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Oorlog in de griekse en romeinse wereld

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THE ROOTS OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION

TWO THOUSAND YEARS OF WARFARE

11

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
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
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


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
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2000 YEARS OF WARFARE





18th century galleons



Tank



Peace demonstration



Fortification by Vauban




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
Phalanx



Florence Nightingale



Scale 1:16,000,000 approx



Ceramic vase in the shape of the helmeted head of a Greek warrior, dating from the 6th century BC.



War in the Greek and Roman world

War was in the Greek and Roman world a normal state of affairs. Rules and regulations applied, if at all, to warfare with culturally 'equal' opponents, hardly with 'barbarians'. War made possible some technical progress and was the ultimate cause of most slavery and of the success of Greek and Roman civilization. Eventually warfare led to a unified and internally more or less peaceful world around the Mediterranean in the shape of the Roman Empire.

Henk Singor



Greeks and Persians fighting in the battle at the Granikos in northwestern Anatolia. Marble relief from the so-called Alexander sarcophagus (late 4th century BC).

This *stèle* (tombstone) was erected in memory of Aristion (6th century BC). The *hoplite*, spear in hand, is wearing a cuirass which offers extra protection to shoulders and breast. Below the waist, the cuirass ends in strips. A pleated tunic, woven out of fine wool, is worn under the thorax. Metal greaves protect the legs, and a simple helmet covers the head.

One force above all determined the course of Greek and Roman history: war. There was nearly always war somewhere. It was a part of nature questioned only by a few philosophers. Only gradually did peace become a norm to the extent that war had to be started upon by an official declaration. But even so, such declarations of war were considered necessary only in dealing with one's neighbors or with states that were on an equal or comparable level of civilization. The true outsiders, the barbarians, could be dealt with without any legal or moral restraints and thus exterminated or enslaved – or subjugated and ultimately Hellenized or Romanized.

The effects of war were many. In a technologically nearly stagnant civilization it was war that stimulated some technical progress. The foundation of Greek and later of Roman colonies amidst barbarian populations was due to military superiority. The phenomenon of slavery could not have become as widespread as it did without the captives brought in by victorious armies. Greco-Roman civilization itself, being typically urban, could not have spread as it did, had it not been by force. So it was warfare that culminated into a united and only then internally peaceful world around the Mediterranean in which that civilization could penetrate the countryside and at last Romanize large parts of continental Europe.

Aristocratic fighters


Traditionally a man's social and political status was linked closely to his ability to fight. To a large extent, this explains aristocratic supremacy in early Greece and Rome since only the elite had horses and metal

armor at their disposal. Then, in the classical period of the fifth and fourth centuries BC, the citizen militia largely dominated the battlefields. In politics, it was the age of democratic or moderately oligarchic regimes.


The appearance of the professional soldier and the mercenary in the course of the fourth century BC made possible the great territorial states based on conquests that characterized the age of Alexander and his Hellenistic successors. These as well as the conquests of the Roman Republic made the city-states and the citizen-armies obsolete, requiring standing armies and permanent commanders-in-chief. Thus the great Hellenistic monarchies and finally the Roman Empire arose with its professional legions and its *imperator* as sole head of state ruling a disarmed population of citizens and subjects.

It has been stated that the contribution of Greece to the history of warfare consisted of the introduction of new battle tactics in the form of the line formation of heavy infantry fighting in close order with short-distance weapons like spears and swords aimed at crushing its opponents by the sheer shock and weight of its organized mass. But this is surely an overstatement. Not only did warfare in ancient Greece often differ from this model, but the line formation itself cannot be regarded as a Greek invention. What the Greeks did, though, was stiffen that line and develop its tactics to near perfection, thereby fashioning the shape of battle for more than 1,000 years. The *phalanx*, as the line of heavy infantry was known in Greece, made its first appearance in history at around 700 BC in the verses of Homer. It was made up of the best fighters, either fighting in very small companies on their own, or acting as a thin screen in front of a mass of lesser-armed people. In both cases, only small numbers were involved. The tactics themselves can be interpreted as a special development of the champion role aristocratic fighters had to perform in ancient times.


In the seventh and sixth centuries BC, however, foreign contacts generally brought more wealth for the elites of the Greek city-states and enabled them to monopolize the military function of the state to a large extent. More and more, the lower classes, who could not afford to equip themselves with bronze armor, tended to be excluded from the battlefield. So the Archaic Age was the heyday of aristocratic warfare. The bronze-clad warriors fought in close ranks and armies that consisted of a few hundred men at the most. The larger populace was called up to fight, with whatever they might have, only in times of emergency, like when the existence of the community was at stake. As a rule archaic warfare was rather restrained. Wars were seldom fought to the finish and were often characterized by certain restrictions (like a ban on long-distance weapons, avoidance of destruction of vital goods or areas, an obligation not to attack the opponent unawares etc.). All this applied only to Greeks, however (and even then was not always observed), and not to war between Greeks and barbarians.



The statue of this Greek hero, shown in heroic nakedness and ready for combat (5th century BC), formed part of the front frieze of the temple of the Aphaea temple on the island of Aegina. This Doric temple was probably built during the Persian wars.



15th century miniature depicting the tale of the Trojan horse. According to this tale the huge wooden horse, which the Greeks had left behind on the shore before setting sail, was wheeled into the city by the guileless Trojans. During the night the Greek warriors came out of the hollow horse, took the city and destroyed it by fire.



In archaic and classical times only members of the aristocracy could afford a horse to ride in battle. This splendid mural painting, showing a Campanian cavalryman with shield, was made c. 370 BC and was found in a tomb in the Greek colony of Paestum, south of Naples.

Citizen-soldiers

Although the Greek *phalanx* originated in an aristocratic world, it was in a different environment that it

acquired its historical significance. Probably because of intensifying competition between the city-states (with some of them, notably Sparta, enabled by their special internal organization to put many more heavily armed men in the field than others), most Greek cities enlarged their armies in the latter half of the sixth century. Hand in hand with this development, and indeed often as its precondition, body armor became lighter and cheaper. As a result, in the fifth century BC Greek heavy infantry used only bronze shields for protection. Helmets, cuirasses and greaves were no longer invariably of metal but usually made of leather, felt, or linen for the rank and file. Roughly half of the free population could equip themselves in this manner as *hoplites*, as these citizen-soldiers were now normally called.

The hoplite armies of classical Greece were much larger than those of the preceding age. The main cities like Athens, Argos or Thebes could raise armies of up to 12,000, 7,000 or 6,000, respectively. Sparta, also

This is the famous scene from Homer's *Iliad*, in which fleet-footed Achilles carries the body of Hector, his opponent, from the battlefield. Detail of a painted vase, 6th century BC.



drawing on non-citizen troops from its territory, could put some 6,000 men in the field. Yet land warfare kept many of its 'aristocratic' traits. Ambushes and surprise attacks were frowned upon. The decisive battle took place as a bloody tournament in a well-known and open space. Captives were as a rule returned for a ransom and the dead handed over for proper burial.


Above all, tactics other than those of the hoplite *phalanx* were virtually disregarded well into the fifth century. This meant that cavalry remained underdeveloped and that light-armed skirmishers with javelins, slings or bows hardly played any role, while fortification almost always held the better of a still rudimentary siege technique. In social and political terms it meant that the lower classes of the population, because of their lack of military value, could not exert any political influence. The hoplites could, of course, and many aristocracies in Greece had their base broadened to absorb these 'middle classes'. Only in Athens could the poorer citizens exercise a military role as rowers of the war fleet, itself a creation of the early fifth century and the wars against the Persians. This certainly is part of the explanation for classical democracy in Athens.

The old rules and norms of archaic and aristocratic warfare lived on to some extent in a sort of unwritten code of 'Hellenic laws' applying to warfare between the Greek city-states. Much of that code was broken, but it did provide a certain standard and was to some extent a forerunner of modern international law. In practice, though, hoplite warfare was a rough and bloody affair. Devastation of crops and orchards usually accompanied a campaign. The battle itself was a deadly encounter of nervous amateur soldiers running headlong into each other with rows of spears outstretched. Casualty rates of 5-10% for the victors were normal, and generals and officers in the front line ran a special risk. The fallen numbered at least twice as many on the side of the defeated. Only the Spartans were disciplined professionals who preferred to march steadily where the opponents ran and to sing their old war songs where the other side yelled in excitement or panic. But they could afford to take the time for military exercises, having a large serf population to do their daily work. In a certain sense, the Spartans continued the practices of the archaic age, both in war and in other areas. Real innovation was not to be expected from these conservative professionals. This came from the amateurs of the other cities.


The *phalanx* was a decisive element in the military successes of King Philip of Macedonia. A *phalanx* consisted of heavily armed soldiers who were arranged in rows and armed with a long, heavy spear (*sarissa*) and a relatively short sword. For protection, they wore helmets with cheek and neck guards, a small shield, which during the attack was strung to the thorax, and greaves. This reconstruction shows the infantry charging against the enemy in closed formation.

Professionalism

After the Persian Wars (490 and 480/79 BC), the victorious Greeks had taken up their internal competitions again, and the city of Athens was, thanks to its fleet and to its hoplites, able to assemble a whole league of cities de facto submitted to it. The ensuing struggle between Athens and its 'alliance' against most cities of mainland Greece under the leadership of Sparta in the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC) ushered in a new phase of warfare that was finally to destroy the independence of the cities themselves. The bitterness of the struggle gave rise to new tactics and new techniques. Foremost the light-armed troops reappeared on the stage, and with them the ambush and the ruse of war. Cavalry became more important. Siege warfare developed and the first use of siege engines was perfected in the next century. Above all, professionalism spread. The last years of the fifth century witnessed the rise of the mercenary soldier:



View of the Peloponnesian city of Mycenae. On top of the small hill lies the fortress of the Mycenaean kings, which is over 3,000 years old. The city walls below were built in the 3rd century BC.






In 1978 archaeologists discovered three royal tombs for members of the Macedonian royal dynasty just outside Vergina (Aigai), the ancient Macedonian capital. During the 1980s the largest tomb (4th century BC) was examined, yielding an unique panoply, made of iron and embellished with the royal emblems – a shining star and lion's head – in gold. The bronze greaves reflect the uneven length of the warrior's legs.



Greeks fighting for powers other than their own city against whoever might be the 'enemy', as long as they were paid. Still, for a long time, in the fourth century, the citizen hoplites held their own against the new forces. First Sparta after its victory over Athens, then, by applying a new battle order while still using its own citizens as hoplites, Thebes held a precarious hegemony in Greece.

Meanwhile the new shape of things to come hailed from Macedonia in the north. There, King Philip created a professional army recruited from among the citizens and financed from recently acquired gold mines. It fought as a new-style heavy infantry in battalions called *phalanges*. Armed with pikes of some four meters (12 feet) long which needed handling with both arms and thus drastically reduced the size of the shield that was attached to the left elbow, these troops could, in progressive ranks, literally sweep any opponent off the battlefield. To them was added a more or less professional cavalry recruited from among the

Detail of the 'Sosias' cup (c. 500 BC), which shows the solidarity among soldiers who are treating their wounds. Here Achilles is helping the wounded Patroklos.




Doctor Iapyx removing an arrow point from the thigh of Aeneas, the Trojan hero and legendary founder of Rome. The Roman poet Virgil relates that the wound was then treated with a mixture of marjoram, picked by the goddess Venus herself... This fresco from Pompeii realistically portrays this episode.



Stèle
commemorating
Caius
Largennius,
born in
Italy, who
died in the army
camp of
Argentorate
(Strasbourg) at
the age of 37
after 18 years of
active service
as a
legionary.

Macedonian gentry. In 338 BC, Philip defeated the combined armies of Athens and Thebes and in doing so virtually brought the era of the citizen hoplites to a close. Nearly the whole of Greece had to acknowledge his leadership. His son Alexander then led the Macedonian army, strengthened by mercenaries and contingents from Greece, against the Persian Empire (334-323 BC) for the great campaign of revenge, glory and conquest with which a new era began: Hellenism.

In the Hellenistic Age (late fourth till late first century BC), war was a professional business. The armies of the states in Europe, Asia and Egypt that originated in Alexander's conquests consisted of professional soldiers, whether mercenaries from abroad or Greek or Macedonian settlers in the newly conquered territories. They fought in Macedonian-style *phalanges*, in battalions of light-armed troops or in regiments of cavalry. It was an age of diversification of armies, even of experiments (with the use of elephants from India, for example). Battles became more complicated, depending on the cooperation of various 'arms'. Logistics and strategy demanded attention and generals could excel more clearly than in the simple tactics of hoplite battles. Thus, the Hellenistic Age became the time of the great strategists and tacticians. Siege warfare reached its apogee, and the building of fortresses and walls, however much developed, could not keep pace with it. For the first time, science and technique were applied to war in a somewhat systematic way and theoretical treatises on the art of war were being published. The armies of the great monarchies in Egypt, Syria or Macedonia were naturally much bigger than those of the classical city-states (numbering up to 70,000 or 80,000) yet represented a much smaller fraction of the population. For, characteristic of the age, there was a virtual disarmament of the citizens, and certainly of the subjugated Oriental populations, now that war was in the hands of the professionals. Armies had become the instruments of governments and kings, and vast territories could be



Replica of the
valetudinarium, or
hospital of a Roman
legion in Vetera (Xanten,
Germany), made by R. Schultze.
Hospitals built during the 1st and 2nd
centuries would invariably be made up of
three wings with 60 rooms and a wing with
the entrance, kitchen, baths and operation rooms.
All wings were situated around a patio.

The golden age of galleys

About 5,000 years ago in Egypt the first known wooden warship appeared; a galley which combined a square-rigged sail, for long distances, and forty oarsmen for a fast attack on the enemy. The fore and aft decks were raised for archers and spearthrowers and some ships had a fender above the water line.

Crete formed an organized navy with Egypt in 2000 BC to combat piracy. Five hundred years later there was a marked difference between merchant vessels, the slow 'round ship', and the *unireme* (Latin *remus*, 'oar'), the narrow, fast one-master with sharp curved stems and one tier of oarsmen. In 1100 BC the Phoenicians became the dominant sea power in the Mediterranean. Their galleys had two tiers of oarsmen (*bireme*) and were long in the bows with a high stern. The fender (Greek, *embolon*) was now on or under the water line. This was the most important type of warship in 1000-500 BC. The Greeks also went over to biremes around 700 BC, when the maximum length (65 feet, 50 oarsmen each side) of their single-decked *pentekonter* was attained. A few generations later the trireme appeared, a fast galley (7-9 knots) measuring 130 by 13 feet with a crew of 200, including 170 oarsmen in three tiers and a small group of heavily armed sailors. Even on this slim maneuverable ship there was little room for

victuals, so that it had to go into a port every night.


Tactics were fairly rudimentary: two columns of galleys tried to destroy each other by ramming and boarding each others' vessels. In 500 BC there was also the *diekplous*, the breaking through of the enemy's line, followed by an attack to the flank, and the *periplous*, the widening of the battle line so far that the enemy could be taken on its vulnerable flank. After the Battle of Salamis (480 BC), where these tactics were applied, the trireme became

the backbone of the fleets of the various Greek states. At the end of the fourth century, Demetrius I Poliorketes of Macedonia further equipped the archers with heavy projectiles, catapults and ballistas, making it possible to attack from a greater distance. The ships were also made faster by setting more oarsmen to every oar.

Rome traditionally had a land army, but throughout the Punic Wars from 264 BC onwards, it was forced to develop as a sea power. Roman *corvus* galleys were fitted out with a falling gangplank and grappling hook. Grappling tactics were more important than ramming and

led to great success at the Battle of Mylae (Sicily), where 44 Carthaginian ships and 10,000 men were defeated.

After the Second Punic War, Rome was supreme at sea and the conventional fully decked ramming galley made its return, fitted with spritsail (*artemon*), two archery towers and a grappling iron (*harpax*), which could also be catapulted. For sailing in convoy and combating pirates a lighter unireme made its entrance. This more than 97.5 feet long *navis liburna* (Greek, *dromon*, 'sprinter') would remain in use far into Byzantine times. The last galleys only made their exit at the end of the eighteenth century.



Roman galley
from c. 35 BC.

dominated by expert troops in small garrisons. There was no longer any organic link between the military and the populace at large. In the vicissitudes of war, huge areas could easily be carved out or overrun by rivals or foreign peoples. In the end, the Hellenistic states could not resist the pressures from outside. In the east, there were the Iranian peoples, foremost the Parthians, who reconquered the territory up to the Euphrates. The rest fell to the power of Rome.


The Roman expansion

In its early history, Rome was probably quite similar to the Greek city-states. Still, Roman society was more primitive and primitive traits characterized Roman warfare – not only in its semi-magical practices, but

also in its tendency to put as many men on the battlefield as possible and to fight its wars, with disregard of most of the rules of the Greek code of war, if possible to the finish. Defeated enemies could be totally exterminated, or enslaved or incorporated into the Roman community itself. Alternatively, states could be forced into an 'alliance' which amounted to a form of submission. These incorporations into the Roman community led to full Roman citizenship immediately or after some generations. It is here that a cardinal difference with the Greek city can be observed. In Greece, a ruling city hardly ever granted citizenship to foreigners; in Rome, it was a simple matter. The explanation may lie in the social structure of Rome, where equality of the citizens counted for less than the

vertical links between the mighty and the low. Consequently, it was in the interest of the mighty to cast their nets of patronage still wider.

Under the kings (till c. 500 BC), Rome was a powerful community in the heart of the Italian peninsula. After some setbacks against neighboring peoples in the first age of the Republic, during the second half of the fourth century, a period of practically unbroken expansion began. The *civitas Romana* spread by force through central Italy, then to the north and to the south of the peninsula. Growth of the Roman citizenry meant



The so-called 'Mars of Todi' gives a picture of the panoply in the time of the early Republic Roman legionaries (4th century BC).

Helmet, shield and spear have been lost over the ages, but the structure of the harness, which at the time consisted of leather with metal plates, shows that it is an improved version of the rigid bronze thorax of archaic Greece.




Elephants were used in warfare by the Carthaginian general Hannibal during the Punic Wars he fought with the Romans. The objective of this tactic was to deter the infantry, but the animals soon proved to be very difficult to maintain. Plate from Campania, 3rd century BC.

growth of the Roman citizen army. At the beginning of the Republic the normal levy or legio had numbered some 3,000 infantry equipped in the manner of hoplites and fighting in a Roman *phalanx* formation, while the sons of the aristocracy provided a small cavalry. Starting in the fourth century, *legions* were divisions of the army and nominally 4,200 men strong. The legion now attacked in three waves: first the light-armed with long distance weapons, then the first shock troops with javelins, long shields and swords, lastly and only when necessary the old-fashioned shock troops with spears and swords in the style of the hoplites. This diversified and flexible organization would prove itself superior to the armies of Carthage and the Hellenistic monarchies in the third and second centuries BC.

Around 270 BC, the whole of the peninsula south of the river Po was directly or indirectly under Roman rule. About one quarter of its territory and one third of its population had become Roman, the rest as 'allies' in varying degrees of dependence, provided, in time of war, at least as many troops as the Roman state itself. It was this reservoir of manpower combined with a doggedness of character that would not shrink from heavy losses in the field that explains to a large extent Roman successes in subsequent wars with the great powers around the Mediterranean. In the murderous Second Punic War (218-201, against Carthage), Roman manpower (up to 20 legions were then under arms) brought Hannibal, the greatest of the Hellenistic generals, to his knees. In the ensuing century large parts of Spain, Southern Gaul, North Africa, Greece and Asia Minor were conquered and divided into provinces.

This expansion eventually caused a dramatic change

in the composition of the Roman army. Traditionally it had been a citizen levy; in the second century, some 40-50% of the citizens actually did wartime service at one moment or other. But the impoverishment of the smaller landowners, due among other things to long-time absence from their lands in the army and to the new competition of rich proprietors (the profiteers of war and booty), together with the ongoing demand from ever new theaters of war, compelled the Roman state first to lower the property qualifications, then, towards the end of the second century, to abolish them altogether. As a result, generals now could replete their legions from the numerous class of proletarians – those sections of the population that had hitherto not been eligible for military service, because they lacked the means to equip themselves properly. These soldiers became in fact professionals, serving for a moderate salary (out of which they had to pay for their own equipment) and often for many years on end, and awaiting from their commanders a pension in the form of a piece of land – and war booty in the meantime. The higher classes withdrew from the ranks and filled the officers corps, with the result that the Roman army, like the Greek armies, became a body of professionals with only weak links to an unarmed citizenry. Politically, this situation undermined the constitutional fabric of the Republic, since the great warlords now had armies at their disposal that were more loyal to their persons than to the abstract notion of ‘the state’. An age of blood and iron ensued, in which first the Italian allies acquired the Roman citizenship, thereby more than doubling Roman numbers (c. 80 BC). More countries were then conquered by rival generals who enlarged the state with Syria (64 BC), Gaul (58-52



Emperor Trajan (98-117) addressing his troops. The supreme command was one of the most important responsibilities of the Roman emperor; its delegation to technocrats, along with the increasing numbers of mercenaries, led to the decay of the Roman army. Bas-relief of the Arch of Constantine in Rome.



This *Gemma Augustea* shows Emperor Augustus, crowned with laurels, next to the goddess Roma. At the bottom the vanquished barbarians, whose lives the magnanimous emperor has spared. Roman soldiers erect a trophy, symbol of victory.

BC) and finally Egypt (30 BC). At the same time, the clashes between the generals hammered the old republic into the new mold of the monarchy. It was Octavian, having changed his name to Augustus, who finally founded the empire (30 BC-14 AD), thus 'Hellenizing' Rome in the respect of making its army essentially an instrument of monarchical power.

The Imperial army

Augustus rounded off the Roman conquests in Spain, the Alps and the Balkans. He established a regular system of provincial administration and reorganized the army. The enormous number of legions from the last phase of the civil wars was reduced to twenty-

eight from a total of around sixty at the height of the civil wars, albeit of a nominal strength of henceforth 6,000 men each. By now, the equipment of the legionary soldiers had become standardized and uniform: they wore metal cuirasses and helmets, oblong shields embossed or inlaid with metal, and fought with two rather heavy javelins and, for close combat, a short sword. The main subdivisions of the legion now were the *cohorts*, consisting of six *centuries* each, recruited from the Roman citizenry. Since the number of the latter had grown enormously in the last century, Augustus' legions now represented only about 3% of the population. The army of the Empire also numbered auxiliary troops, both cavalry and infantry, from the provincial populations that still had not received Roman citizenship. The fighting quality of these troops was high as they were commanded by Roman officers. They received, however, just under a legionary's pay. The tendency towards uniformity that had already set in during the late Republic continued under the Empire. As a result, the cohorts of auxiliary infantry could in the second century hardly be distinguished from those of the legions.

The forces of the Roman Empire, some 3-400,000 troops in all, were concentrated in the outer provinces. In the course of time, a system of frontier defense arose, called the *limes* system, in which the legions mainly along the rivers Rhine and Danube, in the East and in Britannia (the last province was joined to the Empire in the middle of the first century) at certain intervals, with auxiliary troops in between. The Roman defense system in the second and early third centuries was a nearly perfect machine with high standards of provision, housing, medical care, logistical organization and troops and officer rotation. The rank and file had better prospects in the army than in society at large. For the elite of the Empire, military service was a more or less obligatory phase in their careers which traditionally conferred high prestige. Tactically, the strength of the Roman army lay in the heavy infantry of its legions and cohorts, although we do not know very much about its actual fighting practices in open battle. For instance, did the legions still operate as fighting units or was that role taken over by the cohorts? But in one way or another, the imperial Roman army still continued the line formation that was first brought to perfection by the early Greek *phalanges*.

Main areas of recruitment of the Roman army during the rule of Emperor Trajan (98-117). Trajan's army consisted of c. 30 legions, complemented by auxiliary forces and cavalry, totalling around 400,000 troops. Legionaries always had Roman civil rights and mainly originated from the areas which had been ruled by Rome for a considerable period of time. The auxiliary forces were mainly recruited in fringe areas, still by and large un-Romanized, particularly in the border provinces. During the rule of Trajan hardly any legionaries were recruited in Italy itself; only the imperial guard, the Praetorian Guard, was recruited in Italy.



Part of the ruins of the army camp in Nijmegen (the Netherlands), where troops of the 10th Roman legion were quartered. The stone construction was built in 90 AD.

