that De Rijk labels them <sophistaria>, not <sophistria>). De Rijk has edited three tracts, dating from about 1300: 1. a *Tractatus Vaticanus de multiplicacionibus circa orationes accidentibus* (ms Vatican, Libr., Vat. lat. 7678, ff. 82rb-88ra) 2) a *Sophistaria Floriania* (or: *Tractatus Florianus de solutionibus sophismatum*) (ms Sankt Florian (Austria), Stiftsbibliothek XI, 632, ff. 42ra-51vb), and 3) a *Tractatus Vaticanus de communibus distinctionibus* (ms Vatican, Libr., Vat. lat. 7678, ff. 73r-82r).

²⁶ A. Piltz, *Studium Upsalense* ..., 1977, p. 43, note 77.

²⁷ Piltz refers to the *Monumenta Germaniae historica* I, p. 90, cf. p. 89.

²⁸ See Piltz, *Studium Upsalense* ..., 1977, p. 20.

²⁹ Cf. A. Kenny, J. Pinborg, <Medieval Philosophical Litterature>, in *The Cambridge History*..., pp. 18-19.

³⁰ L.M. de Rijk, *Some Earlier Parisian Tracts on Distinctiones* ..., forthcoming.

In his introduction, De Rijk distinguishes between three kinds of tracts which are closely related even to such an extent, as De Rijk says, that the distinction between them is not always very clear: 1) tracts on *syncategoreumata*, 2) collections of *sophismata*; 3) the so-called *sophistariae*.

As is commonly known, the first kind of tracts discuss especially such functors as <est>, <non>, <omnis> etcetera, functors which are crucial for the structure of sentences and on which fallacies often depend. Examples of these kind of tracts of the thirteenth century are the tracts on syncategorematic terms by William of Sherwood and by Peter of Spain.

The second kind of tracts discuss *sophismata*, or: problematic sentences, e.g. <omnis homo est omnis homo> of which the truth value or meaning is not immediately clear. These tracts start with those complicated sentences and use them to clarify properties of terms or the structure of (fallacious) arguments.

The third kind, De Rijk's *sophistariae*, take the usual solutions as their starting point. In other words the *sophistariae* primarily present the theories which should be used to solve the sophisms. The three tracts edited by De Rijk are composed of objections and answers, and aim to solve the *sophismata*³¹. They are in fact another name for the thirteenth century *Distinctiones*-tracts, of which distinctions concerning ambiguous expressions are made. Eponymous examples of the latter kind are Roger Bacon's *Summa de sophismatibus et distinctionibus*³². The *Tractatus de distinctionibus communibus in sophismatibus accidentibus* attributed to a master Matheus (to be edited by De Rijk in the near future) and a tract on *distinctiones*, very similar to the former, attributed to some father Bonaventura OFM, De Rijk also lists anonymous tracts.

Let us return to the *sophistria*-tracts discussed in this paper. My claim is that these two are examples of a *sophistria*-genre of the late fourteenth century, or of the beginning of the fifteenth century. What they have in common with the earlier *sophistaria*-genre discussed by De Rijk is that they primarily give theories which could help to solve logico-semantic problems. However, they also differ from the *sophistaria*-genre discussed by De Rijk: the tracts discussed in the present paper are primarily collections of questions that cover all kinds of topics from the *Logica moderna*, and they do not focus on the actual solution of sophisms. In fact, in the tract of manuscript C I could not find discussions of *sophismata* proper: in that of manu-

³¹ See also J.A. Weisheipl, 'Repertorium Mertonense', p. 196, note 22.

³² See De Rijk, *Some Earlier Parisian Tracts on Distinctiones* ..., forthcoming, the Introduction; this tract has been edited by Robert Steele.

script V one can read from the *incipit* that the science of *sophistria* is intended to construct *sophisticalia* (so the text clearly reads and I seldomly found examples of what traditionally ranges as a *sophisma*, viz. on f. 236v, *en passant*: «quicquid heri emisti, hodie comedisti» and on ff. 258r-v of the question edited above: «omnes apostoli Dei sunt duodecim»). Further study of the text should confirm this, however.

V. Conclusion

The intention of this paper was to bring to light examples of *sophistria*-genre of the late fourteenth/early fifteenth century. They proved to be a collection of questions, discussing various topics of the *logica moderna* which could serve (at least according to the statutes of some Central-European universities) as an exercise for students as an alternative to an exercise in Peter of Spain's *Tractatus* with sophisms. As the *sophistria*-tracts say themselves, the tracts are useful to frame and solve fallacious arguments and propositions.

My further claim is that the tracts I have discussed are a gold-mine of valuable information about philosophical life and thought in Central-Europe of the late fourteenth and early fifteenth century, a period in the history of logic and semantics which is still relatively unknown.

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