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Early Jaina epistemology: a study of the philosophical chapters of the Tattvārthādhigama; With an English translation of the Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya I, II.8 25, and V

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3. Textual Analysis

3.1 General Structure of the *Tattvārthādhigama*

The TA differs in many respects from canonical Jaina texts that deal with similar topics, such as the *Nandīsūtra*.²³³ The TA provides a soteriology (*mokṣamārga*)²³⁴ which is firmly rooted in an ontological and epistemological framework, and the text is composed in a concise and systematic manner. By contrast, the canonical texts that deal with epistemological and ontological concepts do not present these theoretical elements as a system and the different types of knowledge and substances are usually listed in a merely encyclopaedic way. The order of the ten chapters of the TA clearly indicates that the composer of the text tried to position Jaina soteriology within an overall theory of reality and wanted to legitimise this account by providing a theory of knowledge. The different chapters deal respectively with the following topics:

- I. The means of cognition and perspectives

- II. Types and characteristics of the soul
- III. Cosmology — the lower and the middle regions
- IV. The gods
- V. Non-sentient substances

- VI. The influx of *karman*
- VII. The vows
- VIII. Karmic bondage
- IX. Inhibiting and wearing off *karman*
- X. Liberation

The whole text can be divided into three parts, which are indicated by the horizontal lines in the table above.²³⁵ The first part (chapter I) presents the Jaina theory of

²³³ See § 2.1 for an overview of early Jaina philosophical texts.

²³⁴ The first *sūtra* of the TA uses the term '*mokṣamārga*' (see TA 1.1).

²³⁵ The proposed division relates only to the conceptual structure of the text and does not reflect a historical division of the text.

knowledge (*jñāna*). The second part (chapters II – IV) provides a description of reality from an ontological perspective. It discusses the layout of the universe, which consists of non-sentient (*ajīva*) matter and principles — including space, time, and motion — as well as sentient elements (*jīva*) that animate living organisms, such as plants, animals, human beings, and gods. The third part (chapters VI – X) discusses how the material world affects the non-material soul, and how the soul can cut its bonds with the material world in order to reach a state of liberation. The way in which the chapters are divided is clearly based on the traditional Jaina categories (*tattva*), which Umāsvāti presents as follows:²³⁶

II. The seven categories of reality (<i>tattva</i>) (TA 1.4)	
i.	<i>jīva</i> (soul)
ii.	<i>ajīva</i> (non-soul, i.e., non-living substance)
iii.	<i>āsrava</i> (influx of karmic particles that stick to the soul)
iv.	<i>bandha</i> (binding; the bondage which results from karmic influx)
v.	<i>saṃvara</i> (the way to stop the accumulation of <i>karman</i>)
vi.	<i>nirjarā</i> (destruction; wearing off collected karmic particles through asceticism)
vii.	<i>mokṣa</i> (liberation)

These seven categories contain the basic elements of Jaina soteriology and form a sequential series.²³⁷ The different *tattvas* can be connected with the individual chapters of the TA as follows:

²³⁶ The Jaina *tattvas* are mentioned in TA 1.4, which reads: '*jīvājīvāsravabandhasaṃvaranirjarāmokṣās tattvam*'. See also Part II.

²³⁷ See § 3.2 *The categories of reality* for a discussion of the *tattvas*.

III. Chapters of the <i>Tattvārthādhigama</i> and the <i>tattvas</i>	
Chapters	<i>tattvas</i>
I. The means of cognition and perspectives	-
II. Types and characteristics of the soul	i. <i>jīva</i>
III. Cosmology — the lower and the middle regions	-
IV. The gods	-
V. Non-sentient substances	ii. <i>ajīva</i>
VI. The influx of <i>karman</i>	iii. <i>āsrava</i>
VII. The vows	-
VIII. Karmic bondage	iv. <i>bandha</i>
IX. Inhibiting and wearing off <i>karman</i>	v. <i>saṃvara</i>
	vi. <i>nirjarā</i>
X. Liberation	vii. <i>mokṣa</i>

Even though it is evident that the chapters of the TA largely follow the sequence of the *tattvas*, it is also clear that the TA wants to provide more than a manual on the *tattvas*. Chapters I, III, IV, and VII — which deal respectively with knowledge, cosmology, gods, and the vows — do not address any of the *tattvas* and they form a substantial portion of the whole text.²³⁸ It remains a question whether this was a response to an external intellectual movement or whether the author simply thought that these topics should be part of a compendium on Jaina doctrine even though he could not connect them to the traditional list of *tattvas*.²³⁹

²³⁸ One may argue that chapter III and IV can be subsumed under one of the *tattvas*; since these chapters deal with the different cosmic realms and its inhabitants, it makes sense to see these chapters as a further elaboration on the first *tattva* (i.e., *jīva*), which is discussed in chapter II. Yet, it remains a given that the composer of the TA dedicated separate chapters to these topics.

²³⁹ I am not aware of any Jaina text that predates the TA and has a similar tenfold structure, and one may wonder why the composer of the TA did not choose a sevenfold structure in accordance with the *tattvas*. The structure of the text has some similarities with the layout of the *Abhidharmakośakārikā* and it is noteworthy that chapters III and IV of the TA — which do not correspond with one of the *tattvas* — deal with the same topic as the third chapter of the *Abhidharmakośakārikā*, titled '*Lokanirdeśa*' (for a French translation of this chapter, see La Vallée Poussin 1919). Partly based on this observation, Ohira assumes that the composer of the TA was directly influenced by the *Abhidharmakośakārikā* (Ohira 1982: 59-60). However, since there are no direct references to Vasubandhu's work in the TA, it is hard to determine whether the composer of the TA was indeed acquainted with the *Abhidharmakośakārikā* or not. Mark Mejer has shown that Siddhasenagaṇi and Akalaṅkadeva explicitly refer to the *Abhidharmakośakārikā* in their commentaries on the TA,

It is remarkable that the TA opens with a chapter on knowledge — a topic that is not included in the *tattvas* — and one may wonder why the author gives such a prominent position to epistemology. Looking at the overall structure of the TA, one could argue that the composer of the text started with an epistemological discussion in order to maintain a conceptually clear order. This is a feature that strongly characterises the whole text. For example, the TA opens by saying that ‘the path to liberation is constituted by right worldview, right knowledge, and right conduct’ (TA 1.1). Immediately after that, the text explains the first element in this list — i.e., right worldview — which is defined as confidence in the *tattvas* (TA 1.2). Then, after a remark on the causes of right worldview (TA 1.3), the text continues with an enumeration of these *tattvas* (TA 1.4). In the same way, the author deals with the other two items that are mentioned in TA 1.1, i.e., right knowledge and right conduct. In other words, the questions that are raised by the individual *sūtras* are systematically answered in the subsequent sections.²⁴⁰ A similar pattern applies to the text as a whole. To illustrate, chapter III starts with a general layout of the cosmos. This is followed by an explanation of the different realms, i.e., hells, the middle region, and the heavens. Next, the TA discusses the ontological categories in chapter V. This answers the question as to what ultimately constitutes the cosmos. Only after introducing the ontological categories, which includes material substance (*pudgala*), does the TA continue with an analysis of *karman* — which is seen as a material element — and the way in which *karman* influences the soul’s inherent urge for liberation. However, the Jaina doctrine had to compete with different worldviews, such as those of the Buddhists and Brahmins, and the Jaina doctrine is not self-evident. This is precisely where the first chapter comes in. By discussing the different means of cognition — including verbal testimony which gives an

and Siddhasenagaṇi even mentions Vasubandhu’s name (Mejor 2008: 142). This indicates that Jaina authors after the TA not only knew Vasubandhu’s work but also found the *Abhidharmakośakārikā* a relevant work for a discussion of the TA. This seems to support Ohira’s hypothesis.

²⁴⁰ For a contemporary reader it might seem obvious that philosophical texts are always composed in a systematic way and that the order of sections makes sense for the audience. However, this is certainly not a given for the *sūtra* texts of the classical Indian philosophical traditions. The fact that the structure of the TA is fairly systematic, suggests that a significant part of the composition of the text, or at least its redaction, can be attributed to a single author. See also Ruzsa 2010 for a discussion of the authorship of the philosophical *sūtras*.

authoritative status to traditional Jaina texts — the first chapter provides an epistemological basis for the Jaina doctrine.²⁴¹

While it was new for the Jaina tradition to open a text with a discussion of knowledge, it seems that the overall structure of the TA was influenced by another tradition. The *Nyāyasūtra*, which was one of the most influential treatises on epistemology in the history of Indian philosophy, opens with a discussion of the means of cognition (*pramāṇa*). As I will show in § 3.2, the TA clearly relied on this part of the *Nyāyasūtra* for its presentation of Jaina epistemology. It seems likely, therefore, that the choice of the composer of the TA to start with a chapter on the sources of knowledge was influenced by the *Nyāyasūtra*.

The importance that the TA gives to epistemology appears to signify a change in the intellectual tradition of the Jainas. Yet, it is unclear what urged the author of the TA to present the Jaina doctrine in a new way. Since there is not enough external evidence to situate the TA and the TABh conclusively in a historical context, this chapter will focus on an internal analysis of the text.²⁴² This analysis serves a dual purpose. Firstly, it will clarify how the texts relate to other schools and movements. By examining the presentation of the material, including the vocabulary and the way in which specific ideas are discussed, I will show the relationship between the TA and other philosophical texts that were written in the first half of the 1st millennium CE. This will contribute to a better understanding of the intellectual landscape in which the TA and the TABh were composed and will help to situate the text in a socio-historical context. Secondly, this analysis will also help to clarify the philosophical content of the TA and the TABh. Even though the TA had a major influence on later Jaina philosophers and is regarded nowadays as a standard compendium of Jaina doctrine, there are many passages in the text that are difficult to understand. Therefore, this chapter explores the philosophical content of the TA and the TABh in an effort to clarify its main purport.

My textual analysis will be limited to chapters I, II.8 – 25, and V, which are translated in Part II of this thesis. Unlike the other chapters, which mainly discuss matters of faith such as the different classes of gods and hellish beings, these chapters provide a philosophical analysis of the constituents of reality (chapter V)

²⁴¹ Likewise, the *sambandhakārikās*, which introduce the TA and the TABh, mention that the TA is a summary of the words of the *jina*, which implies that the text is derived from an indisputable source of knowledge (see *sambandhakārikā* 22).

²⁴² See chapter 2 for an analysis of the historical position of the TA and the TABh.

and the way in which we can gain valid knowledge about this reality (chapter I). *Sūtras* II.8 – 25 provide an account of the sense faculties and form, as such, a logical link between the chapters on ontology and epistemology since ordinary knowledge results from the contact between sense faculties and the surroundings of the subject of knowledge. Apart from the fact that the selected chapters form a consistent whole, there are two more reasons to focus on these parts.

First, if we want to find out more about the intellectual milieu in which the TA was written, it makes sense to look at those chapters that are more likely to reflect external influences. The TA shows little change in doctrinal matter, such as the theory of *karman*, while there is significant conceptual change in the theory of knowledge. Since there was a lively debate about the theory of knowledge amongst the different philosophical schools in the first half of the 1st millennium CE, one can assume that the TA reflects some of the aspects of this wider philosophical debate in its discussion of knowledge and in the underlying ontological framework. Therefore, this chapter will examine whether the philosophical parts of the TA and the TABh reflect any influences from contemporary movements, such as the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools. This will provide a better basis to understand the position of the TA and the TABh in the history of Indian philosophy.

The second reason why it makes sense to focus on the selected chapters is that these chapters were the most influential parts of the text. The large majority of citations of the TA in later Jaina texts are derived from chapter I, II and V.²⁴³ This demonstrates that the tradition itself regarded these chapters as the most significant parts of the text.²⁴⁴

Apart from a study of the content of the philosophical parts of the TA, this chapter of the thesis also provides an analysis of the introductory verses, the colophon, and some peculiar verses that are found in the TABh. Even though these parts may not be directly relevant for our understanding of the philosophical account that can be found in the TA, they are most relevant for the authorship of the

²⁴³ Ohira provides an overview of references to the TA in the Jaina commentarial literature up to the 10th cent. CE (Ohira 1982: 71-78).

²⁴⁴ One could argue that it is anachronistic to make a distinction between the more rational or philosophical parts of the text on the one hand, and the doctrinal or religious parts on the other. However, the fact that later authors focused on precisely those chapters that one could label as the 'philosophical chapters' indicates that these chapters are not only significant from a contemporary philosophical point of view.

TA and the TABh, which has important implications for the interpretation of both texts. The study of these textual passages can be found in § 3.5.²⁴⁵

²⁴⁵ The translated passages of the TA and the TABh that I cite in this chapter sometimes deviate from the way in which these passages are translated in Part II. In order to facilitate a better understanding of the expressed ideas, I sometimes opt for a less literal translation and omit some brackets. For a more precise translation of these passages, see the translation in Part II.

3.2 *Tattvārthādhigama* Chapter I

The overall content of the first chapter of the TA can be represented as follows:

- 1.1 The path to liberation
 - 1.2 – 1.3 The right worldview
 - 1.4 The categories of reality
 - 1.5 – 1.8 The modes of analysis and viewpoints
 - 1.9 – 1.12 Knowledge and means of cognition
 - 1.13 – 1.30 Five types of knowledge
 - 1.13 – 1-19 Ordinary cognition
 - 1.20 Testimony
 - 1.21 – 1.23 Cosmic perception
 - 1.24 – 1.26 Mental perception
 - 1.27 – 1.30 Domains of the five varieties of knowledge, including omniscience
 - 1.31 Co-presence of varieties of knowledge
 - 1.32 – 1.33 Misapprehension
 - 1.34 – 1.35 The perspectives

The path to liberation

As mentioned above, chapter I opens by stating that the way to liberation consists of right worldview (*darśana*), right knowledge (*jñāna*), and right conduct (*cāritra*). This idea is not new to the Jaina tradition. Several canonical texts, like the *Uttarādhyaṇa*²⁴⁶ and the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*²⁴⁷ already contain similar expressions. The three elements that are mentioned are known as the ‘three jewels’, a concept which has a parallel in the Buddhist tradition.²⁴⁸ However, the author of the TA deviates from the earlier sources by putting *darśana* before *jñāna* and one may wonder why he felt the need to change the traditional order. Since the three jewels are listed in the first sentence of the text and determine the order of the following sections, it is

²⁴⁶ *Uttarādhyaṇa* 23.33 (Jacobi 1985: 337). See also Ohira 1982: 55.

²⁴⁷ *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* 1.6.17 (Jacobi 1985: 447). See also Dundas 1992: 87.

²⁴⁸ The concept of the three jewels plays a prominent position in both Jainism and Buddhism, and one could argue that the Buddhist version — in which the three jewels stand for the Buddha, his teachings, and the community — is conceptually close to the Jaina version (Dundas 1992: 87).

unlikely that this was an accidental change. In an effort to explain the significance of this change, Dundas writes the following:

By putting faith²⁴⁹ at the beginning of the first rule of the *Tattvārthasūtra* which defines the very nature of Jainism, *Umāsvāti* is both drawing attention to its role as an essential component on the path to salvation and at the same time broadening Jainism's range of spiritual reference beyond early Hinduism for whom faith, at least textually, did not have such a central and formally enunciated position.²⁵⁰

Is it possible that the author of the TA did indeed try to demonstrate the superiority of the Jaina doctrine by stressing an element that is absent in rival soteriologies?²⁵¹ Apart from the fact that the TA deviates from the traditional order, the text also adds the adjective 'samyañc' to the three jewels.²⁵² This seems to be an innovation of the TA. Interestingly, the word does not appear very often in Jaina texts and it is tempting to see a connection with the Buddhist tradition, which uses the word 'samyañc' in the formulation of the 'eightfold path'.²⁵³ In short, the opening verse of the TA consists of a traditional Jaina expression but the small changes of the formulation seem to indicate that the author of the TA was well aware of rival views and tried to overtrump them.

After the introductory *sūtra*, chapter I begins with a discussion of right worldview (*samyagdarśana*), which is characterised as 'confidence in the categories of reality' (*tattvārthasraddhāna*) (TA 1.2). This is a new idea for the Jaina tradition, even though there seems to be a precedent in the *Uttarādhyayana*, which states that '[h]e who verily believes in the true teaching of the (above nine) fundamental truths, possesses righteousness' (*Uttarādhyayana* 28.15).²⁵⁴ However, the TA is making a

²⁴⁹ Dundas translates *darśana* as 'faith', which he defines as follows: 'For Jainism, faith does not imply some kind of blind belief but is rather the correct way of looking at things, a positive and well-informed disposition' (Dundas 1992: 87).

²⁵⁰ Dundas 1992: 87.

²⁵¹ It should be remarked that the TA is not the first text in which the three jewels appear in a new order. Even though the *Uttarādhyayana* mentions the three jewels several times in the traditional order, one can already find the order that the TA uses in *Uttarādhyayana* 28.29-30 (See also Ohira 1982: 55). Interestingly, *Sambandhakārikā* 1 seems to prioritise *jñāna*, and presents *darśana* as an aspect of *jñāna* (see Part II, *sambandhakārikā* 1).

²⁵² '*samyagdarśana jñānacāritrāṇi mokṣamārgaḥ*' (TA 1.1).

²⁵³ A description of the *āryaṣṭāṅgamārga* can be found in Buswell 2014: 763-764.

²⁵⁴ '*tahiyāṇaṃ tu bhāvāṇaṃ sabbhāve uvaesaṇaṃ | bhāveṇaṃ saddahaṃtassa sammataṃ taṃ viyāhiyaṃ* (Amar 2011: 356).' Transl. Jacobi 1985: 357.

different claim. While the *Uttarādhyayana* states that belief in the categories (*tattvas*) is an indicator of righteousness (*samyaktva*), the TA defines *samyagdarśana* as belief or confidence in the categories.²⁵⁵ Since *samyagdarśana* is presented as the first element of the way to liberation (TA 1.1), it seems that the author of the TA presents confidence in the categories as the prerequisite of *mokṣa*. This is a new idea for the Jaina tradition.²⁵⁶ Yet, we can find a similar idea expressed in *Nyāyasūtra* I.1.1, which says:

***pramāṇaprameyasamśayaprayojanadr̥ṣṭāntasiddhāntāvayavatarkaniṣṭayavā
dajalpavitaṇḍāhetvābhāsacchalajātinigrahasthānānāṃ tattvajñānān niḥśreya-
sādhigamah***

Par la connaissance juste des moyens-de-connaissance-droite, des objets-de-connaissance-droite, du doute, du but <de la démonstration>, de l'illustration, de la conclusion, des <cinq> membres <du raisonnement dialectique>, de l'argumentation, de la connaissance définitive, de la discussion, de la dispute, de la chicane, des pseudo-raisons, des sophismes, des ripostes sophistiques et des situations de défaite, on atteint le bonheur indépassable (NS I.1.1).²⁵⁷

As can be seen in the above passage, the *Nyāyasūtra* promises that knowledge of the different categories that the Nyāya tradition propounds leads to 'the highest good' (*niḥśreyaśa*). The similarity between the opening of the TA and the *Nyāyasūtra* seems to indicate that the author of the TA was acquainted with this text. The fact that he followed the *Nyāya* model in his compendium of Jaina doctrine raises the question as to how the Jaina intellectuals related to the adherents of the Brahmanical schools. In any case, it is clear that the author of the TA conformed to the *Nyāya* model, which suggests that the text was composed in an environment in which the people adhering to the Naiyāyika theory provided the dominant philosophical blueprints.

In addition to TA 1.2, *sūtra* 1.3 explains that right worldview either results from learning or occurs by nature. Even though the *bhāṣya* remains somewhat vague when it explains the latter option — which is caused by 'a particular transformation' (*pariṇāmaviśeṣa*) (TABh 1.3.6) — it is clear that the text tries to solve an important

²⁵⁵ See also Ohira 1982: 55.

²⁵⁶ Ohira 1982: 56.

²⁵⁷ Angot 2009: 246-247 (Sanskrit and translation), my underlining.

epistemological problem. If right worldview could only be obtained from learning, one could question how the teacher obtained his knowledge, and one would end up with an infinite regress. However, by stating that right worldview spontaneously occurs in some beings, the text has an answer to this question, even though it does not have much explanatory value. To summarise, the elements of the way to liberation can be presented as follows:

IV. The threefold path to liberation (<i>mokṣamārga</i>) (TA 1.1)	
i. <i>samyagdarśana</i> (right worldview)	<i>nisargasamyagdarśana</i> (right worldview by nature) (TA 1.3)
	<i>adhigamasamyagdarśana</i> (right worldview from learning) (TA 1.3)
ii. <i>samyagjñāna</i> (right knowledge)	
iii. <i>samyakcāritra</i> (right conduct)	

The categories of reality

Next, TA 1.4 lists the categories of reality (*tattvas*).²⁵⁸ As discussed by Ohira, the TA deviates from previous presentation of the *tattvas* and reduces their number from nine to seven, as can be seen in the table below.²⁵⁹

V. Order of the <i>tattvas</i> in canonical texts and in the TA		
<i>Sthāna</i> 9.867	<i>Uttarādhyayana</i> 28.14	TA 1.4
<i>jīva-ajīva</i>	<i>jīva-ajīva</i>	<i>jīva</i>
<i>puṇya-pāpa</i>	<i>bandha</i>	<i>ajīva</i>
<i>āsrava-saṃvara-nirjarā</i>	<i>puṇya-pāpa</i>	<i>āsrava</i>
<i>bandha-mokṣa</i>	<i>āsrava-saṃvara-nirjarā-mokṣa</i>	<i>bandha</i>
		<i>saṃvara</i>
		<i>nirjarā</i>
		<i>mokṣa</i>

²⁵⁸ See also § 3.1.

²⁵⁹ Ohira 1982: 55.

Unlike the lists that appear in older texts, the TA organises the categories in a causal order. It begins with the primary ontological distinction between the soul (*jīva*) and non-living entities (*ajīva*). Because of the influx (*āsrava*) of karmic particles, the soul becomes entangled with *ajīva* (*bandha*). By subsequently stopping the influx of *karman* (*saṃvara*) and removing karmic residue from the soul through asceticism (*nirjarā*), the soul finally gets liberated from its state of bondage and reaches *mokṣa*. It is interesting to note that the categories of merit (*puṇya*) and demerit (*pāpa*), which appear in the older texts, are completely ignored in the TA. Some scholars have suggested that these categories can be subsumed under *āsrava*, and that the author therefore omitted these categories.²⁶⁰ The TA does not give a reason for this omission and the TABh also does not mention *puṇya* and *pāpa* in its discussion of the categories.²⁶¹ Even if we follow the standard explanation that the TA reduced the number of categories in an attempt to make the Jaina doctrine more systematic, it remains hard to understand why this change of a traditional list was acceptable for the audience of the text.

Even though the enumeration of categories at the beginning of the text resembles the start of the *Nyāyasūtra*, it is clear that the Jaina categories or *tattvas* have very little to do with the categories of the Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika school, which are mainly ontological and dialectical categories. Instead, the Jaina categories provide the basic elements of their soteriological account. It is noteworthy that the *bhāṣya* explicitly mentions that the *tattvas* are the seven ‘*padārthas*’ (TABh 1.4.2). As far as I am aware, the word ‘*padārtha*’ is not used in earlier Jaina discussions of the Jaina *tattvas* but it is the standard word for the ontological categories in the Vaiśeṣika tradition. The fact that the *bhāṣya* explains the word ‘*tattva*’ with the term ‘*padārtha*’ indicates that the audience of the text was familiar with basic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory.²⁶² Moreover, it confirms that the TA and the TABh tried to present the Jaina doctrine as an alternative that can compete with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika account.

²⁶⁰ See for example Dixit’s introduction to Sanghvi’s commentary on the TA (Sanghvi 1974: 12).

²⁶¹ The TABh talks about ‘the fruit of merit and demerit’ (*puṇyapāpaphala*) but does not refer to these terms as categories. See [1.3.6].

²⁶² For example, *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1.1.4 reads ‘*dharmaviśeṣaprasūtād dravyaguṇakarma-sāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyānām padārthānām sādarmyavaidharmyābhyām tattvajñānān niḥśreyasam*’ (The highest good results from particular merit [and is obtained] by means of the similarity and dissimilarity of the **categories**, substance, attribute, action, generality, particularity, and inhesion) (Gough 1873: 4).

Nevertheless, it also indicates that the Jainas were well aware that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika movement provided the dominant vocabulary for the discussion.

The modes of analysis

Following the list of categories, TA 1.5 introduces the four modes of analysis (*nyāsa*), which can be applied to the categories. These hermeneutical tools deal with the complex relationship between entities, words, and meanings. For example, when the deity Indra is depicted in a painting or a sculpture, we can use the word 'Indra' to refer to this figure, and we have to interpret such a reference from the perspective of representation (*sthāpanā*) (TABh 1.5.8). In other words, the modes of analysis point to the different references of a word, such as 'Indra', which facilitates a better understanding of the precise meaning of sentences and helps to see why two seemingly contradictory statements can be both true. The *bhāṣya* labels these modes of analysis (*nyāsa*) with the traditional word 'doors of examination' (*anuyogadvāra*) (TABh 1.5.1). Apart from the list of perspectives given in TA 1.5, the text provides two more lists in TA 1.7 and TA 1.8. The TABh adds a fourth list in TABh 1.8.8, as can be seen in the following table.

The TA and the TABh do not explain how these different lists relate to each other and the origin of the lists is not clear. They partly overlap with some of the lists that are mentioned in the *Anuyogadvārasūtra*.²⁶³ Yet, the date of the *Anuyogadvārasūtra* is quite uncertain and it is hard to determine whether the lists in the TA and the TABh are derived from the *Anuyogadvārasūtra* or whether the TA influenced some parts of this text.

The fourth list that is mentioned in the *bhāṣya* deviates from the three lists that the TA mentions and mostly relates to aspects that are particular for the Jaina worldview, such as the theory about the colours of the soul (*leśyā*) and the threefold path to liberation (*jñāna, darśana, cāritra*). By contrast, the first three lists address more general aspects, such as number (*saṃkhyā*), place (*kṣetra*), cause (*sādhana*), etc. As such, these lists strongly relate to grammatical categories.²⁶⁴

²⁶³ The different doors of examination are mentioned throughout the *Anuyogadvārasūtra*, in a rather unsystematic manner. The text has been translated by Hanaki (1970).

²⁶⁴ Several modes of analysis also correspond to some elements of the Vaiśeṣika theory such as the category (*padārtha*) 'substance' (*dravya*) and the qualities (*guṇa*) 'touch' (*sparśa*) and 'number' (*saṃkhyā*). See, e.g., Kumar 2013.

VI. The doors of examination (<i>anuyogadvāra</i>) (TA 1.5, 1.7, 1.8)			
The four modes of analysis (<i>nyāsa</i>) (TA 1.5) or four doors of examination (<i>anuyogadvāra</i>) (TABh 1.5.1)	The six doors of examination (<i>anuyogadvāra</i>) (TA 1.7, TABh 1.7.1)	The eight doors of examination (<i>anuyogadvāra</i>) (TA 1.8, TABh 1.8.4)	The thirteen doors of examination (<i>anuyogadvāra</i>) (TABh 1.8.8)
i. <i>nāma</i> (name)	i. <i>nirdeśa</i> (description)	i. <i>sat</i> (existence)	i. <i>gati</i> (transmigration)
ii. <i>sthāpanā</i> (representation)	ii. <i>svāmitva</i> (ownership)	ii. <i>saṃkhyā</i> (numeration)	ii. <i>indriya</i> (the senses)
iii. <i>dravya</i> (substance)	iii. <i>sādhana</i> (cause)	iii. <i>kṣetra</i> (place)	iii. <i>kāya</i> (body)
iv. <i>bhāva</i> (state)	iv. <i>adhikaraṇa</i> (locus)	iv. <i>sparsāna</i> (touching/reach)	iv. <i>yoga</i> (activity)
	v. <i>sthiti</i> (duration)	v. <i>kāla</i> (time)	v. <i>kaṣāya</i> (passion)
	vi. <i>vidhāna</i> (classification)	vi. <i>antara</i> (interval)	vi. <i>veda</i> (feelings)
		vii. <i>bhāva</i> (state)	vii. <i>leśyā</i> (colouring)
		viii. <i>alpabahutva</i> (quantity) ²⁶⁵	viii. <i>samyaktva</i> (rightness)
			ix. <i>jñāna</i> (knowledge)
			x. <i>darśana</i> (worldview)
			xi. <i>cāritra</i> (conduct)
			xii. <i>āhāra</i> (taking food)
			xiii. <i>upayoga</i> (cognitive operation)

The author of the TA is very brief in his explanation of this hermeneutical theory and does not mention the traditional term '*anuyogadvāra*'. By contrast, the TABh provides an elaborate commentary on the *sūtras* that enumerate these modes of analysis and even adds a fourth list that is not mentioned in the *sūtra*. This might indicate that the topic had become more important in the Jaina tradition at the time of the composition of the *bhāṣya*. It is also possible that the composer of the TA was

²⁶⁵ Lit. 'being little or much'.

less interested in this theory because it did not relate to the general epistemological discussions of the other schools.

Classification of the means of cognition

After the enumeration of the modes of analysis, the TA continues with a description of the means of cognition (*pramāṇas*) — one of the main topics in Nyāya philosophy. This part runs from TA 1.9 to TA 1.31 and forms the largest part of chapter I. Hence, it seems that the author of the TA did not only follow the *Nyāyasūtra* by opening his treatise with a chapter on knowledge. He also dedicates most of the chapter to an epistemological discussion that is less important in the Jaina tradition while the more traditional Jaina topics are only briefly mentioned.²⁶⁶

TA 1.6 explains that one can understand the categories through the means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) and the perspectives (*naya*). TA 1.9 and TA 1.10 state that there are five types of knowledge, which can be subsumed under two *pramāṇas*, as shown in the following table.

VII. The five varieties of knowledge (<i>jñāna</i>) (TA 1.9) or two means of cognition (<i>pramāṇa</i>) (TA 1.10)	
<i>parokṣa</i> (indirect cognition) (TA 1.11)	<i>pratyakṣa</i> (direct cognition) (TA 1.12)
i. <i>mati</i> (ordinary cognition)	iii. <i>avadhi</i> (cosmic perception) ²⁶⁷
ii. <i>śruta</i> (testimony)	iv. <i>manaḥparyāya</i> (mental perception) ²⁶⁸
	v. <i>kevala</i> (absolute knowledge)

²⁶⁶ The *sūtra* and the *bhāṣya* differ in this respect. While the largest part of the epistemological theory in the TA deals with a discussion of the *pramāṇas*, the TABh provides more information on traditional Jaina topics, such as the different lists of *anuyogadvāra*. Likewise, the TA is very brief in its discussion of *avadhi*, *manaḥparyāya*, and *kevala*. These means of knowledge are specific for the Jainas and were not accepted by other schools. The *bhāṣya* provides a more elaborate discussion of all the subclassifications of these types of knowledge, and their individual ranges. This might indicate that the author of the *bhāṣya* felt that he had to compensate for the omission of important elements of the more traditional Jaina theory of knowledge.

²⁶⁷ For a discussion of the meaning and translation of this term, see § 3.2, *Cosmic perception, mental perception, and absolute knowledge*.

²⁶⁸ A more literal translation of the term '*manaḥparyāya*[*jñāna*]' would be '[knowledge of] the modifications of the mind'. See also § 3.2, *Cosmic perception, mental perception, and absolute knowledge*.

It seems that there were different views on the classification of these five varieties of knowledge.²⁶⁹ Even though the TA clearly refers to two *pramāṇas*, the *bhāṣya* mentions that some people (*eke*) claim that there are four *pramāṇas*.²⁷⁰ The text does not explain whether this alternative view can be attributed to other Jaina intellectuals or whether it is a reference to a different philosophical movement. Since the Nyāya school propounded that there are four *pramāṇas*, Jacobi assumes that the text refers to the Nyāya position.²⁷¹ However, the TABh rarely refers to non-Jaina positions, and it is far from clear what the motive for mentioning the Nyāya view could have been. In his commentary on TA 1.9, which lists the Jaina means of cognition, Jacobi tries to explain the reference to the view of the others (*eke*) as follows:

Diese Einteilung zeigt, wie weit man von Logik und Psychologie noch entfernt war, als man sie aufstellte. Da sie im Kanon gilt und also kanonische Geltung hatte, mussten sich die Jainas damit abfinden, was ihnen nicht leicht war, nachdem der Nyāya die Erkenntnistheorie wissenschaftlich begründet hatte (Jacobi 1906: 294).

In other words, Jacobi assumes that the author of the TA had to present the traditional Jaina view on the different types of knowledge, even though he was well aware that the Nyāya school had a better theory. However, there seems to be a better explanation for the reference to the four *pramāṇas*.

In his discussion of the evolution of *pramāṇa* theory in the Jaina tradition, Dixit states that some early Jaina texts mention four *pramāṇas*, which correspond to the four *pramāṇas* that were accepted by the Nyāya tradition.²⁷² The remark in the TABh that others ‘claim that that there are four *pramāṇas*’²⁷³ could, therefore, refer to the fact that other Jaina texts mention these four means of cognition. Yet, Dixit assumes that the canonical passages that mention the four *pramāṇas* are later interpolations. His argument for this idea, however, is rather weak. He simply states that the *pramāṇas* are not discussed in other parts of these texts, that none of the ‘old Āgamic texts’ deal with *pramāṇa*, and that the *āgamas* usually speak about the

²⁶⁹ The individual varieties of knowledge will be discussed in the next section.

²⁷⁰ See TABh 1.6.3.

²⁷¹ ‘Diese *eke* waren natürlich die Anhänger des Nyāya’ (Jacobi 1906: 294).

²⁷² The *Bhagavatī* (*Viyāhapannatti*) 5.4.26 mentions perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*), and testimony (*śabda*). See also Balcerowicz 2016: 1004, n. 28

²⁷³ See TABh 1.6.3.

‘five types of *jñānas*’.²⁷⁴ Nevertheless, the fact that the TA discusses the *pramāṇas* shows that the author was not only acquainted with *pramāṇa* theory but also thought that it was somehow relevant for a compendium of Jaina doctrine. This suggests that *pramāṇa* theory was not completely new for the Jainas at the time of the composition of the TA, which is a good reason to doubt Dixit’s line of argumentation.

If we do not accept Dixit’s idea that earlier references to the *pramāṇas* in Jaina literature are all later interpolations, it remains a question whether the TABh refers to the Nyāya school when it mentions that some teachers believe that there are four *pramāṇas*. A recent study by Balcerowicz, which deals with the development of epistemological concepts in the history of Jaina philosophy, shows that the Jaina tradition adopted the *pramāṇa* concept in several stages.²⁷⁵ The first stage is represented by the *Stānāṅgasūtra* (*Tḥāṇaṅgasutta*), in which four means of cognition are listed as ‘causes of valid cognition’ (*hetu*).²⁷⁶ The *hetus* that are mentioned in this text correspond with the set of *pramāṇas* that were accepted in the Nyāya tradition, i.e., *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *aupamya*, and *āgama*.²⁷⁷ However, at a later stage, these four concepts were listed as *pramāṇas*.²⁷⁸

One may wonder why the Jainas initially adopted the four means of cognition that were advanced by the Nyāya school, instead of coming up with their own list of *pramāṇas*. Balcerowicz speculates that ‘the notion of [*pramāṇa*] was introduced into Jainism with the ‘typological package’, i.e., already with the fourfold classification, not as a separate term’.²⁷⁹ In other words, he claims that before the time of the TA the term ‘*pramāṇa*’ automatically referred to the four *pramāṇas* listed above and was not seen as a general concept that could be redefined by the Jainas. This is certainly not inconceivable and provides a better explanation for the change that the TA proposes. If the concept of *pramāṇas* was completely absent in the Jaina tradition before the TA, it would not make much sense to claim that the *jñānas* are the *pramāṇas*. However, if Jaina thinkers incorporated the Nyāya model in earlier texts, even though this theory did not match the traditional theory of *jñānas*, there

²⁷⁴ Dixit 1977: 22.

²⁷⁵ Balcerowicz 2016d.

²⁷⁶ Ibid., 1004.

²⁷⁷ Ibid.

²⁷⁸ Balcerowicz refers to the *Bhagavatī* (*Viyāhapannatti*) as an example of this stage (Balcerowicz 2016d: 1004).

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

would be a very good reason to claim that the traditional *jñānas* are the *pramāṇas*. In this way, the TA gets rid of a theoretical element that does not fit very well in the overall system that the TA tries to establish, and it clearly distinguishes the Jaina theory from its opponents.

To sum up, Dixit's claim that the references to the four *pramāṇas* before the TA are later interpolation should not be taken at face value. Further, it is perfectly plausible that the reference to four *pramāṇas* in the TABh refers to the fourfold list that the Jaina tradition had adopted before the composition of the TA. Unlike what Jacobi claims, the fact that the TA presents the five types of knowledge as the *pramāṇas* while the *bhāṣya* refers to the fourfold division, does not prove that the composer of the TABh thought that the traditional Jaina view was inferior to the Nyāya view. Instead, it shows that the TA wanted to present the orthodox position as a viable alternative to the Nyāya theory, which had influenced earlier Jaina text. Yet, the fact that the TA presents the traditional *jñānas* as the *pramāṇas*, instead of abandoning the *pramāṇa* concept, indicates that the Nyāya framework was seen as the dominant model.

Direct and indirect types of knowledge

After listing the varieties of knowledge (*jñāna*) in TA 1.9, the author divides these five varieties into two categories of *pramāṇas*:²⁸⁰

ādye parokṣam ||1.11|| pratyakṣam anyat ||1.12||

The first two [varieties of knowledge are forms of] indirect cognition (*parokṣa*). The other [varieties of knowledge are forms of] direct cognition (*pratyakṣa*).

In other words, the TA teaches that ordinary cognition (*matī*) and testimony (*śruta*) are forms of indirect cognition (*parokṣa*), while cosmic perception (*avadhi*), mental perception (*manaḥparyāya*), and absolute [knowledge] (*kevala*) are forms of direct cognition (*pratyakṣa*).²⁸¹ At first sight, this seems a counterintuitive classification.

²⁸⁰ See table above.

²⁸¹ Balcerowicz suggests that the classification that we find in the TA was based on the *Prajñāpanāsūtra* (*Pañṇavaṇāsutta*), which 'mentions the division into *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa* in passing, but does not mention any division of cognitive criteria, or the term *pramāṇa* per se' (Balcerowicz 2016d: 1005, n29).

From a phenomenological perspective, ordinary cognition — which includes visual experience — appears as a very direct way to acquire knowledge. It is, therefore, somewhat odd that the TA claims that ordinary cognition (*matī*) is a form of indirect cognition (*parokṣa*) instead of direct cognition (*pratyakṣa*). However, the inversion of the meaning of *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa* can be seen as a legitimate move from the perspective of Jaina epistemology as presented in the TA. If one accepts that the soul can acquire knowledge by cosmic perception (*avadhī*), mental perception (*manaḥparyāya*), and omniscience (*kevala*) without the involvement of any sense organ, it makes sense to interpret these types of knowledge as more direct than ordinary cognition (*matī*) and testimony (*śruta*), which cannot take place without the interference of the sense organs. Yet, the fact that one can argue in favour of the Jaina model that we find in the TA does not sufficiently explain what urged the Jainas to change the original meaning of *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*.²⁸²

In this section, I will discuss how this inversion relates to the standard interpretation of these terms, and I will explore whether this unique feature of Jaina philosophy can tell us something about the way in which Jaina intellectuals who propounded this model related to other philosophical traditions. For this goal, I will also discuss the *bhāṣya* on TA 1.11 – 1.12, which explicitly deals with some other views on the means of cognition.

The idea that sense perception — which is included in ordinary cognition (*matī*) — is an indirect means of cognition (*parokṣa*) is not only unusual from a contemporary phenomenological perspective but also deviates from the standard interpretation of *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa* in Indian philosophy. The *Nyāya* tradition, for example, clearly interprets perception (*pratyakṣa*) as an unmediated means of cognition, as can be read in *Nyāyasūtra* I.1.4:

²⁸² The interpretation of *pratyakṣa* in the Jaina tradition is not unprecedented. In his translation of NS 1.1.4, Angot remarks that the meaning of the word ‘*perception*’ (in French) does not fully correspond to the meaning of ‘*pratyakṣa*’ in Sanskrit. Even though he does not discuss the Jaina tradition, he mentions that memory and yogic experience were classified as ‘*pratyakṣa*’ by other philosophical traditions (Angot 2009: 271, n.777). This shows that the Jainas were not alone in interpreting non-sensory cognition as direct forms of knowledge. See also Oberhammer 2006: 37-61 and Balcerowicz 2016d: 1001-1002.

The simple fact that the *sūtra* mentions *parokṣa* before *pratyakṣa* indicates that we are dealing with an inversion of a pre-existing system. From a linguistic point of view, it is somewhat counterintuitive to mention the particle ‘*paras*’ (‘beyond’) before ‘*prati*’ (‘near to’).

*indriyārthasaṃnikarṣotpannaṃ jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri
vyavasāyātmakaṃ pratyakṣam |*

La perception-immédiate c'est la connaissance produite par le contact d'un organe-sensoriel avec un objet; elle est non-verbale, non sujette à l'erreur et consiste en une connaissance déterminée (NS I.1.4).²⁸³

Note that the word '*pratyakṣa*' in the *Nyāyasūtra* — which Angot translates as '*perception-immédiate*' — refers to the type of knowledge that is included in ordinary cognition (*mati*) in the TA. Yet, the TA does not classify ordinary cognition (*mati*) as a form of direct cognition (which is called '*pratyakṣa*' in the TA) but as a variety of indirect cognition (*parokṣa*). This inversion is strange from a historical point of view. In his study of the historical development of Jaina epistemological terms, Balcerowicz notes that the distinction between *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa* can be traced back to the *Brāhmaṇas*, in which *pratyakṣa* refers to that which is 'directly in front of our eyes' whereas *parokṣa* refers to 'the realm of the divine, beyond our eyes'.²⁸⁴ However, he demonstrates that the Jaina tradition developed a completely different understanding of these terms, and that '*pratyakṣa* came to denote direct cognition of the soul, unmediated by any physical organ, whereas *parokṣa* referred to cognitive acts by means of sense organs and/or the mind which served as instruments of cognition for the soul'.²⁸⁵ This is indeed the model that we find in the TA.

It is plausible that this move was a conscious effort of the Jainas to distinguish themselves from other philosophical traditions. Since there is no textual evidence that the Jaina tradition classified the five types of knowledge as *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa* according to the model of the TA before, it is feasible that this move was initiated by the author of the TA. In fact, such a move would match the overall strategy of the TA, which is characterised by the reorganisation of traditional

²⁸³ Angot 2009: 271-272.

²⁸⁴ Balcerowicz 2016d: 1001. Balcerowicz has proposed a reconstruction of the different stages of the Jaina theory of knowledge. He suggests that the fivefold list of types of knowledge and the twofold classification of *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa* represent different historical stages, which eventually merged. He tentatively dates the merging of these two models to the 2nd cent. CE (Balcerowicz 2016d: 1002). Unfortunately, he does not specify the texts that represent this stage and it is not clear why he assumes that the Jainas originally associated the term *pratyakṣa* with *mati* and *śruta*, while *avadhi*, *manaḥparyāya*, and *kevala* were seen as *parokṣa* (Balcerowicz 2016d: Appendix, Model IV).

²⁸⁵ Balcerowicz 2016d: 1001.

Jaina notions in such a way that it resembles the ideas of other movements but also demonstrates the uniqueness of the Jaina model. In fact, one could even say that this model has a certain theoretical advantage. Since the soul is the seat of knowledge in the Jaina system, it makes sense to describe the types of knowledge that are directly perceived by the soul, such as *avadhijñāna*, as direct sources of knowledge. By interpreting sense perception as an indirect means of cognition, the Jaina model can also explain why sense perception can sometimes be erroneous, which is a serious problem for theories that interpret sense perception as a form of direct perception.

Other means of cognition

While the TA teaches that there are only two *pramāṇas*, i.e., *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*, the *bhāṣya* discusses an alternative view on the means of cognition:

anumānopamānāgamārthāpattisambhavābhāvān api pramāṇāni iti kecit manyante | tat katham etad iti |

Some people think that inference, comparison, verbal testimony, postulation, equivalence, and negation are means of cognition too. How, then, can this be explained (TABh 1.12.7 – 1.12.8)?²⁸⁶

This passage shows that the commentator was well aware of *pramāṇa* theories that differed from the theory that the TA presents. Yet, the list of *pramāṇas* that are mentioned in the *bhāṣya* is somewhat peculiar. The sixfold list — which consists of inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*), verbal testimony (*āgama*), postulation (*arthāpatti*), equivalence²⁸⁷ (*sambhava*), and negation (*abhāva*) — does

²⁸⁶ See also Part II.

²⁸⁷ This translation of '*sambhava*' follows MW, which explains that equivalence as a *pramāṇa* is 'illustrated by the equivalence between one shilling and pence'. Gerhard Oberhammer discusses the meaning and historical development of *sambhava* in his *Terminologie der frühen philosophischen Scholastik in Indien*. He mentions that the *Carakaśaṃhitā* refers to '*sambhava*' as a cause or origin of things but the text does not connect this term with an epistemological theory. Although Oberhammer notes that later sources connect the epistemological use of *sambhava* with the 'Paurānikas', he writes: 'Wer jene Lehrer waren, die den *sambhava* als eigenständiges Erkenntnismittel vertraten, läßt sich nicht wirklich klären' (Oberhammer 2006: 232ff). The meaning of '*sambhava*' clearly changed over time and referred to different concepts in different traditions. It is, therefore, hard to tell which

not correspond with any of the standard lists that are associated with the main philosophical schools and it also does not fit within the Jaina framework. The list comes very close to the list of *pramāṇas* that is associated with the Mīmāṃsakas but equivalence (*sambhava*) does not feature in the Mīmāṃsā theory.²⁸⁸ It is possible that the author of the TABh did not refer to the theory of a particular school and simply listed the different elements that were accepted as *pramāṇas* by other philosophical movements. Yet, even in that case, it is remarkable that the author included *sambhava* since none of the known philosophical movements claimed that *sambhava* should be accepted as a *pramāṇa*. Nevertheless, even though there is no textual source that claims that *sambhava* should be accepted as a *pramāṇa*, this position was sometimes attributed to others. For example, an opponent in *Nyāyasūtra* II.2.1 raises the following objection against the Nyāya position:

na catuṣṭvam aitiyārthāpattisambhavābhāvaprāmāṇyam |

Il n'y a pas quatre moyens-de-connaissance-droite parce que le caractère de *pramāṇa* s'attache aussi à la tradition orale (*aitihya*), à la supposition nécessaire (*arthāpatti*), à l'inclusion (*sambhava*) et à l'absence (*abhāva*) (NS II.2.1).²⁸⁹

Even though it is not clear what the identity of the opponent is, this passage indicates that some people interpreted *sambhava* as a *pramāṇa*. However, the *Nyāyasūtra* is the first text that mentions this position and later literature has little

concept the author of the TABh had in mind when he included '*sambhava*' in his list. In his French translation of the *Nyāyasūtra*, Angot translates *sambhava* as 'inclusion', which makes sense in the light of the interpretation that the *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* provides: '*sambhavo nāmāvinābhāvino 'rthasya sattāgrahaṇād anyasya sattāgrahaṇam | yathā droṇasya sattāgrahaṇād āḍhakasya sattāgrahaṇam, āḍhakasya [ca] sattāgrahaṇāt prasthasyeti*' ('Ce qu'on nomme *sambhava* 'inclusion', c'est le fait de connaître l'existence de quelque chose en connaissant l'existence d'une autre sans laquelle nécessairement elle n'existerait pas. Par exemple c'est connaître l'existence du poids d'un *āḍhaka* parce qu'on connaît l'existence du poids d'un *droṇa*, celle du *prastha* parce qu'on connaît l'existence de l'*āḍhaka*.') (Angot 2009: 479-480). The idea seems to be that one can infer the existence of a *prastha* ($\frac{1}{4}$ of the weight of an *āḍhaka*, which is in turn $\frac{1}{4}$ of a *droṇa*) of something by knowing that there is an *āḍhaka* of something, just as one can infer that there is a gram of gold when one perceives a kilo of gold. This type of knowledge does indeed rely on sense perception, as claimed in TABh 1.12.10.

²⁸⁸ Śabarāsvāmin's commentary on the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* lists six *pramāṇas*: *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *śabda*, *upamāna*, *arthāpatti*, and *abhāva* (see, e.g., Oberhammer 2006: 70).

²⁸⁹ Angot 2009: 479.

to say about the identity of the proponents of this theory. One may, therefore, question whether the author of the TABh had a specific opponent in mind when he mentioned the view that *sambhava* is a *pramāṇa*. In fact, it is possible that he simply followed the *Nyāyasūtra*. While there is not enough evidence to answer this question definitively, it is noteworthy that TABh 1.12.7 is phrased as an objection while NS II.2.1 likewise contains the voice of an opponent. This strongly indicates that the author of the TABh was influenced by NS II.2.1.²⁹⁰

Furthermore, the counterargument that is provided in the TABh resembles the counterargument in the *Nyāyasūtra* but the counterargument does not fit very well in the overall theory that is presented in the TA. The TABh refutes the view of the opponent as follows:

sarvāṅy etāni matiśrutayor antarbhūtāni, indriyārthasannikarṣanimittatvāt |

All these [means of cognition] are within ordinary cognition (*mati*) and testimony (*śruta*) since they are caused by the connection of the object with the sense organ (TABh 1.12.10).

In other words, the author claims that inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*), verbal testimony (*āgama*), postulation (*arthāpatti*), equivalence (*sambhava*), [and] negation (*abhāva*) are in fact forms of ordinary cognition (*mati*) and testimony (*śruta*). This is legitimised by stating that these varieties of cognition are all dependent on sense contact (*indriyārtha-sannikarṣa-nimitta*). The first part of this counterargument is similar to *Nyāyasūtra* II.2.2, which refutes the opponent in II.2.1 who claims that *aitihya*, *arthāpatti*, *sambhava*, and *abhāva* are independent means of cognition:

²⁹⁰ Alternatively, it is possible that the objection was a common trope in the discussion of *pramāṇas* at the time of the composition of the TABh and that TABh 1.12.7 was not directly influenced by the *Nyāyasūtra*. Even in that case, however, the similarity between the objections in the TABh and the *Nyāyasūtra* suggests that the TABh derived some of its content from a textual source that was very close to the *Nyāyasūtra*.

*śabda aitihyānarthāntarabhāvād anumāne 'rthāpattisambhavābhāvānar-
thāntarabhāvāc cāpratiśedhaḥ |*

Parce que la 'tradition' n'a pas d'objet qui soit différent de celui du témoignage verbal et que 'supposition nécessaire', 'inclusion' et 'absence' ne diffèrent pas de 'l'inférence', cette dénégation n'est pas justifiée (NS II.2.2).²⁹¹

The *Nyāyasūtra* claims that the means of cognition that the opponent mentions are not proper means of cognition, since they are forms of verbal testimony (*śabda*) and inference (*anumāna*).

While the form of this argument is identical to the form of the argument in the TABh,²⁹² the argument in the *Nyāyasūtra* seems to make more sense. It is perfectly understandable why the *Nyāyasūtra* classifies traditional instruction²⁹³ (*aitihya*) as a type of verbal testimony (*śabda*) and it is also not difficult to see why postulation (*arthāpatti*), equivalence (*sambhava*), and negation (*abhāva*) are classified as forms of inference (*anumāna*). In the end, these means of cognition seem to refer to different types of inferential reasoning. By contrast, the claim in the TABh that inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*), verbal testimony (*āgama*), postulation (*arthāpatti*), equivalence (*sambhava*), and negation (*abhāva*) are all forms of ordinary cognition (*mati*) and testimony (*śruta*) is less obvious. First, the TABh does not explain which of these means of cognition are specifically included in ordinary cognition (*mati*) and which means of cognition are subsumed under testimony (*śruta*). Second, the counterargument that the TABh provides is not fully consistent with the theory about ordinary cognition (*mati*) in the TA itself. TABh 1.12.10 states explicitly that the other types of cognition result from 'the connection of the object with the sense organ' (*indriya-artha-sannikarṣa*) but it is not self-evident that inferential reasoning (*anumāna* etc.) is always caused by sense perception. Yet, TA 1.14 mentions that *mati* is caused by the senses (*indriya*) and the mind (*anindriya*) and one could argue, therefore, that inferential reasoning is a form of *mati* that is caused by the mind.²⁹⁴ If the author of the TABh wanted to say that

²⁹¹ Angot 2009: 480.

²⁹² In both texts, the *pramāṇas* that are mentioned by the opponent are subsumed under the accepted *pramāṇas*.

²⁹³ This translation of *aitihya* follows MW. Angot translates 'tradition'.

²⁹⁴ Likewise, TA 1.13 explicitly states that mental activities such as remembrance, recognition, and thought are not different from ordinary cognition (*matih smṛtiḥ samjñā*

inferential reasoning is included in *mati* since it is caused by the mind (*anindriya*), it is hard to explain why he only talks about the sense organ (*indriya*) in his counterargument. The fact that the argument in TABh 1.12.10 strongly resembles the argument in NS II.2.2 while it does not fit very well within the epistemological framework of the TA, suggests that the author of the TABh strongly relied on the presentation of *pramāṇa* theory in the *Nyāyasūtra*.

Further, it is somewhat odd that the terminology in the counterargument corresponds with the terminology that the *Nyāyasūtra* uses to qualify *pratyakṣa*. The well-known definition of *pratyakṣa* in NS I.1.4 states that perception (*pratyakṣa*) is the knowledge that results from the contact of the object with the sense organ (*indriyārthasaṃnikarṣotpannaṃ jñānam ... pratyakṣam*). However, the TABh uses the same description to demonstrate that *anumāna* etc. are forms of indirect cognition (*parokṣa*). Perhaps the author used this terminology on purpose to stress that the Jaina model interprets ordinary cognition — which includes sense perception — as *parokṣa* instead of *pratyakṣa*.

Even though the counterargument in TABh 1.12.10 is perhaps not fully convincing, it is still worth questioning why the author tried to refute a different view on the number of *pramāṇas*. Can this passage tell us anything about the opponent and the audience of the TABh? Since the list of mentioned *pramāṇas* cannot be connected with one particular movement but includes *pramāṇas* that were accepted by different opponents, we can assume that the TABh does not try to refute a particular rival. The fact that the list includes *sambhava*, which is an unusual element in *pramāṇa* theory and might be derived from *Nyāyasūtra* II.2.1, further supports the idea that the author is refuting a merely theoretical option and not the actual position of a rival movement. The passage defends the Jaina position by ruling out that there is any other authoritative *pramāṇa* — apart from the five types of knowledge that the TA identifies — and serves, as such, an apologetic goal. The way in which the counterargument is presented only makes sense if one already accepts the Jaina position, which interprets sense perception and mental activity as indirect means of cognition (*parokṣa*). It is, therefore, likely that this passage was mainly written for a Jaina audience that was eager to hear about the superiority of Jaina

cintābhīnibodha ity anarthāntaram). From this perspective, it is not hard to understand why *anumāna* etc. can be seen as forms of *mati*. It is curious that the author of the TABh does not refer to TA 1.13 in his refutation of the opponent.

philosophy. This also explains why the author adds the following remark to his counterargument:

apramāṇāny eva vā | kutaḥ | mithyādarśanaparigrahāt viparītopadeśāc ca |

Or, [they are] indeed not means of cognition. Why? Due to adoption of wrong view and since [it results] from false teaching (TABh 1.12.12 – 1.12.14).²⁹⁵

This is a purely rhetorical remark and not an argument that can be used in any actual debate with a real opponent. Nevertheless, it is clear that the author of the TABh knew the debates in the *Nyāyasūtra*, and the way in which he uses *Nyāya* vocabulary and phrases suggests that his audience was acquainted with the *Nyāyasūtra* too. Therefore, it is likely that the author wrote for a Jaina audience that was acquainted with Nyāya thought but wanted to distinguish itself from the upholders of Nyāya philosophy.

The five types of knowledge

After explaining that the five types of knowledge (*jñāna*) are the two *pramāṇas*, and that the additional *pramāṇas* that are accepted by other movements are in fact forms of *parokṣa*, the TA continues with a discussion of the individual types of knowledge. This section forms the largest part of the first chapter and runs from TA 1.13 up to TA 1.30. The discussion is structured as follows:

²⁹⁵ See also Part II.

[Direct cognition]

TA 1.13 – 1.19 Ordinary cognition (*mati*)

TA 1.13 Synonyms of ordinary cognition

TA 1.14 Relation to the senses and the mind

TA 1.15 Stages of ordinary cognition

TA 1.16 – 1.17 The objects of ordinary cognition

TA 1.17 – 1.18 Perception of the *vyañjana*

TA 1.20 Testimony (*śruta*)

[Indirect cognition]

TA 1.21 – 1.23 Cosmic perception (*avadhi*)

TA 1.24 – 1.25 Mental perception (*manaḥparyāya*)

TA 1.26 Difference between cosmic and mental perception

TA 1.27 – 1.30 Ranges of the different types of knowledge

TA 1.27 Range of ordinary cognition and testimony

TA 1.28 Range of cosmic perception

TA 1.29 Range of mental perception

TA 1.30 Range of omniscience (*kevala*)

The discussion of the types of knowledge starts with an investigation of ordinary cognition (*mati*). First, it defines the concept by giving a list of synonyms (TA 1.13), followed by an explanation of its relation to the senses and the mind (TA 1.14) and an analysis of the different stages that are involved in the process of ordinary cognition (TA 1.15). Next, the *sūtra* deals with the objects of ordinary cognition (TA 1.16 – 1.17) and the role of what is called the *vyañjana*²⁹⁶ in the perceptual process (TA 1.18 – 1.19). The discussion of testimony (*śruta*) is limited to one *sūtra* (TA 1.20). This *sūtra* clarifies the way in which testimony relates to ordinary cognition and explains that ‘testimony’ refers to the different collections of canonical texts. Cosmic perception (*avadhi*) is discussed in three *sūtras*, which mention that there are two classes and six types of cosmic perception (TA 1.21 – 1.23). In a similar way, the *sūtra* mentions that there are two types of mental perception (*manaḥparyāya*) (TA 1.24 – 1.25). This is followed by one *sūtra*, which clarifies the difference

²⁹⁶ Since I am not sure about the exact meaning of the term ‘*vyañjana*’, I have left the term untranslated. The prime meaning of the word ‘*vyañjana*’ is ‘sign’ or ‘mark’ (MW). However, these translations do not match the use of ‘*vyañjana*’ in the TA. See the discussion of TA 1.18 below for a further analysis of the term.

between cosmic and mental perception. The final four *sūtras* of the section that deals with the types of knowledge discuss the range of the individual types of knowledge (TA 1.27 – 1.30). The last *sūtra* discusses the range of omniscience (*kevala*) (TA 1.30).

Apart from the comparison of the range of omniscience with the range of other types of knowledge, there is no separate discussion of omniscience. In fact, all types of direct cognition (i.e., *avadhi*, *manaḥparyāya*, and *kevala*) are only briefly discussed, and the *sūtra* does not provide a proper definition of these means of cognition. Even though the *sūtra* mentions that there are different varieties, it does not explain how these types of knowledge function. By contrast, the discussion of ordinary cognition is quite elaborate and makes it clear what ordinary cognition is and how it functions. The fact that the discussion of knowledge mostly focuses on a type of knowledge that was also accepted by other schools, while the types of knowledge that are not accepted as valid means of cognition by other movements are only briefly mentioned, suggests that the composer of the *sūtra* wanted to clarify the Jaina perspective on ordinary cognition vis-à-vis the views of other movements. In the following paragraphs, I will discuss the different types of knowledge in the TA in further detail, with reference to the commentary in the *bhāṣya*. By analysing the way in which the types of knowledge are discussed, I will demonstrate that the TA and the TABh consciously position the Jaina theory of knowledge in a wider epistemological debate.

Ordinary cognition

The TA introduces the discussion of ordinary cognition (*mati*) by giving a list of synonyms:

matih smṛtiḥ saṃjñā cintābhinibodha ity anarthāntaram ||1.13||

‘Ordinary cognition’, ‘remembrance’, ‘recognition’, ‘thought’, [and] ‘apprehension’ — [these are] not different (i.e., they are synonyms).²⁹⁷

At first sight, this list seems to suggest that ordinary cognition is predominantly seen as mental activity.²⁹⁸ However, TS 1.14 states explicitly that *mati* is ‘caused by the

²⁹⁷ See also Part II.

organs of sense (*indriya*) and the mind (*anindriya*).²⁹⁹ This raises the question as to what the role of the senses in ordinary cognition exactly is. The *bhāṣya* on TA 1.14 explains that ordinary cognition that is caused by the sense organs is fivefold, i.e., derived from the five senses; ordinary cognition that is caused by the mind has two varieties: activity of the mind (*manovṛtti*) and instinctive knowledge (*oghajñāna*).³⁰⁰ This indicates that ‘ordinary cognition’ (*mati*) has a very wide meaning — it refers to all types of sensory cognition and includes conscious and unconscious mental activity.

The *sūtra* continues with a description of the four stages of ordinary cognition (TA 1.15). This list suggests that the process of ordinary cognition — from the initial sense perception to the final grasping of its content — involves both the senses and the mind:

***avagrahehāpāyadhāraṇāḥ* ||1.15||**

[The phases of ordinary cognition are]:

- sense perception (*avagraha*)
- endeavour to obtain (*īhā*)
- elimination (*apāya*)³⁰¹ [and]
- holding (i.e., remembrance) (*dhāraṇā*).

This list explains the way in which knowledge is obtained from ordinary cognition. First, there is sense perception (*avagraha*), which should be understood as the initial contact between a sense organ and its object.³⁰² This initial impression is followed by the ‘endeavour to obtain’ (*īhā*), i.e., the attempt of the cogniser to grasp

²⁹⁸ The meaning of the word ‘*abhinibodha*’ (or *ābhinibodhika-jñāna*) is not as obvious as the meaning of the other synonyms in the list and is not mentioned in standard Sanskrit dictionaries. Bhatt writes that the later Jaina tradition interpreted ‘*ābhinibodhika-jñāna*’, which frequently appears in the canonical sources, as a synonym of *mati*. Eventually, the term ‘*mati-jñāna*’ replaced ‘*ābhinibodhika-jñāna*’ (Bhatt 1978: 75).

²⁹⁹ *tad indriyānindriyanimittam* (TA 1.14).

³⁰⁰ The five senses, which are mentioned in TABh 1.14.3, are listed in TA 2.20. The term *oghajñāna* seems to refer to instinctive knowledge. See the translation of TABh 1.14.4 for a discussion of this term.

³⁰¹ Sanghvi reads *avāya*. He remarks that both readings are possible according to Akalaṅka (Sanghvi 1974: 4, footnote 4). Balcerowicz notes that ‘*apāya*’ is used in the Śvetāmbara tradition and ‘*avāya*’ in the Digambara tradition (Balcerowicz 2016d: 1001).

³⁰² See also TABh 1.15.4 – 1.15.5.

the object completely.³⁰³ Next, the cogniser determines the right interpretation of the perception by eliminating alternative interpretations. This stage is called 'elimination' (*apāya*). After determining the right interpretation of the sense perception, the cogniser can retain the acquired knowledge. This final stage is labelled 'holding' (*dhāraṇā*).

This fourfold analysis of the process of ordinary cognition is perfectly comprehensible from a common sense point of view and matches ordinary experience. Moreover, it provides a model that can account for the fact that ordinary cognition can lead to false knowledge. To illustrate, when someone walks along the beach, her eye might suddenly be attracted to a shiny object at a short distance because the sun reflects its light on its surface. At this point, the perceiver is not paying proper attention to the object and she does not know yet what it is. This is the stage of 'sense perception' (*avagraha*), i.e., the initial contact between the object and the sense organ. Next, she might focus her attention on the object to find out what it is. In the end, it might be something valuable, like a silver coin. This is the 'endeavour to obtain' (*īhā*). By approaching the object and examining it more carefully, the perceiver can find out that there is no silver coin but just a shell that is coated in mother-of-pearl. This is the stage of 'elimination' (*apāya*). Finally, the perceiver knows what the object is. Having acquired knowledge about the initial sense perception, she can remember this knowledge episode when she is confronted with a similar situation. This is called 'holding' (*dhāraṇā*).

Since a perceiver only acquires knowledge when the initial sense perception is properly investigated, it is possible that one ends up with false cognition (*ajñāna*).³⁰⁴ For example, when someone sees a coin but does not know that there are counterfeit coins, it is likely that this person will falsely determine the object as a genuine coin.³⁰⁵

Even though this fourfold analysis nicely explains how sensory perception can lead to knowledge, it is remarkable that this model assumes that all ordinary

³⁰³ TABh 1.15.6 explains 'īhā' as 'the desire to know the particularities by inquiry' (*niścaya-viśeṣa-jijñāsā*). TABh 1.15.7 mentions 'tarka' as a synonym.

³⁰⁴ See TABh 1.32.3. See § 3.2 *False knowledge* for a discussion of the theory of error.

³⁰⁵ Epistemological models that interpret perception as a linear process in which knowledge automatically results from sense perception face problems in explaining the possibility of error. The four stages of ordinary cognition provide a model in which sense perceptions can lead to false knowledge due to a wrong interpretation of the initial sense perception.

cognition begins with sense perception.³⁰⁶ This does not seem to match the description of ordinary cognition in TA 1.13, which interprets ordinary cognition as mental activity. Of course, one could claim that all forms of thought are ultimately based on sensory input and it is not unlikely that this is the idea behind the discussion of ordinary cognition in the TA. Nevertheless, it remains unclear why the TA deals with ordinary cognition in a rather confusing way: TA 1.13 equates ordinary cognition with *mental activity*, TA 1.14 states that ordinary cognition is caused by the *sense organs and the mind*, and the remainder of the discussion (TA 1.15 – TA 1.19) deals with ordinary cognition as *sensory cognition*. As such, it seems that there are two different views on ordinary cognition, which are only connected by the claim in TA 1.14. This might indicate that the Jaina tradition did not have a consistent view on ordinary cognition at the moment of the composition of the *sūtra* and that the author of the TA tried to unite these views in a single discussion.

Balcerowicz suggests that the Jaina tradition developed its theory about the fourfold stages of perception under influence of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thought.³⁰⁷ It is hard to trace exactly how the development of Jaina epistemology took place before the TA but it is clear that Nyāya epistemology influenced the traditional Jaina perspective. This process is reflected in the *Bhagavatī*, which lists the four means of cognition that the Naiyāyikas accept as authoritative *pramāṇas*. The same text also mentions the four stages of ordinary cognition that are listed in TA 1.15, which supports Balcerowicz' claim that this theory developed under Nyāya influence.³⁰⁸ It seems likely, therefore, that the first Jaina epistemological theories had little to say about sense perception. More advanced theories about *pratyakṣa* in other schools probably urged the Jainas to include a theory about sensory perception in their own system. The different layers of this process seem to be reflected in the presentation of ordinary cognition in the TA. The analysis of the role of the *vyāñjana* in ordinary cognition in TA 18 – 19 provides further evidence that the Jainas were still

³⁰⁶ The *bhāṣya* explicitly states that the four stages apply to all forms of ordinary cognition, i.e., those that are caused by the senses and those that are caused by the mind (See TABh 1.15.1).

³⁰⁷ Balcerowicz notes that the fivefold division of knowledge in the Jaina tradition does not reflect any external influence but that the 'particular solutions and definitions of respective cognitions' show influence from outside (Balcerowicz 2016d: 1001).

³⁰⁸ See, e.g., Shastri 1990: 202. The oldest layers of the epistemological theory of the Jainas do not include the fourfold theory of perception (Balcerowicz 2016d: 1024, Model I).

developing their theories against the background of Nyāya thought at the time of the composition of the TA.

After listing the stages of ordinary cognition, the TA continues with a description of the objects of ordinary cognition:

bahubahavidhakṣiprāniśritānuktadhruvāṇām setarāṇām ||1.16||

[The objects of ordinary cognition appear as] much (*bahu*), of many sorts (*bahavidha*), swift (*kṣipra*), independent (*aniśrita*), non-verbal (*anukta*), and constant (*dhruva*) together with their opposites.

It is not exactly clear to me what the idea behind this list is.³⁰⁹ The fact that these qualifications are supposed to have their opposites indicates that this list tries to categorise the objects of perception in a systematic way, even though it is hard to understand the underlying principles. The explanation in the *bhāṣya* is not very helpful. It simply mentions that the objects of ordinary cognition throughout its four stages are qualified as described in the *sūtra* (TABh 1.16.1). While these qualifications most likely relate to the objects (*artha*)³¹⁰ of ordinary cognition, it seems that some of them actually qualify the perception itself. In other words, it is not entirely clear whether the terms in TA 1.6 are ontological or phenomenological descriptions. This ambiguity is also reflected in the *Sarvārthasiddhi*. In his commentary on TA 1.16, Pūjyapāda explains that the list provides a subdivision of *avagraha* but in the commentary on the following *sūtra* he states that *bahu* etc. qualify the objects of apprehension.³¹¹

It is hard to decide which interpretation of TA 1.16 is more plausible based on the text alone. Apart from the list of adjectives and the reference to their opposites (*itara*), there is no additional information in TA 1.16 that provides any context. The qualifications are in genitive plural and seem to relate syntactically to the four stages of perception (*avagraha* etc.) that are listed in TA 1.15 in nominative plural. If we combine these two *sūtras*, we end up with the basic structure: '[There is]

³⁰⁹ Jacobi points out that the Jaina commentaries have different interpretations of the meaning of '*aniśrita*' (Jacobi 1906: 296). Further, a variant version of the text reads '*sandigdha*' (unambiguous) instead of '*anukta*' (see also Part II). It seems, therefore, that the Jaina tradition struggled to agree on the meaning of this *sūtra*.

³¹⁰ See TA 1.17.

³¹¹ S.A. Jain 1992: 25-26.

sense perception (*avagraha*) etc. of many (*bahu ...*) etc.³¹² However, this combined sentence still needs a noun that is qualified by *bahu* etc. This noun is provided in TA 1.17, which consists of one word only, i.e., '*arthasya*'. It is unclear to me why '*artha*' does not correspond in number with the adjectives in TA 1.16.³¹³ The underlying idea of TA 1.15 – 1.17 seems to be that there is sense perception etc. of sense objects that are many, of many sorts, swift etc.³¹⁴ One could argue that the text allows for this interpretation, even though '*artha*' and '*bahu[...]*' do not correspond in number. Yet, the bigger problem is formed by the three last adjectives. While it is perfectly plausible to describe sense objects as 'many' (*bahu*), 'of many sorts' (*bahavidha*), and 'swift' (*kṣipra*), it is harder to understand how sense objects could be 'independent' (*aniśrita*), 'non-verbal' (*anukta*), and 'constant' (*dhruva*).

The translation of the TA by Tatia solves this problem by taking the first items in TA 1.16 as qualifications of the sense objects and the last items as qualifications of the process of perception.³¹⁵ Unfortunately, Tatia's work does not refer to a source that legitimises this interpretation. The definition of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) in the *Nyāyasūtra*, however, contains a threefold qualification that resembles the last three adjectives in TA 1.16:

³¹² The full translation of TA 1.15 and 1.16 is provided above.

³¹³ One would expect '*arthānām*' instead of '*arthasya*'. It is also possible to read TA 1.17 together with TA 1.18: '*arthasya ||1.17|| vyañjanasyāvagrahaḥ ||1.18||*' ([There is] sense perception of the *vyañjana* [and] the sense object.) Pūjyapāda discusses '*arthāvagraha*' and '*vyañjanāvagraha*' in his commentary on TA 1.18, which indicates that he reads TA 1.17 together with TA 1.18 (S.A. Jain 1992: 26 - 27). In fact, it is not impossible that the author of the TA used '*artha*' as the object of the preceding and the following *sūtras*.

³¹⁴ A more straightforward organisation of the content in TA 1.15 – 1.17 would be: *bahubahavidhākṣiprāniśritānuktadhruvāṇām setarāṇām arthānām avagrahehāpāyadhāraṇāḥ*.

³¹⁵ Tatia translates TA 1.16 as follows: 'The objects perceptible by relatively pure mental faculties are multiple and complex and the comprehension of them is quick, partially exposed, unspoken and constant. The objects perceptible by relatively impure mental faculties are few and simple and the comprehension of them is slow, completely exposed, spoken and inconstant' (Tatia 2011: 16-17). He obviously reads a lot into the rather concise *sūtra* and the meaning of the adjectives that qualify the 'comprehension' is still obscure. Nevertheless, the idea that some of the adjectives qualify the sense object while the others qualify the sense perception is appealing.

*indriyārthasaṃnikarṣotpannaṃ jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri
vyavasāyātmakaṃ pratyakṣam |*

La perception-immédiate c'est la connaissance produite par le contact d'un organe-sensoriel avec un objet; **elle est non-verbale, non sujette à l'erreur et consiste en une connaissance déterminée** (NS I.1.4).³¹⁶

Of course, the individual words in TA 1.16 and NS I.1.4 are quite different but it is remarkable that both *sūtras* are dealing with sense perception and that both passages use the qualifications 'non-verbal' (*anukta* in the TABh, *avyapadeśya* in the NS) and 'definitive' (*dhruva* in the TABh, *vyavasāyātmaka* in the NS).³¹⁷ It is unlikely that this correspondence is completely coincidental. Even though there is not enough evidence to say that TA 1.16 was directly influenced by NS I.1.4, the matching terms do suggest that at least some of the adjectives in TA 1.16 qualify the perceptual process (*avagraha* etc.) instead of the objects (*artha*). The fact that this is not evident from the syntax of the *sūtra* might explain why later commentators did not agree on its interpretation and why we ended up with different versions of this *sūtra*.

The content of the *sūtras* that immediately follow TA 1.15 – 1.17 provides further evidence that this passage was indeed influenced by the discussion of *pratyakṣa* in the *Nyāyasūtra*. TA 1.18 – 1.19 addresses a technical debate about the precise object of sense perception:

vyañjanasyāvagrahaḥ ||1.18|| na cakṣuranindriyābhyām ||1.19||

[There is] sense perception of the *vyañjana*. [However, there is] no [sense perception of the *vyañjana*] by the eyes (*caṅṣus*) or the mind (*anindriya*).

³¹⁶ Angot 2009: 271-272 (emphasis mine). As demonstrated above, the counterargument in TABh 1.12.10 seems to be based on the first part of this *sūtra*.

³¹⁷ Dasti translates '*vyavasāyātmaka*' as 'definitive' (Dasti 2017: 20). This is very close to the prime meaning of '*dhruva*', which is given as 'unchangeable', 'permanent', etc. in MW. It is hard to evaluate whether the term '*anīṣṛita*' in the TA possibly relates to '*avyabhicārin*' in the *Nyāyasūtra*. As mentioned above, the reading and meaning of this term is contested in the Jaina tradition (Jacobi 1906: 296). The *Sarvārthasiddhi* reads '*anīṣṛta*'.

The word ‘*vyañjana*’ is difficult to translate but seems to refer to the actual contact of a sense organ with its object.³¹⁸ TA 1.19 points out that the eye and the mind cannot perceive the ‘*vyañjana*’ and the *bhāṣya* explicitly states that the other senses do have the *vyañjana* as its object.³¹⁹ This suggests that the term ‘*vyañjana*’ refers to the physical contact between the sense organ and the object, which is possible in the case of the other sense organs but not in the case of the eye or the mind.³²⁰ Hence, we end up with the following four possible connections between a sense organ and the *vyañjana*:

VIII. Types of ordinary cognition (<i>mati</i>) that have <i>vyañjanāvagraha</i> (TA1.19)	
<i>indriya</i>	<i>vyañjanāvagraha</i>
i. <i>sparśana</i>	+
ii. <i>rasana</i>	+
iii. <i>ghrāna</i>	+
iv. <i>caḥsus</i>	-
v. <i>śrotra</i>	+
<i>anindriya</i>	
vi. <i>manas</i>	-

The idea that there is no direct contact between the eye and its object goes against the view on *pratyakṣa* in NS I.1.4, which says that *pratyakṣa* — which includes visual perception for the *Naiyāyikas* — results from the contact of the object with the sense organ (*indriyārthasaṃnikarṣa*).³²¹ Hence, it seems that the author of the TA is trying to present a slightly different view by excluding the possibility of direct contact between the object and eye or the mind.

The TABh on TA 1.18 explains that the phrase ‘*vyañjanasyāvagrahaḥ*’ entails that the *vyañjana* is the object at the first stage of ordinary cognition only. In other words, there is only sense perception (*avagraha*) of the *vyañjana*, and not the

³¹⁸ Jacobi translates the term ‘*vyañjana*’ as ‘eine unbestimmte Empfindung’ (Jacobi 1906: 296). Tatia translates ‘contact-awareness’ (Tatia 1951:35).

³¹⁹ ‘*caturbhir indriyaiḥ śeśair bhavati*’ (TABh 1.19.2).

³²⁰ The *Sarvārthasiddhi* illustrates this point as follows: ‘The sense-organ of sight is one without contact, for it does not apprehend an object in contact with it. If it were one with contact, it would perceive the collyrium applied to the eye. But it does not perceive it; so it is a sense without contact like the mind’ (S.A. Jain 1992: 27 - 28).

³²¹ The relation between TA 1.18 - 1.19 and NS I.1.4 has been previously observed by Ohira (Ohira 1982: 57).

endeavour to obtain (*īhā*) etc.³²² Ordinary cognition, however, is directed at the object (*artha*) throughout its four stages.³²³ Hence, the way in which the different stages of ordinary cognition relate to the object and the *vyañjana* can be summarised as follows:

IX. Objects of the different phases of ordinary cognition (<i>mati</i>) (TA1.17 – 1.18)		
	<i>artha</i>	<i>vyañjana</i>
<i>avagraha</i>	+	+
<i>īhā</i>	+	-
<i>apāya</i>	+	-
<i>dhāraṇā</i>	+	-

If the *vyañjana* indeed refers to the physical contact between the sense organ and the object, the above table makes perfect sense. In the end, the three last stages of ordinary cognition (*īhā*, *apāya*, and *dhāraṇā*) are predominantly mental activities and do not engage with the object in a physical way.

It is remarkable that the *bhāṣya* on TA 1.19 uses the peculiar word formation ‘*noindriya*’ instead of ‘*anindriya*’, which is used in the *sūtra* itself.³²⁴ Since both words are clearly used to refer to ‘mind’, one could argue that the *bhāṣya* uses a synonym to clarify the term. However, synonyms are explicitly indicated as such in the *bhāṣya*.³²⁵ It is also unlikely that we are dealing with a scribal error since the same phenomenon occurs in the commentary on TA 2.22, in which the *bhāṣya* uses the word ‘*noindriya*’ in the first sentence after the *sūtra* while the *sūtra* says

³²² ‘*vyañjanasyāvagraha eva bhavati nehādayaḥ*’ (TABh 1.18.1).

³²³ ‘*īhādayas tv arthasyaiva*’ (TABh 1.18.3).

³²⁴ The *sūtra* states: ‘*na cakṣuranindriyābhyām*’ (TA 1.19) and the *bhāṣya* comments: ‘*cakṣuṣā noindriyeṇa ca vyañjanāvagraho na bhavati*’ (TA 1.19.1). The word ‘*noindriya*’ is uncommon in classical Sanskrit. It probably derives from ‘*na u indriya*’ (and not ‘*indriya*’). The particle ‘*u*’ can indicate a restriction or an antithesis (MW).

In her article on sensory cognition in the *Nandīsūtra*, Clavel points out that the *Nandīsūtra* uses the term ‘*noindriya*’ in reference to two different meanings: it is used to label the types of cognition that are included in *pratyakṣa* (*avadhi*, *manaḥparyāya*, and *kevala*) but it is also used as a name for non-sensory cognition that is caused by the mind. The TABh uses the term in this second sense. In the same article, Clavel remarks that the difference between the TA and the TABh illustrates that the philosophical terminology of the Jainas was subject to change at the time of the composition of these texts. She relates this change of vocabulary and the shifting classifications of cognition to the influence of the Naiyāyikas (Clavel 2015).

³²⁵ The *bhāṣya* usually adds ‘*anarthāntaram*’ when a word is explained with synonyms. See, e.g., TABh 1.3.4, 1.3.7, 1.5.5. The *sūtra* uses the same expression in TA 1.13.

'*anindriya*'.³²⁶ Since the word '*noindriya*' was used in different ways in early treatises on Jaina epistemology, it is possible that there was some controversy about the exact meaning of the term. Since the *bhāṣya* uses both '*noindriya*' and '*anindriya*' while the context of these terms does not indicate that they refer to different concepts, it is hard to tell whether these terms had a different meaning for the author of the *bhāṣya*.³²⁷ The difference can be seen as an argument for the position that the author of the *sūtra* did not write the *bhāṣya*, even though this cannot be taken as conclusive evidence.

After discussing the different types of ordinary cognition (*mati*) and their objects (*artha* and *vyañjana*), the *bhāṣya* concludes the commentary on *mati* by summing up the divisions and subdivisions of *mati*:

***evam etat matijñānaṃ dvividhaṃ caturvidham aṣṭāviṃśatavidham aṣṭaṣṭy-
uttaraśatavidhaṃ ṣaṭtriṃśattriśatavidhaṃ ca bhavati |***

So, this ordinary cognition (*matijñāna*) is twofold, fourfold, 28-fold, 168-fold, and 336-fold (TABh 1.19.3).

The *bhāṣya* does not provide any further explanation about this enumeration and it is hard to interpret the meaning of these numbers on the basis of the *sūtra* and *bhāṣya* alone.³²⁸ This suggests that the author of the *bhāṣya* refers to a classification of the types of ordinary cognition that was well known when the *bhāṣya* was composed. In the table below, I provide a possible interpretation of the numbers. The organisation of the table corresponds to the organisation of the types of ordinary cognition in the *Nandīsūtra*, which successively lists four types of '*vyañjanāvagraha*', and six types of '*arthāvagraha*', six types of '*ihā*', six types of '*avāya*', and six types of '*dhāraṇā*'.³²⁹ The number six in these lists refers to the five

³²⁶ While the *sūtra* says '*śrutam anindriyaṣya*' (TA 2.22), the *bhāṣya* comments '*śrutajñānaṃ dvividham anekadvādaśavidhaṃ noindriyaṣyārthaḥ*' (TABh 2.22.1).

³²⁷ The *bhāṣya* uses the term '*anindriya*' in different parts of the commentary, such as TABh 1.1.9, 1.14.1, and 1.20.36. Unlike the *bhāṣya*, which seems to use the two terms interchangeably, the *sūtra* only uses '*anindriya*'.

³²⁸ The *bhāṣya* mentions the twofold division of *mati* in TABh 1.18.2 and the fourfold division in TABh 1.15.1. The other numbers are not mentioned before.

³²⁹ Amar 2007: 309-319.

senses (*indriya*) and the mind (*manas*). Since the eye and the mind cannot perceive the *vyañjana*, the list of types of *vyañjanāvagraha* is only fourfold.³³⁰

X. Varieties of ordinary cognition (<i>mati</i>) (TA 1.13 – 1.19)				
Stages (TA 1.15)	Types (2) (TABh 1.14.2)	Objects and <i>vyañjana</i>		
	<i>indriyanimitta</i> and <i>anindriyanimitta</i> ³³¹ (TA 1.14)	<i>artha</i> (TA 1.17)		<i>vyañjana</i> (TA 1.18)
		Qualifications (TA 1.16) ³³²	The opposites (TABh 1.16.2–9)	Four types of <i>vyañjanāvagraha</i> (TABh 1.19.1-2)
<i>avagraha</i>	<i>sparśana</i>	<i>bahu</i>	<i>alpa</i>	<i>sparśana</i>
<i>ihā</i>	<i>rasana</i>	<i>bahuvīdha</i>	<i>ekavīdha</i>	<i>rasana</i>
<i>apāya</i>	<i>ghrāna</i>	<i>kṣīpra</i>	<i>cireṇa</i>	<i>ghrāna</i>
<i>dhāraṇā</i>	<i>caḥsus</i>	<i>anīśrita</i>	<i>nīśrita</i>	
	<i>śrotra</i>	<i>anukta</i> ³³³	<i>ukta</i>	<i>śrotra</i>
	<i>manas</i>	<i>dhruva</i>	<i>adhruva</i>	
4	6	6	6	*4
28 [= (4 × 6) + 4*]		12 (= 2 × 6)		
168 (= 28 × 6)				
336 (= 28 × 12)				

The numbers that are mentioned in TABh 1.19.3 are emphasized in the above table. The **twofold** division refers to the types of ordinary cognition that are caused respectively by the sense organs and the mind (TA 1.14).³³⁴The **fourfold** division relates to the stages of the perceptual process, as mentioned in TA 1.15. The larger numbers result from the multiplication of the stages of ordinary cognition by the types of ordinary cognition and their objects. The **28-fold** division results from the application of the four stages of ordinary cognition to the five senses and the mind

³³⁰ Since the *vyañjana* is the object of sense perception (*avagraha*) only, the *vyañjana* is not the object of '*ihā*' etc. (TABh 1.18.1). Therefore, apart from the four types of *vyañjanāvagraha* (related to *sparśana*, *rasana*, *ghrāna*, and *śrotra*), all other types of ordinary cognition are directed at the object (*artha*) (TA 1.17).

³³¹ The five *indriyas* are listed in TA 2.20.

³³² As discussed above, it is possible that some of the qualifications in TA 1.16 refer to the perceptual process instead of the objects.

³³³ Other versions of the TA read '*asandigdha*' instead of '*anukta*'. See also above.

³³⁴ Alternatively, it could refer to the type of ordinary cognition that relate to the object (*artha*) and the *vyañjana*, as mentioned in TA 1.17 – 1.18. The commentary on these *sūtras* uses the term 'twofold' (*dvividha*).

(which gives 24 varieties) together with the four types of *vyañjanāvagraha*. The number **168** results from the application of the 28 varieties to the six sorts of objects. By adding the six opposite sorts of objects to the same calculation, the number doubles to **336**.³³⁵

Testimony

After discussing ordinary cognition (*mati*), the TA addresses testimony (*śruta*), which is seen as a form of indirect knowledge (*parokṣa*).³³⁶ Testimonial knowledge is discussed as follows:

śrutam matipūrvaṃ dvyanekadvādaśabhedam ||1.20||

Testimony (*śruta*) is preceded by ordinary cognition (*mati*). [It consists of] two [varieties], the many [outer limbs] and the twelve [inner limbs].

The *sūtra* is very concise, and the TA does not provide any further information about testimony as a source of knowledge. It is striking that there is only one *sūtra* that deals with testimony while ordinary cognition is discussed in seven *sūtras*. This suggests that the composer of the TA did not feel the need to defend the Jaina perspective on testimony vis-à-vis the views of other movements. The *sūtra* further suggests that the meaning of ‘two’ (*dvi*), ‘many’ (*aneka*) and ‘twelve’ (*dvādaśa*) was evident for the audience of the TA, since the TA does not explain their meaning. The number ‘two’ (*dvi*) in the *sūtra* seems to refer to the division of texts as listed in the *bhāṣya*, i.e., the twelve ‘inner limbs’ and many ‘outer limbs’.³³⁷ The *bhāṣya* explains that the disciples of the *jina* (*gaṇadharas*) composed the first group of texts, while the second group was composed by later teachers (*ācāryas*).³³⁸ While the *bhāṣya* does not comment on the number ‘two’, it does explain the reference of ‘many’ and ‘twelve’ as follows:

³³⁵ The table is based on the analyses of the TABh by Tatia (Tatia 1951: 44) and Sanghvi (Sanghvi 1974: chapter 1, p. 36).

³³⁶ See TA 1.11.

³³⁷ The ‘inner limbs’ and ‘outer limbs’ are listed in the table below.

³³⁸ TABh 1.20.19 – 22. This interpretation is in line with the explanation in the *Sarvārthasiddhi* (S.A. Jain 1960: 30).

aṅgabāhyam anekavidham [...] aṅgapraviṣṭam dvādaśavidham |

The [corpus of] outer limbs (*aṅgabāhya*) [is] manifold (TABh 1.20.5). The [corpus of] inner limbs (*aṅgapraviṣṭa*) [is] twelvefold (TABh 1.20.8).

The word ‘limb’ (*aṅga*) in the commentary refers to a section of the corpus of authoritative Jaina texts or ‘āgamas’.³³⁹ The TABh explains that there are twelve ‘inner limbs’ (*aṅgapraviṣṭa*) and many ‘outer limbs’ (*aṅgabāhya*), which can be interpreted as ‘core teachings’ and ‘additional teachings’.³⁴⁰ The titles of these texts are given in the table below.

XI. Testimonial knowledge (<i>śrutajñāna</i>): The Jaina scriptures	
The corpus of outer limbs (<i>aṅgabāhya</i>) (TABh 1.20.7)	The corpus of inner limbs (<i>aṅgapraviṣṭa</i>) (TABh 1.20.10)
i. <i>Sāmāyika</i>	i. <i>Ācāra</i>
ii. <i>Caturviṃśatistava</i>	ii. <i>Sūtrakṛta</i>
iii. <i>Vandana</i>	iii. <i>Sthāna</i>
iv. <i>Pratikramaṇa</i>	iv. <i>Samavāya</i>
v. <i>Kāyavyutsarga</i>	v. <i>Vyākhyāprajñapti</i>
vi. <i>Pratyākhyāna</i>	vi. <i>Jñātadharmakathāḥ</i> ³⁴¹
vii. <i>Daśavaikālika</i>	vii. <i>Upāsakādhyayanadaśāḥ</i>
viii. <i>Uttarādhyāyāḥ</i>	viii. <i>Antakṛddāśāḥ</i>
ix. <i>Daśāḥ</i>	ix. <i>Anuttaraupapātikadaśāḥ</i>
x. <i>Kalpavyavahārau</i>	x. <i>Praśnavyākaraṇa</i>
xi. <i>Niśītha</i>	xi. <i>Vipākasūtra</i>
xii. <i>Ṛṣibhāṣitāni</i>	xii. <i>Drṣṭipāta</i>
<i>Etc.</i> ³⁴²	

³³⁹ Dundas notes that the terminology that is used to describe the two main parts of the contemporary Śvetāmbara canon (i.e., *aṅga* and *upāṅga*) ‘may have been borrowed from Vedic learning and indicate an original desire to organise Jain writings on the model of those of the brahmins’. The Jaina tradition compares their body of scriptures to the human body, which both have twelve limbs (*aṅga*), i.e., ‘feet, calves, thighs, forearms, arms, neck and head’ (Dundas 1992: 73).

³⁴⁰ The *Nandīsūtra* divides the Jaina corpus in a similar way into ‘inner limbs’ (*aṅgapraviṣṭa*) and ‘outer limbs’ (*aṅgabāhira*, *anaṅgapraviṣṭa*). It attributes the first group to Mahāvīra’s disciples and the second group to later monks (Dundas 1992: 77). The same view about the composers of these two groups of text is expressed in the *Sarvārthasiddhi* (1960: 31).

³⁴¹ Some manuscripts read ‘*jñātādharmakathā*’ (Mody 1903: 20).

³⁴² The TABh adds ‘*evam ādi*’ to the list, which indicates that there are more texts that belong to the group of ‘outer limbs’.

The list of twelve ‘inner limbs’ (*aṅgapraviṣṭa*) in the TABh corresponds to the twelvefold list of *aṅgas* that is accepted by the Śvetāmbara and Digambara traditions.³⁴³ The *Sarvārthasiddhi* mentions a similar list in its commentary on TA 1.20.³⁴⁴ However, the *Sarvārthasiddhi* explains the word ‘many’ (*aneka*) in the *sūtra* by giving only two examples of outer limbs (*aṅgabāhya*) instead of twelve: the *Daśavaikālika* and the *Uttarādhyayana*.³⁴⁵ This suggests that the composers of the TABh and the *Sarvārthasiddhi* had different views on the ‘outer limbs’.³⁴⁶ The fact that the TA refers to the ‘many’ (*aneka*) outer limbs instead of giving an exact number indicates that there had yet to be a standard list of ‘outer limbs’, or that there was no consensus about the list. By contrast, it must have been generally accepted that there were twelve ‘inner limbs’, since the *sūtra* explicitly refers to a ‘twelvefold’ list.

Whatever the precise reference of the ‘many’ and ‘twelvefold’ texts might be, the reference to the ‘inner and outer limbs’ in TA 1.20 suggests that the author of the TA interprets testimonial knowledge (*śruta*) as the knowledge that is derived from sacred teachings and not simply as knowledge that is conveyed by any credible person.³⁴⁷ However, the first part of the *sūtra* states that testimony is preceded by ordinary cognition (*matipūrva*). The meaning of this expression is open to various interpretations since it is not specified whether testimony is preceded by ordinary

³⁴³ Even though the Digambara tradition agrees that these titles refer to the twelve *aṅgas*, they assume that the original texts are lost. Unlike the Śvetāmbaras, they do not accept the outstanding versions of these texts as authoritative works. It is unclear how and when the crystallisation of these different perspectives on the Jaina scriptures took place (Dundas 1992: 79-80). Dixit assumes that the Digambara view on the authority of the *aṅgas* started to change in the 6th – 7th cent. CE (Dixit 1971: 2).

³⁴⁴ The *Sarvārthasiddhi* reads ‘*Jñātr̥dharmakathā*’ instead of ‘*Jñātdharmakathāḥ*’ (alt. *jñātā*), ‘*Upāsakādhyayana*’ instead of ‘*Upāsakādhyayanadaśāḥ*’ and *Dr̥ṣṭivāda* instead of *Dr̥ṣṭapāta* (see also Fujinaga 2007: 4). These minor variations might result from the fact that these texts are composed in Prākṛit while the titles are provided in Sanskrit. Nevertheless, these differences indicate that the titles of the twelve *aṅgas* were not completely standardised yet at the moment of the composition of the TABh.

³⁴⁵ The TABh uses the name ‘*Uttarādhyāyāḥ*’.

³⁴⁶ It is unclear to me what the source of the list of outer limbs in the TABh is.

³⁴⁷ The explanation in the *bhāṣya* confirms this view: “Testimony’ (*śruta*), ‘the words of the *āpta*’ (*āptavacana*), ‘scriptural tradition’ (*āgama*), ‘teaching’ (*upadeśa*), ‘tradition’ (*aitihya*), ‘sacred tradition’ (*āmnāya*), ‘sacred writings’ (*pravacana*), [and] ‘the words of the *jina*’ (*jinavacana*) (*iti*) — [these are] not different (i.e., they are synonyms) (*śrutam āptavacanam āgamaḥ upadeśa aitihiyam āmnāyaḥ pravacanam jinavacanam ity anarthāntaram*)’ (TABh 1.20.2). This list strongly suggests that *āptavacana* — the second synonym in the list — refers to scriptural knowledge.

cognition for the receiver or for the conveyer of testimony. In other words, it is unclear whether the *sūtra* tries to say that scriptural knowledge is ultimately derived from ordinary cognition or that one cannot acquire scriptural knowledge without ordinary cognition since one has to hear it. The *bhāṣya* on TA 1.11, which deals with indirect cognition, discusses the relationship between ordinary cognition and testimony as follows:

tatpūrvakatvāt paropadeśajatvāc ca śrutajñānam |

Knowledge from testimony (*śrutajñāna*) [is an indirect means of cognition] from the quality of being preceded by that (i.e., by ordinary cognition) (*tatpūrvakatva*) and by the quality of being caused by the instruction of others (*paropadeśajatva*) (TABh 1.11.8).

Even though this passage in the *bhāṣya* does explain why testimony is not a direct form of cognition, it does not fully clarify the exact relationship between ordinary cognition and testimony. The *bhāṣya* on TA 1.20 comments on the phrase ‘preceded by ordinary cognition’ (*matipūrva*) but does not satisfactorily explain its meaning. It basically repeats the statement in the *sūtra* without giving much more information.³⁴⁸ Therefore, one might question whether the author of the *bhāṣya* had a clear idea about the precise meaning of the expression in the *sūtra*.

The *Sarvārthasiddhi* addresses the relationship between ordinary cognition and testimony in greater detail. It states explicitly that ordinary cognition is the instrumental cause of testimony. Following this statement, Pūjyapāda discusses several objections to this view, such as the idea that testimony cannot be eternal if it is caused by ordinary cognition. He tries to counter this argument by applying different perspectives, which leads Pūjyapāda to the conclusion that testimony is both eternal and non-eternal, depending on one’s perspective.³⁴⁹ This argument is hardly convincing for anyone who does not adhere to the Jaina theory of perspectives. Given the difficulties of the position that testimony results from ordinary cognition, it is hard to understand why the composer of the TA added this

³⁴⁸ The *bhāṣya* on TA 1.20 simply comments that ‘[k]nowledge from testimony is preceded by knowledge from ordinary cognition’ (*śrutajñānam matijñānapūrvakam bhavati*) (TABh 1.20.1). At the end of the commentary on TA 1.20, the *bhāṣya* uses the expression ‘*tatpūrvaka*’ again but does not elaborate on its meaning (see TABh 1.20.37).

³⁴⁹ S.A. Jain 1960: 28 - 30.

phrase to its description of testimony. In the end, there is nothing in the context of TA 1.20 that asks for a specification of the relationship between ordinary cognition and testimony and it would have been sufficient if TA 1.20 simply said '*śrutam dvyanekadvādaśabhedam*' and omitted '*matipūrvam*'.

As shown previously, the discussion of ordinary cognition in the TA seems to respond to the definition of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) in *Nyāyasūtra* I.1.3. It is, therefore, remarkable that the next *sūtra* (i.e., NS I.1.4) uses an expression that is very similar to the phrase 'preceded by ordinary cognition' (*matipūrva*) in TA 1.20:

atha tatpūrvakaṃ trividham anumānaṃ pūrvavaccheṣavatsāmānyatodṛṣṭaṃ ca |

Maintenant l'inférence précédée de cette <perception>; elle est de trois sortes appelées *pūrvavat* 'avec précédent', *śeṣavat* 'avec conséquent' et *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* 'vu à partir d'un trait commun' (NS I.1.5).³⁵⁰

Even though this *sūtra* deals with inference (*anumāna*) and not with testimony, there are some striking similarities between TA 1.20 and NS I.1.5. First of all, NS I.1.5 immediately follows the discussion of *pratyakṣa*, while TA 1.20 immediately follows the discussion of *mati*. The expression '*tatpūrvaka*' in NS I.1.5 means 'preceded by *pratyakṣa*', which is very close to the meaning of '*matipūrva*' in TA 1.20. Both expressions play a similar role in the text: they connect the discussion of the first and second source or type of knowledge.³⁵¹ Further, after stating that inference is preceded by *pratyakṣa*, NS I.1.5 explains that there are three types of inference. Likewise, the TA classifies testimony in a threefold manner by pointing to a twofold, manifold, and twelvefold division of texts. In other words, the structure of both *sūtras* can be rendered as 'X is preceded by Y and has three varieties'. It seems, therefore, that the composer of the TA used NS I.1.5 and twisted its meaning when he wrote his definition of testimony. This might explain why the suggested relation between ordinary cognition and testimony is not evident and caused some difficulties for the early commentators; the expression '*matipūrva*' in the TA basically echoes '*tatpūrvaka*' in the *Nyāyasūtra* but the concepts in both *sūtras* are fundamentally different. Hence, it is not surprising that the relationship between

³⁵⁰ Angot 2009: 280.

³⁵¹ I.e., *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* in the *Nyāyasūtra* and *mati* and *śruta* in the TA.

ordinary cognition (*mati*) and testimony (*śruta*) is not as evident as the relationship between direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*).

The similarity between TA 1.20 and NS I.1.5 confirms my earlier observation that the composer of the TA was well acquainted with Nyāya theory. As mentioned previously, the discussion of knowledge in the TA suggests that the composer of the TA wrote his compendium for an audience that was familiar with Nyāya epistemology. The author of the *bhāṣya* must have been well aware of the content of the *Nyāyasūtra* as well, which is evident from his commentary on TA 1.20.³⁵² At the end of the discussion on testimony, the *bhāṣya* states the following:

*matijñānam indriyānindriyanimittam ātmano jñasvabhāvyāt pāriṇāmikaṃ |
śrutajñānaṃ tu tatpūrvakam āptopadeśād bhavatīti |*

Knowledge from ordinary cognition is caused by the senses and the mind (*indriyānindriyanimitta*), resulting from a natural disposition (*pāriṇāmika*), due to the own nature of knowing (*jña-svabhāvyā*) of the self (i.e., since knowing is the essence of the self); but knowledge from testimony, **which is preceded by that** (*tatpūrvaka*), arises **from the teaching of the āptas** (*āptopadeśa*) (TABh 1.20.36 – 1.20.37).

First of all, instead of using the phrase ‘preceded by ordinary cognition’ (*matipūrva*) which is used in the *sūtra*, the *bhāṣya* says ‘preceded by that’ (*tatpūrvaka*). As mentioned above, it is likely that the expression ‘*matipūrva*’ in TA 1.20 echoes the phrase ‘*tatpūrvaka*’ in NS I.1.5. The fact that the *bhāṣya* uses the expression that is found in the *Nyāyasūtra*, suggests that the author of the *bhāṣya* was well aware of the connection between NS I.1.5 and TA 1.20.³⁵³ It is unlikely that this correspondence between these phrases in the *bhāṣya* and the *Nyāyasūtra* is merely coincidental, since the expression in the *bhāṣya* is immediately followed by a definition of testimony that seems to be directly derived from the *Nyāyasūtra*. While

³⁵² This does not oppose my earlier observation that the author of the *bhāṣya* has difficulties to explain the meaning of ‘*tatpūrva*’. Even if one knows *Nyāyasūtra* I.1.5, which served as the model for TA 1.20, it is still hard to explain TA 1.20 since the concepts in both passages are radically different.

³⁵³ The *bhāṣya* uses the same expression in TABh 1.11.18.

the TA does not mention the role of *āptas*³⁵⁴ in testimony, the *Nyāyasūtra* defines testimony as follows:

***āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ* |**

Le *śabda* ‘mot, verbalité’ c’est le témoignage des personnes fiables (NS I.1.7).³⁵⁵

The fact that the final sentence on testimony (*śabda*) in the *bhāṣya* adds that testimonial knowledge originates from the teachings of the *āptas* — which is precisely the definition that NS I.1.7 provides — shows again that the *Nyāyasūtra* was a relevant source for the author of the *bhāṣya*. Since he does not further explain the meaning of the expression ‘*āptopadeśa*’, it is likely that his audience was acquainted with the Nyāya definition of testimony as well.

As mentioned above, the TABh does not elaborate on the relationship between ordinary cognition and testimony, which raises the question whether the author had a clear idea about the precise meaning of the expression ‘*matipūrva*’. Yet, it is possible that the concept of testimony was simply ambiguous and that the author could not be more precise without contradicting himself. On the one hand, testimony clearly refers to scripture, which is evident from the definition in TA 1.20. On the other hand, however, the TABh explains that testimony is the type of knowledge that is conveyed by an authoritative person (*āpta*), which seems to indicate that testimony is a wider category of knowledge than scripture alone. If testimony is interpreted in this more general way, it is easy to understand why testimony is preceded by ordinary cognition. In the end, the knowledge that the *āpta* conveys must have a proper foundation. However, the same model does not work for all scriptures. The TABh explicitly states that testimony has the ‘three times’ as its object (i.e., past, present, and future), while ordinary cognition only relates to the present.³⁵⁶ Since ordinary cognition can only provide knowledge about the present,

³⁵⁴ The word ‘*āpta*’ can be translated as ‘credible or authoritative person’ (MW).

³⁵⁵ Angot 2009: 286.

³⁵⁶ The TABh explains the difference between the respective ranges of ordinary cognition and testimony as follows: ‘That which perceives objects that have been produced and are not [yet] destroyed, having the present time as its range, that is knowledge from ordinary cognition; but knowledge from testimony has the three times as its range and perceives objects that have been produced, that are destroyed, and are not [yet] produced (*utpannāvinaṣṭārthagrāhakaṃ sāmpratākālaviṣayaṃ matijñānam śrutajñānam tu trikālavīṣayam utpannāvinaṣṭānutpannārthagrāhakaṃ*)’ (TABh 1.20.14 – 1.20.15). See also Part II.

it is impossible that all testimony — including scriptural knowledge about the future — is based on ordinary cognition. This suggests that testimony (*śruta*) in fact refers to two different types of knowledge: scripture and general testimony. This would be in line with *Nyāyasūtra* I.1.8, which explicitly mentions the dual character of testimony:

sa dvividho dr̥ṣṭādr̥ṣṭārthatvāt |

Ce <témoignage verbal>, parce que son objet est soit visible soit non-visible, est de deux sortes (NS I.1.8).³⁵⁷

In his commentary on this *sūtra*, Vātsyāyana explains that the two types of testimony relate respectively to sages (*ṛṣi*) and ordinary people (*laukika*).³⁵⁸ It is possible that the composer of the TA had this division in mind when he wrote that testimony has two varieties.³⁵⁹ Nevertheless, the author of the TABh does not follow this line of interpretation but explains that the twofold division relates to the ‘inner limbs’ and ‘outer limbs’:

vaktṛviśeṣād dvaividhyam | yad bhagavadbhiḥ [...] uktaṃ bhagavacchiṣyair [...] gaṇadharair dṛḥdhaṃ tad aṅgapraviṣṭam | gaṇadharānantaryādibhis tv [...] ācāryaiḥ [...] yat proktaṃ tad aṅgabāhyam iti |

The twofold variance results from the difference of expounder (*vaktṛviśeṣa*): That which has been spoken by the *jinās* (*bhagavat*) [...] — which is composed by the *gaṇadharas*, who are the pupils of the *jinās* (*bhagavacchiṣya*) [...] — that is the corpus of inner limbs (*aṅgapraviṣṭa*). And that which is taught by the *ācāryas* [...] — who are the successors of the *gaṇadharas* etc. — that is the corpus of outer limbs (*aṅgabāhya*) (TABh 1.20.20 – 22).

Even though this interpretation of the twofold nature of testimony clearly differs from the explanation in NS I.1.8, it seems that these two accounts are not completely incompatible. The *bhāṣya* qualifies the *jinās* — who are the source for the inner limbs — as ‘all-knowing (*sarvajña*) and all-seeing (*sarvadarśin*) most excellent sages

³⁵⁷ Angot 2009: 288.

³⁵⁸ ‘*evam ṛṣilaukikavākyānāṃ vibhāga iti*’ (Angot 2009: 288).

³⁵⁹ See TA 1.20.

(*paramarṣi*)'.³⁶⁰ This corresponds to the way in which the *ṛṣis* are described in the *Nyāyasūtra* as the source of testimony about that which is invisible (*adr̥ṣṭārtha*). By contrast, the *ācāryas* — who composed the outer limbs — are described as having 'highly superior powers of speech, ordinary cognition and mind' (*parama-prakṛṣṭa-vāc-mati-buddhi-śakti*).³⁶¹ Even though the *ācāryas* have above average cognitive capacities, this description suggests that their powers are quite different from those of the *jinās*. As such, one could interpret the difference between testimony that is conveyed by the *jinās* and *ācāryas* along the lines of the twofold division between testimony by the sages (*ṛṣi*) and ordinary people (*laukika*) in NS I.1.8.

It is hard to evaluate whether the author of the TABh consciously tried to connect the dual nature of scripture with the two types of testimony that are specified in the *Nyāyasūtra*, or whether the parallels are merely coincidental. However, the passage in the TABh that deals with the twofold nature of testimony is remarkably elliptical and the sentences are unusually long.³⁶² This might be an indication that the author struggled to present his view on the twofold nature of testimony in a way that would please the Jaina audience, without being at odds with the wider accepted view of testimony as described in the *Nyāyasūtra*.

Cosmic perception, mental perception, and absolute knowledge

While it is evident that the composer of the TA was more interested in ordinary cognition (*mati*) than in testimony (*śruta*), it is also clear that he does not have much to say about the three types of knowledge that are classified as direct sources of knowledge (*pratyakṣa*). Cosmic perception (*avadhi*) is discussed in three short *sūtras*, mental perception (*manaḥparyāya*) in two *sūtras*, and absolute knowledge (*kevala*) is only briefly mentioned in a more general discussion of the respective ranges of the different types of knowledge.³⁶³

Cosmic perception (*avadhi*), which is the first type of direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) that is mentioned in the TA, is discussed as follows:

³⁶⁰ TABh 1.20.21. See also Part II.

³⁶¹ Ibid.

³⁶² The above quote omits substantial parts of the passage. The complete passage can be found in Part II (TABh 1.20.21 - 22). The style of these sentences deviates from the general style of the *bhāṣya*, which is usually more straightforward.

³⁶³ TA 1.21 – 23 discusses *avadhi*, TA 1.23 – 24 discusses *manaḥparyāya*. *Kevala* is mentioned in TA 1.30.

dvividho 'avadhiḥ ||1.21|| bhavapratyayo narakadevānām ||1.22|| yathokta-nimittaḥ ṣaḍvikalpaḥ śeṣānām ||1.23||

Cosmic perception (*avadhi*) has two varieties (TA 1.21). Hellish beings and gods [have cosmic perception] caused by birth (*bhavapratyaya*) (TA 1.22). The other [beings have cosmic perception] that is caused as it is said. [This variety of cosmic perception has] six forms (TA 1.23).

There are several problems with this explanation of cosmic perception. First, the TA does not clarify what cosmic perception actually is. It mentions that there are several varieties but it does not give a proper definition of the term. Even though ordinary cognition and testimony are also not well defined, the TA does at least provide synonyms of *mati* and explains that *śruta* refers to the Jaina scriptures. Moreover, the meaning of *mati* and *śruta* can be easily derived from the prime meaning of these words in Sanskrit. By contrast, '*avadhi*' usually refers to 'limit' or 'boundary', and it is not immediately evident what '*avadhi*' could mean in an epistemological context. The fact that the *sūtra* does not give a proper explanation of the term strongly indicates that the TA was written for a Jaina audience that was already familiar with basic Jaina terminology.

Based on the commentary in the *bhāṣya*, one could say that cosmic perception is the ability to perceive things that are beyond the range of the senses directly.³⁶⁴ As mentioned in the *sūtra*, there are two types of cosmic perception (TA 1.21). The first type belongs to gods and hellish beings, for whom cosmic perception is an innate capacity (TA 1.22). The second type of cosmic perception appears as a

³⁶⁴ Although the term '*avadhi*' is usually translated as 'clairvoyance' (see, e.g., Tatia 2011), I prefer the translation 'cosmic perception' for two reasons. First, this translation relates directly to the prime meanings of the Sanskrit word '*avadhi*'. Monier-Williams gives '*avadhijñāna*' as 'perception extending as far as the furthest limits of the world', which nicely connects to the meaning of '*avadhi*' as 'limit'. This view is supported by the *bhāṣya*, which explains that *avadhi* provides knowledge of extended substances (*rūpīni dravyāṇi*, TABh 1.26.4), ranging from an extremely small part of the world up to the whole cosmos (*ā sarvalokāt*, TABh 1.23.10). This is the basis of my translation 'cosmic perception'. Another reason to avoid the translation 'clairvoyance' is the vagueness of the term in English. Depending on one's interpretation, 'clairvoyance' can also refer to the ability to read other people's minds. However, the content of the mind is the object of *manaḥparyāya*, and not of *avadhi*.

result of favourable karmic circumstances³⁶⁵ and has six varieties (TA 1.23). These varieties are listed in the TABh as follows:

XII. Varieties of cosmic perception (<i>avadhi</i>) (TABh 1.23.6)	
i.	<i>anānugāmika</i> (the one that is not following)
ii.	<i>ānugāmika</i> (the one that is following)
iii.	<i>hīyamānaka</i> (the one that weakens)
iv.	<i>vardhamānaka</i> (the one that increases)
v.	<i>anavasthita</i> (the one that is not continuous)
vi.	<i>avasthita</i> (the one that is continuous)

The first variety occurs at a specific location to someone and disappears when this person moves away (TABh 1.23.7). By contrast, the second variety remains with the person, even if the person goes to another place (TABh 1.23.8). The third variety initially reveals a large part of the world, after which the range of the perception gradually contracts (TABh 1.23.9). The fourth type does exactly the opposite (TABh 1.23.10). The range of the fifth variety increases and diminishes constantly, like waves (TABh 1.23.11). The sixth variety never goes away but remains until the person reaches absolute knowledge (*kevala*) (TABh 1.23.12).

Even though the *bhāṣya* properly explains the different aspects of cosmic perception that are mentioned in the *sūtra*, the description of the second variety of cosmic perception in the *sūtra* itself is somewhat odd. TA 1.23 explains that this variety is ‘caused as it is said’ (*yathoktanimitta*). However, it is very clear that this refers to the explanation given in the *bhāṣya* on TA 1.21, which says:

bhavapratyayaḥ kṣayopasāmanimittaś ca |

[There are two varieties of cosmic perception], [i.e., cosmic perception] that originates in birth (*bhavapratyaya*) and [cosmic perception] caused by destruction and cessation [of *karman*] (*kṣaya-upasāma-nimitta*) (TABh 1.21.1).

³⁶⁵ I.e., ‘caused by destruction and cessation of *karman*’ (*kṣaya-upasāma-nimitta*) (TABh 1.21.1).

In other words, 'yathoktanimitta' in TA 1.23 refers to the expression 'kṣayopaśamanimitta' in TABh 1.21.1. Since the *sūtra* never refers to the *bhāṣya*, it is highly suspicious that TA 1.23 apparently refers to TABh 1.21.1 here. Ohira interprets this as proof of the common authorship of the *sūtra* and the *bhāṣya*.³⁶⁶ This is not a farfetched conclusion, since it is hard to explain how the *sūtra* could possibly refer to a passage from a later commentary. However, there are certainly other possible scenarios since there is a good reason to doubt the textual transmission. The Digambara version of the TA, which follows the reading of the *sūtra* in the *Sarvārthasiddhi*, omits TA 1.21, and adds 'avadhi' to the following *sūtra*.³⁶⁷ This version also reads 'kṣayopaśamanimittaḥ' instead of 'yathoktanimittaḥ'.³⁶⁸ The differences between the two versions of the passage on cosmic perception are highlighted in the table below:

TA 1.21 – 23: Version A (TA with <i>bhāṣya</i>)	TA 1.21 – 22: Version B (<i>Sarvārthasiddhi</i>)
<i>dvididho 'vadhiḥ</i> [<i>bhavapratyayaḥ</i> <i>kṣayopaśamanimittaś ca</i> (TABh 1.21.1)] <i>bhavapratyayo nārakadevānām</i> <i>yathoktanimittaḥ ṣaḍvikalpaḥ śeṣāṇām</i>	<i>bhavapratyayo 'vadhīr devanārakānām</i> <i>kṣayopaśamanimittaḥ ṣaḍvikalpaḥ śeṣāṇām</i>

It is hard to tell how these two versions evolved exactly. Yet, it is clear that the first sentence of the *bhāṣya* is an essential part of version A; if it is left out, the expression 'yathokta' does not make any sense. This might indicate that a part of the original *sūtra* ended up in the *bhāṣya*.³⁶⁹ If we accept TABh 1.21.1 as a part of the TA itself, the whole problem of the reference to the *bhāṣya* disappears.³⁷⁰ If this happened before the *Sarvārthasiddhi* was composed, it is understandable why Pūjyapāda felt the need to reformulate the *sūtra*, which does not make sense without the *bhāṣya*. In

³⁶⁶ Ohira 1982: 33-34.

³⁶⁷ Ibid., 10.

³⁶⁸ Ibid., 9.

³⁶⁹ It is striking that the first two sentences of the *bhāṣya* on TA 1.24 have the exact same structure as TA 1.21 and TABh 1.21.1: '*manaḥparyāyajñānaṃ dvididham | ṛjumati-manaḥparyāyajñānaṃ vipulamati-manaḥparyāyajñānaṃ ca*' (TABh 1.24.1 – 2). This might indicate that TA 1.21 used to be part of the *bhāṣya*. In that case, it is unclear what the original *sūtra* could have been.

³⁷⁰ Even if the *bhāṣya* were an auto-commentary, it would still be unlikely that the author of both texts refers to the *bhāṣya* in the *sūtra* itself since this would go against the conventional format of a *sūtra*.

any case, as long as there is no further evidence for the exact textual transmission of this part of the *sūtra*, one cannot take this passage as proof of the common authorship of the *sūtra* and the *bhāṣya*.

After the discussion of cosmic perception, the TA continues with two *sūtras* on mental perception (*manaḥparyāya*):

rjuvipulamatiḥ manaḥparyāyaḥ ||1.24|| viśuddhyapratipātābhyaṃ tadviśeṣaḥ ||1.25||

Mental perception (*manaḥparyāya*) [has two varieties]: direct perception (*rjumati*) and extensive perception (*vipulamati*).³⁷¹ Their difference results from purity (*viśuddhi*) and permanence (*apratipāta*).

As in the case of cosmic perception, the TA does not explain what mental perception (*manaḥparyāya*) is exactly. The *bhāṣya* explains that the knowledge that is obtained by extensive mental perception (*vipulamati*) is more pure and stable than the knowledge that is obtained from direct mental perception (*rjumati*). However, the exact character of mental perception remains unclear. TA 1.29 mentions that the range of mental perception is an infinitesimal part of the range of cosmic perception. This seems to suggest that mental perception does not have extended substance as its object but the subtle matter that makes up the mind. This would also be in line with the term '*manaḥparyāya*', which can also be translated as 'modifications of the mind'.³⁷² As such, *manaḥparyāyajñāna* can be seen as direct knowledge about the modifications of the mind.³⁷³

The passage on cosmic perception and mental perception finishes with a comparison between the different ranges and objects of these types of knowledge (TA 1.26 – 1.28). At the end of this section, the TA says:

³⁷¹ The exact meaning of the terms '*rjumati*' and '*vipulamati*' in this context is not entirely clear to me. The prime meaning of '*rju*' and '*vipula*' is respectively 'straight' and 'extensive', which is interpreted as 'simple' and 'complex' by other translators (e.g., Tatia). The intended meaning might be 'mental perception of simple cognitions' and 'mental perception of complex cognitions'. However, if '*rjuvipulamati*' were the object of '*manaḥparyāya*' one would rather expect a genitive construction.

³⁷² TA 5.37 explains that substance has qualities and modes (*guṇaparyāyavad dravyam*). See also § 3.4.

³⁷³ Since it is not clear whether this type of knowledge includes the capacity to read other people's minds, I prefer to avoid using the more common translation 'mind-reading' (see, e.g., Tatia 2002).

sarvadravyaparyāyeṣu kevalasya ||1.30||

[The domain of] absolute knowledge (*kevala*) [consists of] all modes of all substances (*sarvadravyaparyāya*).

This is the only passage in the first chapter of the TA that deals with absolute knowledge (*kevala*). The *sūtra* makes it clear that *kevala* is the most extensive type of knowledge and that everything falls in its range.³⁷⁴ Apart from the comparison of the range of absolute knowledge with the range of other varieties of knowledge, the TA does not elaborate on the meaning of absolute knowledge. It seems that the author of the *bhāṣya* felt that absolute knowledge was not properly discussed in the first chapter of the TA. After discussing cosmic perception and mental perception, he addresses the lack of a separate discussion of absolute knowledge in the following way:

***uktaṃ manahparyāyajñānam | atha kevalajñānaṃ kim iti | atrocyate | kevala-
jñānaṃ daśame 'dhyāye vakṣyate | mohakṣayāt jñānadarśanāvaraṇāntarāya-
kṣayāc ca kevalam iti |***

Knowledge from mental perception has now been discussed. But what is absolute knowledge (*kevalajñāna*)? At this point, it is said: Absolute knowledge will be discussed in the tenth chapter; [there it will be said that] 'absolute knowledge results from the destruction of deluding [*karman*] (*mohakṣaya*) and from the destruction of knowledge[covering], worldview-covering, and obstacle-creating [*karman*] (*jñānadarśanāvaraṇāntarāya*)' (TABh 1.26.18 – 1.26.22).³⁷⁵

In other words, the *bhāṣya* notes that absolute knowledge is omitted in the discussion of knowledge in the *sūtra* and refers to the tenth chapter, which indeed deals with *kevala*. However, the chapter discusses *kevala* as the state of the liberated soul and does not deal with the *kevala* as a type of knowledge. Hence, the fact that *kevala* is not discussed in the first chapter remains a significant omission in the epistemological theory in the TA. The fact that the TA discusses the two indirect

³⁷⁴ While the term is frequently translated as 'omniscience', I translate '*kevala*' as 'absolute knowledge', which still preserves the prime meaning of '*kevala*'.

³⁷⁵ This passage refers to TA 10.1.

types of cognition (i.e., *mati* and *śruta*) in a more precise way than the three direct types of knowledge (i.e., *avadhi*, *manaḥparyāya*, and *kevala*) and barely deals with *kevala* in the first chapter, might indicate that the TA was written in an environment in which the epistemological debates were mainly focused on sense perception and that there was little discussion of yogic perception between the different schools at the time of composition of the TA.³⁷⁶

Concomitance of the varieties of knowledge

After discussing the different varieties of knowledge, the TA addresses the possible co-occurrence of the varieties of knowledge:

ekādīni bhājyāni yugapad ekasmin ā caturbhyaḥ ||1.31||

One up to four [varieties of knowledge] can be shared simultaneously in one [soul].

Commenting on this *sūtra*, the *bhāṣya* explains that one can simultaneously have knowledge from ordinary cognition (*mati*) etc.³⁷⁷ but that there cannot be a concomitance (*sahabhāva*) of absolute knowledge (*kevalajñāna*) and one of the other varieties of knowledge.³⁷⁸ The idea that absolute knowledge cannot co-exist with other varieties of knowledge is certainly understandable since absolute knowledge already entails knowledge of all substances in all modes.³⁷⁹ However, it seems that there were different views on this issue at the time of the composition of the *bhāṣya* since the TABh mentions the view of some teachers who claim that the other varieties of knowledge are still there for someone with absolute knowledge, even though they do not have a real function anymore. This view is illustrated

³⁷⁶ See Isaacson 1993 for a discussion of the early history of yogic perception.

³⁷⁷ 'In some soul[s] there is one of the [varieties of knowledge, i.e.] ordinary cognition etc. (*mati-ādi*). In some soul[s], there are two. In some, there are three. In some, there are four (*kasmimścij jīve matyādīnām ekaṃ bhavati | kasmimścij jīve dve bhavataḥ | kasmimścit trīṇi bhavanti | kasmimścic catvāri bhavanti*)' (TABh 1.31.2 – 1.31.5). The expression 'ordinary cognition etc.' (*matyādi*) most likely refers to ordinary cognition (*mati*), testimony (*śruta*), cosmic perception (*avadhi*), and mental perception (*manaḥparyāya*). However, the *bhāṣya* only mentions the co-occurrence of ordinary cognition and testimony in the subsequent discussion (TABh 1.31.6 – 1.31.8).

³⁷⁸ TABh 1.31.10.

³⁷⁹ '[The domain of] absolute knowledge [extends to] all modes of all substances (*sarvadavyaparyāyeṣu kevalasya*)' (TA 1.30).

through a comparison between absolute knowledge and the blazing light of the sun:³⁸⁰

*yathā vā vyabhre nabhasi āditya udite bhūritejastvād ādityenābhibhūtāny
anyatejāṃsi jvalanamaṇicandranakṣatraprabhṛtini prakāśanaṃ prati akiñcit-
karāṇi bhavanti tadvad iti |*

Or just like the other lights, such as shining jewels, the moon and the stars, [being] surpassed by the sun when the sun rises in the cloudless sky — since [the sun] is a strong light — become likewise non-functional (*akiñcitkara*) with regard to that which is illuminating (*prakāśana*) (TABh 1.31.14).

In other words, by surpassing the light of other celestial bodies, the sun makes their light irrelevant, just as other varieties of knowledge are non-functional when the soul reaches the state of absolute knowledge.

This discussion about the concomitance of absolute knowledge and other varieties of knowledge relates to a broader debate about the nature of a liberated soul and the activities of a liberated being (*kevalin*).³⁸¹ The inclusion of a different view in the *bhāṣya* might indicate that the author of the *bhāṣya* wanted to provide a commentary on the *sūtra* that was acceptable for different groups within the Jaina community. In fact, the metaphor of the sun — which is primarily used to illustrate the other view — works well to mitigate the contrast between the two views. By describing the other varieties of knowledge as ‘non-functional’ or ‘non-significant’ (*akiñcitkara*), just like the stars in daytime, it remains somewhat vague whether these types of knowledge can co-occur with *kevalajñāna* or not. In fact, the metaphor could even be used by the opposite party to illustrate that other types of knowledge cannot go together with absolute knowledge. As such, it seems that the author of the *bhāṣya* tried to mitigate the differences between the two views. This is further supported by his use of vocabulary. The difference between the idea that the *kevalin* cannot have knowledge from ordinary cognition etc. and the idea that the other varieties of knowledge are ‘non-significant’ for someone with *kevalajñāna* seems almost trivial. Therefore, one could question whether the *bhāṣya* discusses the other

³⁸⁰ TABh 1.31.11 - 1.31.14.

³⁸¹ Kundakunda discusses this issue in several works. For an analysis of Kundakunda’s view on *kevalajñāna* and the cognitive state of the *kevalin*, see Bajželj 2018.

view to highlight the differences between the two doctrinal standpoints or to demonstrate that there are no major differences between the two positions after all.

False knowledge

The theory of knowledge in the TA presupposes ontological realism and could be classified as a correspondence theory.³⁸² It assumes that the world exists independent of the observer and that knowledge corresponds to the state of affairs in the external reality. In order to acquire knowledge, therefore, the process of cognition should reveal reality as it is. However, every epistemological account that claims that the process of cognition reveals the world as it is faces the problem of erroneous cognition. The TA describes ordinary cognition, testimony, etc. as reliable means of knowledge. However, these means of cognition can also lead to erroneous cognition.

Therefore, the epistemological theory in the TA needs an account of false cognition in order to disambiguate knowledge from error. The TA addresses this issue in the following two *sūtras*:

matīśrutāvadhayo viparyayaś ca ||1.32|| sadasator aviśeṣād yadṛcchopalabdher unmattavat ||1.33||

[There is knowledge from] ordinary cognition, testimony, and cosmic perception, and the opposite. [Erroneous cognition results] from accidental-perception (*yadṛcchopalabdhī*) because of indistinction between [things that are] real and unreal, like a madman.

TA 1.32 is very short and the intended meaning is not immediately obvious. The *sūtra* seems to say that ordinary cognition, testimony, and cosmic perception each have their opposite. Even though it is not explained in the *sūtra* what these opposites exactly are, one can infer from TA 1.33 that ‘the opposite’ must refer to erroneous cognition. Commenting on TA 1.32, the *bhāṣya* explains that the ‘opposite’ (*viparyaya*) refers to *ajñāna*, i.e., the opposite of knowledge (*jñāna*).³⁸³ While the

³⁸² See David 2016 for a discussion of the correspondence theory of truth.

³⁸³ ‘The opposite of knowledge is false knowledge (*jñānaviparyayo ’jñānam iti*)’ (TABh 1.32.3). Soni translates the term ‘*viparyaya*’ in TA 1.32 as ‘erroneous’ instead of ‘opposite’. He

term ‘*ajñāna*’ can be translated as ‘ignorance’, the example of the madman (*unmattavat*) in TA 1.33 clearly indicates that we are dealing with erroneous cognition and not with an absence of cognition.³⁸⁴

Since there are five varieties of knowledge, one would expect that there are also five varieties of false knowledge. However, in the commentary on TA 1.35, the *bhāṣya* uses the phrase ‘all eight’,³⁸⁵ in reference to the varieties of knowledge and their opposites. Since there are five varieties of knowledge, one can infer that there are only three varieties of false knowledge. This corresponds with the text in TA 1.32, which only mentions the opposite of the first three varieties of knowledge. The *bhāṣya* specifies these three types of false knowledge as follows:

matyajñānaṃ śrutājñānaṃ vibhaṅgajñānaṃ iti | avadher viparīto vibhaṅga ity ucyate |

False knowledge from ordinary cognition (*maty-ajñāna*), false knowledge from testimony (*śruta-ajñāna*) and deceptive knowledge (*vibhaṅga-jñāna*). It is said that deceptive knowledge is the opposite of cosmic perception (TABh 1.32.11 – 12).³⁸⁶

translates: ‘Sensory knowledge, knowledge of scripture, clairvoyance also are [or: can be] erroneous.’ The word ‘*viparyaya*’ is sometimes used as ‘misapprehension’ or ‘error’ (MW) and this translation does make sense in the context of TA 1.32 - 33. However, the *bhāṣya* clearly interprets ‘*viparyaya*’ as opposite. In the commentary on TA 1.32, the *bhāṣya* explains ‘*viparyaya*’ by contrasting ‘*jñāna*’ and ‘*ajñāna*’, and uses metaphors such as ‘shade and sunshine’ and ‘heat and cold’ (*chāyātapavac chītoṣṇavac ca*) to illustrate the difference between *jñāna* and *ajñāna* (TABh 1.32.3 - 1.32.6). Therefore, I prefer to translate ‘*viparyaya*’ as ‘opposite’ instead of ‘erroneous’.

³⁸⁴ As Soni remarks in his study of the Jaina theory of error, it is somewhat odd that the TA first introduces the five varieties of knowledge as *pramāṇas*, and later explains that *mati*, *śruta*, and *avadhi* can also lead to erroneous cognition (Soni 2018: 57). In the end, *pramāṇas* are usually seen as reliable means of knowledge. Soni tries to explain this by pointing out that TA 1.9 deals with the varieties of knowledge as *pramāṇas*, while TA 1.32 deals with the same varieties of knowledge as forms of *jñānopayoga* (i.e., cognitive operation in the form of knowledge) (Soni 2018: 63-64). Yet, this does not solve the central problem that the varieties of knowledge that are listed in TA 1.9 as *pramāṇas* are not fully reliable, which goes against the concept of *pramāṇa*. As explained above, the *pramāṇa* theory in the TA consists of several historical layers, and the five varieties of knowledge already existed before the concept of *pramāṇa* was introduced in Jaina theory. It is, therefore, not entirely surprising that the TA discusses these varieties of knowledge in a way that does not fully match the standard idea of *pramāṇas*.

³⁸⁵ *naigamādayas trayaḥ sarvāṇy aṣṭau śrayante* (TABh 1.35.77).

³⁸⁶ See also Part II. It is unclear to me why the opposite of cosmic perception (*avadhi*) is labelled ‘*vibhaṅgajñāna*’ instead of ‘*avadhyajñāna*’.

Following the explanation in the *bhāṣya*, the eight varieties of knowledge and false knowledge can be classified as shown in the table below:

XIII. The eight varieties of knowledge (<i>jñāna</i>) and false knowledge (<i>ajñāna</i>) ³⁸⁷	
<i>jñāna</i> (TA 1.9)	<i>ajñāna</i> (TABh 1.32.3)
i. knowledge from ordinary cognition (<i>matijñāna</i>)	vi. false knowledge from ordinary cognition (<i>matyajñāna</i>) (TABh 1.32.11)
ii. knowledge from testimony (<i>śrutajñāna</i>)	vii. false knowledge from testimony (<i>śrutājñāna</i>) (TABh 1.32.11)
iii. knowledge from cosmic perception (<i>avadhijñāna</i>)	viii. deceptive knowledge (<i>vibhaṅga</i>) (TABh 1.32.12)
iv. knowledge from mental perception (<i>manaḥparyāyajñāna</i>)	
v. absolute knowledge (<i>kevalajñāna</i>)	

The overall account of the opposites of the varieties of knowledge makes a rather unsystematic impression. As can be seen in the table above, there is no opposite of knowledge from mental perception (*manaḥparyāyajñāna*).³⁸⁸ However, the *sūtra* and the *bhāṣya* do not explain why only the first three varieties of knowledge have their opposite. Furthermore, it is unclear to me why the opposite of cosmic perception (*avadhī*) is labelled '*vibhaṅgajñāna*' instead of '*avadhyajñāna*'. The unsystematic presentation of these opposites suggests that the Jaina theory of erroneous cognition was not yet fully developed, and that the author of the TA combined some pre-existent ideas in an effort to address the problem of error.

Apart from a lack of clarity when it comes to the classification of knowledge and false knowledge, the *sūtra* also does not clearly identify the cause of error, even

³⁸⁷ TA 2.9 refers to the eight and four varieties of cognitive operation (*upayoga*). This eightfold list corresponds to the eight types of *jñānopayoga* that are listed in TABh 2.9.5. TA 2.8 defines *upayoga* as the characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of the soul. This passage will be further discussed below.

³⁸⁸ One could argue that it is not possible to have the opposite of absolute knowledge (*kevalajñāna*), which could explain why there is no opposite of this means of cognition specified in the TABh. A similar claim could be made with respect to mental perception (*manaḥparyāya*).

though this is a crucial element in any theory of error. According to TA 1.33, the opposites of ordinary cognition etc. arise by accidental perception (*yadṛcchopalabdhi*). This explanation, however, has little explanatory value as it does not identify the actual cause of error. The *bhāṣya* offers a more detailed theory:

yathonmattaḥ karmodayād upahatendriyamatir viparītagrāhī bhavati so 'śvaṃ gaur ity adhyavasyati gāṃ cāśva iti loṣṭaṃ suvarṇam iti suvarṇam loṣṭa iti loṣṭaṃ ca loṣṭa iti suvarṇaṃ suvarṇam iti tasyaivam aviśeṣeṇa loṣṭaṃ suvarṇaṃ suvarṇaṃ loṣṭam iti viparītam adhyavasyato niyatam ajñānam eva bhavati – tadvan mithyādarśanopahatendriyamater matīśrutāvadhayo 'py ajñānaṃ bhavanti |

Just as a madman, whose senses and mind are damaged from the rising of *karman*, perceives the opposite (*viparīta*); he determines a horse as a cow and a cow as a horse, gold as clay and clay as gold, and [sometimes he determines] 'clay as clay and gold as gold'; thus, that is certainly false knowledge for him who is determining the opposite (*viparīta*) without distinction, [saying] 'clay is gold and gold is clay'. In the same way, ordinary cognition, testimony and cosmic perception of a person whose senses and mind are damaged due to wrong worldview (*mithyādarśana*), are also false knowledge (TABh 1.33.1).

First of all, the commentary relates false knowledge to a defect of the senses and mind. This defect is the result of an unfavourable karmic process. In the last part of this passage, the *bhāṣya* relates the defect of the mind and senses to wrong worldview (*mithyādarśana*). Hence, there are two factors that result in a defective cognitive apparatus: unfavourable *karman* and wrong worldview. These two factors, however, are causally related. This is explained in TA 6.14, which says that disrespect for the Jaina religion results in worldview-deluding *karman*.³⁸⁹ In other words, the causal chain that leads up to false knowledge can be summarised as follows:

³⁸⁹ This idea is expressed in TA 6.14, which says: '[The varieties of karmic influx related to] delusion of worldview (*darśanamoha*) are: blaming omniscient beings, scripture, the community, the *dharma*, and the gods' (*kevalīśrutasaṅghadharmadevāvarṇavādo darśanamohasya*). In other words, disrespect for the Jaina religion causes worldview-deluding *karman*.

XIV. Causal factors of false knowledge (<i>ajñāna</i>)
Disrespect for the Jaina religion (TA 6.14) ↓
Influx of worldview-deluding (<i>darśanamohanīya</i>) <i>karman</i> (TA 6.14, TABh 1.7.37, TABh 1.33.1) ↓
Wrong worldview (<i>mithyādarśana</i>) (TABh 1.33.1) ↓
False knowledge (<i>ajñāna</i>) (TABh 1.32.3, TABh 1.33.1)

For a person with wrong worldview (*mithyādarśana*), the cognitive process becomes unreliable. As mentioned in the *bhāṣya*, such a person will falsely determine sense objects, and ends up with false knowledge. The process of determination is random, which implies that one can accidentally identify an object as it is. However, the *bhāṣya* states that even in that case, one cannot say that this person has real knowledge. Instead, it is still labelled as false knowledge (TABh 1.33.1).³⁹⁰

The explanation of error in the *bhāṣya* suggests that cognition is always based on the state of affairs in a world that exists independent of human minds. Even in the case of false knowledge, there is an external object — such as a lump of clay or gold — that forms the basis for the erroneous cognition. This is probably why the five varieties of knowledge (*jñāna*) and the three varieties of false knowledge (*ajñāna*) are grouped together in the *bhāṣya* as a cluster of eight, as mentioned above.³⁹¹ In both cases, the mind and the senses are directed at an object in the real world, which is grasped by the knower. However, only when an object is correctly identified by someone who is endowed with right worldview, can one speak of real knowledge. In all other cases, the outcome of the cognitive process is classified as false knowledge.

When one compares the two *sūtras* on error with the explanation in the *bhāṣya*, it is clear that the *bhāṣya* has a more elaborate theory of error than the *sūtra*. For example, the *bhāṣya* deals with the question as to why someone with wrong

³⁹⁰ In other words, the author of the *bhāṣya* claims that a true cognition (or belief) cannot be called 'knowledge' if it is not justified.

³⁹¹ See TABh 1.35.77.

views (*mithyādr̥ṣṭi*)³⁹² can incidentally make right claims (TABh 1.32.15 – 1.33.1). Furthermore, the author of the *bhāṣya* introduces some technical terms that are not mentioned in the *sūtra*, such as ‘*ajñāna*’ and ‘*viparīta*’.³⁹³ While the word ‘*viparīta*’ clearly functions as a synonym of ‘*viparyaya*’, which is used in TA 1.32, it is noteworthy that the term ‘*viparīta*’ is associated with the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā theory of error, which is known as ‘*viparītakhyāti*’.³⁹⁴

Even though the *bhāṣya* has a more elaborate explanation of error than the *sūtra* itself, it remains an incomplete theory. It claims that a false cognition is based on the perception of an actual object — which the cognizer misidentifies due to wrong worldview — but it does not explain where the content of this false cognition comes from. One can only misidentify a lump of clay as gold if one knows the concept ‘gold’. One obvious solution would be to refer to memory as the source of these concepts. However, it is hard to explain how the concept of gold could ever enter memory if one assumes that a person with wrong worldview can only obtain false knowledge.³⁹⁵ The fact that the TA and the *bhāṣya* do not deal with this issue, suggest that the theory of error was not fully developed in the Jaina tradition at the time of the composition of these texts, even though the difference between the *sūtra* and the *bhāṣya* indicates that the theory of error had become more important by the time of the TABh.

³⁹² The term ‘*mithyādr̥ṣṭi*’ also refers to the lowest of the fourteen *guṇasthānas* (stages from bondage to liberation). See, e.g., Wiley 2004: 243-244.

³⁹³ See TABh 1.33.1 (translated above): ‘*yathonmattaḥ karmodayād upahatendriyamatir viparītagrāhī bhavati [...] viparītam adhyavasyato niyatam ajñānam eva bhavati - tadvan mithyādarśanopahatendriyamater matīśrutāvadhayo ’py ajñānaṃ bhavanti*’.

³⁹⁴ See, e.g., Rao 1998: 73ff. It is unclear to me whether there is a historical link between the theory of error in the TABh and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā view since the TABh (5th cent. CE) largely predates Kumārila (fl. 700). The shared vocabulary suggests that there was an ongoing debate about error that transcended the boundaries of the different schools. This idea is supported by the fact that the term ‘*viparītakhyāti*’ was not exclusively used for the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā view. For example, Jayanta uses the word ‘*viparītakhyāti*’ with reference to the Nyāya theory of error, which is usually called ‘*anyathākhyāti*’ (Rao 1998: 63).

³⁹⁵ This problem relates to Prabhākara’s criticism of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā theory of error (*viparītakhyāti*), propounded by Kumārila. Prabhākara thinks that memory must be involved, while the Kaumārilas assume that error can take place without memory being involved. For them, it is enough that the falsely perceived object (such as silver, when the actual object is a shell) is real, even though it is unperceived (Rao 1998: 74).

The perspectives

The last two *sūtras* of the opening chapter of the TA deal with the theory of perspectives (*naya*). This theory became important in the later Jaina tradition but the presentation of this doctrine in the TA is rather brief:³⁹⁶

naigamasamgrahavyavahārarjusūtraśabdā nayāḥ ||1.34||

ādyasābdau dvitribhedau ||1.35||

The perspectives are the commonplace [perspective] (*naigama*), the collecting [perspective] (*saṅgraha*), the practical [perspective] (*vyavahāra*), the linear [perspective] (*rjusūtra*), and the literal [perspective] (*śabda*). The first [perspective] (i.e., the commonplace perspective, *naigama*) and the literal perspective (*śabda*) [have respectively] two and three varieties.

The two *sūtras* simply list five different perspectives and add that two of these perspectives have several varieties. The composer of the TA does not explain the meaning of the different perspectives and even does not specify the varieties that TA 1.35 hints at.³⁹⁷

While the Jaina tradition is well known for its advocacy for non-one-sidedness (*anekāntavāda*), it is not that easy to understand the exact purpose of the theory of viewpoints that is presented in the TA. The general idea seems to be that objects of knowledge can be analysed from different perspectives that only grasp a particular aspect of that object. The *bhāṣya* defines the word ‘*naya*’ as follows:

³⁹⁶ For a discussion of *anekāntavāda* throughout the history of Jainism, see Barbato 2018. A more detailed discussion of the different lists of perspectives in the Jaina tradition can be found in Balcerowicz 2003b.

³⁹⁷ The *Sarvārthasiddhi* omits TA 1.35 and has a different reading of TA 1.34. The *sūtra* on the perspectives in the *Sarvārthasiddhi* reads as follows: ‘*naigamasamgrahavyavahārarjusūtraśabdasamabhirūḍhaivambhūtā nayāḥ*’ (*Sarvārthasiddhi* 1.33, Tatia 2011: 23). *Sarvārthasiddhi* 1.33 adds ‘*samabhirūḍha*’ and ‘*evambhūta*’ to the five perspectives that are listed in the version of the TA that is accompanied by the TABh. However, these two perspectives are listed as varieties of the literal perspective (*śabda*) in the TABh on TA 1.35 (see the table below). Since the *Sarvārthasiddhi* omits TA 1.35, which is the final *sūtra* of the first chapter, one may question whether this *sūtra* was perhaps added to the main body of the TA at a later stage.

*nayāḥ prāpakāḥ kārakāḥ sādhakā nirvartakā nirbhāsakā upalambhakā
vyañjakā ity anarthāntaram | jīvādīn padārthān nayanti prāpnuvanti kārayanti
sādhayanti nirvartayanti nirbhāsayanti upalambhayanti vyañjayantīti nayāḥ |*

‘Perspectives’ (lit. ‘leading’) (*naya*), ‘[that which is] causing to reach’ (*prāpaka*), ‘[that which is] causing to make’ (*kāraka*), ‘[that which is] causing to accomplish’ (*sādhaka*), ‘[that which is] causing to bring about’ (*nirvartaka*), ‘[that which is] causing to illuminate’ (*nirbhāsaka*), ‘[that which is] causing to perceive’ (*upalambhaka*), ‘[that which is] causing to appear’ (*vyañjaka*) — [these are] not different (i.e., they are synonyms). The perspectives lead (*nayanti*), [i.e.], reach (*prāpnuvanti*), cause to make (*kārayanti*), cause to accomplish (*sādhayanti*), cause to bring about (*nirvartayanti*), cause to illuminate (*nirbhāsayanti*), cause to perceive (*upalambhayanti*), and cause to clarify (*vyañjayanti*) the categories (*padārtha*), beginning with soul (TABh 1.35.19 – 1.35.20).

Simply put, the *bhāṣya* claims that the perspectives lead to knowledge of the categories (*padārtha*).³⁹⁸ The different perspectives that are mentioned in the TA and the TABh are given in the table below:³⁹⁹

³⁹⁸ TABh 1.35.91 says that the perspectives (*naya*) can be used to investigate the *tattvas* (*nayaiḥ parīkṣyāṇi tattvāni*). This is in line with TA 1.6, which says that the categories can be understood through the means of cognition and the perspectives (see Part II).

³⁹⁹ The way in which the TA and the TABh categorise the different perspectives is somewhat unusual. As can be seen in the table, the TA lists five *nayas* and the TABh adds several subtypes. Most other discussions, including the theory of perspectives in Siddhasena Divākara’s *Sanmatitarka*, list seven *nayas*. The etymological viewpoint (*samabhirūḍha*) and the exact viewpoint (*evambhūta*) — which the TABh mentions as subtypes of the literal perspective (*śabda*) — are usually seen as independent *nayas*. The present viewpoint (*sāmprata*) is not mentioned in the other discussions. The fact that the TABh adds several subtypes to the short list in the TA suggests that the theory of perspectives was not standardised yet at the time of the composition of the TA and the TABh. For an overview of different descriptions of the *nayas*, see Balcerowicz 2003b: 48-49.

XV. The perspectives (<i>naya</i>) (TA1.34 – 1.35)	
i. <i>naigama</i> (the commonplace perspective)	<i>deśaparikṣepin</i> (encompassing partially) (TABh 1.35.2)
	<i>sarvaparikṣepin</i> (encompassing all) (TABh 1.35.2)
ii. <i>saṅgraha</i> (the collecting perspective)	
iii. <i>vyavahāra</i> (the practical perspective)	
iv. <i>ṛjusūtra</i> (the linear perspective)	
v. <i>śabda</i> (the literal perspective)	
	<i>sāmprata</i> (the present viewpoint) (TABh 1.35.3)
	<i>samabhirūḍha</i> (the etymological viewpoint) (TABh 1.35.3)
	<i>evambhūta</i> (the exact viewpoint)(TABh 1.35.3)

As mentioned above, it is hard to understand the exact meaning of the different perspectives as described in the *bhāṣya*, especially since the descriptions of several perspectives seem to be partly similar. In the following passage, I will summarise the explanation of the perspectives that the *bhāṣya* provides.⁴⁰⁰

When one analyses something from the ‘commonplace perspective’ (*naigama*), one grasps the object (*artha*) and the meaning of words (*śabdārtha*) as used in daily undertakings (*nigama*). This perspective reveals either a part or the whole⁴⁰¹ (TABh 1.35.7). For this reason, it is said that there are two varieties: the

⁴⁰⁰ Another discussion of this passage in the *bhāṣya* can be found in Balcerowicz 2001c: 382ff. Balcerowicz proposes that each item in the list of *nayas* ‘represents a further restriction of the point of reference’ (2001c: 383). However, I doubt whether the list of *nayas* in the TA was composed with this idea in mind since the list deals with different aspects of language that cannot be reduced to the same categories. For example, it is unclear to me how the point of reference of the practical perspective (*vyavahāra*) could be a further restriction of the point of reference of the collective perspective (*saṅgraha*). They seem to refer to two different ways in which language is used and their difference, therefore, relates more to pragmatics than to semantics.

⁴⁰¹ The compound ‘*deśa-samagra-grāhin*’ can be interpreted in different ways. It is not fully clear to me whether ‘*deśasamagra*’ refers to ‘a part **and** the whole’ or ‘a part **or** the whole’. Since the *naigama* perspective is said to have two varieties (*deśaparikṣepin* and *sarvaparikṣepin*), I interpret the compound as a disjunctive compound. This interpretation is supported by TABh 1.35.27, which uses the word ‘*vā*’ in the application of the *naigama* perspective to the example of a jar. The ‘part’ and the ‘whole’ seem to refer to the ‘object’

commonplace perspective that is ‘encompassing partially’ (*deśaparikṣepin*) and the commonplace perspective that is ‘encompassing all’ (*sarvaparikṣepin*) (TABh 1.35.2). The *bhāṣya* illustrates the different perspectives by applying them to a pot (*ghaṭa*). When the word ‘pot’ is interpreted from the commonplace perspective, it refers either to a particular pot or to all objects of the class (*jātīya*) of pots in general (TABh 1.35.27).

The ‘collecting perspective’ (*saṅgraha*) perceives the ‘whole and the part’ (*sarva-ekadeśa-grahaṇa*) (TABh 1.35.8).⁴⁰² Applied to a pot, the collective perspective reveals the pot as being one (*eka*) or many (*bahu*), its name etc.⁴⁰³ (*nāma-ādi-viśeṣita*), and the aspect of time, i.e., past, present, and future (*sāmprata-atīta-anāgata*) (TABh 1.35.28).

The practical perspective (*vyavahāra*) ‘equals the view of worldly men’ (*laukika-sama*) and is applied in a ‘pragmatic way’ (*upacāra-prāya*) with a ‘broad meaning’ (*vistrta-artha*) (TABh 1.35.9). In the example of the pot, it reveals the pot from the perspective of its use (*upacāra-gamyā*) (TABh 1.35.29).

The linear perspective (*rjusūtra*) focuses on the present aspect of an object, and is not concerned with its past or future (TABh 1.35.10). In the example of the pot, it is the understanding of ‘pot’ as the pot that exists at present (*sāmprata*) (TABh 1.35.30).⁴⁰⁴

The ‘literal perspective’ (*śabda*) is described as the ‘designation in accordance with reality’ (*yathārtha-abhidhāna*) and has three varieties (TABh

(*artha*) and the ‘meaning’ (*śabdārtha*) that are mentioned at the beginning of the explanation, which can be interpreted as the particular and the universal.

⁴⁰² I follow Siddhasenagaṇi’s *ṭīkā*, which analyses this compound as a *dvandva*. Based on the explanation of the *naigama* perspective, one could argue that the phrase ‘the whole and the part’ (*sarva-ekadeśa*) refers to a particular object and its class. As such, the collecting perspective (*saṅgraha*) combines the two varieties of the commonplace perspective (*naigama*). According to John Cort, the *saṅgraha* perspective ‘describes an object in terms of its generic characteristics’ (Cort 2000: 326). This partly corresponds with the description in the *bhāṣya*, which talks about number, name, etc. However, it is not clear to me how this relates to ‘the whole and the part’ (*sarva-ekadeśa*), which are said to be known from the *naigama* perspective.

⁴⁰³ The expression ‘name etc.’ (*nāmādi*) seems to refer to the four *anuyogadvāras*, which are listed in TA 1.5, i.e., name (*nāma*), representation (*sthāpanā*), substance (*dravya*), and state (*bhāva*).

⁴⁰⁴ It is somewhat odd that the explanation of the linear perspective (*rjusūtra*) uses the word ‘*sāmprata*’ to qualify the jar, even though ‘*sāmprata*’ is also presented as a variety of the literal perspective (*śabda*).

1.35.11).⁴⁰⁵ The first variety of this literal perspective, which is the ‘present viewpoint’ (*sāmprata*), results from a word that has previously been coined, which is expressive of name etc. (TABh 1.35.12). Applied to a pot, it is the aspect of a pot that is actually present that is revealed by the word ‘pot’ (TABh 1.35.12).⁴⁰⁶

The ‘etymological perspective’ (*samabhirūḍha*) makes distinctions between existing objects in accordance with their name (TABh 1.35.13).⁴⁰⁷ Applied to the same pot, it is the ‘delimitation of the apprehension’ (*adhyavasāya-asāṅkrama*) of the pots that are present (TABh 1.35.32).

The exact viewpoint (*evambhūta*), which is the third variety of the literal perspective, distinguishes between the object and the sign (*vyañjana*)⁴⁰⁸ (TABh 1.35.3). It grasps the mutual dependence of the word and the object, such as the word ‘pot’ and the actual pot (TABh 1.35.33).

Even though it is hard to understand the precise demarcation of the different perspectives on the basis of the explanation in the *bhāṣya* alone, the commentary does help to identify the underlying problem. Conceived as a whole, the system of *nayas* disambiguates the different ways in which words can be used. The example of the pot shows that the word ‘pot’ can refer to a particular pot or to pots in general. Further, it might point to a particular pot at different moments in time, i.e., a pot that does not yet exist, a pot that exists right now, or a pot that has been destroyed. In addition, the word ‘pot’ might refer to the word ‘pot’ itself. As such, the theory of perspectives addresses different philosophical problems that were discussed amongst the different philosophical schools: the status of universals, the problem of change, and the relationship between words and their meaning.⁴⁰⁹ The list of *nayas*

⁴⁰⁵ Mehta explains that ‘[i]t treats synonymous words as all having the same sense’ (Mehta 1971: 179).

⁴⁰⁶ It is not entirely clear to me what the difference between the *sāmprata* variety of the *śabda* perspective and the *ṛjusūtra* perspective is. The list of perspectives in the version of the TA that is included in the *Sarvārthasiddhi* omits the *sāmprata* perspective.

⁴⁰⁷ According to Mehta, the etymological perspective (*samabhirūḍha*) ‘holds that with the difference of the words expressing the object, the significance of the object also differs.’ He gives the example of a jar (*kumbha*), a pitcher (*kalaśa*), and a pot (*ghaṭa*) (Mehta 1971: 178).’

⁴⁰⁸ The meaning of the word ‘*vyañjana*’, which appears in TA 1.18, has been discussed above. In the context of the theory of perception, the term ‘*vyañjana*’ seems to refer to the physical contact between a sense object and a sense organ. In the commentary on the ‘literal’ perspective, ‘*vyañjana*’ is more likely to have the more common meaning of ‘sign’ or ‘letter’, referring to the words as it is written or pronounced.

⁴⁰⁹ In his study of *anekāntavāda*, B. K. Matilal describes how the different standpoints correspond to the positions of different philosophical schools. For example, he identifies the

in the TA suggests that the Jainas tried to contribute to these debates by pointing out that a single word can have different functions and by providing a model for the analysis of these functions. For example, Indian philosophers disagreed about the question as to whether a pot already exists right before the potter combines the two pot-halves that constitute the pot.⁴¹⁰ Following the model of *nayas*, the Jainas could say that the pot does not exist from a practical perspective (*vyavahāra*), since the two pot-halves cannot be used as a pot yet. Nevertheless, taking the collecting perspective (*saṅgraha*), one could say that the pot already exists in terms of its substance (*dravya*). As such, the Jaina theory of perspectives accommodates seemingly contradictory positions, such as the idea that an object is both existent and non-existent.

The theory of perspectives is usually seen as one of the elements of the Jaina theory of non-one-sidedness (*anekāntavāda*).⁴¹¹ According to this doctrine, reality is multifaceted, which leads to apparent contradictions in philosophical analysis. Jaina philosophers claim that a full understanding of reality, therefore, includes different viewpoints. Given the multifaceted nature of reality, they accept that the views of rival religio-philosophical movements can be partially true, even though their views are ultimately inferior because of their one-sided character.⁴¹² Even though the TA discusses the theory of viewpoints, one should be careful in attributing a perspectivistic view to the composer of the TA. Importantly, the TA does not contain the word '*anekānta*' or '*anekāntavāda*' and there is no explicit reference to the partial truth of the views of other schools.

According to Dundas, the TA was the first text that brought the 'inchoate and unconnected remarks' about the standpoints that can be found in the canonical texts

practical perspective (*vyavahāra*) as the position of the Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya traditions and the literal perspective (*śabda*) as the perspective of the grammarians. This is based on the analysis of the *nayas* in Siddhasena Divākara's *Sanmatitarkaprakaraṇa*, which links the different *nayas* with the position of different schools (Matilal 1981: 32-34).

⁴¹⁰ The example of the pot-halves and the pot is a stock example in the discussion of causation in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition. See, e.g., Potter 1977: 56.

⁴¹¹ The other part is the theory of sevenfold predication (*syādvāda*). The following description of the theory of *anekāntavāda* is based on Wiley 2004: 36.

⁴¹² In more recent times, the Jains have reinterpreted the doctrine of *anekāntavāda* as an 'attitude of tolerance in situations of religious pluralism' (Wiley 2004: 36). This idea is often expressed with the term 'intellectual *ahiṃsā*'. Cort argues that the historical understanding of *anekāntavāda* has nothing to do with 'intellectual *ahiṃsā*'. Instead, Jaina philosophers mainly used this theory to criticise other philosophies because of their one-sided character (Cort 2000: 341).

together in a more systematic way; as such, it functioned as a ‘catalyst in the emergence of philosophical relativism.’⁴¹³ Nevertheless, this does not mean that the theory of standpoints in the TA was already connected with the idea of philosophical relativism. Dundas assumes that Mallavādin was the first author who applied the theory of *anekāntatva* to rival intellectual systems and that the TA only deals with the theory of standpoints as a part of its theory on substance and modifications.⁴¹⁴

However, it seems that the composer of the TABh, which predates Mallavādin, was aware of a pluralistic interpretation of the theory of perspectives. After the explanation of the meaning of the different viewpoints, the *bhāṣya* raises the following question about the nature of the different perspectives:

atrāha | kim ete tantrāntarīyā vādina āhosvit svatantrā eva codakapakṣa-grāhiṇo matibhedena vipradhāvitā iti | atrocyaṭe | naite tantrāntarīyā nāpī svatantrāḥ matibhedena vipradhāvitāḥ | jñeyasya tv arthasyādhyavasāyāntarāṇy etāni |

At this point one says: Are these [perspectives] the proponents (*vādin*) of other sects (*tantrāntarīya*) or [proponents of] our own school (*svatantra*) who are taking the side of the objector (*codaka-pakṣa-grāhin*), [and who are] running in different directions (i.e., disagreeing) (*vipradhāvita*) by difference in opinion (*matibheda*)? At this point it is said: These [perspectives are] not [the proponents belonging to] other schools nor [proponents belonging to] our own school, [who are] running in different directions by difference in opinion. On the contrary, these are different apprehensions (*adhyavasāya-antara*) of the object to be known (TABh 1.35.21 – 1.35.25).

In other words, the *bhāṣya* denies that the perspectives represent the views of different schools and states that the perspectives are just different ways to apprehend an object. As far as I am aware, this would be the earliest reference to the idea that the perspectives represent the views of different schools, even though the text denies that one should interpret the theory of perspectives in this way. However, there are several reasons why we should be cautious in drawing conclusions about the section of the *bhāṣya* in which this passage occurs. First, the *bhāṣya* on the two *sūtras* on the standpoints consists of a hundred sentences, which

⁴¹³ Dundas 1992: 230.

⁴¹⁴ Ibid.

is exceptionally long.⁴¹⁵ Second, the structure of this passage of the *bhāṣya* is somewhat loose. The different topics that are discussed in the commentary on TA 1.35 can be summarised as follows:⁴¹⁶

XVI. Content of the <i>bhāṣya</i> on TA 1.35 (TABh 1.35.1–100)		
i.	1.35.1–3	The varieties of the commonplace perspective (<i>naigama</i>) and the literal perspective (<i>śabda</i>)
	1.35.4–14	Explanation of the different perspectives
	1.35.15–20	Definition of <i>naya</i>
ii.	1.35.21–25	Denial of contradictions between the standpoints of different schools
	1.35.26–33	The perspectives applied to the example of a pot
	1.35.34–38	Different views on the unity of reality
iii.	1.35.39–41	Comparison between the perspectives and the varieties of knowledge
	1.35.42–49	Summary of the perspectives in four verses in <i>āryā</i> metre
iv.	1.35.50–73	The perspectives applied to the word ‘soul’
v.	1.35.74–88	Relationship between specific perspectives and varieties of knowledge
	1.35.89	Statement about the authoritativeness of direct perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony
	1.35.90–99	Summary of the relation between the perspectives and the varieties of knowledge in five verses in <i>āryā</i> metre
vi.	1.35.100	Closing sentence of the first chapter of the TABh

The first three elements in this discussion (TABh 1.35.1–20) are fairly normal. It explains the meaning of the different perspectives, the varieties that are mentioned in the *sūtra* and it provides a definition of the word perspective ‘*naya*’. Next, the *bhāṣya* deals with seemingly contradictory statements of different philosophical schools, illustrated with the application of the perspectives to the example of a pot (TABh 1.35.21–33). In a similar way, the unity of reality is analysed from different

⁴¹⁵ See TABh 1.35.1 – 1.35.100. This is the only passage of the first chapter in which the *bhāṣya* exceeds fifty sentences and only a few verses have a commentary of more than twenty sentences.

⁴¹⁶ The division of this part of the commentary into six sections (i. – vi.) is based on my analysis of the content and is not indicated as such in the *bhāṣya* itself.

perspectives, which shows that reality can be said to be onefold, twofold, and manifold, depending on one's perspective (TABh 1.35.34–38). Thereafter, the *bhāṣya* explains that the perspectives can be compared to the five varieties of knowledge (*jñāna*), which also reveal different aspects of an object without contradicting each other (TABh 1.35.39–40). Immediately following this comparison, the *bhāṣya* continues as follows:

yathā vā pratyakṣānumānopamānāptavacanaiḥ pramāṇair eko 'rthaḥ pramiyate svaviśayaniyamāt na ca tā vipratipattayo bhavanti tadvan nayavādā iti |

Or, just as one object is understood by the means of cognition (*pramāṇa*), [i.e.], direct cognition, inference, comparison, and verbal testimony (*pratyakṣa-anumāna-upamāna-āptavacana*) — and these are not contradictory (*vipratipatti*) on account of the limitation of their respective ranges — likewise, the statements [from the different] perspectives [are not incompatible] (TABh 1.35.41).

The claim in this sentence is similar to the claim about the compatibility of the five varieties of knowledge in the passage that precedes this sentence.⁴¹⁷ However, instead of mentioning the five varieties of knowledge, this sentence talks about the means of cognition (*pramāṇa*). It is striking that the means of cognition are specified as 'direct cognition, inference, comparison, and verbal testimony' (*pratyakṣa-anumāna-upamāna-āptavacana*) since the TA claims that there are only two means of cognition, i.e., *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*.⁴¹⁸ Moreover, the listed means of cognition are the means of cognition that were associated with the Naiyāyikas and it is not evident what the exact purpose of the reference to the Nyāya means of cognition is. The passage clearly compares the perspectives with the means of cognition, pointing out that one can know an object in different ways without ending up with a contradictory understanding of that object. However, the *bhāṣya* already made that point with reference to the five varieties of knowledge, which is more in line with the general epistemological account of the TA. By repeating the same argument with reference to the means of cognition that were accepted by the Naiyāyikas, the *bhāṣya* seems to suggest that the Nyāya point of view is also a legitimate perspective.

⁴¹⁷ I.e., TABh 1.35.40.

⁴¹⁸ In the commentary on TA 1.6, the *bhāṣya* mentions the position of others who claim that there are four means of cognition (TABh 1.6.3). For a discussion of this passage, see the above section on the classification of the means of cognition.

In fact, this interpretation is supported by another sentence that appears towards the end of the discussion of the perspectives:

*ataś ca pratyakṣānumānopamānāptavacanānām api prāmāṇyam abhyanu-
jñāyata iti |*

Hence, the authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya*) of direct perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony (*pratyakṣa-anumāna-upamāna-āptavacana*) is also approved (TABh 1.35.89).

This passage clearly supports the Nyāya position on the means of knowledge, even though the TA offers a different account. Hence, based on the commentary on TA 1.35, one could say that the TABh provides the first account of philosophical pluralism in the Jaina tradition. It is clear that the author of these parts of the *bhāṣya* does not only interpret the theory of standpoints as a solution to the problems of change, universals, etc. but also applies this model to the compatibility of different philosophical traditions.⁴¹⁹ Yet, just as the passage about the four means of cognition (TABh 1.35.41), the above sentence is not well connected with the topic that precedes it. TABh 1.35.74–88 discusses how the perspectives relate to the varieties of knowledge. It explains, for example, that the literal perspective (*śabda*) only applies to knowledge from testimony and absolute knowledge (TABh 1.35.83). Even though TABh 1.35.89 begins with '*ataś ca*', which suggests an argumentative connection with the preceding passage, the conclusion in this sentence does not follow from the foregoing sentences. This might be a further indication that the commentary on TA 1.35 was not written at one moment in time. If this is indeed the case, we cannot say with certainty that the Jaina philosophers already applied their theory of perspectives to the different philosophical traditions when the core of the TABh was composed.

Looking at the different sections of the commentary on TA 1.35, as specified in the table above, it is possible to imagine that some of the sections were added at a later stage. If this passage was written at one moment in time, I would expect that

⁴¹⁹ Since the Naiyāyikas are not mentioned explicitly, it is possible that the *bhāṣya* simply argues for the compatibility of different views within the Jaina tradition. As discussed previously, some Jaina texts do indeed present a fourfold list of *pramāṇas*, which corresponds with the Nyāya model. Nevertheless, even in that case, it remains a fact that the text uses the theory of perspectives to argue for philosophical pluralism.

the application of the perspectives to the word ‘soul’ (TABh 1.35.50–73) would immediately follow the application of the perspectives to the word ‘pot’ (TABh 1.35.26–33). Furthermore, it is remarkable that the *bhāṣya* contains two passages in *āryā* metre, which strongly deviate from the overall style of the *bhāṣya*, which is composed in prose.⁴²⁰ To conclude, the disorderly presentation of this section of the *bhāṣya* and the reference to the Nyāya means of cognition as authoritative sources of knowledge suggest that this passage underwent changes over time. Since the first parts of the commentary on TA 1.35 are straightforward and in line with the general style of the *bhāṣya*, it is plausible that TABh 1.35.1–20 belonged to an early version of the TABh and that the remaining parts were added at a later stage. Given the lack of contemporary sources, it is hard to know whether this happened before or after Mallavādin.

Despite this, it is likely that the theory of perspectives in the TA and the *bhāṣya* on this passage reflect several stages of a theory that was still in development when the *sūtra* and the main part of the *bhāṣya* were composed. As mentioned above, TA 1.34 lists five perspectives while the *Sarvārthasiddhi* lists seven perspectives. Yet, the additional two perspectives that the *Sarvārthasiddhi* mentions are included in the varieties of the literal perspective (*śabda*) that are mentioned in the *bhāṣya* on TA 1.35. This might indicate that the TA originally only listed five perspectives and did not include TA 1.35, which states that the first and fifth perspective have several varieties. This *sūtra* was perhaps added at a later stage in order to make sure that the TA also included those perspectives that were missing in the original text.⁴²¹ The discussion in the *bhāṣya* about the connection between the perspectives and views of different philosophical schools probably reflects another stage in the development of the Jaina theory of perspectives, which ties in with the treatment of the topic by Mallavādin. The fact that these different aspects of the theory of perspectives are included in the present version of the TA and the TABh suggests that the TA was seen as a relevant text in the discussion and that later redactors of the TA and the TABh felt the need to bring the text in line with new ideas that emerged long after the TA itself was composed.

⁴²⁰ The first of these passages occurs halfway through the commentary on TA 1.35 (TABh 1.35.42–49) and the second passage occurs at the very end of the discussion of the perspectives (TABh 1.35.90–99). For a more detailed discussion of these passages, see § 3.5.

⁴²¹ The majority of Jaina authors follow the sevenfold list of perspectives, as listed in the *Sarvārthasiddhi* (Ohira 1982: 16).

3.3 *Tattvārthādhigama* Chapter II.8-25

After the first chapter of the TA, which primarily deals with epistemology, the second chapter continues with a discussion of the soul (*jīva*). The soul is a central notion in Jaina thought and is an important element of different theories in the TA. First of all, the soul plays a crucial role in the soteriology of the Jainas. In the first chapter of the TA, the soul is mentioned as one of the fundamental categories of reality (*tattva*). These categories are the basic constituents of the path to liberation and the soul — the final goal of which is liberation from karmic influence and rebirth — is the very first category in this list. Apart from its role in the soteriological framework of the Jainas, the soul is also an important element in their ontological theories. The soul constitutes the essence of living beings and is listed in TA 5.2 as one of the five substances (*dravya*). From an ontological perspective, the soul is radically different from the other substances, which are inanimate (*ajīvakāya*).⁴²² Finally, the soul is also the centre of knowledge and is, as such, the cornerstone of the epistemological account in the TA.

The second chapter of the TA discusses various aspects of the Jaina theory of the soul. The first section of the chapter on the soul explains how different types of *karman* relate to different states (*bhāva*) of souls (TA 2.1 – 2.7). Next, the TA mentions different varieties of cognitive operation (*upayoga*), which is introduced as the hallmark of the soul (TA 2.8 – 2.9). Thereafter, the text deals with specific characteristics of different kinds of living beings, ranging from plants to gods (TA 2.10 – 2.52). This section includes a discussion of the senses (*indriya*).

Since the soul is the actual centre of knowledge, it forms an important link between the epistemological and ontological theories in the TA. For this reason, I have included an analysis of the relevant parts of the second chapter of the TA in this chapter. Since this study is mainly concerned with the epistemological account in the TA, I will focus my analysis on those parts that are directly relevant to the theory of knowledge. Therefore, I will leave out the first section (TA 2.1 – 2.7), which deals with karmic theory, and the last section (TA 2.26 – 2.52), which deals with the movements of the transmigrating soul, the varieties of rebirth, the different types of

⁴²² The inanimate entities are listed in TA 5.1.

bodies, and the life span of beings. The middle part (TA 2.8 – 2.25), which forms the basis of the following analysis, discusses the following topics:

- i. Cognitive operation (*upayoga*) (TA 2.8 – 2.9)
- ii. Varieties of worldly souls (TA 2.10 – 2.14)
- iii. The five senses (TA 2.15 – 2.20)
- iv. The objects of the senses and the mind (TA 2.21 – TA 2.22)
- v. Number of senses in classes of beings (TA 2.23 – 2.25)

Cognitive operation (upayoga)

TA 2.8 – 2.9 discuss the notion of cognitive operation (*upayoga*), which is introduced as the defining characteristic of the soul:

upayogo lakṣaṇam ||2.8|| sa dvividho 'ṣṭacaturbhedaḥ ||2.9||

[Cognitive] operation (*upayoga*) is the characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) [of the soul]. It is twofold and has eight and four varieties.

The more general meaning of the term '*upayoga*' is 'use' or 'application'⁴²³ and the term usually does not refer to cognitive processes. However, the *bhāṣya* and other commentaries, such as the *Sarvārthasiddhi*, interpret *upayoga* as a generic term for the different varieties of knowledge (*jñāna*) and worldview (*darśana*), which are clearly cognitive aspects. Therefore, I translate the term as 'cognitive operation'.⁴²⁴ The *bhāṣya* on TA 2.9 explains the different varieties of cognitive operation as follows:

⁴²³ MW.

⁴²⁴ The term '*upayoga*' also appears in canonical sources, such as the *Prajñāpanāsūtra* (*Pañṇavaṇāsutta*). However, it seems that the interpretation of the term in the commentaries on the TA differs from the canonical use of the term. In my analysis, I will only deal with the concept of *upayoga* as used in the TA and the TABh. For a more detailed study of *upayoga* in different sources, see Soni 2007.

sa upayogo dvividhaḥ sākāro 'nākāraś ca jñānopayogo darśanopayogaś cety arthaḥ | sa punar yathāsaṅkhyam aṣṭacaturbhedo bhavati |

This cognitive operation is twofold: having shape (*sa-ākāra*) and shapeless (*an-ākāra*). The meaning is: cognitive operation [in the form of] knowledge (*jñāna-upayoga*) and cognitive operation [in the form of] worldview (*darśana-upayoga*). This [twofold cognitive operation] is again respectively eight- and fourfold (TABh 2.9.1 – 2.9.2).

First, the *bhāṣya* explains that cognitive operation falls into two categories: 'having shape' (*sa-ākāra*) and 'shapeless' (*an-ākāra*). These terms are explained as references to 'cognitive operation [in the form of] knowledge' (*jñāna-upayoga*) and 'cognitive operation [in the form of] worldview' (*darśana-upayoga*). However, the *bhāṣya* does not explain why *jñānopayoga* is qualified as 'having form' (*sa-ākāra*) and *darśanopayoga* as 'shapeless' (*an-ākāra*). Since the meaning of these terms is not self-evident in this particular context, it remains unclear what the composer of the *bhāṣya* means exactly by these qualifications. However, the two terms are not only used in the Jaina tradition but also feature in the discussion of perception in the Yogācāra tradition.⁴²⁵ The main question in this debate is whether cognition is representational or not. This ties in to the more general discussion in Indian epistemology about determinate (*savikalpa*) and indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpa*), i.e., the difference between the bare apprehension of an object and concept-laden perception.⁴²⁶ Yet, it is hard to tell whether the terms that are used in the *bhāṣya* on TA 2.9 have the same meaning as the terms that were discussed by the Yogācārins or the other schools.

After making this distinction, the commentary explains that cognitive operation in the form of knowledge (*jñāna-upayoga*) and cognitive operation in the form of worldview (*darśana-upayoga*) have eight and four varieties respectively. These varieties are summed up in TABh 2.9.5 and 2.9.8 and are given in the table below.

⁴²⁵ For a discussion of the *sākāra* – *nirākāravāda* controversy, see, e.g., Peter Della Santina 2000 and Stephen Phillips 2011.

⁴²⁶ Soni 2007: 208-209. Tatia translates '*sākāra*' and '*anākāra*' as 'determinate' and 'indeterminate' (Tatia 1951: 70) and Sanghvi uses the same terms in his commentary in the TA (Sanghvi 1974: 82). It seems, therefore, that both authors interpret the terms '*sākāra*' and '*anākāra*' as synonyms of '*savikalpa*' and '*nirvikalpa*'. Since the *bhāṣya* does not explain the meaning of these terms, it is hard to evaluate whether this identification is justified.

XVII. Varieties of cognitive operation (<i>upayoga</i>) (TA 2.8 – 2.9)	
<i>jñānopayoga</i> (TABh 2.9.1, 2.9.5)	<i>darśanopayoga</i> (TABh 2.9.1, 2.9.8)
i. <i>matijñānopayoga</i>	i. <i>cakṣurdarśanopayoga</i>
ii. <i>śrutajñānopayoga</i>	ii. <i>acakṣurdarśanopayoga</i>
iii. <i>avadhijñānopayoga</i>	iii. <i>avadhidarśanopayoga</i>
iv. <i>manaḥparyāyajñānopayoga</i>	iv. <i>kevaladarśanopayoga</i>
v. <i>kevalajñānopayoga</i>	
vi. <i>matyajñānopayoga</i>	
vii. <i>śrutājñānopayoga</i>	
viii. <i>vibhaṅga</i> ⁴²⁷ <i>jñānopayoga</i>	

The eight varieties of cognitive operation in the form of knowledge (*jñānopayoga*) correspond to the eight varieties of knowledge (*jñāna*) and false knowledge (*ajñāna*) that are listed in TA 1.9 and TABh 1.32.3. The four varieties of cognitive operation in the form of worldview (*darśanopayoga*) do not correspond to a previously mentioned list.⁴²⁸ The categorisation of these four varieties of *darśanopayoga* differs in several respects from the varieties of *jñānopayoga*. First, the list does not mention any opposites. The list of *jñānopayoga* also contains forms of cognitive operation in the form of false knowledge (*ajñāna*) but the list of *darśanopayoga* does not contain any elements that are related to wrong worldview (*mithyādarśana*).⁴²⁹ Second, the list of varieties of *darśanopayoga* contains two of the five varieties of knowledge — i.e., *avadhi* and *kevala* — but does not refer to *mati*, *śruta*, and *manaḥparyāya*. Instead, it uses the terms ‘*cakṣus*’ and ‘*acakṣus*’. This might refer to a distinction between two forms of ordinary cognition (*matī*) — i.e., ordinary cognition derived from visual perception and ordinary cognition derived from the other senses and the mind — but the *bhāṣya* does not clarify the meaning of these terms.

⁴²⁷ *vibhaṅgajñāna* is the opposite of *avadhijñāna* (TABh 1.32.12).

⁴²⁸ It is unclear to me whether this fourfold list of varieties of *darśanopayoga* is derived from an older source. Glasenapp discusses the different varieties of *upayoga* in his discussion of the soul but he does not specify his source. His explanation, however, seems to follow the TABh (Glasenapp 1925: 203-206).

⁴²⁹ Wrong worldview is seen as a cause of false knowledge. See, e.g., TABh 1.33.1.

The order in which the *bhāṣya* introduces the terms *sākāra/anākāra* and *jñānopayoga/darśanopayoga* suggests that the varieties of *jñānopayoga* are qualified as *sākāra* and the varieties of *darśanopayoga* as *anākāra*. In other words, the varieties of cognitive operation in the form of knowledge are determinate (or concept-laden) and the varieties of cognitive operation in the form of worldview are indeterminate (or conceptless). The general idea seems to be that all varieties of *darśana* are non-representational. They are ways of ‘seeing’ the world in the form of bare perceptions. This could explain why testimony (*śruta*) and mental perception (*manaḥparyāya*) are not included in this list, even though the other varieties of cognition — such as cosmic perception (*avadhi*) and absolute worldview⁴³⁰ (*kevala*) — are mentioned in the list of *darśanopayoga*. Testimony and mental perception are inherently conceptual and have, therefore, nothing to do with *darśanopayoga*, which is non-representational (*anākāra*).

Varieties of worldly souls

After the two *sūtras* on cognitive operation (TA 2.8 – 2.9), the TA continues with a discussion of the varieties of souls (TA 2.10 – 2.14).

***saṃsāriṇo muktās ca ||2.10|| samanaskāmanaskāḥ ||2.11|| saṃsāriṇas
trasasthāvarāḥ ||2.12|| pṛthivyabvanaspatayaḥ sthāvarāḥ ||2.13|| tejovāyū
dvīndriyādayas ca trasāḥ ||2.14||***

[There are] worldly (*saṃsārin*) and liberated (*mukta*) [souls]. [Souls exist] with minds (*samanaska*) and without minds (*amanaska*). Worldly souls (*saṃsārin*) are mobile (*trasa*) and immobile (*sthāvara*). Earth (*pṛthivī*), water (*ap*), and plants (*vanaspati*)⁴³¹ are immobile (*sthāvara*). Fire (*tejas*) and air (*vāyu*) and [beings with] two senses (*indriya*) etc. are mobile (*trasa*).

⁴³⁰ In the first chapter of the TA, the term ‘*kevala*’ is only used with reference to ‘*kevalajñāna*’. For this reason, I have translated the term ‘*kevala*’ as ‘absolute knowledge’. However, in this context, the *bhāṣya* differentiates between *kevalajñāna* and *kevaladarśana*. Therefore, the appropriate translation of ‘*kevala*’ in this context is ‘absolute worldview’.

⁴³¹ The first meaning of ‘*vanaspati*’ is ‘tree’ (MW). However, TABh 2.13.4 explains that this category begins with ‘*śaivala*’, which is a kind of duckweed. Hence, it seems that the term ‘*vanaspati*’ refers to the category of plants.

First, TA 2.10 makes a distinction between worldly (*saṃsārin*) and liberated (*mukta*) souls. Then, the next *sūtra* adds that there are souls with minds (*manaska*) and souls without minds (*amanaska*). The TA and the TABh do not specify whether this relates to worldly and liberated souls, or to worldly souls only. However, the *Sarvārthasiddhi* explicitly mentions that these two qualifications relate to worldly souls.⁴³² TABh 2.25.2 explains that all gods, hellish beings, human beings, and some mammals are provided with a mind (*samanaska*).

Next, the TA 2.12 explains that worldly souls are either mobile (*trasa*) or immobile (*sthāvara*). The souls of earth, water, and plants are classified as immobile and the souls of fire, air, and beings with two or more senses are qualified as mobile.⁴³³ The classification of souls in TA 2.10 – 2.14 can be represented as follows:

⁴³² S.A. Jain 1992: 60 - 61. The TABh on TA 2.11 is less clear. It says: ‘Succinctly, **these souls** are twofold: with minds and without minds. We will explain them later on (see TA 2.25) (*samāsatas ta eva jivā dvividhā bhavanti samanaskās cāmanaskās ca | tāt parastād vakṣyāmaḥ*)’ (TABh 2.11.1 – 2.11.2). The commentary does not explicitly exclude the possibility that the qualifications in TA 2.11 relate to worldly and liberated souls since it is not obvious what the reference of ‘*ta (< te)*’ is exactly. If one reads TA 2.11 together with the next *sūtra*, the phrase ‘*samanaskāmanaskāḥ*’ would qualify the word ‘*saṃsāriṇaḥ*’. In fact, if the *daṇḍa* that separates TA 2.11 and TA 2.12 would be placed after ‘*saṃsāriṇaḥ*’ in TA 2.12, we would end up with the following reading: ‘*saṃsāriṇo muktās ca | samanaskāmanaskāḥ saṃsāriṇaḥ | trasasthāvarāḥ | pṛthivyabvanaspatayaḥ sthāvarāḥ | tejovāyū dvīndriyādayas ca trasāḥ*’. With this minor change, the whole passage would be more straightforward and the ambiguity of TA 2.11 would disappear.

⁴³³ The *Sarvārthasiddhi* has a variant reading of TA 2.13 – 2.14 and categorises the souls of fire and air bodies as immobile beings (*pṛthivyaptejovāyuvanaspatayaḥ sthāvarāḥ | dvīndriyādayas trasāḥ*).

XVIII. Varieties of souls (<i>jīva</i>) (TA 2.10 – 2.14)			
		<i>sthāvara</i> (immobile) (TA 2.12, TABh 2.13.1)	<i>trasa</i> (mobile) (TA 2.12, TABh 2.14.1 – 3)
one-sensed beings (TA 2.23)	<i>amanaska</i> (without a mind) (TA 2.11)	<i>pṛthivīkāyika</i> (earth-bodied)	<i>tejaḥkāyika</i> (fire-bodied)
		<i>apkāyika</i> (water-bodied)	<i>vāyukāyika</i> (air-bodied)
		<i>vanaspatikāyika</i> (plant-bodied)	
beings with more than one sense (TA 2.14)	<i>samanaska</i> ⁴³⁴ (having a mind) (TABh 2.25.2)		<i>dvīndriya</i> (having two senses)
			<i>trīndriya</i> (having three senses)
			<i>caturindriya</i> (having four senses)
		<i>pañcendriya</i> (having five senses)	

This model shows a general distinction between more complex beings with more than one sense and simple one-sensed beings, which are specified as earth-, water-, plant-, air-, and fire-bodied beings.⁴³⁵ The TABh gives some examples of these beings, such as snow (*hima*), duckweed (*śaivala*), and charcoal (*aṅgāra*).⁴³⁶

⁴³⁴ Not all five-sensed beings have a mind (*manas*). Gods, hellish beings, and humans have a mind but not all animals that have five senses are provided with a mind (TABh 2.25.2).

⁴³⁵ TA 2.23 explains that the souls of earth etc. have only one sense, which is the sense of touch (TABh 2.23.1). Since the Jainas attribute a soul and the sense of touch to these entities, we can qualify their ontology as a form of hylozoism, i.e., the view that matter is in some sense alive. Even though this idea might sound very outlandish from a contemporary perspective, we can find similar ideas attributed to, e.g., Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes. For a general outline of their philosophical ideas, see Guthrie 1962.

⁴³⁶ TABh 2.13.2 – 2.14.2. The TA and the TABh do not mention *nigodas*, which are often included in Jaina classifications of beings. P.S. Jaini explains that these minute beings are smaller than the elements, are provided with the sense of touch only, ‘permeate the bodies of other beings’ and ‘are born together in colonies which die a fraction of a second later’ (P.S.

The five senses

After the basic outline of the different varieties of living beings, the TA provides an explanation of the senses (TA 2.15 – 2.20):

pañcendriyāṇi ||2.15|| dviividhāni ||2.16|| nirvṛtṭyupakaraṇe dravyendriyam ||2.17|| labdhyupayogau bhāvendriyam ||2.18|| upayogaḥ sparś-ādiṣu ||2.19|| sparśanarasanaghrāṇacakṣuḥśrotrāṇi ||2.20||

There are five senses (*pañcendriya*). [The five senses are] twofold (*dviividha*). The sense organ (*dravyendriya*) [consists of] the ‘manifestation’ (*nirvṛtṭi*) [and] the instrument (*upakaraṇa*). The sense faculty (*bhāvendriya*) [consists of] acquisition (*labdhi*) and cognitive operation (*upayoga*). Cognitive operation (*upayoga*) relates to touch (i.e., touchable objects) (*sparśa*) etc. [The five senses are] the sense of touch (*sparśana*), taste (*rasana*), smell (*ghrāṇa*), sight (*cakṣus*) and hearing (*śrotra*).⁴³⁷

TA 2.15 states that there are five senses (*indriya*), which are specified in TA 2.20. TA 2.16 adds that the senses are twofold. The twofold distinction is explained in the next two *sūtras* (TA 2.17 and 2.18), which deal respectively with the sense organ and the sense faculty. The *bhāṣya* on these two *sūtras* describes the sense organ (*dravyendriya*) as the physical component of the senses and the sense faculty (*bhāvendriya*) as the cognitive power of the senses.

Next, TA 2.17 divides the physical sense organ into the ‘manifestation’ (*nirvṛtṭi*) and the ‘instrument’ (*upakaraṇa*).⁴³⁸ The TABh explains the term ‘*nirvṛtṭi*’ as the apertures of the senses (*indriyadvāra*) — which are brought about (*nirvartita*) by body-determining *karman* (TABh 2.17.2) — and ‘*upakaraṇa*’ as the part that is

Jaini 1998: 109). The beings that are mentioned in the TABh as the earth-bodied (*pṛthivīkāyika*) etc. take the elements as their bodies. The idea that these simple entities are provided with a soul and the sense of touch explains why certain professions that involve harm to these beings are forbidden. For a discussion of the forbidden professions, see Williams 1963: 117-123.

⁴³⁷ The discussion of the senses in the *Bhagavatī* (*Vīyāhapannatti*) presents the senses in the inversed order (*Bhagavatī* 2.4.1). Since the TA says that one-sensed beings have the sense of touch only, while the sense of hearing only appears in complex beings such as humans (TA 2.23 – 2.24), it makes sense to begin the list with the sense of touch.

⁴³⁸ Even though the terms ‘*nirvṛtṭi*’ and ‘*upakaraṇa*’ suggest that the *sūtra* makes a distinction between the physical and instrumental aspect of the senses, they are both used to describe an aspect of the physical sense organ.

‘assisting’ (*upakārin*) that which is brought about (*nirvartita*) (TABh 2.17.5).⁴³⁹ TA 2.18 says that sense faculties (*bhāvendriya*) have, likewise, two components: acquisition (*labdhī*) and cognitive operation (*upayoga*). The *bhāṣya* explains the term ‘acquisition’ as something that results from different karmic processes, such as the destruction of knowledge-covering *karman* (TABh 2.18.2).⁴⁴⁰ The meaning seems to be that the capacity of the sense faculty is determined by *karmic* factors. The term ‘cognitive operation’ (*upayoga*)⁴⁴¹ seems to refer to the power of the sense faculty, which links the cognitive apparatus with the objects of the sense.⁴⁴² The *bhāṣya* on TA 2.19 further explains that perception cannot take place in the absence of one of the different components (i.e., *nirvṛtti* etc.) (TABh 2.19.6). The different components of the five senses can be represented as follows:

⁴³⁹ The explanation of these terms in the *bhāṣya* is not entirely clear to me. The *Sarvārthasiddhi* explains that the ‘manifestation’ (*nirvṛtti*) is a minute part of the soul that takes the shape of the sense. The term ‘*upakaraṇa*’ refers to a part of the physical sense organ that assists this process, such as the eyeball and eyelid. This subtle division of the sense organ into the general physical aspect and the involvement of the soul seems to be a way to bridge the gap between the mental and physical aspects of sense perception (S.A. Jain 1992: 64).

⁴⁴⁰ The *bhāṣya* adds that acquisition (*labdhī*) is fivefold, related to the five senses (TABh 2.18.3 – 2.18.5).

⁴⁴¹ See also TA 2.8, which introduces cognitive operation (*upayoga*) as the characteristic of the soul.

⁴⁴² TA 2.19 explains that cognitive operation applies to the objects of the five senses (*sparśādi*). This *sūtra* is omitted in the *Sarvārthasiddhi*. The objects of the different senses are listed in TA 2.21. The *bhāṣya* gives ‘joining’ (*āyoga*) as one of the synonyms of ‘*upayoga*’, which confirms the idea that *upayoga* is the power that links the sense object with the sense organ (TABh 2.19.3).

XIX. Structure of the five senses (<i>pañcendriya</i>) (TA 2.15 – 2.20)			
sense organ (<i>dravyendriya</i>) (TABh 2.16.2)		sense faculty (<i>bhāvendriya</i>) (TABh 2.16.2)	
manifestation (<i>nirvṛtti</i>) (TA 2.17)	the instrument (<i>upakaraṇa</i>) (TA 2.17)	acquisition (<i>labdhi</i>) (TA 2.18, TABh 2.18.5)	cognitive operation (<i>upayoga</i>) (TA 2.18 – 2.19)
		related to the sense of touch (<i>sparśanendriyalabdhi</i>)	related to touch (<i>sparśa</i>)
		related to the sense of taste (<i>rasanendriyalabdhi</i>)	related to taste (<i>rasa</i>)
		related to the sense of smell (<i>ghrāṇendriyalabdhi</i>)	related to smell (<i>gandha</i>)
		related to the sense of sight (<i>caḡṣusindriyalabdhi</i>)	related to colour (<i>varṇa</i>)
		related the sense of hearing (<i>śrotrendriyalabdhi</i>)	related to sound (<i>śabda</i>)

The objects of the senses and the mind

At the end of the discussion of the structure of the senses, the TA lists the five senses and their objects (TA 2.20 – 2.21), which are given in the table below. The *bhāṣya* briefly comments that the five items in TA 2.20 are the five senses and the items in TA 2.21 their respective objects. After listing the objects of the five senses, TA 2.22 adds that testimony (*śruta*) is the object of the mind (*anindriya*).⁴⁴³

⁴⁴³ The *bhāṣya* on TA 2.22 uses the word '*noindriya*' instead of '*anindriya*'. The same phenomenon occurs in TABh 1.19.1. For a discussion of this peculiar word formation, see § 3.2 *Ordinary cognition*.

XX. The senses and their objects (TA 2.20 – 2.22)	
<i>indriya</i> (sense)	<i>artha</i> (sense object)
i. <i>sparśana</i> (sense of touch)	i. <i>sparśa</i> (touch)
ii. <i>rasana</i> (sense of taste)	ii. <i>rasa</i> (taste)
iii. <i>ghrāṇa</i> (sense of smell)	iii. <i>gandha</i> (smell)
iv. <i>cakṣus</i> (sense of sight)	iv. <i>varṇa</i> (colour)
v. <i>śrotra</i> (sense of hearing)	v. <i>śabda</i> (sound)
<i>anindriya</i> (mind) (TA 2.22)	<i>śruta</i> (testimony)

Unlike the longer and complex explanations on the preceding *sūtras* that deal with the structure of the senses, the *bhāṣya* on TA 2.20 – 2.22 is remarkable short and straightforward. Furthermore, it is a somewhat odd that TA 2.20 lists the five senses without mentioning that these are the senses (*indriya*) and puts this *sūtra* at the very end of the discussion of the structure of the five senses. A more obvious place for this *sūtra* would be after TA 2.15, which says that there are five senses. If one joins TA 2.15 and TA 2.20 by taking out TA 2.16 – 2.19, one would end up with a more straightforward passage (*pañcendriyāṇi | sparśanarasanaghrāṇacakṣuḥ-śrotrāṇi*). This might be an indication that the discussion of the senses has several historical layers.

Number of senses in classes of beings

The last part of the discussion of the senses explains how the different senses relate to different types of beings:

vāyvantānām ekam ||2.23|| kṛmipīlikābhramaramanuṣyādīnām ekaikavṛddhāni ||2.24|| saṃjñīnaḥ samanaskāḥ ||2.25||

[Living beings] up to the air[-bodied]⁴⁴⁴ (*vāyv-anta*) have one [sense]. [The number of senses of] worms (*kṛmi*), ants (*pīlikā*), bees (*bhramara*), human beings (*manuṣya*), etc. increases one by one (i.e., worms have two senses, ants three, etc.). Conscious beings (*saṃjñin*) are provided with minds (*samanaska*).

⁴⁴⁴ The *Sarvārthasiddhi* reads '*vanaspatyantānām*', 'up to the plant-bodied'.

TA 2.23 explains that the simplest beings have one sense only. The expression ‘up to the air[-bodied]’ (*vāyvanta*)’ refers to the souls that inhabit the elements, which are mentioned in TA 2.13 – 2.14.⁴⁴⁵ The *bhāṣya* on TA 2.23 mentions that these beings have the sense of touch (*sparsāna*) only (TABh 2.23.1). Beings that are more complex have more senses, as specified in TA 2.24. The table below provides an overview of the different classes of living beings and their respective number of senses.

XXI. Number of senses in the different classes of living beings (TA 2.23 – 2.25)					
Classes of beings (<i>jīva</i>) ⁴⁴⁶	Senses (<i>indriya</i>)				
	<i>sparsāna</i>	<i>rasana</i>	<i>ghrāṇa</i>	<i>cakṣus</i>	<i>śrotra</i>
i. one-sensed beings (<i>pṛthivī, ap, vanaspati, tejaḥ, vāyu</i>)	x				
ii. worms (<i>kṛmi</i>) etc.	x	x			
iii. ants (<i>pipīlikā</i>) etc.	x	x	x		
iv. bees (<i>bhramara</i>) etc.	x	x	x	x	
v. human beings (<i>manuṣya</i>) etc.	x	x	x	x	x

In addition to this model, TA 2.25 adds that conscious beings (*saṃjñīn*) are provided with a mind (*samanaska*). This suggests that the mind (*manas*) was somehow seen as a sixth sense. The *bhāṣya* explains the term ‘*samanaska*’ as a form of moral

⁴⁴⁵ I.e., *pṛthivīkāyika* (earth-bodied), *apkāyika*, (water-bodied), *vanaspatikāyika*, (plant-bodied), *tejaḥkāyika*, (fire-bodied), and *vāyukāyika* (air-bodied) (TABh 2.13.1, 2.14.1 – 2.14.2). See also above.

⁴⁴⁶ The *bhāṣya* provides more examples of beings of each class (see TABh 2.24.4 – 2.24.7). Unfortunately, it is rather difficult to identify many of the species that are mentioned in this passage.

consciousness,⁴⁴⁷ which is attributed to all gods, hellish beings, human beings, and some mammals.⁴⁴⁸

Even though the model is understandable to a certain extent, the suggested link between the classes of beings and the number of senses is not fully evident. For example, the beings in the class of bees etc. do not have the sense of sight according to the theory in the TA. This is somewhat odd, since the eyes of bees and similar insects⁴⁴⁹ are clearly visible. This could be an indication that the classifications of beings was originally not connected with the theory about the senses.

To conclude, the model that is presented in the TA demonstrates a close link between epistemology and ontology in the conceptual framework of the Jainas. The different classes of beings are organised on the basis of the number of senses. Furthermore, the different senses correspond to the different varieties of matter (*pudgala*).⁴⁵⁰ In the next section, I will discuss the ontological account of the TA, which is the topic of the fifth chapter of the TA.

⁴⁴⁷ TABh 2.25.1 uses the term ‘recognition of deliberation’ (*saṃpradhāraṇasaṃjñā*), which is explained in TABh 2.25.3 as the capacity of making a distinction between merit and vice (*guṇa-doṣa-vicāraṇā-ātmikā*).

⁴⁴⁸ TABh 2.25.2. Animals such as fishes, snakes, and birds — which are listed as examples of the class of ‘humans etc.’ in TABh 2.24.7 — seem to be excluded.

⁴⁴⁹ The *bhāṣya* mentions several other beings that belong to the class of bees etc., such as gnats (*daṃśā*) and mosquitos (*maśaka*) (TABh 2.24.6).

⁴⁵⁰ Matter (*pudgala*) is discussed in the fifth chapter of the TA. See also the analysis in the next section.

3.4 *Tattvārthādhigama* Chapter V

The fifth chapter of the TA deals with the different types of substance (*dravya*). The discussion mainly focuses on the inanimate entities (*ajīva-kāya*).⁴⁵¹ As such, it forms the counterpart of chapter II, III and IV, which provide a discussion of souls (*jīva*).⁴⁵² Unlike the previous chapters, which contain many lists of types of *karman*, gods, hellish beings, and cosmic realms, chapter V is composed in a more systematic way and presents a concise and coherent ontological account. Even though this study is mainly concerned with the epistemological account of the TA, there are several reasons to look at the ontological theory as well. First, the TA assumes a direct relation between the sense organs and the sense objects, which exist independently of the knower. As such, the ontological makeup of the world determines the knowledge that results from ordinary cognition. Second, the explanation of the differences between mind-reading (*manaḥparyāya*), cosmic perception (*avadhi*), and absolute knowledge (*kevala*)⁴⁵³ in the first chapter of the TA cannot be understood without a proper understanding of the notion of substance (*dravya*) and its modifications (*paryāya*).⁴⁵⁴ Given its relevance to the epistemological account in the TA, this section will provide an outline of the ontological theory in the fifth

⁴⁵¹ The term ‘*ajīva*’ literally translates as ‘non-soul’, and refers to all ontological categories that are not living, such as space and matter (TA 5.1).

⁴⁵² Even though chapter II, III, and IV address different topics — including *karman*, the senses, hellish beings and gods, and the different realms of the cosmos that are inhabited by living beings — they all discuss aspects of the soul (*jīva*). The introductory sentences of chapter II and V in the *bhāṣya*, indicate that the composer of the *bhāṣya* regards chapters II - IV as a unity. The *bhāṣya* introduces the first *sūtra* of the second chapter by asking what the soul is and what its characteristic is (*ko jīvaḥ katham lakṣaṇo veti*) (TABh 2.0.1) and opens the fifth chapter by saying that souls have now been discussed and that the next chapter will address inanimate entities (*uktā jīvāḥ | ajīvān vakṣyāmaḥ*) (TABh 5.0.1 - 5.0.2).

⁴⁵³ I.e., the three direct types of knowledge that are classified as *pratyakṣa* in the TA. See § 3.2.

⁴⁵⁴ TA 1.27 - 1.30 says: ‘The range (*nibandha*) of ordinary cognition and testimony [extends to] all substances (*sarvadravya*) but not in all modes (*asarvaparyāya*). [The range] of cosmic perception [extends to all things] having extension (*rūpin*). [The range of] mental perception [extends to] an infinitesimal part of that. [The range of] absolute knowledge [extends to] all modes (*paryāya*) of all substances’ (*matīśrutayor nibandhaḥ sarvadravyeṣv asarvaparyāyeṣu | rūpiṣv avadheḥ | tadanantabhāge manaḥparyāyasya | sarvadravyaparyāyeṣu kevalasya*). The *bhāṣya* adds that the domain of cosmic perception extends to all extended substances (*rūpidravya*) but not in all modes (*asarvaparyāya*) (TABh 1.26.15).

chapter of the TA.⁴⁵⁵ The chapter consists of 44 *sūtras* and discusses the following topics:

- i. The substances (*dravya*) (TA 5.1 – 5.6)
- ii. Space-points (*pradeśa*) (TA 5.7 – 5.16)
- iii. Function (*upakāra*) of the substances (TA 5.17 – 5.22)
- iv. The material elements (*pudgala*): atoms and aggregates (TA 5.23 – 5.28)
- v. Existence (*sat*) and permanence (TA 5.29 – 5.31)
- vi. Connection of material elements (*bandha*) (TA 5.32 – 5.36)
- vii. Qualities (*guṇa*), modes (*pariyāya*), and transformation (*pariṇāma*) (TA 5.37 – 5.44)

The substances (dravya)

The first *sūtra* of the fifth chapter opens with an enumeration of the four inanimate entities (*ajīvakāya*). The second *sūtra* explains that the inanimate entities together with the soul are the substances (*dravya*) (TA 5.2). This implies that there are five types of substance, which are given in the table below:

XXII. The five substances (<i>dravya</i>) (TA 5.1 – 5.2)	
<i>ajīvakāya</i> (the non-living entities)	
i. <i>dharma</i> (motion)	v. <i>jīva</i> (souls)
ii. <i>adharma</i> (rest)	
iii. <i>ākāśa</i> (space)	
iv. <i>pudgala</i> (material elements)	
[<i>kāla</i> (time), TA 5.38]	

The first two inanimate substances (*dharma* and *adharma*) facilitate movement (*gati*) and inertia (*sthiti*).⁴⁵⁶ The terms that are used for these categories is peculiar

⁴⁵⁵ The prime goal of the analysis in this section is to present the different components of the ontological account of the TA. My analysis is mainly based on the text of the TA and the explanation in the *bhāṣya*. Since this study is primarily focused on the epistemological account in the TA, my discussion of the ontological account will be relatively brief and I will not analyse its historical relationship with other texts or schools. For a comparative study of the ontological theory in the TA and the ontological account of Kundakunda, see Bajželj 2013.

⁴⁵⁶ The functions of motion (*dharma*) and rest (*adharma*) is explained in TA 5.17, which will be discussed below. The category of rest (*adharma*) does not feature in the ontological model

since '*dharma*' and '*adharma*' usually refer to ethical categories. However, the idea that one needs an ontological category to explain movement or change is not unique to the TA. Similar ideas are expressed in influential ontological treatises such as the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* and the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*.⁴⁵⁷ Apart from motion and rest, the TA mentions two other inanimate substances, i.e., space (*ākāśa*) and material elements (*puḍgala*). The soul (*jīva*) forms the counterpart of the inanimate entities. It is the cause of life, the locus of knowledge, and explains the agency of living beings.

The ontological categories that the TA proposes, provide a relatively simple but coherent model. It reduces the plurality of phenomena to a limited number of substances that are fundamentally different and cannot be further reduced. The idea that the world exists of material elements (*puḍgala*), which occur in space (*ākāśa*), which can move or be stationary because of the principles of motion and rest (*dharma* and *adharma*), and which can be animated by a sentient principle (*jīva*) has some explanatory value and the text does not postulate special entities such as universals, individuator, or the relation of inherence, which can be found in rival theories.

Even though the TA presents a fairly coherent ontological model, it seems that the text reflects different stages of the Jaina theory of substance. In the last part of the chapter, the TA adds that some teachers also regard time (*kāla*) as one of the

in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, which is the locus classicus for the theory of categories. The TA and the TABh do not explain why motion (*dharma*) has an opposite (*adharma*). The *Dravyasaṃgraha* — a later Jaina text by Nemicandra (fl. 10th cent. CE) — explains that the principle of rest (*adhama*) helps matter (*puḍgala*) and living entities (*jīva*) to stay in the same place, just like shade helps travellers to remain at the same place (*Dravyasaṃgraha* 18, in Balbir 2010: 10 – 11). The inclusion of a principle of rest can also be found in other traditions. The *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, for example, mentions *tamas* as one of the three strands (*guṇa*) of *prakṛti* (*Sāṃkhyakārikā* 13 in Burley 2007: 166 - 167).

⁴⁵⁷ The *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* (VS) includes motion (*karman*) as one of the ontological categories (*padārtha*) (VS 1.1.4, Gough 1873: 4). It is remarkable that the ontological categories in the TA correspond to several of the Vaiśeṣika categories. However, the vocabulary that is used to describe the different ontological categories deviates from the vocabulary that is used in the VS. For example, the different categories are listed as different types of '*dravya*'. By contrast, the VS uses the term '*padārtha*' to refer to the categories. However, it uses '*dravya*' to refer to the material elements, which are called '*puḍgala*' in the TA. Space (*ākāśa*) is seen as one of the substances (*dravya*) in the VS but the list of categories in the same text does not include time. As such, the TA proposes a radically different ontological account even though the similarity of some of the terms suggests that the models in the TA and the VS emerged from a shared intellectual context. For a general overview of the meaning of '*padārtha*' in the different traditions, see Oberhammer 1996: 153 - 156.

substances (TA 5.38).⁴⁵⁸ The TA does not refute this idea, even though time is not listed as one of the substances at the beginning of the chapter in TA 5.1 – 5.2. Furthermore, the discussion of the function (*upakāra*) of the different substances also deals with the function of time (TA 5.22) after discussing the function of the five substances that are mentioned in TA 5.1 – 5.2, which suggests that the composer of that passage regarded time as one of the substances.⁴⁵⁹

After enumerating the substances, the TA continues with some general qualifications of the substances. The first two *sūtras* of this section read as follows:

nityāvasthitāny arūpāṇi ||5.3|| rūpiṇaḥ pudgalāḥ ||5.4||

[These substances] are eternal (*nitya*), [their number is] fixed⁴⁶⁰ (*avasthita*), and [they are] formless (*arūpa*). The material elements (*pudgala*), [however], have form (*rūpin*).

This description is somewhat confusing. TA 5.3 seems to suggest that all substances are eternal, that their number is fixed, and that they are formless. Nevertheless, TA 5.4 adds that the material elements (*pudgala*) do have form, even though the material elements are mentioned as one of the substances. The *bhāṣya* provides the following explanation of TA 5.3:

***etāni dravyāṇi nityāni bhavanti | tadbhāvāvyayaṃ nityam iti vakṣyate ||
avasthitāni ca | na hi kadācit pañcatvaṃ bhūtārthatvaṃ ca vyabhicaranti ||
arūpāṇi ca | naiṣāṃ rūpam astīti | rūpaṃ mūrtir mūrtyāśrayās ca sparśādāya
iti ||***

These substances (*dravya*) are eternal (*nitya*). It will be said⁴⁶¹ that '[an entity that] does not change its condition (*tadbhāvāvyaya*) is eternal (*nitya*)'. Furthermore, [the substances] are fixed (*avasthita*) since they never deviate from the quality of being five (*pañcatva*) and the quality of being real (*bhūtārthatva*). And they are formless (*arūpa*). They have no form. 'Form' (*rūpa*) is 'embodiment' (*mūrti*) and [the objects

⁴⁵⁸ For a discussion of this passage, see § 3.4 (*Qualities, modes, and transformation*).

⁴⁵⁹ The function of the individual substances is discussed in TA 5.17 – 5.22. See also § 3.4 (*Function of the substances*).

⁴⁶⁰ See TABh 5.3.4.

⁴⁶¹ See TA 5.30.

of the senses] beginning with touch (*sparśa-ādi*) are dependent on embodiment (*mūrti-āśraya*) (TABh 5.3.1 – 5.3.7).

As can be seen in the passage above, the composer of the *bhāṣya* interprets the three terms in TA 5.3 (*nitya, avasthita, arūpa*) as qualifications of the substances. Since TA 5.4 says that the material elements (*pudgala*) have form, it would be strange if TA 5.3 is indeed trying to say that all substances are formless (*arūpa*). Moreover, if the three terms in the *sūtra* all qualify substance, one would expect a different syntactical structure of TA 5.3. The *sūtra* separates the third term (*arūpa*) from the first two terms, which are given in compound (*nityāvasthita*). If the three terms all qualify substance, it would be more obvious to write '*nityāvasthitārūpāṇi*'. However, if we do not follow the interpretation of the *bhāṣya*, we could read TA 5.3 – 5.4 (*nityāvasthitāny arūpāṇi | rūpiṇaḥ pudgalāḥ*) in at least two other ways:

- i. The formless [substances are] eternal and [their number is] fixed. The material elements have form.
- ii. [The five substances are] eternal and [their number is] fixed. [There are] formless [substances]. The material elements have form.

The first reading would imply that material elements are not eternal. The second reading does not necessarily entail the same idea about the material elements but it is not the most obvious reading. Unfortunately, the TA does not discuss whether material elements are eternal. Therefore, it is hard to decide how these *sūtras* should be interpreted exactly.⁴⁶² Nevertheless, all the different readings entail at least the eternality of four substances, i.e., motion (*dharmā*), rest (*adharma*), space (*ākāśa*) and souls (*jīva*). Since the qualification 'fixed' (*avasthita*) is not explained in the TA, it is not clear whether the *sūtra* tries to say that the number of types of substances is fixed or whether there is a fixed number of all substances, i.e., a fixed number of souls, material elements, etc. The *bhāṣya* chooses the first option and explains that the number of substances is five (TABh 5.3.4).⁴⁶³

⁴⁶² The *ṭīkā* discusses several interpretations of these *sūtras* and mentions the variant reading '*arūpīṇi*', which is also given in Mody's edition. Kapadia's edition adds '*ca*' at the end of TA 5.3. The fact that there are variant readings of the *sūtra* and different interpretations in the commentaries suggest that there was no consensus about the meaning of the *sūtra* and might indicate a problem in the textual transmission.

⁴⁶³ The same explanation is given in the *Sarvārthasiddhi* (S.A. Jain 1992: 132).

The *sūtra* adds that motion, rest, and space are unique substances (*ekadravya*) and that they are inactive (*niṣkriya*).⁴⁶⁴ The *bhāṣya* explains that souls (*jīva*) and matter (*pudgala*) are active (*kriyāvat*) and non-unique substances (*anekadravya*).⁴⁶⁵ The table below shows the different qualities of the substances as discussed in this passage:

XXIII. Qualities of the substances (<i>dravya</i>) (TA 5.5 – 5.6, TABh 5.5.1 – 5.6.1)				
	inactive (<i>niṣkriya</i>)	active (<i>kriyāvat</i>)	unique (<i>ekadravya</i>)	non-unique (<i>anekadravya</i>)
motion (<i>dharma</i>)	x		x	
rest (<i>adharmā</i>)	x		x	
space (<i>ākāśa</i>)	x		x	
matter (<i>pudgala</i>)		x		x
souls (<i>jīva</i>)		x		x

Space and space-points (pradeśa)

After giving an overview of the five substances, the TA continues with a discussion of space (TA 5.7 – 5.16). The first *sūtras* of this section deal with the peculiar concept of ‘space-points’ (*pradeśa*). The general idea seems to be that space consists of atomic spatial units, which are called ‘*pradeśa*’.

The substances motion (*dharma*), rest (*adharmā*), and souls (*jīva*) are said to occupy innumerable (*asaṅkhyeya*) space-points (TA 5.7 – 5.8). Space (*ākāśa*) occupies infinitely many space-points (TA 5.9). Material elements (*pudgala*) can occupy numerable (*saṅkhyeya*), innumerable (*asaṅkhyeya*), or infinitely many (*ananta*) space-points (TA 5.10).⁴⁶⁶ However, individual atoms (*aṇu*) do not occupy space-points (TA 5.11). The *bhāṣya* explains that atoms have no beginning or

⁴⁶⁴ ‘[The substances] up to space (i.e., motion, rest and space) (*ā-ākāśa*) are unique substances. And [they are] inactive’ (*ākāśād ekadravyāṇi | niṣkriyāṇi ca*) (TA 5.5 – 5.6).

⁴⁶⁵ TABh 5.5.2 and 5.6.1. It is interesting that the material elements are seen as active (*kriyāvat*). The *bhāṣya* explains that action (*kriyā*) means ‘the action of going’ (*gati-karman*) (TABh 5.6.3).

⁴⁶⁶ The *bhāṣya* does not explain why matter (*pudgala*) can occupy numerable, innumerable, or infinitely many space-points. The TA does mention that motion, rest, and souls, exist in the worldly realm (*loka-ākāśa*) (TA 5.12 – 5.15), which suggests that they do not exist in the part of the cosmos outside the worldly realm (*aloka*).

centre.⁴⁶⁷ The meaning seems to be that atoms cannot have further divisions and, therefore, cannot occupy multiple space-points.⁴⁶⁸ The number of space-points occupied by the different substances and the atoms, as mentioned in TA 5.7 – 5.11, are summarised in the table below:

XXIV. Space-points (<i>pradeśa</i>) occupied by substances and atoms (TA 5.7 – 5.11)				
	none	numerable (<i>saṅkhyeya</i>)	innumerable (<i>asaṅkhyeya</i>)	infinitely many (<i>ananta</i>)
motion (<i>dharma</i>)			x	
rest (<i>adharmā</i>)			x	
souls (<i>jīva</i>)			x	
space (<i>ākāśa</i>)				x
matter (<i>puṅgalā</i>)		x	x	x
atoms (<i>aṇu</i>)	x			

As can be seen in the table above, the number of space-points that are occupied by motion, rest, and souls is large (innumerable) but ultimately limited (i.e., not ‘infinitely many’). By contrast, the number of space-points that are occupied by space (*ākāśa*) is said to be infinitely many (TA 5.9). However, the *bhāṣya* explains that space (*ākāśa*) in the world (*loka*) occupies a limited number of space-points too, just like motion, rest, and souls. However, the *bhāṣya* makes a distinction between the world (*loka*) and that which is beyond the world (*aloka*) and adds that the space in these two realms together occupies infinitely many space-points, as stated in TA 5.9.⁴⁶⁹ In other words, the cosmos as a whole (*loka* and *aloka*) has infinitely many space-points but the number of space-points in the worldly realm of the cosmos

⁴⁶⁷ “There are no space-points for an atom (*aṇu*) since the infinitesimal particle (*paramāṇu*) is without beginning (*anādi*), without centre (*amadhya*) and without space-point (*apradeśa*)’ (*aṇoḥ pradeśā na bhavanti | anādir amadhyo ‘pradeśo hi paramāṇuḥ*) (TABh 5.11.1 - 5.11.2).

⁴⁶⁸ The size of an atom corresponds to the size of a space-point. Therefore, the *sūtra* says that there are no space-points in atoms. However, clusters of atoms can take up two or more space-points (TABh 5.14.3 - 5.14.6). Jacobi’s commentary on TA 5.11 says: ‘[Das Atom] ist eben ein Punkt und hat keine Punkte’ (Jacobi 1885: 513).

⁴⁶⁹ “The worldly realm and that which is beyond the world (*loka-aloka-ākāśa*) have infinitely many space-points. However, [the number of space-points] in the worldly realm (*loka-ākāśa*) is equal to motion, rest and souls’ (*lokālokākāśasyānantāḥ pradeśāḥ | lokākāśasya tu dharmādharmaikajīvais tulyāḥ*) (TABh 5.9.1 – 5.9.2).

(*loka*) — which is inhabited by souls and in which the principles of motion and rest are present — is limited.

After discussing the number of space-points that are occupied by the different substances, TA 5.12 – 5.16 continues with a discussion of the presence of the substances in the worldly realm (*loka*):

lokākāśe 'vagāhaḥ ||5.12|| dharmādharmayoḥ kṛtsne ||5.13|| ekapradeśādiṣu bhājyaḥ pudgalānām ||5.14|| asaṅkhyeyabhāgādiṣu jīvānām ||5.15|| pradeśa-saṃhāravisargābhyāṃ pradīpavat ||5.16||

[There is] 'abidance' (*avagāha*) in the worldly realm (*lokākāśa*). [There is abidance of] motion and rest (*dharmā-adharma*) in the entire (*kṛtsna*) [worldly realm]. [There is] distribution (*bhājya*) of material elements (*pudgala*) in one space-point etc. (*ekapradeśa-ādī*). [The abidance] of souls (*jīva*) is in innumerable parts etc. (*asaṅkhyeyabhāga-ādī*). [It is caused] by contraction (*saṃhāra*) and expansion (*visarga*) [of] space-points (*pradeśa*), like a light (*pradīpa*).

The passage begins by saying that there is 'abidance' (*avagāha*)⁴⁷⁰ in the worldly realm of the cosmos. The subject of the abidance is not mentioned explicitly but must be substances, which is the main subject of chapter V. In other words, the intended meaning of the *sūtra* seems to be that the substances have their abode in the worldly realm (*lokākāśa*) but not in the space outside the worldly realm (*aloka*). The principles of motion (*dharmā*) and rest (*adharma*) are present in the entire worldly realm, which facilitates the movement of matter and souls. The material elements (*pudgala*) are dispersed throughout the worldly realm and can take up one, two, or more space-points (*pradeśa*). Individual souls (*jīva*) can expand and contract and their size may grow to the size of the entire worldly realm (TABh 5.15.1 – 5.15.2). This is compared to the way in which light functions. The *bhāṣya* explains that the light of a lamp can reach the ceiling of a large room but remains small when it is placed in a small room (TABh 5.16.3). By expanding itself up to the size of the whole worldly realm, the soul can acquire knowledge about the whole world.⁴⁷¹

⁴⁷⁰ The prime meaning of the word '*avagāha*' is 'plunging' or 'bathing' (MW). In this passage, the term refers to the act of occurring or existing in a specific part of the cosmos.

⁴⁷¹ The *bhāṣya* mentions that the ultimate expansion of the soul happens to worldly souls (*saṃsārin*) in an advanced spiritual state and to perfected beings (*siddha*) (TABh 5.16.9). This relates to the different varieties of cosmic perception (*avadhi*), such as 'the one that

Function of the substances

After discussing the loci of the different substances and the space-points that they can occupy, the TA explains the functions of the individual substances as follows:

***gatisthityupagraho dharmādharmayor upakārah ||5.17|| ākāśasyāva-
gāhaḥ ||5.18|| śarīravānmanahprāṇāpānāḥ pudgalānām ||5.19|| sukhaduḥkha-
jīvitamaraṇopagrahās ca ||5.20|| parasparopagraho jīvānām ||5.21|| vartanā
pariṇāmaḥ kriyā paratvāparatve ca kālasya ||5.22||***

The function (*upakāra*) of motion and rest (*dharmādharmā*) is the support (*upagraha*) of movement (*gati*) and inertia (*sthiti*). [The function] of space (*ākāśa*) is abidance (*avagāha*). [The function] of material elements (*pudgala*) is [the support of] body, speech, mind, inhalation, and exhalation (*śarīra-vāc-manas-prāṇāpāna*) and the support (*upagraha*) of pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*), life (*jīvita*), and death (*maraṇa*). [The function] of souls (*jīva*) is mutual support (*parasparopagraha*). [The function] of time (*kāla*) is continuation (*vartanā*), transformation (*pariṇāma*), activity (*kriyā*), temporal priority (*paratva*) and posteriority (*aparatva*).

First, motion (*dharma*) and rest (*adharmā*) are said to facilitate movement and inertia (TA 5.17). Next, space (*ākāśa*) is said to facilitate ‘abidance’ (*avagāha*) (TA 5.18). In other words, it functions as the abode of the other substances. The function of the material elements (*pudgala*) is explained as the support (*upagraha*) of bodily processes, experiences, and states (TA 5.19 – 5.20).⁴⁷² Next, souls (*jīva*) are said to provide mutual support (*paraspara-upagraha*) (TA 5.21). The *bhāṣya* explains this idea in the following way:

weakens’ (*hīyamānaka*) and ‘the one that increases’ (*vardhamānaka*), which are mentioned in TABh 1.23.6. See also the discussion of cosmic perception above (§ 3.2).

⁴⁷² It is not clear to me why the function of the material elements is explained in terms that relate to the human body only. One would expect a more general description of the function of matter, such as hardness, weight etc. Such terms are used, however, in the description of atoms in TA 5.23 - 5.24 (see § 3.4, *The material elements*). It is interesting that the explanation of the material elements (*pudgala*) relates to the primary meaning of the word (i.e., ‘body’, MW).

parasparasya hitāhitopadeśābhyām upagraho jīvanām iti |

[The function] of souls (*jīva*) is support (*upagraha*) for each other by teaching [about that which is] beneficial and disadvantageous (*hita-ahita-upadeśa*) (TABh 5.21.1).

This is a somewhat remarkable passage. So far, the characteristics of the substances were mainly explained in ontological terms. The explanation of the function of the soul, however, has more to do with ethics. It would have been more consistent if the TA had referred to consciousness or the power to animate as the function of the soul as a substance.

In her analysis of this section of the TA, Ohira mentions that the discussion of the functions of the different substances is largely based on canonical sources such as the *Sthāna* and *Uttarādhyayana*.⁴⁷³ However, the description of the function of the soul that is given in the TA does not appear in canonical texts. Hence, this might be an innovation of the composer of the TA. The author might have felt the need to specify the function of the soul since he also mentions the functions of the other substances. In the end, the overall style of the TA is rather systematic and it would be odd to leave one of the substances out of the discussion. Since the canonical sources do not specify the function of the soul, there was a significant lacuna in the theory, which allowed the composer to come up with a new idea.⁴⁷⁴

The discussion of the functions of the different substances finishes with a discussion of time (*kāla*), which is said to facilitate continuation (*vartanā*), transformation (*pariṇāma*), activity (*kriyā*), anteriority (*paratva*), and posteriority (*aparatva*) (TA 5.22).⁴⁷⁵ Since time is not mentioned as one of the substances in TA

⁴⁷³ Ohira 1982: 60.

⁴⁷⁴ One may still question why the composer of the TA chose this particular solution, which differs strongly from the explanations of the functions of the other substances. It is striking that this *sūtra* became one of the most cited parts of the TA and is even included in an often-used contemporary Jaina emblem. The influential English translation of the TA by Tatia has singled out this *sūtra* on a separate page following the title page, translated as ‘Souls render service to one another’ (Tatia 2011: v).

⁴⁷⁵ The *bhāṣya* has an extensive commentary on the terms ‘*paratva*’ and ‘*aparatva*’. It distinguishes three different meanings of these terms, related to praiseworthiness (*praśamsā*), region (*kṣetra*), and time (*kāla*) (TABh 5.22.10). It illustrates these meanings with, respectively, the highest and inferior knowledge, remoteness and proximity, and being young and old. Since the first two options are irrelevant for the discussion of time, it seems that the *bhāṣya* simply lists the possible meanings of the terms and does not try to explain different aspects of the function of time. Therefore, I translate the terms as ‘anteriority’ and ‘posteriority’, even though these English words cannot be related to ‘praiseworthiness’ and

5.1 – 5.2, it is striking that the TA deals with the function of time immediately following the discussion of the function of the five substances. The TA and the TABh do not explain why time is included in this section.⁴⁷⁶ This inconsistency in the presentation might indicate that the chapter on ontology was composed at different stages.

The table below summarises the discussion of the functions of the different substances and time, as discussed in TA 5.17 – 5.22.

XXV. The functions of the substances and time (TA 5.17 – 5.22)	
Substances (<i>dravya</i>) ⁴⁷⁷	Functions (<i>upakāra</i>) ⁴⁷⁸
i. <i>dharma</i> (motion) (TA 5.17)	<i>gati</i> (movement)
ii. <i>adharmā</i> (rest) (TA 5.17)	<i>sthiti</i> (inertia)
iii. <i>ākāśa</i> (space) (TA 5.18)	<i>avagāha</i> (abidance)
iv. <i>pudgala</i> (material elements) (TA 5.19 – 5.20)	<i>śarīra</i> (body)
	<i>vāc</i> (speech)
	<i>manas</i> (mind)
	<i>prāṇāpāna</i> (inhalation and exhalation)
	<i>sukha</i> (pleasure)
	<i>duḥkha</i> (pain)
	<i>jīva</i> (life)
v. <i>jīva</i> (souls) (TA 5.21)	<i>parasparopagraha</i> (mutual support)
vi. <i>kāla</i> (time) (TA 5.22)	<i>vartanā</i> (subsistence)
	<i>pariṇāma</i> (transformation)
	<i>kriyā</i> (activity)
	<i>paratva</i> (anteriority)
	<i>aparatva</i> (posteriority)

‘region’. The length of the commentary on this passage might indicate that the discussion of the different meanings of ‘*paratva*’ and ‘*aparatva*’ was added at a later stage, perhaps as a result of the accidental inclusion of a gloss.

⁴⁷⁶ As mentioned previously, the TA says that some teachers classify time as a substance (TA 5.38).

⁴⁷⁷ This list includes time, which is not mentioned as a substance in TA 5.1 - 5.2.

⁴⁷⁸ The function of the individual substances is explained as ‘support of’ (*upagraha*) the items that are listed in the right column of this table.

The material elements (pudgala): atoms and aggregates

Having discussed the functions of the different substances, the TA continues with a discussion of the material elements (*pudgala*) (TA 5.23 – 5.28).

sparśarasagandhavarnavantah pudgalāh ||5.23|| śabdabandhasaukṣmya-sthaulyasaṃsthānabhedatamaśchāyātapodyotavantaś ca ||5.24||

The material elements (*pudgala*) possess touch (*sparśa*), taste (*rasa*), smell (*gandha*), and colour (*varṇa*); and they possess sound (*śabda*), connection (*bandha*), subtlety (*saukṣmya*), largeness (*sthaulya*), shape (*saṃsthāna*), partition (*bheda*), darkness (*tamas*), shade (*chāyā*), heat (*tapas*), and light (*uddyota*).

aṇavaḥ skandhās ca ||5.25|| saṃghātabhedebhya utpadyante ||5.26|| bhedād anuḥ ||5.27|| bhedasamghātābhyāṃ cākṣuṣāḥ ||5.28||

[The material elements exist as] atoms (*aṇu*) and aggregates (*skandha*). They result (*utpad*) from combination (*saṃghāta*) [and] disintegration (*bheda*). An atom (*aṇu*) [results] from disintegration (*bheda*) [only]. The perceptible [aggregates] (*cākṣuṣa*) [result] from disintegration (*bheda*) [and] combination (*saṃghāta*).

The section on the material elements begins with a list of characteristics, which has been divided into two *sūtras* (TA 5.23 – 5.24).⁴⁷⁹ The *bhāṣya* introduces this section by explaining that the word ‘*pudgala*’ has different meanings in other schools (*tantrāntarīya*) and can even mean ‘soul’ (*jīva*). It adds that the TA explains the meaning of ‘*pudgala*’ in TA 5.23 to distinguish its meaning from the way in which other traditions use the word (TABh 5.22.16 - 5.22.21). The TABh further provides a detailed specification of the varieties of each of the characteristics of the material elements that are mentioned in these two *sūtras*, which are listed in the table below.

⁴⁷⁹ It is not immediately obvious why the characteristics of the material elements are discussed in two separate *sūtras*. The four characteristics that are mentioned in TA 5.23 are all related to the senses (touch, taste, smell, and colour) and describe, as such, phenomenal aspects of the material elements. By contrast, most of the characteristics in TA 5.24 describe more objective aspects of the material elements, such as size and shape. However, the first item that is mentioned in TA 5.24 is sound (*śabda*), which one would expect, rather, in the preceding *sūtra*, which describes the sensory qualities. The *bhāṣya* raises the question about the separation of the list and explains that the items in TA 5.23 relate to infinitesimal particles (*paramāṇu*) as well as aggregates (*skandha*) but that the items in TA 5.24 qualify aggregates only (TABh 5.24.24 - 5.24.25).

TA 5.25 – 5.28 explains that the group of material elements (*puḍgala*) exists of atoms (*aṇu*), which can be combined into aggregates (*skandha*). When aggregates disintegrate, they end up as smaller aggregates and/or individual atoms. Unlike the atoms, the aggregates are perceptible.

XXVI. Characteristics of material elements (<i>puḍgala</i>)			
TA 5.23 ⁴⁸⁰		TA 5.24	
<i>sparśa</i> (touch)	<i>kaṭhina</i> (hard)	<i>śabda</i> (sound) ⁴⁸¹	<i>tata</i> (far reaching)
	<i>mrdu</i> (soft)		<i>vitata</i> (diffused)
	<i>guru</i> (heavy)		<i>ghana</i> (firm)
	<i>laghu</i> (light)		<i>śuśira</i> (hollow)
	<i>śīti</i> (cold)		<i>gharṣa</i> (frictional)
	<i>uṣṇa</i> (hot)		<i>bhāṣa</i> (speaking)
	<i>snigdha</i> (smooth)	<i>bandha</i> (connection)	<i>prayogabandha</i> (yoked)
	<i>rūkṣa</i> (rough)		<i>visrasābandha</i> (loose)
<i>rasa</i> (taste)	<i>tikta</i> (bitter)	<i>saukṣmya</i> (subtlety)	<i>mīśra</i> (mixed)
	<i>kaṭu</i> (sharp)		<i>antya</i> (ultimate)
	<i>kaṣāya</i> (astringent)	<i>sthaulya</i> (largeness)	<i>āpekṣika</i> (relative)
	<i>amla</i> (acid)		<i>antya</i> (ultimate)
	<i>madhura</i> (sweet)		<i>āpekṣika</i> (relative)
<i>gandha</i> (smell)	<i>surabhi</i> (fragrant)	<i>saṃsthāna</i> (shape)	<i>anekavidha; dīrgha-hrasva-ādi</i> (manifold; long, short, etc.)
	<i>asurabhi</i> (non-fragrant)		<i>autkārika</i> (split)
<i>varṇa</i> (colour)	<i>kṛṣṇa</i> (black)	<i>bheda</i> (partition)	<i>caurṇika</i> (pulverised)
	<i>nīla</i> (blue)		<i>khaṇḍa</i> (a piece)
	<i>lohita</i> (red)		<i>pratara</i> (layered) ⁴⁸²
	<i>pīta</i> (yellow)		<i>anutata</i> (from the sides) ⁴⁸³
	<i>śukla</i> (white)	<i>tamas</i> (darkness)	<i>pariṇāmaja</i> (produced by transformation)
	<i>chāyā</i> (shade)		
	<i>tapas</i> (heat)		
	<i>uddyota</i> (lightness)		

⁴⁸⁰ The items in TA 5.23 qualify infinitesimal particles (*paramāṇu*) and aggregates (*skandha*). The items in TA 5.24 qualify aggregates only (TA 5.24.24 - 5.24.25).

⁴⁸¹ The *ṭikā* illustrates the different varieties of sound with different musical instruments, such as a drum, a stringed instrument, a bell, and a flute. See also Sanghvi 1974: 195.

⁴⁸² Like chopped off layers of mica (Sanghvi 1974: 196).

⁴⁸³ Like the removal of the bark of bamboo or sugar cane (Sanghvi 1974: 196).

Existence and permanence of substance

After listing the characteristics of material elements, the TA discusses existence (*sat*) and permanence (*nitya*) (TA 5.29 – 5.30):

***utpādayayadhrauvyayuktam sat ||5.29|| tadbhāvāvyayam nityam ||5.30||
arpitānarpitasiddheḥ ||5.31||***

Existence⁴⁸⁴ (*sat*) is connected with production (*utpāda*), decay (*vyaya*), and duration (*dhrauvya*). [An entity that] does not change its state (*bhāva*), is eternal (*nitya*). [The apparent contradiction] results from the validity of the conventional [standpoint] (*arpita*) and the non-conventional [standpoint] (*arpita-anarpita-siddhi*).⁴⁸⁵

It is hard to grasp the intended meaning of these three *sūtras* and translators and commentators have come up with different interpretations.⁴⁸⁶ It seems that the *sūtra* refers to different aspects of substance and tries to explain their apparent contradiction. The first *sūtra* says that existence is connected with decay. However, TA 5.5 says that the substances are eternal (*nitya*). This seems to imply that the existence of substance contradicts its eternity. The composer of the TA was apparently aware of this problem and he explains in TA 5.31 that this contradiction results from analysing the subject from two different standpoints.

Connection of material elements (bandha)

The next section in the *sūtra* is more straightforward and explains how atoms can form aggregates (TA 5.32 – 5.36):

⁴⁸⁴ Alternatively, 'things that exist'.

⁴⁸⁵ The *bhāṣya* explains the '*arpita*' perspective as a common sense perspective (*vyavahārika*) and the '*anarpita*' perspective as an uncommon standpoint (*avyavahārika*) (TABh 5.31.2). Sanghvi translates TA 5.31 as follows: 'Each thing is possessed of a number of properties; for as viewed from the standpoint adopted and as viewed from another standpoint it proves to be something self-contradictory' (Sanghvi 1974: 206). Tatia notes that this *sūtra* is based on the discussion of substance in the *Aṅgapraśāsta* 3.10.46 (Tatia 200: 136, n. 3). See also Soni 2003: 29ff.

⁴⁸⁶ Sanghvi provides different interpretations of this passage (Sanghvi 1974: 202 - 208). See also Tatia 2011: 135 - 140.

snigdharūkṣatvād bandhaḥ ||5.32|| *na jaghanyaguṇānām* ||5.33|| *guṇasāmye sadṛśānām* ||5.34|| *dvyadhikādiguṇānām tu* ||5.35|| *bandhe samādhikau pāriṇāmikau* ||5.36||

A connection (*bandha*) [results] from smoothness (*snigdha*) and roughness (*rūkṣatva*). [Such a connection does] not [take place between material elements having a] low [degree] of [these] qualities (i.e., smoothness and roughness) (*jaghanyaguṇa*). [Likewise, such a connection does not take place] when [there is] an evenness of the qualities (*guṇasāmya*) [between] similar [material elements] (*sadṛśa*) (i.e., two material elements having the same degree of smoothness or roughness cannot connect). However, [a connection exists between material elements whose] qualities [have a] difference of two or more (i.e., when there is a difference of at least two degrees in smoothness or roughness) (*dvy-adhika-ādi-guṇa*). [When there is] a connection (*bandha*), [two material elements whose smoothness or roughness is] equal or more (*samādhika*) are subject to transformation (*pāriṇāmika*).

The text distinguishes two characteristics of material elements,⁴⁸⁷ i.e., smoothness (*snigdha*) and roughness (*rūkṣatva*). The intensity of these qualities determines the adhesion between the material elements. Only those material elements that have opposite qualities in a sufficient degree — i.e., a difference of two or more degrees in smoothness or roughness — will connect and will thereby transform into aggregates.

Qualities, modes, and transformation

The last section of the fifth chapter discusses several aspect of substance (*dravya*), which centre around the notion of change (*pāriṇāma*) (TA 5.37 – 5.44). The passage reads as follows:

⁴⁸⁷ The *sūtra* does not mention explicitly that the material elements (*puṅgava*) are the subject of the passage. However, the *bhāṣya* clearly states that the passage deals with the connection between material elements (TABh 5.32.1).

guṇaparyāyavad dravyam ||5.37|| *kālaś cety eke* ||5.38||
so 'nantasamayaḥ ||5.39|| *dravyāśrayā nirguṇā guṇāḥ* ||5.40|| *tadbhāvaḥ*
pariṇāmaḥ ||5.41|| *anādir ādimāṃś ca* ||5.42|| *rūpiṣv ādimān* ||5.43||
yogopayogau jīveṣu ||5.44||

Substance (*dravya*) has qualities and modes (*guṇa-paryāyavat*). Time (*kāla*) is also [a substance] according to some. It [consists of] infinitely many moments (*anantasamaya*). Qualities (*guṇa*) inhere in substance (*dravya-āśraya*) [and are themselves] devoid of qualities (*nirguṇa*). The existence of these [substances] (*tadbhāva*) [is characterised by] transformation (*pariṇāma*). [There is transformation, *pariṇāma*] without beginning (*anādi*) and having a beginning (*ādimat*). [Transformation] with a beginning (*ādimat*) [applies to substances which are] having form (*rūpin*). Action (*yoga*) and cognitive operation (*upayoga*) [cause transformation] in the case of souls (*jīva*).

The passage begins by saying that substances (*dravya*) have qualities (*guṇa*) and modes (*paryāya*) (TA 5.37).⁴⁸⁸ Qualities (*guṇa*) are said to inhere in substance and they do not have qualities themselves (TA 5.40). In other words, qualities cannot inhere in qualities but only in matter.⁴⁸⁹ Modes are not further explained in the *sūtra* but the *bhāṣya* explains modes as 'other states' (*bhāva-antara*) or 'other recognitions' (*saṃjñā-antara*) of substance (TABh 5.37.2).⁴⁹⁰

In the middle of the discussion of qualities, the TA mentions that some teachers say that time is a substance too and that it exists of infinitely many moments (TA 5.38 – 5.39).⁴⁹¹ It is not entirely clear to me why the TA includes a discussion of time at this point even though the notion of time relates to the concept of transformation (*pariṇāma*), which is mentioned in TA 5.41.⁴⁹² This *sūtra* says that substances undergo transformation, and specifies two sorts of transformation (TA 5.42). The first type of transformation relates to substances with form (*rūpin*) (TA

⁴⁸⁸ See Soni 1991 for a discussion of these three notions in Jaina thought.

⁴⁸⁹ Halbfass observes that this *sūtra* reflects the view of *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* I.1.15 (Halbfass 1992: 107, n.21).

⁴⁹⁰ As explained in the above analysis of the sources of valid cognition, only the omniscient beings can grasp all modes of all substance.

⁴⁹¹ See the beginning of this section (§ 3.4, *The substances*) for a discussion of the ambiguous status of time in the TA.

⁴⁹² TA 5.22 explains that transformation (*pariṇāma*) is a function of time.

5.43). The second type relates to the transformation of the soul, which is caused by action (*yoga*) and cognitive operation (*upayoga*) (TA 5.44).⁴⁹³

The inclusion of this topic at the very end of the chapter is rather suspicious, especially since the version of the TA in the *Sarvārthasiddhi* deviates from the version that is accompanied by the *bhāṣya*. The *Sarvārthasiddhi* simply reads '*kālaś ca*' and omits '*ity eke*', which indicates that time was seen as a substance by Pūjyapāda.⁴⁹⁴ By contrast, the version of the TA that is accompanied by the *bhāṣya* does not confirm whether time is a substance or not and only mentions that some people regard time as a substance. Furthermore, TA 5.42 – 5.44 are fully omitted in the *Sarvārthasiddhi*. Given these textual varieties, and because of the unusual position of the discussion of time,⁴⁹⁵ there are good reasons to treat the last verses of the TA with caution.

To sum up, the fifth chapter of the TA provides a rather common-sensical ontological account and the theory is fairly coherent. Yet, the presentation of the material is rather unsystematic, which might indicate that the ontological theory in the TA has undergone some changes. This is further supported by the fact that the version of the fifth chapter of the TA in the *Sarvārthasiddhi* deviates at several points from the version that is accompanied by the *bhāṣya*. In the next section (§ 3.5), I will analyse several passages in the TA, which will further support the idea that the TA contains several historical layers.

⁴⁹³ It is not clear to me why these two varieties of transformation are qualified as 'having a beginning' (*ādīmat*) and 'without beginning' (*anādi*). The underlying idea seems to be that the transformation of the soul is beginningless, unlike the transformation of material elements.

⁴⁹⁴ Tatia 2011: 143.

⁴⁹⁵ Since the TA lists the different substances at the very beginning of the chapter (TA 5.1 – 5.3), it would make more sense if the discussion of time would have been included in the first section of the chapter.

3.5 The Verses in the *Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya*

As discussed in § 2.3, there are different accounts of the authorship of the TABh. Some scholars, such as Ohira and Dhaky, think that the TABh is an auto-commentary written by Umāsvāti. By contrast, Bronkhorst, Balcerowicz, and others assume that the author of the TA did not write the TABh.⁴⁹⁶ In order to interpret and date the TA and the TABh, it is crucial to know whether the author of the *sūtras* wrote the TABh or not. Since the *sūtras* are composed in a concise manner, many passages are hard to interpret, or are open for various explanations. If the TABh was written as an auto-commentary, we can assume that the commentator correctly understands the *sūtras*, and we can accept the explanations as authoritative. Yet, if the commentator was a different commentator, we have to be more careful in our analysis since it might be that the commentator did not fully understand the *sūtras*, or he might have had his own agenda and might have consciously changed the intended meaning of the root text.

Unfortunately, the existing evidence for the authorship of the TA and the TABh is rather inconclusive. It seems, however, that previous studies have overlooked one aspect of the TABh that is certainly relevant for any discussion of the authorship of the *bhāṣya*. Although the TABh is composed in prose, the text contains some passages in verse, which are introduced as citations. As I will explain below, these short citations form a serious problem for the view that the TA and the TABh were written by the same author as the first Jaina philosophical text in Sanskrit.

The following section contains an analysis of all the verses that accompany the TABh. The first part discusses the different quotations in the TABh. The second part deals with other parts of the *bhāṣya* that are composed in verse but are not introduced as citations. In the third part, I provide an analysis of the introductory verses (*sambandhakārikā*) and the colophon (*praśasti*) that accompany the *bhāṣya*. The authorship and date of these two short texts is contested but most scholars assume that these parts are later additions. Since these passages are also composed in verse, however, I will analyse whether the verses in the *bhāṣya* itself can be linked to these parts. Apart from that, I will also discuss whether the *sambandhakārikās* and *praśasti* can tell us anything about the authorship of the TA and the TABh.

⁴⁹⁶ See Ohira 1982, Dhaky 1996, Bronkhorst 1985 and 2010, and Balcerowicz 2008.

Quotations in the TABh

There are three passages that are introduced with the expressions 'āha ca' and 'uktaṃ ca', which deviate from the main text. The first instance can be found at the end of the first chapter of the *bhāṣya* at TABh 1.35.42-49, and reads as follows:⁴⁹⁷

āha ca

[1.35.42] *naigamaśabdārthānām ekānekārthanayagamāpekṣaḥ |*

[1.35.43] *deśasamagragrāhī vyavahāri naigamo jñeyaḥ ||1||*

[1.35.44] *yat saṅgrhītavacanam sāmānye deśato 'tha ca viśeṣe |*

[1.35.45] *tat saṅgrahanayanīyatam jñānam vidyān nayavidhijñāḥ ||2||*

[1.35.46] *samudāyavyaktyākṛtisattāsamjñādiniścayāpekṣam |*

[1.35.47] *lokopacāranīyatam vyavahāram viśṛtam vidyāt ||3||*

[1.35.48] *sāmprataviśayagrāhakam ṛjusūtranayam samāsato vidyāt |*

[1.35.49] *vidyād yathārthaśabdaṃ viśeṣitapadaṃ tu śabdanayam ||4|| iti ||*

And one says: Grasping either partially or wholly, depending on the understanding from a perspective on objects that are single and many, with reference to meanings of common words, this is to be known as the ordinary commonplace perspective (*naigama*) (TABh 1.35.42-43).

One who knows the perspectives should know that knowledge which is established by the collecting perspective (*saṅgraha-naya*) as the one which is expressive of the collective, in general terms, in partial terms, and specific terms (TABh 1.35.44-45).

He should know the practical perspective (*vyavahāra*) as broad, established by worldly usage, depending on the ascertainment of 'group, individual, form, existence and name etc.' (TABh 1.35.46-47).

He should know concisely the linear perspective (*ṛjusūtra-naya*) as the kind of grasping having the present as its range; and he should know the verbal perspective (*śabda-naya*) as the one where word is in accordance with the object, which has qualified stages (TABh 1.35.48-49).

This passage occurs in a discussion of the theory of perspectives (*nayavāda*) and gives a brief summary of the five perspectives.⁴⁹⁸ Unlike the main body of the text,

⁴⁹⁷ This passage is also given in Part II, with explanatory notes and a discussion of the translation.

⁴⁹⁸ For an explanation of the perspectives, see § 3.2 *The perspectives*.

which is written in prose, this passage consists of four verses in *āryā* metre. It is clearly demarcated by the introductory phrase ‘*āha ca*’ and closes with ‘*iti*’, which suggests that we are dealing with a quotation.⁴⁹⁹ The use of vocabulary in these *āryās* also differs from the overall style of the *bhāṣya*. For example, the *naigama* or commonplace perspective is qualified as *vyavāhārin* or ‘ordinary’ in TABh 1.35.42-43. However, the *vyavahāra* perspective is also discussed as a separate perspective in TABh 1.35.47. This is confusing and does not match the straightforward explanations that characterise most parts of the *bhāṣya*. This strongly suggests that we are dealing with a quotation from an external source.

A similar passage appears later in the commentary on the same *sūtra* in TABh 1.35.90-99:

āha ca

[1.35.90] *viññāyaikārthapadāny arthapadāni ca vidhānam iṣṭam ca* |

[1.35.91] *vinyasya parikṣepān nayaiḥ parikṣyāṇi tattvāni* ||1||

[1.35.92] *jñānaṃ saviparyāsaṃ trayaḥ śrayanty ādito nayāḥ sarvam* |

[1.35.93] *samyagdrṣṭer jñānaṃ mithyādrṣṭer viparyāsaḥ* ||2||

[1.35.94] *rjusūtraḥ saṭ śrayate mateḥ śrutopagrahād ananyatvāt* |

[1.35.95] *śrutakevale tu śabdaḥ śrayate nā’nyac chrutāṅgatvāt* ||3||

[1.35.96] *mithyādrṣṭyajñāne na śrayate nāsya kaścīd ajño ’sti* |

[1.35.97] *jñāsvābhāvyāj jīvo mithyādrṣṭir na cāpy ajñāḥ* ||4||

[1.35.98] *iti nayavādās citrāḥ kvacid viruddhā ivātha ca viśuddhāḥ* |

[1.35.99] *laukikaviṣayātītās tattvajñānārtham adhigamyāḥ* ||5||⁵⁰⁰

⁴⁹⁹ One could argue that we are not necessarily dealing with a quotation from an external source. As mentioned by Tubb & Boose, it is often the *mūlakāra* who is the subject of a verb in the third person singular such as ‘*āha*’ in a commentary (Tubb 2007: 227). Likewise, the participle ‘*ukta*’ may mean “stated by the *mūlakāra*” (Tubb 2007: 228). Further, even in the case of an auto-commentary, the author ‘normally refers to the *mūlakāra* as if the *mūlakāra* were another person’ (Tubb 2007: 229). Hence, these quotation marks do not necessarily imply that we are dealing with citations from a different work. However, the cited passages do not occur in the TA and, as far as I am aware, the passages also do not occur in any other text attributed to the author of the TA. It is also unlikely that these verses try to render what is intended by the *mūlakāra*, since in that case there is no reason to write in *āryā* verse while the TA and the TABh are in prose. Hence, the most plausible reading is that we are dealing with genuine quotations from an external source.

⁵⁰⁰ See part II.

Having understood words of single meaning⁵⁰¹ and words referring to objects and their appropriate classification, having set them out completely, the entities are to be examined by the perspectives (*naya*) (TABh 1.35.90-91).

The first three perspectives apply to all [types of cognition], i.e., knowledge together with its opposite; knowledge results from a right view, delusion results from wrong view (TABh 1.35.92-93).

The linear perspective (*rjusūtra*) applies to six [types of cognition] due to identity, since testimony seizes ordinary cognition; but the literal perspective (*śabda*) applies to testimony and absolute knowledge [only] due to the quality of being dependent on testimony, not on anything else (TABh 1.35.94-95).

[The literal perspective] does not apply to wrong view or false knowledge because there is not any [soul which is] unknowing of that; and there is also no unknowing soul having wrong view, due to the own nature of having knowledge (TABh 1.35.96-97).

In this manner, the statements from the different perspectives (*nayavāda*) are manifold; first they appear to be opposed⁵⁰² and yet they are free from vice; surpassing the range of the worldly they are to be studied for the sake of knowledge of reality (TABh 1.35.98-99).

These five verses are also written in *āryā* metre, and form the very last part of the first chapter. Just as the previous *āryā* verses, they summarise the discussion of *nayavāda*. They are introduced in the same way as the first four *āryās*, even though the passage is not closed with '*iti*'. The omission of '*iti*' might be explained by the fact that TABh 1.35.99 is immediately followed by a standard formula which starts with '*iti*' and indicates the end of the chapter.⁵⁰³ As such, it is slightly ambiguous whether the particle '*iti*' forms the beginning of a new sentence or simply closes the *āryās*. The third apparent quotation appears in the fifth chapter, and consists of just one verse, which deals with the concept of *paramāṇu*:

⁵⁰¹ The meaning of the expression '*ekārthapadāni*' is not entirely clear to me. Perhaps the intended meaning is 'synonyms'.

⁵⁰² Alternatively, 'in their pure form they appear to be opposed'.

⁵⁰³ '*iti tattvārthādhigame rhatpravacanasaṅgrāhe prathamō dhyāyaḥ samāptaḥ*' (TABh 1.35.100). Similar sentences are used at the end of the other chapters (see also part II).

uktaṃ ca
kāraṇam eva tad antyaṃ sūkṣmo nityaś ca paramāṇuḥ |
*ekarasagandhavarṇo dvisparśaḥ kāryaliṅgaś ca || iti |*⁵⁰⁴

And it has been said: ‘The cause is indeed that, the ultimate (*antya*). The infinitesimal particle is subtle and eternal. It has one taste, smell and colour, two types of touch and its mark is the effect’ (TABh 5.25.1-2).

This verse is introduced with ‘*uktaṃ ca*’ instead of ‘*āha ca*’ and is composed in *upagīti* metre. The fact that these three passages in verse seem to be quotations raises the question as to what their possible source can be. If we are indeed dealing with quotations and if we follow Ohira’s and Dhaky’s idea that the TABh is an auto-commentary, then we have to assume that the author cites a source in Sanskrit that predates the TA. Since the first passage discusses an exclusively Jaina topic, i.e., *naṃavāda*, it has to be derived from a Jaina source. However, the TA is usually seen as the first Jaina text in Sanskrit, and there is no evidence that other Jaina philosophical texts were written in Sanskrit before the TA.⁵⁰⁵ Yet, if the TABh is not an auto-commentary, the source of the quotations could theoretically postdate the TA. But even in that case, it is still not clear which text could have been the source since there are no extant Jaina philosophical texts in Sanskrit that predate the TABh apart from the TA. Hence, if we are dealing with proper quotations, we have to accept that another philosophical Jaina text in Sanskrit existed before the composition of the TABh. Further, if one assumes that the TABh is an auto-commentary, it implies that the TA is not the first Jaina text in Sanskrit.

Other verses in the TABh

The existence of other Jaina philosophical works in Sanskrit is relevant for our investigation of Jaina intellectual life at the time of the composition of the TA and the TABh, and the position of the TA itself. Unfortunately, there are no other sources apart from the TABh that provide any information about these texts. Therefore, we can only look at the TABh itself to find out more about these lost sources. One of the

⁵⁰⁴ See also Part II.

⁵⁰⁵ It is also unlikely that the passages are Sanskrit renderings of verses from a Prākṛit source. In such a case, it would be strange to present the verses as a quotation.

questions that need to be addressed is whether the different quotations are derived from a single source or not. Since the quotations are written in verse, we can assume that the original text was composed in verse. Apart from the three explicit quotations, the main body of the TABh has two more passages in verse, which could potentially be copied from the same source as the quotations. The first verse appears in chapter six:

***saṃrambhaḥ sakaṣāyaḥ paritāpanayā bhavet samārambhaḥ |
ārambhaḥ prāṇivadhaḥ trividho yogas tato jñeyaḥ ||***

The threefold (*trividha*) undertaking (*yoga*) [is] therefore (*tatas*) to be known (*jñeya*) [as] action (*saṃrambha*), [which is] accompanied by passion (*sa-kaṣāya*), undertaking (*samārambhaḥ*), [which] may appear (*bhavet*) by torment (*paritāpanā*), [and] violent action (*ārambha*), [which is] the slaughter of living beings (*prāṇivadha*) (TABh 6.9.18-19).

The verse is composed in *āryā* metre but is not marked as a quotation. However, one could question whether this verse was included in the TABh at the time of its composition since Siddhasenagaṇi and Haribhadra, two important early commentators, do not comment on this verse. Moreover, Siddhasenagaṇi usually comments on every word of the TABh.⁵⁰⁶

The last passage in verse can be found at the end of the final chapter, at TABh 10.7.157-220. This passage consists of 32 verses in *anuṣṭubh* metre. These verses summarise the content of the last chapter, which deals with *mokṣa*, and address some additional problems, such as the question as to whether a bodiless being can experience happiness.⁵⁰⁷

There is no reason to assume that the different verses in the TABh are derived from a single pre-existent source. First, only three of the five passages are introduced as quotations. It is unclear what the character of the verse in chapter six

⁵⁰⁶ Mody 1903: 142. Kapadia has a slightly different verse, which corresponds with manuscript C in Mody.

Mody has one more passage in *āryā* metre in chapter five. However, these *āryās* are part of a longer passage that Mody presents in brackets, indicating that this part does not belong to the TABh. The whole passage is omitted by Kapadia. Mody's edition mentions a comment found in several manuscripts that identifies this passage as a part of Haribhadra's commentary. Therefore, this passage is omitted in the present analysis.

⁵⁰⁷ An analysis and translation of these verses can be found in Zydenbos 1983.

is but the verses at the end of the *bhāṣya* clearly summarise the content of the whole chapter and form a suitable ending of the work. It is highly unlikely that such a summary can be derived from another source. As such, we can assume that these last verses were composed by the author of the *bhāṣya*, unlike the quotations in the first and fifth chapter. The idea that the different passages in verse are not derived from the same source is further supported by the fact that these passages are composed in different meters. The quotations in the first chapter and the verse in the sixth chapter are in *āryā*, the quotation from the fifth chapter is in *upagīti*, and the last 32 verses of the tenth chapter are in *anuṣṭubh*.

In short, it seems that the TABh contains several passages that were derived from various texts. It is possible that some of these passages were added to the TABh at a later stage but this must have happened before the composition of the *ṭīkā* (9th cent. CE). Yet, since none of these passages have been identified, it is plausible that these verses were derived from older works that have not been preserved. This would indicate that there were other Jaina works in Sanskrit at the time of the composition of the TABh.

The sambandhakārikās and praśasti

Since we do not have any Sanskrit texts from the Jaina tradition that are composed before the TABh apart from the TA, we cannot use the quotations in the TABh to answer the question as to whether the TABh was written at a later stage than the TA. However, manuscripts of the TABh often include two additions in verse that are most relevant for the discussion of the authorship.⁵⁰⁸ The first part is an introductory section, which is known as the *sambandhakārikās*. It consists of 31 verses in *āryā* metre. The second addition is a *praśasti*, which is added at the end of the work. It consists of six verses in *āryā* metre and provides information about the work and the author. Both parts can be found in Siddhasenagaṇi's *ṭīkā*.⁵⁰⁹ However, it is unclear who the author of the *sambandhakārikās* and the *praśasti* is. Since they contain information about the authorship of the text, the title of the work, and the

⁵⁰⁸ For a discussion of the manuscripts of the TA and the TABh, see Ohira 1982: 1-4. See also § 2.3.

⁵⁰⁹ Siddhasenagaṇi does comment on the *praśasti*, but he does not comment on the *sambandhakārikās*. However, he includes the commentary of Devagupta on these verses in his own work (Ohira 1982: 25). Devagupta's comments on the *sambandhakārikās* can be found in Kapadia's edition of Siddhasenagaṇi's *ṭīkā* (Kapadia 1926).

place of composition, it is important to examine the relationship between these passages and the TA/TABh. Further, there is a good reason to compare the style of the *sambandhakārikās* and the *praśasti* with the verses in the TABh since both passages are composed in *āryā* metre. Even though the *sambandhakārikās* play an important role in the debate about the question as to whether the TABh is an auto-commentary or not, these 31 verses have not been translated in any European language. Therefore, I have provided a translation of this passage in Part II, which serves as the basis for the following analysis.

The *sambandhakārikās* deal with various topics related to Jaina doctrine and the nature of the TA/TABh. The opening verse, which resembles the first *sūtra* of the TA, goes as follows:⁵¹⁰

samyagdarśanaśuddhaṃ yo jñānaṃ viratim eva cāpnoti |
duḥkhanimittam apīdaṃ tena sulabdhaṃ bhavati janma ||1||

[For] him who obtains knowledge, which is pure through right worldview, and indeed non-passion, for him there is good birth, even though this is the cause of pain (SK 1).⁵¹¹

Even though the opening verse of the *sambandhakārikās* seems to deal with the three standard elements of *mokṣamārga* (i.e., *darśana*, *jñāna*, and *cāritra*), the formulation deviates from TA 1.1. First, knowledge (*jñāna*) plays a central role, while right worldview (*samyagdarśana*) is somehow presented as an aspect in the acquisition of knowledge. This raises the question as to why the author of the *sambandhakārikās* chooses to deviate from the way in which *mokṣamārga* is presented in TA 1.1. This deviation would be even more peculiar if these introductory verses are composed by the author of the TA and/or TABh. One may wonder whether it is possible that the author of the *sambandhakārikās* consciously modified the idea presented in TA 1.1 to stress the paramount importance of *jñāna* in the quest for liberation in line with the views of other philosophical treatises like

⁵¹⁰ The first *sūtra* of the TA states: '*samyagdarśana jñāna cāritrāṇi mokṣamārgaḥ*', 'The path to liberation [is constituted by] right worldview, [right] knowledge, and [right] conduct' (see also Part II).

⁵¹¹ See also Part II.

the *Nyāyasūtra*.⁵¹² Apart from the unusual relation between *jñāna* and *darśana* in *sambandhakārikā* 1, it is also remarkable that *cāritra* is not mentioned in the *sambandhakārikās* at all. Of course, one can interpret *virati* as *cāritra* since right conduct results from non-passion in the Jaina perspective. Nevertheless, it remains unclear why the author of the *sambandhakārikās* opens the introductory verses with such an unusual summary of *mokṣamārga*.

As demonstrated in the analysis of the philosophical chapters,⁵¹³ the TABh is clearly influenced by Nyāya thought, and one can hardly escape the impression that the author of the TABh tries to innovate Jaina doctrine based on the model of more influential philosophical treatises, such as the *Nyāyasūtra* and *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*. In a similar way, the *sambandhakārikās* use some words that are not very common for traditional Jaina texts but clearly resonate with Nyāya doctrine. An illustration of this phenomenon can be found in *sambandhakārikā* 8:

abhyarcanād arhatāṃ manaḥprasādas tataḥ samādhiś ca |
tasmād api niḥśreyasam ato hi tatpūjanam nyāyyam ||8||

From the worship of the arhats comes peace of mind, and from that *samādhi*. And from that comes **ultimate bliss**. Therefore, worship of them is appropriate (SK 8).⁵¹⁴

The term ‘ultimate bliss’ (*niḥśreyasa*) is uncommon for the Jaina tradition, even though it is presented in this verse as the highest goal. Yet, *niḥśreyasa* plays a crucial role in Nyāya philosophy.⁵¹⁵ The same term is used in *sambandhakārikā* 16, where ‘the mark of asceticism’ is described as ‘the means to ultimate bliss’ (*niḥśreyasasādhakam śramaṇaliṅgam*).⁵¹⁶ The fact that the term ‘*niḥśreyasa*’ occurs twice in this short introduction to the TABh demonstrates the importance of the

⁵¹² The order of *darśana*, *jñāna*, and *cāritra* does not correspond with most canonical formulations, in which *jñāna* is usually the first element, followed by *darśana* (Ohira 1982: 55). Therefore, one could also argue that the author of the *sambandhakārikās* simply favours the traditional formulation. However, this does not explain why *cāritra* is replaced with *virati*.

⁵¹³ See § 3.2 – 3.4.

⁵¹⁴ See also Part II.

⁵¹⁵ The *Nyāyasūtra* states at its beginning: ‘*pramāṇaprameya*-[...] *tattvajñānān niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ*’ (NS I.1.1), ‘Par la connaissance juste des moyens-de-connaissance-droite, des objets-de-connaissance-droite [...], on atteint le bonheur indépassable’ (Angot 2009: 246-247).

⁵¹⁶ See also Part II.

concept to the composer of this passage, which indicates that the author was well acquainted with *Nyāya* thought. Furthermore, this term deviates from the terminology in the TA and TABh, which strongly suggests that the *sambandhakārikās* were written by a different hand.⁵¹⁷

After the first half of the *sambandhakārikās*, which covers the way to liberation, the suitability of different kinds of people to achieve liberation, and the life of Mahāvīra, who reached the highest goal and who taught the Jaina doctrine, the text continues with a salutation to Mahāvīra (*sambandhakārikā* 21). Then, the author introduces the work as a summary of the words of Mahāvīra in verse 22:

***tattvārthādhigamākhyam bahvartham samgraham laghugrantham |
vakṣyāmi śiṣyahitam imam arhadvacanaikadeśasya ||22||***

I will teach this short text, called '*Tattvārthādhigama*', an important compendium of some of the words of the *arhat*, which is beneficial for students (SK 22).

This verse forms the core of the *sambandhakārikās*: it mentions the goal and the title of the work that the *sambandhakārikās* introduce. Even though the work is usually called '*Tattvārthasūtra*' or '*Tattvārthādhigamasūtra*', the text is labelled in the *sambandhakārikās* as '*Tattvārthādhigama*' which can be translated as '*A Study of the Categories*'.⁵¹⁸ By using the verb '*vakṣyāmi*', the author of the *sambandhakārikās* presents himself as the author of the text that the *sambandhakārikās* introduce. A similar expression is used in the final verse of the *sambandhakārikās*, which ends with the words '*imam [...] mokṣamārgam pravakṣyāmi*', I will teach this path to

⁵¹⁷ The tenth chapter of the TA deals with liberation (*mokṣa*). Instead of the term '*niḥśreyasa*', which is used in the *sambandhakārikās*, this part of the TABh associates *mokṣa* with 'unsurpassed (*anuttara*) bliss (*sukha*)'. The 27th verse of the concluding verses of the tenth chapter reads: '*puṇyakarmavipākāc ca sukham iṣṭendriyārthajam | karmakleśavimokśāc ca mokṣe sukham anuttaram ||* (And by the fruition of good karma there is bliss, produced by a desired object of the senses; but by the liberation from the afflictions of karma in *mokṣa*, there is unsurpassed bliss)' (tr. Zydenbos 1983: 37).

⁵¹⁸ The Śvetāmbara tradition accepts the TABh including the *sambandhakārikās* as an authoritative work, written by Umāsvāti. Therefore, most Śvetāmbara works use the title '*Tattvārthādhigama(sūtra)*', based on the title that is mentioned in the *sambandhakārikās*. However, the Digambara tradition does not attribute the TABh and *sambandhakārikās* to Umāsvāti. Therefore, they do not accept the title '*Tattvārthādhigama(sūtra)*' and use '*Tattvārthasūtra*' instead. See also Dhaky 1996: 49.

liberation'.⁵¹⁹ However, this does not imply that the *sambandhakārikās* were actually written by the author of the TA or the TABh. Even though most contemporary scholars agree that the TA predates the *sambandhakārikās* and *praśasti*, there is no consensus about the question as to whether these verses were written by the author of the *bhāṣya*.⁵²⁰

Even though the *sambandhakārikās* mention the title of the work that it introduces, the *sambandhakārikās* use ambiguous terms to characterise this work, making it hard to determine the relation with the *bhāṣya*. The work is presented as a summary or compendium (*saṃgraha*) of Mahāvīra's teachings, and the author describes his text as a '*laghugrantha*'. Since the TABh is a relatively extensive commentary, it is not an obvious choice to describe the *Tattvārthādhigama* as a 'short text' if it includes the *bhāṣya*. Yet, one can argue that the author contrasts the teachings of the *arhat* with the size of his own text, and wants to say that his text is relatively short compared to the vast amount of Mahāvīra's teachings. Such an interpretation may seem somewhat far-fetched, especially given the straightforward character of the previous verses. However, the next verse seems to go in this direction:

***mahato 'timahāviṣayasya durgamagranthabhāṣy apārasya |
kaḥ śaktaḥ pratyāsaṃ jinavacanamahodadheḥ kartum ||23||***

Who, in enunciating a difficult text, is able to make a summary of the great ocean of the words of the *jina*, which is boundless, whose scope is way larger than large (SK 23)?⁵²¹

This verse elaborates on the enormous extent of the words of the *jina*, which makes it difficult to decide what '*laghugrantha*' in *sambandhakārikā* 22 means exactly. Compared to the foregoing part, the style of *sambandhakārikā* 23 is more poetic and

⁵¹⁹ *Sambandhakārikā* 31. See also Part II. Based on Phoolchandra's discussion of the *sambandhakārikās*, Zydenbos mentions that the identification 'of the commentator with the author of the original text is not uncommon'. (Zydenbos 1983: 10 – 11, Phoolchandra 1997).

⁵²⁰ Dhaky claims that the TA, TABh, *sambandhakārikās*, and *praśasti* are all written by Umāsvāti (Dhaky 1996: 60). Zydenbos attributes the *sambandhakārikās* and *praśasti* to the author of the *bhāṣya* but he writes that 'we may safely assume that the Sūtra and the Bhāṣya are not by one and the same author' (Zydenbos 1983: 10, 12). Ohira holds basically the same position as Dhaky even though she mentions that *sambandhakārikās* 21, 22 and 31 were possibly composed first as benedictory verses (Ohira 1982: 26 - 28).

⁵²¹ See also Part II.

the verse contains some curious elements. First, the text of the author is described as a '*pratyāsa*'. This is a highly unusual word. Haribhadra's commentary interprets '*pratyāsa*' as '*saṃgraha*', which is used in *sambandhakārikā* 22.⁵²² But even if we follow this interpretation, it does not help in deciding whether this refers to the text with the commentary or not. Second, it is very easy to misread the first line of the verse. In Devanagari script, the compound '*durgamagrānṭhabhāṣya*-' is not separated from '*-apārasya*'. It is very likely that a reader of the manuscript will read '*durgama-grānṭha-bhāṣya-pārasya*', especially since manuscripts of the *sambandhakārikās* usually contain the TA accompanied by the *bhāṣya*.⁵²³ In this way, one could assume that the author of the *sambandhakārikās* claims to have written a '*grānṭha*' and a '*bhāṣya*', i.e., a root text and a commentary. This would support the view that the *bhāṣya* is an auto-commentary. Yet, this reading is problematic from a syntactical perspective, unlike the less intuitive reading '*-bhāṣya apārasya*'.⁵²⁴ It is tempting to think that the author actively tried to create ambiguity.

Up to *sambandhakārikā* 22, the text has a logical structure, and the number of verses that are used for the various subtopics corresponds to the relative importance of these topics. However, the passage that deals with the challenge that the author faces in writing a compendium of the words of the *jina*, is quite elaborate and is written in a different style. This is clearly visible in *sambandhakārikās* 24 – 26, where the text compares the challenge of the author with some Herculean tasks:

śirasā giriṃ bibhited uccikṣipsec ca sa kṣitiṃ dorbhyām |
pratitīrṣec ca samudram mitsec ca punaḥ kuśāgreṇa ||24||
vyomnīduṃ cikramiṣen merugiriṃ pāṇinā cikampayīset |
gatyānilaṃ jigīṣec caramasamudraṃ pipāsec ca ||25||
khadyotakaprabhābhiḥ so 'bhibubhūsec ca bhāskaraṃ mohāt |
yo 'timahāgrānṭhārthaṃ jinavacanaṃ saṃjighṛkṣeta ||26||

He [who] would desire to comprehend the word of the *jina*, [which is] the subject of a very extensive text (SK 26 cd),

he could desire to break a mountain with the head, and he could desire to throw up the earth with two arms (SK 24 ab).

⁵²² Mody 1903: 30, footnote 3.

⁵²³ A discussion of some of the manuscripts can be found in Ohira 1982: 1 – 6.

⁵²⁴ See also the translation of this verse in Part II.

And he could desire to cross the ocean, and further, he could desire to measure [the ocean] with the tip of the *kuśa* grass (SK 24 cd).

He could desire to move the moon in the sky, [and] he could desire to shake mount Meru with one hand (SK 25 ab).

He could desire to move [along with] the wind [by his own] movement, and he could desire to drink the deepest ocean (SK 25 cd).

And he could desire to surpass the sun with the light of fireflies out of delusion (SK 26 ab).

Unlike the previous part, the author uses several verses to present a single idea. Further, the use of multiple desideratives does not match the style of the previous part and does not appear in the TA or TABh. This can be taken as an argument for the position that the *sambandhakārikās* were not written by the author of the TA or TABh. However, we can even question whether this passage was written by the same hand that wrote the first part of the *sambandhakārikās*.

Apart from the difference in style and the unusual length of this passage, it also seems to contradict *sambandhakārikā* 22. While *sambandhakārikā* 22 states that the author wrote a short text (*laghugrantha*), *sambandhakārikā* 26 states that the word of the *jina* is the subject of a very extensive text (*atimahāgranthārtha*). Of course, one could argue that the author simply contrasts the size of his own work with the overwhelming breadth of the subject that he tries to cover. Yet, there is another reference to the size of the work, which creates more ambiguity. In *sambandhakārikā* 28, the author mentions ‘the word of the *jina* in a brief and extended form’ (*samāsato vyāsataś ca jinavacanam*).⁵²⁵ It is not clear from the context what this means exactly but one could interpret this as a reference to the short *sūtra* and extended *bhāṣya*.

Yet, why does the author not make it more explicit what he means? On the one hand, based on *sambandhakārikā* 22, one gets the impression that the *sambandhakārikās* introduce the *sūtra* only since the author mentions that he composed a short text. On the other hand, it seems that the author of *sambandhakārikā* 23 tries to refer to the *bhāṣya*, even though the word ‘*bhāṣya*’ is part of an ambiguous compound. In addition, there seems to be a reference to the *sūtra* and *bhāṣya* at the end of the *sambandhakārikās* when the author writes about

⁵²⁵ See Part II.

the subject of his text ‘in a brief and extended form’. These contradictory elements might indicate that we are dealing with a text that has different historical layers. Even though Ohira attributes the *sambandhakārikās* to the author of the TABh, she already speculates that verse 21, 22, and 31 ‘were originally composed as the benedictory verse’ to which the other verses were added.⁵²⁶ However, she fails to explain why the author would write his introduction in two stages.

Even though there is not enough evidence to rule out the possibility that the *sambandhakārikās* were written by a single hand, it seems more likely that there were at least two different authors. It is hard to explain the difference in style of verses 24 – 26 if the whole text was composed by one person, and the incoherent statements about the text that the *sambandhakārikās* introduce support the view that we are dealing with different historical layers. Unfortunately, apart from the differences in the content and style of some of the verses in the *sambandhakārikās*, there is not much more evidence to reconstruct the history of this text.⁵²⁷ However, it seems reasonable to assume that we are dealing with a text that was written by more than one author. This would also explain the strange structure of the *sambandhakārikās*, which can be summarised as follows:⁵²⁸

⁵²⁶ Ohira 1982: 27.

⁵²⁷ The metre of the *āryās* of the *sambandhakārikās*, the TABh, and the *praśasti* is fairly regular and does not provide further evidence to distinguish the writings of different authors. While the *sambandhakārikās* have only one *vipulā āryā* in *sambandhakārikā* 23, almost half of the verses of the *praśasti* are in *vipulā āryā* (i.e., *praśasti* 2, 3, and 5). However, this difference can be explained by the fact that the *praśasti* contains many names, which are harder to fit in a metrical scheme.

In his analysis of the *sambandhakārikās*, Balcerowicz writes that ‘the style of the *sambandhakārikās* resembles that of the *Bhāṣya*’, and that ‘there are some stylistic devices in the *kārikās* typical of the prose style of the *Bhāṣya*, e.g. the frequent use of gerundives (e.g. *kās* 8, 15, 28, etc.) or ablatives of mode that describe their manner of teaching (e.g. *samāsato vyāsataś ca* in *kā* 28, that are evocative of such phrases as *purastāl lakṣaṇato vidhānataś ca vistareṇa* common to the *Bhāṣya*, e.g. TBh 1.1)’ (Balcerowicz 2008: 35). However, these similarities in style do not necessarily imply that these passages were written by the same author, and even if we accept that some of the verses of the *sambandhakārikās* were written by the author of the *bhāṣya*, we cannot rule out that some parts of the *sambandhakārikās* were written by a different author.

Some of the manuscripts that were surveyed by Ohira only contain *sambandhakārikās* 1-9 and omit the rest of the *sambandhakārikās* (Ohira 1982: 2-3). It is unclear to me how these verses can form an independent and meaningful introduction to the text.

⁵²⁸ The analysis of the different parts follows Ohira 1982: 27 – 28.

i.	The Jaina ideal	SK ⁵²⁹ 1 – 3
ii.	Classification of human beings	SK 4 – 6
iii.	Nature of the Tīrthakara	SK 7 – 10
iv.	Life of Mahāvīra	SK 11 – 20
v.	Salutation	SK 21
vi.	Nature of the work	SK 22
vii.	Difficulty of the task of the author	SK 23 – 26
viii.	Benefits for the author and others	SK 27 – 30
ix.	Nature of the work	SK 31

It is somewhat odd that the salutation starts at *sambandhakārikā* 21, and that the statement about the nature of the work in *sambandhakārikā* 22 is interrupted by verse 23-30 and continues at *sambandhakārikā* 31. In fact, the structure of the text seems to suggest that the first historical layer consisted of verses 21, 22, and 31 only, which would constitute a proper introduction for the TA:⁵³⁰

kṛtvā trikaraṇasuddham tasmai paramarṣaye namaskāram |
pūjyatamāya bhagavate vīrāya vilīnamohāya ||21||
tattvārthādhigamākhyam bahvartham saṃgraham laghugrantham |
vakṣyāmi śiṣyahitam imam arhadvacanaikadeśasya ||22||
na rte ca mokṣamārgād dhitopadeśo 'sti jagati kṛtsne 'smin |
tasmāt param imam eveti mokṣamārgam pravakṣyāmi ||31||

⁵²⁹ SK = *sambandhakārikās*.

⁵³⁰ Ohira observes some similarities with the introductory verse of the *Sarvārthasiddhi*, and writes that Pūjyapāda's *maṅgalācaraṇa* 'was directly derived' from *sambandhakārikās* 21 and 31. Pūjyapāda's introductory verse goes as follows: *mokṣamārgasya netāraṃ bhettāraṃ karmabhūbrtām | jñātāraṃ viśvatattvānām vande tadguṇalabdhye ||* ('I bow to the Lord, the promulgator of the path to liberation, the destroyer of mountains of karmas and the knower of the whole reality, so that I may realize these qualities') (ed. and tr. S.A. Jain 1992: 1). Even though there are some similarities, such as the word '*mokṣamārga*' in both texts, and '*jagat*' in the *sambandhakārikās* and '*viśva*' in the *Sarvārthasiddhi*, it is hard to tell how these two passages relate to each other, and Ohira's idea that Pūjyapāda used *sambandhakārikās* 21 and 31 for his own opening verse seems rather speculative. Nevertheless, Pūjyapāda's verse shows that a short introduction with a reference to *mokṣamārga* and the *jina* was as an appropriate opening for a commentary on the TS.

After having made homage to that great sage with purity of the three faculties, [to him who is] a most venerable, illustrious hero, whose delusion is gone (SK 21),

I will teach this short text, called '*Tattvārthādhigama*', an important compendium of some of the words of the *arhat*, [which is] beneficial for students (SK 22).

And besides the path to liberation, there is no beneficial teaching in this entire world. Therefore, I will teach indeed this very highest path to liberation (SK 31).

Perhaps, these introductory verses used to accompany the TA, together with the other *āryās* that became part of the *bhāṣya*. They might have been composed together with the TA, or between the time of the TA and the TABh.

However, what could have been the reason for expanding these introductory verses? As discussed in § 2.3, the Jaina traditions in the North and the South had different ideas about the authorship of the TA and the TABh, and the Jainas in the South did not transmit the TABh. Up to the present day, the Digambara tradition does not accept the TABh as an authoritative commentary, and they disagree with the Śvetāmbara Jainas who assume that Umāsvāti wrote the TA and the TABh. It is hard to believe that the TA and the TABh were originally composed together and that the Jainas in the South embraced the *sūtra* and rejected the *bhāṣya*. If these texts were written together and contained some elements that were unacceptable to the Jaina community, one would expect that the whole text would be considered heretical. Therefore, it is much more likely that the TABh was written at a later stage, and that the text was received differently in the North and the South.

The dispute about the authoritativeness of the TABh might have been a reason for the Jainas in the North to expand the introductory verses of the TA. If the author of the verses that were added to *sambandhakārikās* 21, 22 and 31 indeed tried to legitimate the TABh, it makes perfect sense that he used some ambiguous terms to suggest that the author of the introductory verses claims to be the author of the *sūtra* and the *bhāṣya*. Since *sambandhakārikā* 22 clearly states that the author wrote a short compendium, there was not much space to alter the meaning in such a way that the introductory verses also introduce the *bhāṣya*. However, by comparing the length of the text to the enormous amount of the words of the *jina*, one can argue that the term '*laghugrantha*' in *sambandhakārikā* 22 only means that the text is short compared to the teachings of the *arhat*. It is clear that this strategy did not

influence the views of the Jainas in the South since the TABh never acquired an authoritative position in the Digambara community. Nevertheless, it gave the northern tradition textual evidence to attribute the TABh to the author of the TA.

For the name of this author, we have to look at the *praśasti*, which is the first source that attributes the TA and the TABh to Umāsvāti. As mentioned above, it is unclear who the author of these six verses is and how they relate to the *sambandhakārikās*. The work to which the *praśasti* is attached is referred to as a *śāstra*, called the '*Tattvārthādhigama*'.⁵³¹ This corresponds with the title mentioned in *sambandhakārikā* 22, even though the *sambandhakārikās* refer to the text as a '*saṃgraha*' (*sambandhakārikā* 22), or '*pratyāsa*' (*sambandhakārikā* 23) instead of '*śāstra*'.⁵³² *Praśasti* 6 mentions the title '*tattvādhigama*' instead of '*tattvārthādhigama*'. The *praśasti* attributes the *Tattv(ārth)ādhigama* to 'vācaka Umāsvāti'.⁵³³ The name Umāsvāti seems to indicate a Brahmanical background. This would also explain why *praśasti* 3 mentions Umāsvāti's *gotra*.⁵³⁴ It is hard to locate 'Nyagrodhikā', which is mentioned as the place of birth of Umāsvāti in *praśasti* 3, since it could refer to any place which has banyan trees. The same verse also mentions that Umāsvāti spent some time in Kusumapura, which is another name for Pāṭaliputra.⁵³⁵ However, the information in the *praśasti* should not be taken at face value for several reasons. First, the name 'Umāsvāti' does not appear in any other text that is attributed to him, and the southern tradition did not even attribute the TA to him.⁵³⁶ Apart from the *praśasti* and the later textual tradition, there is no evidence that there was an actual writer with the name Umāsvāti, working in Pāṭaliputra. Further, the names of the teachers in Umāsvāti's lineage that are mentioned in *praśasti* 2, Muṇḍapāda and Mūla, are quite odd and do not appear in other lineages that mention Umāsvāti.⁵³⁷

Given the lack of external evidence that supports the information in the *praśasti* and the fact that the names that are mentioned are rather unusual, while Umāsvāti's place of birth remains vague, there is enough reason to doubt the

⁵³¹ *Praśasti* 5.

⁵³² *Sambandhakārikā* 22 and *praśasti* 5 both use the phrase '*tattvārthādhigamākhyā*'.

⁵³³ *Praśasti* 5.

⁵³⁴ *Praśasti* 3 mentions that Umāsvāti belonged to the Kaubhīṣaṇi *gotra*.

⁵³⁵ Ohira suggests that the author of the *praśasti* preferred the name 'Kusuma' for metrical reasons (Ohira 1982: 53).

⁵³⁶ Ohira 1982: 43. For a discussion of the TA in the southern tradition, see § 2.3.

⁵³⁷ For an overview of the lineages that mention Svāti, which is another name for Umāsvāti according to Ohira, see Ohira 1982: 44ff.

veracity of the *praśasti*.⁵³⁸ Since it seems that the extended version of the *sambandhakārikās* was written in an attempt to legitimise the TABh as an auto-commentary, one can easily imagine that the *praśasti* was added to substantiate this idea, and to attribute both texts to Umāsvāti.

⁵³⁸ Based on an analysis of the lineages that are mentioned in other texts, Ohira concludes that the *praśasti* is 'the authentic record of Umāsvāti' (Ohira 1982: 53). However, her analysis does not provide the evidence needed for this conclusion. The lineages talk about 'Svāti' instead of 'Umāsvāti' and they assign Svāti to the Hārīta *gotra*, instead of the Kaubhīṣaṇi *gotra*, which is mentioned in *praśasti* 3. Furthermore, the teachers that are mentioned in the *praśasti* do not appear in these lineages.

3.6 Conclusion of the Textual Analysis

In the foregoing sections, I have analysed the content of the philosophical chapters of the TA and the TABh with a dual purpose in mind. On the one hand, I have tried to clarify the philosophical ideas that are conveyed in these texts. On the other hand, I have aimed to get more clarity about the intellectual contexts in which the TA and the TABh were composed. In addition, I have investigated the verses in the TABh, the *sambandhakārikās*, and the *praśasti* in order to get a better understanding of the authorship of both texts.

My analysis shows that the epistemological and ontological theories in the TA constitute a fairly coherent account that can compete with the views of the other philosophical movements that were active at the time of its composition. The TA presents a dualistic ontology, in which the soul (*jīva*) is radically different from all other substances (*ajīvakāya*). It is the centre of knowledge and can occupy an innumerable amount of space-points (*pradeśa*). By expanding its range, the soul can acquire direct knowledge of objects in the entire cosmos, which explains why liberated beings (*kevalin*) are omniscient. Yet, the soul that is still bound by *karman* has a limited range and has to rely on indirect means of cognition, such as ordinary cognition (*mati*) and testimony (*śruta*).

These theories are not new for the Jaina tradition but the way in which the TA presents the Jaina view is rather innovative. Throughout my analysis, I have shown that the composer of the TA positions the Jaina perspective as an alternative to the views that are expressed in the texts of the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* traditions. Although the structure of the TA is based on a traditional list of soteriological categories (*tattva*), the TA opens with a chapter on knowledge, a topic that does not correspond to any of the *tattvas*. By opening the TA with a chapter on knowledge, the composer of the TA stresses the crucial role of knowledge in his overall soteriology. This strongly resembles the view about the relationship between knowledge and ultimate bliss (*niḥśreyasa*) in the *Nyāyasūtra*. Likewise, the classification of the five types of knowledge (*jñāna*) as the two means of cognitions (*pramāṇa*) indicates that the author of the TA tried to connect the Jaina theory with the more dominant epistemological models at his time. The same goes for the way in which the TA presents the ontological categories and their functions.

The TABh is mostly in line with the theories held in the TA but some aspects of the *bhāṣya* suggest that the composer of the *bhāṣya* had a slightly different aim. Even though his views are also influenced by Nyāya theories, he seems to place more value on the traditional Jaina theories than the composer of the TA. For example, he mentions that the TA does not discuss absolute knowledge (*kevalalajñāna*) in the first chapter of the TA, which he apparently interprets as a significant omission. Further, the TABh includes longer discussions of the modes of analysis (*anuyogadvāra*) and the theory of viewpoints (*naya*), which are topics that are particular to the Jaina tradition.

The discussion of the viewpoints at the end of the first chapter seems to consist of different historical layers. It is unusually long and rather unsystematic. Moreover, this passage mentions that the four *pramāṇas* that were accepted by the Nyāya tradition are also valid means of cognition (TABh 1.35.89) which is contradicted in an earlier passage (TABh 1.12.7 – 1.12.14). This supports the idea that the *bhāṣya* contains some later additions. The same goes for the TA itself. For example, the unsystematic character of the fifth chapter of the TA suggests that this chapter has undergone some changes over the course of time. These changes might have been made between the composition of the TA and the TABh but it is also possible that some of them were made by the authors of the TABh and the *Sarvārthasiddhi*. The ambiguous status of time (*kāla*) in the fifth chapter indicates that the ontological theory of the Jainas was still in development at the moment of the composition of the TA. Moreover, the differences between the passage on time (*kāla*) in the different versions of the TA show that the text of the TA was not immune to change after its initial composition.

In short, my textual analysis of the philosophical sections shows that it is unlikely that the TA and the TABh were composed by the same author and that both texts include some later additions. This is in line with the outcome of my analysis of the *sambandhakārikās* and *praśasti*, which shows that these compositions were probably composed to legitimise the authority of the *bhāṣya* as an auto-commentary. As such, their value as sources about the authorship of the TA and the TABh is quite limited. Yet, the fact that the identity of the authors of the texts is unclear, does not imply that we cannot make an attempt at situating both texts in their historical intellectual context. In the general conclusion of this study, I will further discuss the implications of the outcomes of my textual analysis and will evaluate the position of the TA and the TABh in the context of the larger development of Indian philosophy.