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Dionysius and Quintilian: Imitation and emulation in Greek and Latin literary criticism

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CHAPTER 2

DIONYSIUS AND QUINTILIAN ON IMITATION AND EMULATION

2.1 INTRODUCTION

In the introduction to the epitome of Dionysius' *On Imitation*, an anecdote derived from the life of Zeuxis relates how this painter carefully observed various Crotonian girls, and creatively rendered their most valuable features in a new composition. The story insists on 'imitation' (μίμησις) as a highly artificial process, consisting of intensive study, the critical selection of the best features of different models, and the eclectic and original composition of a new piece of art, as we have seen in the introductory chapter.

The Zeuxis narrative also encapsulates the idea that imitation is not only about studying, following and reproducing what has been made before; it also comprises the competitive desire for creating a new piece of art that *excels* its models in beauty of style and content. These two related aspects of mimetic composition – imitation and emulation, i.e. μίμησις and ζῆλος – are clearly recognizable in the Zeuxis story. In this chapter, the connections between the notions of μίμησις and ζῆλος and their Latin counterparts *imitatio* and *aemulatio* will be further explored on the basis of the theories of Dionysius and Quintilian.

In Dionysius' thinking, the terms μίμησις and ζῆλος turn out to be inextricably linked and, as such, constitute two essential and complementary parts of one and the same process of imitation, as Russell has rightly observed: '[...] it is important to remember that both [i.e. μίμησις and ζῆλος, M.S.] are means to the same end; they are not exclusive, they complement each other [...]'.¹ As μίμησις and ζῆλος are complementary to Dionysius, so are *imitatio* and *aemulatio* to Quintilian:

[...] nihil autem crescit sola imitatione. Quod si prioribus adicere fas non est, quo modo sperare possumus illum oratorem perfectum? Cum in iis quos maximos adhuc novimus nemo sit inventus in quo nihil aut desideretur aut reprehendatur. Sed etiam qui summa non adpetent, contendere potius quam sequi debent. Nam qui hoc agit, ut

¹ Russell (1979), 10. Cf. Goudriaan (1989), 220-221: 'We moeten μίμησις en ζῆλος dus beschouwen als twee aspecten van een en dezelfde zaak [...]'; Cizek (1994), 19: '[...] wobei die dialektische Komplementarität dieser zwei Prozesse [i.e. μίμησις and ζῆλος, M.S.] offensichtlich ist'.

*prior sit, forsitan, etiam si non transierit, aequabit. Eum vero nemo potest aequare cuius vestigiis sibi utique insistendum putat: necesse est enim semper sit posterior qui sequitur.*²

And nothing does grow by imitation alone. But if we are not allowed to add to previous achievements, how can we hope for our ideal orator? Of the greatest orators known up to the present, nobody can be found in whom nothing is deficient or objectionable. But even those who do not aim for the top have an obligation to compete and not lag behind. For the man who tries to win a race may perhaps draw level, even if he does not get into the lead. However, no one can draw level with a man in whose footsteps he feels bound to tread: the follower is inevitably always behind.

Judging from these passages, for both Dionysius and Quintilian, there is an evident, complementary connection between imitation and emulation, but it is also clear that they conceive of this complementary connection in different ways. The Zeuxis story suggests that μίμησις and ζήλος are of equal value, and merge within the process of imitation.³ The passage from Quintilian's *Institutio*, however, shows a considerable gap between *imitatio* on the one hand – which is described in pejorative terms of *sequi* and *vestigiis insistendum* –, and *aemulatio* on the other hand – which is described in terms of *adocere*, *contendere*, and *aequare*.

Apparently, μίμησις and ζήλος do not mean the same to Dionysius as *imitatio* and *aemulatio* to Quintilian. The present chapter focuses on the semantic value and connotations of mimetic terminology in Dionysius' and Quintilian's theories.⁴ What do the terms μίμησις

² Quint. 10.2.8-10. Quintilian is even of the opinion that it 'is a disgrace to be content merely to attain the effect you are imitating' (*turpe [...] illud est, contentum esse id consequi quod imiteris*) (10.2.7).

³ As stated in section 1.2, I will use the term 'imitation' both in a broad sense (referring to imitation and emulation together, as it does here) and, in terminological discussions, in a narrow sense (referring to μίμησις/*imitatio*, as opposed to ζήλος/*aemulatio*).

⁴ Basic meanings of mimetic terminology in earlier Greek and Latin literature underlie this discussion. In LSJ s.v., μίμησις is described as a rather neutral term, which refers to both the mimetic process and the mimetic result, meaning 'imitation', 'reproduction of a model', or 'representation by means of art', 'representation', 'portrait'. According to LSJ, the term ζήλος can be used both in a bad and a good sense. It can denote 'jealousy' or, more often used in a good sense, 'eager rivalry', 'emulation'. Other possible translations for ζήλος are 'zeal' for one or something, 'fervour' and 'indignation'. The Latin terms *imitatio* and *aemulatio* are described in rather comparable ways in OLD s.v. *Imitatio* means 'the action of imitating an example', 'the action of producing a copy or imitation, mimicking', or 'the result of imitating, a copy, counterfeit, imitation'. *Aemulatio* can, like

and ζῆλος, as well as *imitatio* and *aemulatio* refer to when appearing in overt opposition, and how should they be interpreted when used alternately or separately from each other? In what ways does Quintilian's use of mimetic terminology differ from Dionysius', and how can such divergences be explained? These central questions, which have not been asked before, build on a more general scholarly discussion on the ancient concept of imitation. Within this dissertation, they prepare for the analysis of mimetic theories underlying Dionysius' (chapter 3) and Quintilian's (chapter 4) reading lists, as well as for the broader discussion of Greek and Latin terminology and theories of imitation in the first century AD (chapter 5).⁵

The terminology of imitation in antiquity has been analysed by various scholars. In his essay *De Imitatione*, Russell offers a clear, introductory survey of the ancient notions of imitation and emulation, both in Latin and Greek literature.⁶ With regard to Greek mimetic terminology, Koller's work *Die Mimesis in der Antike* is very useful. Koller argues that μίμησις, often rendered as 'imitation' or 'representation', is originally an actional and performative term, rooted in the music, dance and speech of Greek drama.⁷ In her study *Der Mimesisbegriff in der griechischen Antike*, Kardaun examines the meaning of μίμησις within

ζῆλος, be either good or bad. In a good sense, it pertains to a 'desire to equal or excel others, emulation, ambition'. In a bad sense, it means 'unfriendly rivalry, envious emulation'. Used in a conative way, *aemulatio* pertains to the 'attempt to imitate (a person) or reproduce (a thing), imitation'. L&S s.v. offer as possible translations for *imitatio* 'imitation', 'the faculty of imitation', 'imitation of an orator' and 'imitation of a natural sound, onomatopoeia'. *Aemulatio* is defined as 'an assiduous striving to equal or excel another in any thing', 'emulation' or (in a bad sense) 'jealousy, envy, malevolence'. Interestingly, L&S describe *aemulatio* as a term denoting 'rather the mental effort, while *imitatio* regards more the mode of action'. This observation seems to be applicable also to the meanings of the notions of μίμησις and ζῆλος offered by LSJ: whereas μίμησις pertains rather to the process and result of actual creation, ζῆλος is connotated with mental activity. Another correspondence between the Greek and Latin mimetic terminology is that μίμησις and *imitatio* are often used as rather neutral, objective or descriptive terms, devoid of a specific positive or negative connotation. By contrast, ζῆλος and *aemulatio* are more subjective, evaluative notions, which are prone to become either positively or negatively charged. As we will see in the following sections, both Dionysius' use of μίμησις and ζῆλος and Quintilian's use of *imitatio* and *aemulatio* may be said to fit into this general picture. However, Dionysius and Quintilian also differ on important aspects of imitation and emulation.

⁵ In section 1.5, I explain the separation between the discussions of terminology and theories of imitation in Dionysius and Quintilian.

⁶ Russell (1979).

⁷ Koller (1954).

and outside Plato's dialogues.⁸ She argues that, although we need different translations to do justice to the value of μίμησις, the idea of μίμησις as a polysemic term is not sustainable. Instead, μίμησις always covers what she defines as a 'representation through images'.⁹

As for Latin mimetic terminology, Reiff has made interesting observations in his dissertation *Interpretatio, Imitatio, Aemulatio. Begriff und Vorstellung literarischer Abhängigkeit bei den Römern*.¹⁰ Following Heinze, he distinguishes and demonstrates different forms of Roman literary dependence: *interpretatio* ('Übersetzung'), *imitatio* ('Entlehnung von Form und Stofflichem'), and *aemulatio* ('Selbständigkeit freier Schöpfung').¹¹

Other publications focus not so much on the terminology of imitation, as on the history and range of the concept. Of an unprecedented scope is the study *The Aesthetics of Mimesis* by Halliwell, in which he analyses the treatments of imitation by Plato and Aristotle against the background of the history of imitation as a variable and complex concept of the representational arts.¹² In his book *Greek Literature and the Roman Empire. The Politics of Imitation*, Whitmarsh, whose focus is on the Second Sophistic, explores a range of responses to tradition by focusing on the concepts of μίμησις and παιδεία in authors such as Dionysius, Longinus and Plutarch.¹³

Specific research on mimetic terminology in Dionysius has also been carried out. In the introduction to her commentary on Dionysius' *On Imitation*, Battisti concentrates on Dionysius' ideas on imitation, but does not elaborate on the connotations of and connections between μίμησις and ζῆλος.¹⁴ In a thorough study on classicism in Dionysius' works, Goudriaan devotes an entire chapter to the range of nuances that the notions of μίμησις and ζῆλος can have.¹⁵ Goudriaan establishes that in Dionysius' works, μίμησις (and ζῆλος) is operating at different levels of reality, but he does not always (explicitly) distinguish between

⁸ Kardaun (1993). For a useful overview of scholarly research into the notion of μίμησις, see Kardaun (1993), 10-18.

⁹ Kardaun (1993), 70.

¹⁰ Reiff (1959).

¹¹ Reiff (1959), 7. For a tripartite division of imitative practice, cf. also Cizek (1994).

¹² Halliwell (2002). Halliwell also pays attention to Dionysius' conception of μίμησις (*ibid.*, 292-296), and notices a tension between μίμησις as a 'stylized fabrication' and as a 'possible means of depicting and conveying truth or nature' (*ibid.*, 295).

¹³ Whitmarsh (2001).

¹⁴ Battisti (1997).

¹⁵ Goudriaan (1989), 220-245.

the terms.¹⁶ Cizek also pays attention to Dionysius' definitions of μίμησις and ζῆλος, arguing that μίμησις 'erscheint als ein passiv-rezeptives Moment', whereas ζῆλος points to 'ein dynamisches Moment, nämlich auf das Streben der Seele nach Selbsterhöhung durch Nach- bzw. Wetteifern mit dem gegebenen Vorbild'.¹⁷

Concerning the general ideas on imitation which are put forward in Quintilian's *Institutio*, Fantham has made some interesting remarks.¹⁸ She discusses Quintilian's account on imitation in *Institutio* 10.2 from the perspective of the reputed first-century Roman rhetorical decline, arguing that imitation as such was not a symptom nor a cause of this decline, as it had been encouraged by the best ancient teachers – from Cicero to Quintilian.¹⁹

Regarding the concepts of imitation and emulation in Quintilian, Cizek observes that Quintilian prefers *aemulatio* (which he calls 'wetteifernde *imitatio*') over *imitatio*.²⁰ However, a profound discussion of mimetic vocabulary in Quintilian does not, to my knowledge, exist. Thus, the present chapter differs from and contributes to existing studies in that it analyses and compares Greek and Latin mimetic terminology in Dionysius and Quintilian.

By exploring the range of connotations that μίμησις and ζῆλος, as well as *imitatio* and *aemulatio* can have, this chapter establishes that Dionysius and Quintilian preponderantly conceive of the connections between μίμησις-ζῆλος/*imitatio*-*aemulatio* in different ways. Whereas Dionysius suggests that μίμησις and ζῆλος ideally always form a homogeneous pair in the process of imitation, Quintilian thinks *imitatio* and *aemulatio* should successively cover the whole life of the rhetorician – with *imitatio* gradually fading away as the orator has grown older and wiser.

In fact, when attested separately from ζῆλος, the notion of μίμησις in Dionysius also implies ζῆλος. It is also the other way round: when attested separately from μίμησις, ζῆλος also implies μίμησις. In such cases, the terms on their own highlight different aspects of one and the same process of imitation. To Quintilian, on the other hand, *imitatio* and *aemulatio* are more clearly separated. When one of the terms is mentioned, the meaning of the other term is,

¹⁶ Goudriaan (1989), 229. For literature on the general concept of μίμησις in Dionysius, see section 1.1, n. 10.

¹⁷ Cizek (1994), 19. I agree with Cizek that the term ζῆλος is highly dynamic (although I argue it implies a process rather than a moment), but I will object to the view that μίμησις implies mere passiveness and receptivity.

¹⁸ In his commentary on *Institutio* 10, also Peterson (1891), 122-135 makes several observations on imitation in Quintilian.

¹⁹ Fantham (1978), 111-116.

²⁰ Cizek (1994), 19-20.

in most cases, not implied. We could say that the terms *imitatio* and *aemulatio* do not refer to different aspects of the same process of imitation, but to different, independent kinds of imitation, which run parallel to the orator's development.

Moreover, this chapter establishes that Dionysius and Quintilian agree, but also differ on important points in their interpretations of the concepts of μίμησις-ζῆλος/*imitatio-aemulatio*. As for μίμησις/*imitatio*, it will be argued that both critics understand this notion as a technical device for creating uniformity with models, and that both are of the opinion that μίμησις/*imitatio* is the most current and suitable term for indicating or emphasising the vertical, unequal relationship between model and imitator. Such similarities point to a shared framework of imitation. However, whereas Dionysius interprets μίμησις as a positive 're-expression' of the model and considers it to be of equal value as ζῆλος, Quintilian suggests that *imitatio* merely involves didactic 'repetition' and is, though complementarily indispensable, inferior to *aemulatio*.

Concerning ζῆλος/*aemulatio*, it will be argued that Dionysius regards ζῆλος as an – either positively or negatively motivated – aspiration of the mind to grasp the beauty of the model or to (try to) compete with it, whereas Quintilian considers *aemulatio* a highly recommended, competitive strategy, based on the idea of changing, completing and surpassing the model. These essential divergences will be explained by taking Dionysius' and Quintilian's different cultural backgrounds into account.

The first part of this chapter is dedicated to Dionysius' interpretation and use of the notions of μίμησις and ζῆλος (2.2). The second part is concerned with Quintilian's understanding and use of the notions of *imitatio* and *aemulatio* (2.3), and followed by a conclusion (2.4).

2.2 DIONYSIUS' USE OF MIMETIC TERMINOLOGY

In his rhetorical treatises on the works of classical Greek authors, Dionysius' aim is often to demonstrate which of their stylistic features should be imitated and which avoided. Thus, Dionysius' mimetic ideas underly and give substantial shape to his critical analyses. Although his mimetic theory often remains below the surface of evaluative discussions, Dionysius also explicitly reflects on the notion of imitation. One of his treatises, *On Imitation*, was entirely devoted to the subject, but also in his essay *On Dinarchus*, Dionysius approaches the concept of imitation in a rather systematic way.

Chapter 3 deals with the publication, history and content of Dionysius' treatise *On Imitation*, and tries to explain from its remaining parts how Dionysius makes the concept of imitation subservient to his own rhetorical agenda. The present section has a preparatory function, focusing on Dionysius' use of mimetic terminology throughout his critical essays. It discusses Dionysius' definitions of μίμησις and ζῆλος as preserved by Syrianus (2.2.1), Dionysius' differentiation between artificial and natural μίμησις in *On Dinarchus* (2.2.2), his use of μίμησις and ζῆλος as closely related concepts (2.2.3), the uses and connotations of μίμησις (2.2.4) and of ζῆλος (2.2.5).

2.2.1 DEFINITIONS OF ΜΙΜΗΣΙΣ AND ΖΗΛΟΣ

Apart from the epitome of book 2 of Dionysius' *On Imitation*, a few fragments of book 1 and 2 are preserved. One of the fragments of book 1 in particular is crucial for a better understanding of the terminology of imitation and emulation in Dionysius, and will be discussed in this section; two other fragments of book 1 will only briefly be referred to. I will return to these three fragments in section 3.3.1, in which all remnants of Dionysius' *On Imitation* are closely and coherently examined from a more general, theoretical point of view, focusing on recurring themes and stylistic peculiarities.

According to Usener-Radermacher, whose numbering system of fragments I adopt, there are five remaining fragments which reputedly formed part of the first book, but only three of them are introduced by an explicit reference to the treatise. These three fragments are included in Syrianus' commentaries on Hermogenes' *On Issues* (fr. II U-R) and *On Types of Style* (frs. III and V U-R).²¹ Fragment III U-R is of special interest, since it contains two concise definitions of μίμησις and ζῆλος attributed to Dionysius.

Syrianus refers to these definitions when commenting on a passage from the introduction of Hermogenes' *On Types of Style*. In this introduction, Hermogenes announces the subject of his treatise, i.e. 'types of style' (ιδέαι), and stresses its importance for both critics and authors who wish to compose 'speeches close to the ones the ancients produced' (λόγων [...] παραπλησίων τοῖς τῶν ἀρχαίων).²² This urges him to elaborate some more on the

²¹ Usener-Radermacher (1904-1929). The fragments of *On Imitation* have been published by Usener (1889); some years later, they were published as part of Usener-Radermacher (1904-1929) (= U-R). More on the numbering system and the fragments accepted in U-R, Aujac and Battisti in section 3.3.1. Fr. II U-R = 1 Aujac = 1 Battisti. Fr. III U-R = 2 Aujac = 2 Battisti. Fr. V U-R = 3 Aujac = 3 Battisti.

²² Hermog. *Id.* 1.1.7-9.

notions of imitation and emulation, both of which should, in his opinion, mainly be based on ‘practice and correct training’ (μελέτη καὶ τῇ κατ’ ὀρθὸν ἀσκήσει), which allows ‘those with less natural ability to overtake even those who are naturally talented’ (καὶ τοὺς εὖ πεφυκότας οἱ μὴ τοιοῦτοι [...] παρέλθοιεν):²³

Ἦ γάρτοι μίμησις καὶ ὁ ζῆλος ὁ πρὸς ἐκείνους μετὰ μὲν ἐμπειρίας ψιλῆς καὶ τινος ἀλόγου τριβῆς γινόμενος οὐκ ἂν οἶμαι δύναιτο τυγχάνειν τοῦ ὀρθοῦ, κἂν πάνυ τις ἔχῃ φύσεως εὖ· τοῦναντίον γὰρ ἴσως ἂν αὐτὸν καὶ σφάλλοι μάλλον τὰ τῆς φύσεως πλεονεκτήματα χωρὶς τέχνης τινὸς ἀλόγως ἄττοντα, πρὸς ὃ τι καὶ τύχοι· μετὰ μέντοι τῆς περὶ ταῦτα ἐπιστήμης καὶ γνώσεως ὅτε τις τοὺς ἀρχαίους ἐθέλοι ζηλοῦν, κἂν μετρίως ἔχῃ φύσεως, οὐκ ἂν ἀμαρτάνοι τοῦ σκοποῦ.²⁴

Indeed imitation and emulation of the ancients that depend upon mere experience and some irrational knack cannot, I think, produce what is correct, even if a person has a lot of natural ability. Natural abilities, without some training, dashing off without guidance at random, could in fact go particularly badly. But with a knowledge and understanding of this topic, when anyone wishes to emulate the ancients he would not fail even if he has only moderate ability.

In his commentary on *On Types of Style*, it was apparently a small step for Syrianus to associate (whether in opposition or in conjunction) this Hermogenean passage with the two definitions of μίμησις and ζῆλος attributed to Dionysius, which Syrianus renders as follows:

Fr. III U-R: Μίμησίς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια διὰ τῶν θεωρημάτων ἐκματτομένη τὸ παράδειγμα. Ζῆλος δέ ἐστιν ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς πρὸς θαῦμα τοῦ δοκοῦντος εἶναι καλοῦ κινουμένη.²⁵

Imitation is an activity that moulds the model in accordance with the rules of art. Emulation is an activity of the soul, of being moved towards wonder at what seems to be beautiful.

²³ Hermog. *Id.* 1.1.23-25.

²⁴ Hermog. *Id.* 1.1.11-19.

²⁵ Dion. Hal. *Imit.* fr. III U-R (= 2 Aujac = 2 Battisti). Cf. Syrian. *In Hermog. De Formis* [265, 15], p. 3, 15-21. This fragment is also briefly discussed in section 3.3.1.

When we rely on this fragment alone, which is devoid of any information about its precise place in *On Imitation*, we can only guess as to how Dionysius estimated the value of and relationship between μίμησις and ζήλος. However, the repetition of the noun ἐνέργεια seems suggestive of a close connection between the two notions, and encourages us to infer that Dionysius regarded both μίμησις, which is associated with technical-creative practice, and ζήλος, which is associated with mental effort and natural susceptibility, as complementary imitative activities – whatever weight he assigned to each of them.

There is, however, another reason to suppose that imitation and emulation should be considered complementary. When we compare the introductory story and moral of *On Imitation* starring the ugly farmer (see chapter 1), we observe the same apparent antagonisms, not only of bodily creation and mental effort, but also of the teaching of strict rules (cf. ἐδίδαξε τέχνην) and the intuitive reliance on ‘what seems to be better in each of the ancients’ (τὸ παρ’ ἐκάστῳ τῶν παλαιῶν βέλτιον εἶναι δοκοῦν).²⁶ In short, we discern ‘the rational criterion’ (τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον) and ‘the irrational criterion’ (τὸ ἄλογον κριτήριον) which should go hand in hand.²⁷

A complementary relationship between technical and natural abilities is also suggested in another fragment of the first book of Dionysius’ treatise *On Imitation*, preserved in Syrianus’ commentary on Hermogenes’ *On Issues*. It says that excellence in public discourse, art and science can only be achieved by a combination of aspects belonging to nature and art: a ‘ready nature’ (φύσις δεξιὰ), ‘careful study’ (μάθησις ἀκριβής) and ‘laborious exercise’ (ἄσκησις ἐπίπονος).²⁸

In his article on gendered aesthetics in Greek theory and fiction, Whitmarsh observes that Dionysius’ mimetic theory is ‘repeatedly imaged in terms of heterosexual erotics’.²⁹ He considers Dionysius’ definitions of μίμησις and ζήλος as ‘programmatic’ of Dionysius’ eroticised presentation of imitation, and translates them as follows:

Mimêsis is an activity of receiving the impression of the model, through theorems...
Zêlos is an activity of the soul when it is stirred to wonder at what seems to be beautiful.

²⁶ Dion. Hal. *Imit.* 1.1-3.

²⁷ On Dionysius’ theories of logical and irrational evaluation of literature, see e.g. Schenkeveld (1975); Damon (1991).

²⁸ Dion. Hal. *Imit.* fr. II U-R (= 1 Aujac = 1 Battisti). This fragment is discussed in section 3.3.1.

²⁹ Whitmarsh (2013), 279.

The sentence on μίμησις is, according to Whitmarsh, presented in terms of (female) receptivity (cf. Whitmarsh' translation of ἐκμαπτομένη: 'receiving the impression of'), whereas the sentence on ζῆλος is striking for what Whitmarsh calls its 'phallic imagery'. He argues: 'not only does the idea of 'stirring' (κινουμένη) the soul into 'activity' (ἐνέργεια)' suggest tumescence, but also both roots can themselves carry an obscene, sexual sense'.³⁰ On the basis of these observations, Whitmarsh designates Dionysian μίμησις as 'hybridised between the genders, a hermaphroditic phenomenon', seeing also that in the case of both μίμησις and ζῆλος, 'the imitative activity is described using a passive, feminine participle'.³¹

Insofar as Dionysius' presentation of imitation as a gendered phenomenon is concerned, I agree with Whitmarsh.³² As he points out, also Dionysius' stories on the ugly farmer and the painter Zeuxis depict imitation as a mix of female and male forces.³³ However, I would propose a different reading of the middle voice participle ἐκμαπτομένη, which, in my opinion, does not have a passive semantic value, as Whitmarsh claims, but an active, transitive one.³⁴

According to LSJ, the active verb 'mould' or 'model' (ἐκμάπτειν) has a rather similar meaning ('mould', 'express', 'imitate' + acc.) in the middle voice (ἐκμάπτεσθαι).³⁵ Whitmarsh, who translates Dionysius' ἐκμαπτομένη τὸ παράδειγμα with 'receiving the impression of the model', apparently considers τὸ παράδειγμα an accusative of respect or cognate accusative, but this is very unlikely and devious.

I suggest that the middle participle ἐκμαπτομένη has an active, transitive value – interpreting τὸ παράδειγμα as a direct object. Furthermore, I suppose that Dionysius' choice for the middle voice – as opposed to the active voice – is an indicator of subject-affectedness. As Rutger Allan observes, the middle voice can be used in an indirect-reflexive way, and as such 'involves transitive events performed by a volitional subject (an agent). [...] the subject has the semantic role of beneficiary'.³⁶

³⁰ Whitmarsh (2013), *ibid.* Strictly speaking, there is no 'stirring of the soul', since the participle κινουμένη is congruent with ἐνέργεια.

³¹ Whitmarsh (2013), 280.

³² I do so only on the basis of Dionysius' stories on the ugly farmer and the painter Zeuxis; not on the basis of Dionysius' definitions of μίμησις and ζῆλος.

³³ Whitmarsh (2013), 282-286. For the stories on the ugly farmer and the painter Zeuxis, see section 1.1-3.

³⁴ Cf. Goudriaan (1989), 218, who also reads the verb in an active sense: 'μίμησις is een activiteit die [...] het voorbeeld uitbeeldt'.

³⁵ Cf. LSJ s.v.

³⁶ Allan (2003), 112.

The subject-affectness-highlighting value of the middle voice ἐκματτομένη fits well into Dionysius' conception of imitation, which centers around mental influence by and personal engagement with original literature.³⁷ Taking this into consideration, the transitive middle ἐκμάττεσθαι used by Dionysius can be translated as 'express (a model) by oneself' or 'express (a model) in oneself/in one's own style'.

In Dionysius' works, the verb 'mould' is only attested in the middle voice, and denotes the process of active, imitative 'kneading'.³⁸ The verb is always accompanied by a direct object, which in all cases refers to the original model or style. Dionysius, for instance, applies the verb in his treatise *On Demosthenes*, describing a speech by Demosthenes which is fashioned in the Lysianic style: ὁ [...] λόγος [...] ὅλος ἐστὶν ἀκριβὴς καὶ λεπτὸς καὶ τὸν Λυσιακὸν χαρακτῆρα ἐκμέμακται εἰς ὄνυχας ('the speech is precise and refined throughout and expresses the Lysianic style in every detail').³⁹

In the *Ars Rhetorica*, which is a compilation of texts falsely attributed to Dionysius, we find the active participle ἐκμάττων in a rather confusing definition of μίμησις. Here, the direct object of the process of kneading is not the original model, but (a characteristic of) the imitative result:

Καὶ πᾶσα μίμησις ὧδε ἔχει· τέχνης ζῆλος ἐκμάττων ἐνθυμημάτων ὁμοιότητα.⁴⁰

All imitation is as follows: it is the emulation of technical skill, which expresses a likeness of thoughts.

³⁷ Cf. e.g. Dion. Hal. *Imit.* 1.2-3.

³⁸ In the spurious *Ars Rhet.*, however, we find the active participle ἐκμάττων. See below.

³⁹ Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 13.6. The reference is to Demosthenes' *Or.* 7, now often considered spurious. Cf. also *Pomp.* 5.3: τῆς δὲ λέξεως ἢ Θουκυδίδης κέχρηται τὸ μὲν σημειῶδες καὶ περίεργον πέφυγεν, τὸ δὲ στρογγύλον καὶ πικρὸν καὶ ἐνθυμηματικὸν ἐκμέμακται ('of Thucydides' style, he [i.e. Philistus, M.S.] has avoided the peculiarity and elaboration, and he has expressed its qualities of terseness, sharpness and systematic argument in his own style'); *Comp.* 25.2: ἄρξομαι δὲ πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῆς ψιλῆς λέξεως, ἕνα τῶν ἀνδρῶν προχειρισάμενος ὃν ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα οἶμαι τὴν ποιητικὴν ἐκμεμάχθαι φράσιν ('I shall begin with the language of prose, selecting an author who has, I think, most clearly expressed poetic diction in his own style'). For an overview of the verb ἐκμάττεσθαι in Dionysius' works, cf. Greilich (1886), 15-19, who also lists other instances of the verb in Greek literature. Greilich notices: 'metaphoricus verbi sensus est imitando exprimendi vel formandi [...]' (*ibid.*, 16). For ἐκμάττειν to denote imitation (of people), cf. also Pl. *Resp.* 396d.

⁴⁰ *Ars Rhet.* 10.19.9-10. More on this definition of μίμησις in *Ars Rhet.* in n. 65.

On this basis, I suggest that Dionysius conceives of μίμησις not as an act of receptivity, but as one that actively expresses the model in a different stylistic idiom.

Dionysius' definitions of μίμησις and ζῆλος confront us with several syntactical and lexical oddities. In the first place, it is worth noting that μίμησις and ζῆλος are described in a rather stiff and unnatural way, with the participles ἐκματτομένη and κινουμένη not congruent with an acting person, but with an 'activity' (ἐνέργεια), which is 'moulding' and 'being moved'. An emendation of κινουμένη into κινουμένης would perhaps make more sense, as the soul rather than an activity is a candidate for 'being moved'. However, the analogy in construction between the two definitions (i.e. a participle congruent with ἐνέργεια) invites us to leave the text unchanged.

Secondly, the noun ἐνέργεια, which should not be confused with ἐνάργεια ('vividness' or 'visual immediacy'), appears, apart from the fragment cited above, only four times in the corpus of Dionysius' critical works, which makes its inclusion in this fragment remarkable.⁴¹ Like ἐνάργεια, ἐνέργεια is an Aristotelian concept, which generally refers to the final stage of a process of transformation. Aristotle distinguishes different types of ἐνέργεια, one of which is defined as 'movement' (κίνησις) in the treatise *On the Soul*.⁴² Dionysius' definition of ζῆλος as an 'activity of the soul, of being moved towards wonder' thus seems to be highly indebted to Aristotelian terminology.

In the context of Syrianus' commentary, the noun ἐνέργεια, although used rarely by Dionysius, does not seem to be out of tune. After having quoted Dionysius' definition of

⁴¹ The term ἐνέργεια in Dionysius' works can refer to (endless) labour or creative, technical production. In *Comp.* 20.14, ἐνέργεια pertains to the labour of Sisyphus. In *Comp.* 25.38, arts are discussed whose purpose is a form of 'activity' (ἐνέργεια) or 'production' (ποίησις). This use of ἐνέργεια is explicitly related to τέχνη. In *Pomp.* 1.7, Dionysius argues that only his critical method of comparison between authors can reveal their individual quality, and that this is true of all things manufactured, and 'of which activity (ἐνέργεια) is the aim'. Also in this passage, ἐνέργεια relates to technical production. It should be noted that Usener-Radermacher (1904-1929) and Aujac (1992) read ἐνέργεια here, whereas Usher (1985) has ἐνάργεια. In *Imit.* 5.5, where Aeschines' style is characterised, Usener-Radermacher (1904-1929) have ἐνεργής ('active'), whereas Aujac (1992) reads ἐναργής ('vivid'). (In *Amm.* I 11.5, the verb ἐνεργεῖν occurs in a quote from Philochorus' *Atthis*). For a definition of the frequently occurring stylistic virtue ἐνάργεια, see e.g. Zanker (1981); Otto (2009); Webb (2009), 87-106 (esp. on *evidentia* in Quintilian); Plett (2012) (and extensive bibliography); Allan, De Jong & De Jonge (2017). Cf. section 3.6.1, n. 214.

⁴² E.g. Arist. 1.5, *De an.* 417a16: καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν ἡ κίνησις ἐνέργειά τις ('for movement is a form of activity') (tr. Hett 1936). Although Aristotle considers κίνησις a kind of ἐνέργεια, he overtly distinguishes between them. On Aristotle's distinction between the terms, see esp. Hagen (1984).

μίμησις and before moving on to his definition of ζῆλος, Syrianus reminds his readers of how Dionysius' successors considered μίμησις. They were of the opinion that imitation involved a 'discourse' (λόγος) or 'action' (πρᾶξις) – and it is this πρᾶξις which comes very close to Dionysius' use of the word ἐνέργεια:

Ὡς δὲ οἱ μεταγενέστεροι λέγουσιν, λόγος ἢ πρᾶξις ὁμοίωσιν εὖ ἔχουσιν τοῦ παραδείγματος περιέχουσα.⁴³

But his successors argue it [i.e. imitation, M.S.] is a discourse or action which provides a successful likeness to the model.

Finally, the interpretation of the preposition πρὸς in the definition of ζῆλος is puzzling. In combination with an accusative, πρὸς in the vicinity of verbs of motion expresses 'motion or direction towards an object'. In this fragment, however, we may be inclined to think that it would make more sense to interpret πρὸς in an instrumental way, assuming that 'the activity of the soul' (ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς) is moved 'by wonder' rather than 'towards wonder'. This is obviously the opinion of Aujac, who translates the definition of ζῆλος as follows: 'L'émulation est l'élan actif de l'âme, mis en mouvement par l'admiration de ce qui lui paraît beau'.⁴⁴

However, I would like to suggest that an interpretation of πρὸς as an indicator of direction (i.e. allative πρὸς) is well tenable, and even more acceptable. Here I side with Battisti, who translates Dionysius' definition of ζῆλος as follows: 'L'emulazione e la spinta dell'anima mossa all' [= πρὸς, M.S.] ammirazione'.⁴⁵ In this interpretation, 'wonder' (θαῦμα) is not an auxiliary for ζῆλος, but instead the ultimate goal of successful, emulative composition.⁴⁶ In the first place, considering the fact that ζῆλος is a highly dynamic concept (i.e. ἐνέργεια), it is plausible to expect πρὸς to be used in an allative way. Secondly, Dionysius' perception of ζῆλος as a mental activity which is 'moved towards wonder' parallels Longinus' presentation of μίμησις and ζήλωσις.⁴⁷ Longinus considers these concepts,

⁴³ Dion. Hal. *Imit.* fr. III U-R (= 2 Aujac; sentence left out by Battisti). Cf. Syrian. *In Hermog. De Formis* [265, 15], p. 3, 18-20.

⁴⁴ Aujac (1992), 27. *TLG* offers no instances of the combination πρὸς θαῦμα in other Greek literature.

⁴⁵ Battisti (1997), 57. Cf. also Goudriaan (1989), 218: 'ζῆλος is een zielsactiviteit gericht op [= πρὸς, M.S.] bewondering van datgene wat edel lijkt'.

⁴⁶ Admittedly, in this interpretation, we would expect κινουῦσα rather than κινουμένη.

⁴⁷ More on ζήλωσις as a fairly rare derivative of ζῆλος in section 5.4.

which are apparently closely intertwined, as ‘an additional way’ (ἄλλη τις [...] ὁδός) leading to ‘the sublime’ (τὸ ὕψος):

Ἐνδείκνυται δ’ ἡμῖν οὗτος ἀνὴρ, εἰ βουλοίμεθα μὴ κατολιγωρεῖν, ὥς καὶ ἄλλη τις παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα ὁδὸς ἐπὶ τὰ ὑψηλὰ τείνει. Ποία δὲ καὶ τίς αὕτη; Τῶν ἔμπροσθεν μεγάλων συγγραφέων καὶ ποιητῶν μίμησις τε καὶ ζήλωσις.⁴⁸

Here is an author [i.e. Plato, M.S.] who shows us, if we choose not to ignore it, that there is another road, besides those we have mentioned, which leads to sublimity. What and what manner of road is this? Imitation and emulation of the great prose writers and poets of the past.

The impact of the sublime is described in terms of mental rapture, ecstasy, enchantment and wonder.⁴⁹ For Longinus, ‘wonder’ (θαῦμα) is one of the most important notions suited to describe what the sublime can accomplish.⁵⁰ Since μίμησις and ζήλωσις are, in his opinion, a way towards sublimity, these notions can also be regarded as leading to θαῦμα. Thus, both Dionysius and Longinus seem to apply the terminology of sublimity and wonder to measure the scope and direction of imitation.⁵¹ There are, however, important differences between them.

Whereas Longinus presents both μίμησις and ζήλωσις as an upward movement of the soul towards the model, μίμησις and ζήλος are clearly distinguished by Dionysius. In

⁴⁸ Longin. *Subl.* 13.2. This passage is also discussed in section 5.4.

⁴⁹ These sensations can be experienced both by the author (at the moment of composition) and the audience (at the moment of reading). For the inspired author, see e.g. Longin. *Subl.* 16.2: ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ καθάπερ ἐμπνευσθεὶς ἐξαίφνης ὑπὸ θεοῦ (‘but when in a sudden moment of inspiration, as if possessed by the divine’). On the ecstatic audience, see e.g. Longin. *Subl.* 1.4: οὐ γὰρ εἰς πειθὼ τοὺς ἀκροωμένους ἀλλ’ εἰς ἔκστασιν ἄγει τὰ ὑπερφυᾶ (‘for the effect of genius is not to persuade the audience but to transport them out of themselves’). On the inspired author in Longinus, see further De Jonge (2012), 279-280; on the ecstatic audience, see *ibid.*, 280-281.

⁵⁰ The word θαῦμα (with all (verbal and adjectival) derivatives) frequently turns up in Longinus. See e.g. Longin. *Subl.* 1.4: οὐ γὰρ εἰς πειθὼ τοὺς ἀκροωμένους ἀλλ’ εἰς ἔκστασιν ἄγει τὰ ὑπερφυᾶ· πάντα δέ γε σὺν ἐκπλήξει τοῦ πιθανοῦ καὶ τοῦ πρὸς χάριν αἰεὶ κρατεῖ τὸ θαυμάσιον (‘for the effect of genius is not to persuade the audience but rather to transport them out of themselves. The combination of wonder and amazement always prevails over what is merely convincing and pleasing’); *Subl.* 30.1: ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἡ τῶν κυρίων καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶν ὀνομάτων ἐκλογὴ θαυμαστῶς ἄγει καὶ κατακληῖ τοὺς ἀκούοντας (‘how the choice of right and fine words leaves the audience in a state of wonder and enchants them’).

⁵¹ For the connections between the terminology of the sublime in Dionysius and Longinus, see De Jonge (2012).

Dionysius' thinking, ζῆλος involves an upward movement, while we are allowed to infer that μίμησις represents a countermovement from model to imitator.⁵² After all, Dionysius applies the language of 'movement towards wonder at what seems to be beautiful' only in the case of ζῆλος; in the case of μίμησις, the model has come down to us, and is kneaded within and by our own hands.⁵³

Moreover, Dionysius presents ζῆλος as an inner force which is moved *itself*, whereas Longinus states that μίμησις and ζήλωσις form a *route* along which we – authors and audience – can move upwards to sublimity. Thus, to Dionysius, ζῆλος is something very personal, something deeply anchored in the soul. Longinus, on the other hand, adopts a more dualistic view regarding ζήλωσις and our soul, since he images μίμησις and ζήλωσις as features of methodological nature.⁵⁴

Notwithstanding the phraseological oddities and uncertainties of the fragment of Dionysius' *On Imitation* preserved by Syrianus, we can infer some important aspects of μίμησις and ζῆλος in Dionysius' thinking. He evidently distinguishes between the two terms. He conceives of μίμησις as an activity of merely technical reproduction. The orator is supposed to 'mould' (ἐκμάττεσθαι) his object (the verb being highly suggestive of the kinship between visual and literary arts) – i.e. to reshape the literary 'model' (τὸ παράδειγμα) and make it fit for new literary conditions.⁵⁵ This activity of 'moulding the model' is to be carried out on the basis of 'theoretical rules' (θεωρήματα).⁵⁶

To Dionysius, the concept of emulation, ζῆλος, goes far beyond the faithful moulding of a model. It depends on 'an activity of the soul, of being moved towards wonder at what seems to be beautiful'. The language of motion and appearance used by Dionysius to designate ζῆλος is quite remarkable. Whereas μίμησις pertains to the reproductive kneading of the language material on the basis of prescriptions, ζῆλος on the other hand covers the dynamic process of the rapture of the soul caused by what 'seems to be beautiful', not by

⁵² Cf. Goudriaan (1989), 220; 227.

⁵³ For the movement from model to imitator, cf. e.g. Dion. Hal. *Imit.* 1.2-3, where the idea of mental influence from original literature into the imitator's soul is expressed. For the metaphor of the stream, see section 1.3, n. 31.

⁵⁴ The image of the soul also plays an important role in the conceptualisations of the process of imitation by Aelius Theon (section 5.2) and Seneca (section 5.3).

⁵⁵ On the use of e.g. sculptural metaphors in the works of Dionysius, see Lockwood (1937), who offers a useful list of different kinds of metaphorical expressions. Cf. De Jonge (2008), 186 ff. for a discussion of architectural metaphors.

⁵⁶ For the sculptural language used to describe the process of imitation, see also section 5.2 on Aelius Theon.

‘what is beautiful’. Judging from the entire text corpus of Dionysius, this connection between ζῆλος and ‘beauty’ (τὸ καλόν) is an evident one.⁵⁷

2.2.2 NATURAL AND ARTIFICIAL ΜΙΜΗΣΙΣ

For Dionysius’ ideas on imitation, we can also turn to a passage in his essay *On Dinarchus*, in which the distinction is not between μίμησις and ζῆλος, but between natural and artificial μίμησις:

Ὡς δὲ καθόλου εἰπεῖν, δύο τρόπους τῆς διαφορᾶς τῆς πρὸς τὰ ἀρχαῖα μιμήσεως εὔροι τις ἂν· ὧν ὁ μὲν φυσικός τέ ἐστι καὶ ἐκ πολλῆς κατηχήσεως καὶ συντροφίας λαμβανόμενος, ὁ δὲ τούτῳ προσεχῆς ἐκ τῶν τῆς τέχνης παραγγελμάτων. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ προτέρου, τί ἂν τις καὶ λέγοι; Περὶ δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου, τουτὶ ἂν ἔχοι τις εἰπεῖν ὅτι πᾶσι μὲν τοῖς ἀρχετύποις αὐτοφυῆς τις ἐπιτρέχει χάρις καὶ ὥρα, τοῖς δ’ ἀπὸ τούτων κατεσκευασμένοις, κἂν ἐπ’ ἄκρον μιμήσεως ἔλθωσι, πρόσσετίν τι ὅμως τὸ ἐπιτετηδευμένον καὶ οὐκ ἐκ φύσεως ὑπάρχον.⁵⁸

Generally speaking, two different forms of imitation can be found with regard to ancient models: one is natural, and is acquired by rehearsal and familiarity; the other is related to it, but is acquired by following the precepts of art. About the first, what more is there to say? And about the second, what is there to be said except that a certain spontaneous charm and freshness emanates from all the original models, whereas in the artificial copies, even if they attain the height of imitative skill, there is present nevertheless a certain element of contrivance and unnaturalness also?

In *On Dinarchus*, Dionysius applies the notion of μίμησις as a criterion for establishing the authenticity of literature.⁵⁹ He discusses two different forms of μίμησις in order to explain the failure of the orator Dinarchus, who ‘is neither uniform in all his speeches nor the inventor of an individual style by which one can recognize him with accuracy’ (οὔτε ὅμοιος ἐν ἅπασιν

⁵⁷ See e.g. Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 48.2; *Ant. Rom.* 2.18.2; 8.30.5 (*Ant. Rom.* = ed. Jacoby 1885-1905).

⁵⁸ Dion. Hal. *Din.* 7.5-7.

⁵⁹ Untersteiner (1971) devoted a study to this. Cf. also the thorough discussion of the function of μίμησις in *On Dinarchus* by Goudriaan (1989), 230-240. On the opposition between natural and artificial imitation in *Din.* 7, see esp. Goudriaan (1989), 236-239. For the connection between *Din.* 7 and *Imit.* fr. II U-R (= 1 Aujac = 1 Battisti), see section 3.3.1.

ἔστιν οὐτ' ἰδίου τινὸς εὐρετής, δι' οὗ γινώσεται τις αὐτὸν ἀκριβῶς).⁶⁰ The passage has also been discussed by Wiater, who points out that Dionysius' 'unmistakable criterion by which to distinguish his [i.e. Dinarchus', M.S.] speeches from those of the original classical orators' is his lack of stylistic 'uniformity' (ὁμοείδεια). It is this uniformity which Dionysius presents as 'the most effective means of recognition' (μεγίστη γνῶσις) of the speeches of the orators whom Dinarchus imitates.⁶¹

The criterion of 'uniformity' (ὁμοείδεια) is two-sided. On the one hand, it concerns homogeneity within and individuality of a style, which evidently results from a balanced, imitative blending of a wide variety of models in a new, organic textual unity, and will not be achieved by the orator who, like Dinarchus, 'in some places [...] shows a close resemblance to Lysias, in others to Hyperides, and in others to Demosthenes' (καὶ τοῖς Λυσίου παραπλήσιος ἔστιν ὅπου γίνεται καὶ τοῖς Ὑπερείδου καὶ τοῖς Δημοσθένους λόγοις).⁶²

On the other hand, the notion of ὁμοείδεια expresses the idea of μίμησις which aims at uniformity with classical models – that means, at composing a speech which *is* classical instead of *appearing* so.⁶³ This aspect of the criterion of ὁμοείδεια in relation to models explicitly comes to the fore when Dionysius observes that Dinarchus unfortunately 'displays many examples of imitation and of difference from the original models of the speeches themselves' (πολὺ γὰρ ἐμφαίνει μιμήσεις τε καὶ αὐτῶν ὡς πρὸς τὸ τῶν λόγων ἀρχέτυπον διαφοράν).⁶⁴ The idea of uniformity with classical models is also crucial in the passage on natural and artificial μίμησις quoted above.⁶⁵

⁶⁰ Dion. Hal. *Din.* 6.5.

⁶¹ Wiater (2011), 88. See Dion. Hal. *Din.* 6.2. Wiater rightly observes that this lack of stylistic uniformity is connected with the hybrid life of Dinarchus, who 'lived in both classical and non-classical times, began as a classical and ended as a non-classical orator, [...] first supported democracy and then oligarchy' (*ibid.*, 87).

⁶² Dion. Hal. *Din.* 5.2. In *Din.* 1.1, Dionysius explains that he did not discuss Dinarchus in his writings on the ancient orators 'because he was neither the inventor of an individual style, as were Lysias, Isocrates and Isaeus, nor the perfecter of styles which others had invented, as I judge Demosthenes, Aeschines and Hyperides to have been' (διὰ τὸ μήτε εὐρετὴν ἰδίου γεγονέναι χαρακτήρος τὸν ἄνδρα, ὥσπερ τὸν Λυσίαν καὶ τὸν Ἰσοκράτην καὶ τὸν Ἰσαῖον, μήτε τῶν εὐρημένων ἑτέροις τελειωτὴν, ὥσπερ τὸν Δημοσθένη καὶ τὸν Αἰσχίνη καὶ <τὸν> Ὑπερείδην ἡμεῖς κρίνομεν).

⁶³ Cf. Wiater (2011), 89: '[...] Dinarchus' attempt to look classical, instead of *being* classical, betrays him as an epigone, an imitator. Dinarchus' heterogeneous life-and-style thus demonstrates *ex negativo* how historical continuity is to be achieved through homogeneity of style (ὁμοείδεια)'.
⁶⁴ Dion. Hal. *Din.* 6.5.

⁶⁵ The concept of μίμησις is also connected with the notion of uniformity in a passage from the tenth chapter of *Ars Rhet.*, which is an anthology of different rhetorical texts, probably dating from the early second century AD

Judging from Dionysius' words, the original models, which have 'a spontaneous charm and freshness' (αὐτοφύης τις [...] χάρις καὶ ὥρα), can be imitated in two different ways: naturally and artificially. It is important to note that Dionysius hastens to define artificial imitation as 'bordering' (προσεχής) upon natural imitation. Apparently, the two kinds of imitation are affiliated. Unlike natural imitation, however, artificial imitation is based on the precepts of art and therefore always gives the impression of contrivance and unnaturalness. In deviating from the original models, it is deprived from spontaneity and charm.

We may understand 'artificial imitation' in this context as one aspect of what Dionysius defines as μίμησις, i.e. the artificial 'moulding of the example'. I suggest that artificial imitation is certainly not a deprecatory form of μίμησις, as Untersteiner posits, but one of its essential aspects, which needs to be supplemented by something adjacent: natural

and falsely attributed to Dionysius. On the date and authorship of the chapters 8-11, see Heath (2003), 81, who argues that 'the *Art of Rhetoric* attributed to Dionysius of Halicarnassus is not by Dionysius and is not an art of rhetoric. It is a disparate assemblage of essays on a variety of rhetorical themes rather than a systematic treatise, and it contains the work of more than one rhetorician'. The passage in question (10.19.3-10) contains a definition of what Dionysius thinks μίμησις is and is not, and interestingly also mentions the concept of ζῆλος: ἐτι δὲ καὶ τὴν παλαιότητα μὴ ἐν τῇ θέσει τῶν βυβλίων νομίζωμεν εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ χρήσει τῆς ὁμοιότητος. Μίμησις γὰρ οὐ χρήσις ἐστὶ τῶν διανοημάτων, ἀλλ' ἡ ὁμοία τῶν παλαιῶν ἔντεχνος μεταχείρισις. Καὶ μιμεῖται τὸν Δημοσθένην οὐχ ὁ τὸ <Δημοσθένους λέγων ἀλλ' ὁ> Δημοσθενικῶς, καὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα ὁμοίως καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον. Καὶ πᾶσα μίμησις ὧδε ἔχει· τέχνης ζῆλος ἐκμάττων ἐνθυμημάτων ὁμοιότητα ('moreover, we think that old age too is not in the disposition of books, but in the use of likeness. For μίμησις is not the use of thoughts, but a skillful practice similar to that of the ancients. And not he who expresses what is from Demosthenes imitates Demosthenes, but he who expresses himself in a Demosthenic way, and [neither does he imitate] Plato and Homer [who expresses what is from Plato and Homer]. And all imitation is as follows: it is the emulation of technical skill, which expresses a likeness of thoughts'). On this passage, see also Heath (2003), 97. Although the attribution of the *Ars Rhet.* to Dionysius is evidently spurious, in this passage we can recognize two important parallels with Dionysius' definition of μίμησις (*Imit.* fr. III U-R = 2 Aujac = 2 Battisti) and his description of natural imitation (Dion. Hal. *Din.* 7.5-7). In the first place, μίμησις is connected with artistic skill and the activity of 'moulding', as is true for Dionysius' definition of μίμησις. Secondly, μίμησις goes hand in hand with the idea of creating 'likeness' (ὁμοιότης) to the model, which is e.g. evident from the passage in Dion. Hal. *Din.* 7, but also from other passages in the works of Dionysius (see e.g. section 3.4). In some aspects, however, the quote from the *Ars Rhet.* differs from what can be considered Dionysius' genuine thoughts (frs. and epitome of *Imit.*). For instance, the remarkable definition of μίμησις as an 'emulation of technical skill' (τέχνης ζῆλος) is inconsistent with Dionysius' overt distinction between μίμησις and ζῆλος; instead, it seems to conflate both notions to describe the complex of imitation and emulation together.

μίμησις.⁶⁶ In this passage, we are left in the dark as to what this natural kind of imitation is about – Dionysius refuses to define it, obviously convinced of its meaning being evident to all.⁶⁷

Although we may be inclined to read Dionysius’ description of the original models, which have ‘a spontaneous charm and freshness’ (αὐτοφυῆς τις [...] χάρις καὶ ὥρα), as an indirect characterisation of natural imitation also, this does not follow from Dionysius’ words. In the first place, it would be inconsistent for Dionysius to define natural imitation in a veiled manner after having suggested that it does not require further explanation.

Secondly, when we assume that Dionysius’ description of original models also applies to the natural kind of imitation, the implication would be that natural imitation is preferred above or hierarchically superior to artificial imitation, which, as we have seen, possesses ‘contrivance and unnaturalness’ (τὸ ἐπιτετηδευμένον καὶ οὐκ ἐκ φύσεως). However, since both kinds of μίμησις are presented as ‘contiguous’ (προσεχής), Dionysius rather suggests they are on the same level, and go hand in hand.

So far, we have seen that when Dionysius reflects on the concept of imitation in a systematical way, he divides it into two indispensable and complementary stages: μίμησις and ζῆλος. Within this general division, μίμησις can be further subdivided into two closely related imitative forms: natural and artificial μίμησις. The following sections focus on how the terms μίμησις and ζῆλος are used in the huge corpus of Dionysius’ critical and rhetorical works, and show that in its actual application, Dionysius’ mimetic theory is less clear cut.

⁶⁶ Untersteiner (1971), 651.

⁶⁷ I have thought of considering natural imitation an equivalent of ζῆλος. However, the only clear parallel between Dionysius’ concepts of ζῆλος and natural imitation is that an ‘activity of the soul’ (ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς) can be regarded as ‘natural’. It is difficult to observe more parallels, unless we accept a passage from Longinus’ treatise *On the Sublime* as an intermediate step. In language which reminds us of Dionysius’ description of original models which emanate charm and freshness, Longinus argues that emulators (οἱ ζηλοῦντες) share in the flow of inspiration which emanates from the natural genius of models (*Subl.* 13.2): οὕτως ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ἀρχαίων μεγαλοφυΐας εἰς τὰς τῶν ζηλούντων ἐκείνους ψυχὰς ὡς ἀπὸ ἱερῶν στομίῶν ἀπόρροιαί τινες φέρονται, ὑφ’ ὧν ἐπιπνεόμενοι καὶ οἱ μὴ λίαν φοιραστικοὶ τῷ ἐτέρων συνενθουσιῶσι μεγέθει (‘so, too, from the natural genius of those old writers there flows into the hearts of their admirers as it were an emanation from those holy mouths. Inspired by this, even those who are not easily moved to prophecy share the enthusiasm of these others’ grandeur’). From this Longinean passage, which presents ζῆλος in terms of ‘nobleness of nature’ (μεγαλοφυΐα), movement (cf. φέρονται) and inspiration (cf. ἐπιπνεόμενοι, φοιραστικοί, συνενθουσιῶσι), it is only a small step to Dionysius’ definition of ζῆλος, in which the soul of the imitator is said to ‘be moved’ (κινουμένη) by the apparent beauty of literary models. Thus, only by inference, Dionysius’ understanding of ‘natural imitation’ can be vaguely linked with his conception of ζῆλος. This is, I think, too weak an argument to see a connection.

2.2.3 ΜΙΜΗΣΙΣ AND ΖΗΛΟΣ AS CLOSELY RELATED CONCEPTS

In Dionysius' treatises, μίμησις and ζῆλος can appear in close conjunction. Sometimes there is no (clear) difference in meaning between the two notions.⁶⁸ In these cases, we may be inclined to regard the terms as manifestations of *variatio* or even synonymy. However, other passages contextualise μίμησις and ζῆλος more clearly, and allow us to infer that the terms – although closely intertwined – cover different aspects of the process of imitation. This section argues that μίμησις is often used as a descriptive term denoting (the result of) imitative creation; ζῆλος, in turn, is more evaluative, and as such relates to the imitative process of aspiring engagement with and mental perception and interpretation of models.

An example from *On Thucydides* shows that a distinctive value of μίμησις and ζῆλος is not easily recognizable for modern readers. Reading μιμεῖσθαι λέγοντες and ζηλοῦν λέγοντες in quite similar sentences, we may even suppose *variatio*. What is clear, is that two groups of people are opposed (cf. οἱ μὲν [...] οἱ δέ): those who claim to imitate Plato, and those who claim to emulate Thucydides. Their imitative efforts are in vain, and result in undesirable stylistic contortions of the original:

Καὶ οἱ μὲν Πλάτωνα μιμεῖσθαι λέγοντες καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀρχαῖον καὶ ὑψηλὸν καὶ εὖχαρι καὶ καλὸν οὐ δυνάμενοι λαβεῖν, διθυραμβώδη δὲ ὀνόματα καὶ φορτικὰ εἰσφέροντες κατὰ τοῦτ' ἐλέγχονται ῥαδίως. Οἱ δὲ Θουκυδίδην ζηλοῦν λέγοντες καὶ τὸ μὲν εὐτόνον καὶ στερεὸν καὶ δεινὸν καὶ τὰ τούτοις ὅμοια χαλεπῶς ἐκλαμβάνοντες, τοὺς δὲ σολοικοφανεῖς σχηματισμοὺς καὶ τὸ ἀσαφὲς προχειρίζόμενοι [...].⁶⁹

Again, those who claim to imitate Plato, and are unable to capture his pristine quality, his sublimity, his grace and beauty, but who rather introduce inflated and vulgar language, these are easily exposed on this count. Those who claim to be emulating Thucydides, and find difficulty in assimilating his characteristic vigour, compactness and intensity, resort instead to ungrammatical constructions and to obscurity [...].

⁶⁸ Cf. Goudriaan (1989), 220, who argues: 'Beide termen komen we steeds afwisselend tegen, meestal zonder aantoonbaar verschil in betekenis [...]'.
⁶⁹ Dion. Hal. *Din.* 8.1.

Also in two other passages, the terms μίμησις and ζῆλος are hardly distinguishable, and might even give the impression of being used as synonyms:⁷⁰

Ἐμοὶ μὲν δὴ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια τούτοις ἄξια ζήλου τε καὶ μιμήσεως ἐφάνη [...].⁷¹

This and narratives like it seemed to me admirable and worthy of emulation and imitation [...].

Μίαν μὲν δὴ ταύτην ἀρετὴν ἀξίαν ζήλου καὶ μιμήσεως εὐρίσκω παρὰ τῷ ῥήτορι [...].⁷²

This, then, is one quality [i.e. ‘purity of language’ (καθαρότης), M.S.] I find in our orator [i.e. Lysias] which deserves emulation and imitation [...].

In these two passages, μίμησις and ζῆλος seem to be used rather idiomatically: in both cases, they appear in the same order and as complements of the same adjective ἄξιον (‘worthy’). This may lead us to suppose that there is no intended difference in meaning between them. However, the adjective ἄξιον can also be accompanied by ζῆλος or μίμησις alone, which implies that Dionysius deliberately chooses to mention either both terms or one of them.⁷³ Seeing also that absolute symmetry between two terms within the same semantic field is unlikely, we do well to infer that in the passages from *On Thucydides* and *On Lysias* quoted above, μίμησις and ζῆλος as complements of ἄξιον highlight different aspects of the same process of imitation. From these passages, however, we do not get a clue as to what exactly these aspects are understood to be.

An examination of some other passages confirms that when μίμησις and ζῆλος are mentioned in one breath, they relate to different components of the general process of imitation. Here, it emerges what these components are like. Let us first consider the use of μίμησις and ζῆλος in the moral attached to the narrative on the ugly farmer at the beginning of the epitome of *On Imitation*:

⁷⁰ E.g. McAdon (2018), 24 points to the synonymous relationship between the two terms in Dionysius.

⁷¹ Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 27.1.

⁷² Dion. Hal. *Lys.* 2.3.

⁷³ For the adjective ἄξιον followed by ζῆλος alone, see Dion. Hal. *Lys.* 4.3; *Thuc.* 48.2; *Imit.* 3.9. Cf. also ζῆλος followed by ἐπιτήδειον in *Comp.* 26.7. For the adjective ἄξιον followed by μίμησις alone: see Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 8.3.

Οὕτω καὶ λόγων μιμήσει ὁμοιότης τίκτεται, ἐπὰν ζηλώσῃ τις τὸ παρ' ἐκάστῳ τῶν παλαιῶν βέλτιον εἶναι δοκοῦν [...].⁷⁴

In this way, in literature also, likeness is born through imitation, whenever someone emulates what seems to be better in each of the ancients [...].

Here, Dionysius easily switches from the noun μιμήσει to the verb ζηλώσῃ, without explicitly suggesting any shift in meaning. However, we should note that μίμησις is presented as a creative activity which is said to bring forth (cf. τίκτειν) something (i.e. 'likeness' (ὁμοιότης) to models), whereas ζῆλος relates to what is *perceived* to be excellent.⁷⁵ Thus, ζῆλος is connected to inner reflection and interpretation, and has to do with an 'activity of the soul' (cf. Dionysius' definition of ζῆλος).

Also the description of Homer's qualities in *On Imitation* is typical of the flexible and distinctive use of μίμησις and ζῆλος within the space of one sentence:

Τῆς μὲν οὖν Ὀμηρικῆς ποιήσεως οὐ μίαν τινὰ τοῦ σώματος μοῖραν, ἀλλ' ἐκτύπωσαι τὸ σύμπαν, καὶ λάβε ζῆλον ἡθῶν τε τῶν ἐκεῖ καὶ παθῶν καὶ μεγέθους, καὶ τῆς οἰκονομίας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν ἀπασῶν εἰς ἀληθῆ τὴν παρὰ σοὶ μίμησιν ἡλλαγμένων.⁷⁶

Of the poetry of Homer, do not express one aspect of the corpus, but the whole, and emulate the representation of character there, and the emotions, grandeur, and the disposition and all other qualities, provided that they are modified for a true and personal imitation.

In this passage, Homer is presented as an author whose qualities should be emulated (cf. λάβε ζῆλον) and altered for a 'true and personal imitation' (εἰς ἀληθῆ τὴν παρὰ σοὶ μίμησιν). What is clear, is that the term μίμησις here pertains not so much to the process as to the actual result of imitating, which should express the essence of the model in a faithful and original way. The preposition εἰς, which signifies purpose, invites this interpretation of μίμησις, as well as the resultative perfect participle ἡλλαγμένων. By contrast, the words λάβε ζῆλον indicate the incentive to pursue the emulation of specific virtues of style, or, to put it differently, refer to

⁷⁴ Dion. Hal. *Imit.* 1.3.

⁷⁵ Note, however, that μίμησις appears in a passive construction; it is not explicitly marked as *agens*.

⁷⁶ Dion. Hal. *Imit.* 2.1.

mimetic aspiration. This use of ζῆλος to express aspiration and endeavour is compatible with Dionysius' definition of ζῆλος as a principle of 'activity of the soul, of being moved'.

That μίμησις and ζῆλος cover different aspects of imitation can also be deduced from a passage in Dionysius' treatise *On Thucydides*:

Ταῦτα δὴ τὰ Θουκυδίδου ζηλωτὰ ἔργα, καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων τὰ μιμήματα τοῖς ιστοριογραφοῦσιν ὑποτίθεται λαμβάνειν.⁷⁷

These are the speeches of Thucydides which can be emulated, and it is from these that I suggest writers of history should derive their imitations.

The adjective ζηλωτά and the noun μιμήματα refer to different subjects: ζηλωτά is connected with the exemplary 'speeches of Thucydides' (τὰ Θουκυδίδου ἔργα); μιμήματα indicates the imitations derived from these speeches. Thus, in this passage, ζῆλος implies the aspiring engagement and rivalry with the discussed speeches of Thucydides, whereas μίμημα adverts to the result of inductive (cf. ἀπὸ τούτων) appropriation (cf. λαμβάνειν) – that is, we could say, to a 'moulding of the model' (cf. Dionysius' definition of μίμησις) in order to make it fit one's own literary purposes.

In another passage, μίμησις and ζῆλος are less easy to interpret:

[...] ταύτας μιμεῖσθαι τὰς κατασκευάς ἐν αἷς ἢ τε βραχύτης καὶ ἡ δεινότης καὶ ἡ ἰσχὺς καὶ ὁ τόνος καὶ ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ αἱ συγγενεῖς ταύταις ἀρεταὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις εἰσὶ φανεραί· τὰς δὲ αἰνιγματώδεις καὶ δυσκαταμαθήτους καὶ γραμματικῶν ἐξηγήσεων δεομένας καὶ πολὺ τὸ βεβασανισμένον καὶ τὸ σολοικοφανὲς ἐν τοῖς σχηματισμοῖς ἐχούσας μῆτε θαυμάζειν μῆτε μιμεῖσθαι. Ἵνα δὲ συνελὼν εἴπω, ἀμφοτέρωθεν μὲν ἐπ' ἴσης ζηλωτὰ εἶναι, τὰ τε μὴ σαφῶς εἰρημένα ὑπὸ τοῦ συγγραφέως καὶ τὰ προσειληφότα σὺν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρεταῖς τὴν σαφήνειαν, οὐκ ἔχει λόγον.⁷⁸

They should imitate those specimens of his composition in which his brevity, rhetorical power, force, intensity, impressiveness and other related virtues are plain for all men to see; while those which are allusive and difficult to follow, and require a commentary, and those which are full of tortured and apparently ungrammatical constructions deserve neither to be admired nor imitated. To sum up, it does not make

⁷⁷ Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 42.5.

⁷⁸ Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 55.2-3.

sense for us that the passages in Thucydides which lack clarity and those which possess clarity in addition to his other virtues should be equally emulated [...].

Dionysius advises ‘those who practice political oratory’ (τοῖς ἀσκοῦσι τοὺς πολιτικούς λόγους) only to ‘imitate’ (μιμεῖσθαι) those virtues which are evidently worthy of imitation, and not to ‘admire’ (θαυμάζειν) and ‘imitate’ (μιμεῖσθαι) what should be regarded as a literary perversity. Apparently, when it comes to the selective act of students imitating specific literary virtues, μίμησις is the most obvious and current term.

When Dionysius summarises his words (cf. συνελὼν εἶπω) in a general rule (cf. οὐκ ἔχει λόγον), it is not so evident how we should understand his shift from μιμεῖσθαι to ‘what should be emulated’ (ζηλωτὰ εἶναι), unless we recognize that the verb θαυμάζειν is connected with the notion of ζῆλος, and probably prepares for it. Considering Dionysius’ definition (fr. III U-R) of ζῆλος as ‘an activity of the soul, of being moved towards wonder’ (ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς πρὸς θαῦμα [...] κινουμένη), we are allowed to infer that in this passage from *On Thucydides*, ζῆλος is connotated with ‘admiration’, and implies a rather subjective engagement with models.

From the examples discussed above, we may conclude that when the notions of μίμησις and ζῆλος appear within the same passage, we should always be aware of their difference in meaning. Although the specific, distinctive meaning of both terms cannot be determined in some passages, others clearly show that μίμησις and ζῆλος cover different, but closely related aspects of the complex of imitation: whereas μίμησις is a more descriptive term which often adverts to (the result of) imitative creation, ζῆλος is more evaluative, and often designates the aspiring engagement with and mental perception and interpretation of models. Let us now consider how Dionysius uses μίμησις and ζῆλος as separated concepts.

2.2.4 ΜΙΜΗΣΙΣ

The term μίμησις is clearly the most current term of the two. When used on its own, μίμησις refers to the complex of imitation (i.e. μίμησις and ζῆλος together), but highlights the technical aspect of it – the ‘moulding of the model’. In Dionysius’ works, μίμησις, like ζῆλος, is preponderantly used in an intertextual sense, referring to the imitator’s adaptation of styles, aspects of styles or subjects derived from a wide variety of models. In most cases, ζῆλος is limited to this intertextual kind of imitation. However, μίμησις embraces more. It can also apply to the imitative relationship between form and content of one and the same text (for

example, rough vowels used to describe a rough event), or to the faithful, linguistic representation of various natural, real life-phenomena (for example, events, human character traits, or what is understood to be the uncontrived language spoken by ordinary people).⁷⁹ Like ζῆλος, the term can even, in a moral sense, pertain to the imitation not of an author's style, but of his way of life.

When μίμησις is used to describe the expression of (aspects of) reality in art, the notion appears in its original, Platonic sense, which is not so prominent in Dionysius' rhetorical works. In this section, the focus is on the connotations of the intertextual kind of μίμησις. There are, broadly speaking, two aspects that are intrinsically connected with the concept of μίμησις: 1) artful creation of uniformity between model and imitator and 2) substantial inequality of the relationship between model and imitator.

As we have seen in section 2.2.2 discussing a passage from *On Dinarchus*, every product of imitation should meet the primary criterion of 'uniformity' (ὁμοειδέα). This connection between μίμησις and 'uniformity' is not incidental, nor limited to the works of Dionysius. In fact, Dionysius seems to be indebted to Aristotle, who argues that the pleasure of beholding art is caused by the mental process of 'comparison' (συλλογισμός) of model to

⁷⁹ For μίμησις denoting the imitative relationship between form and content, see e.g. Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 20.14-15, in which Homer's artful description of the torments of Sisyphus is discussed: τὸ δὲ μεταξὺ τῶν ὀνομάτων ψόγμα καὶ ἡ τῶν τραχυνόντων γραμμάτων παράθεσις τὰ διαλείμματα τῆς ἐνεργείας καὶ τὸ τοῦ μόχθου μέγεθος [...] καὶ ὅτι ταῦτα οὐ φύσεώς ἐστιν αὐτοματιζούσης ἔργα ἀλλὰ τέχνης μιμήσασθαι τὰ γινόμενα περὶ τῆς φύσεως ('the drawing-in of breath between the words and the juxtaposition of rough letters indicate the pauses in his [i.e. Sisyphus', M.S.] efforts and the hugeness of his labour [...]. And these effects are not the work of nature improvising, but of art trying to represent events'). For μίμησις pertaining to the representation of reality, see e.g. Dion. Hal. *Is.* 16.1, in which the artful representation of 'nature and truth' by Lysias is praised: τοῦ Λυσίου μὲν οὖν τις ἀναγινώσκων τὰς διηγήσεις οὐδὲν ἂν ὑπολάβοι λέγεσθαι κατὰ τέχνην ἢ πονηρίαν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ φύσις καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια φέρει, αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγνοῶν ὅτι τῆς τέχνης τὸ μιμήσασθαι τὴν φύσιν αὐτῆς μέγιστον ἔργον ἦν ('any reader of Lysias' narratives would suppose that no art or dishonesty had gone into their composition, but that they are written in accordance with nature and truth. He would not know that this illusion is itself the product of an art whose greatest achievement was to imitate nature'). For μίμησις pointing to the representation of character traits and emotion, see e.g. Dion. Hal. *Pomp.* 3.18: μετὰ ταύτην συνίσταται τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ τῶν ἡθῶν τε καὶ παθῶν μίμησις ('after this quality [i.e. vividness, one of the qualities required in historiography, M.S.] comes the imitation of traits of character and of emotions'). For μίμησις indicating the skillful representation of uncontrived speech, see e.g. Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 1.13: ποιητικῆς τε κατασκευῆς τὸν ἀποίητον ἐκμιμουμένης λόγον καὶ σφόδρα ἐν τῇ μιμῇ κατορθούσης αὐτοῦ <τί> τὸ κράτος ('and in what consists the effectiveness of that poetical artistry which closely imitates uncontrived speech and succeeds well in its purpose').

copy, and is not determined by the beauty or ugliness of what is represented.⁸⁰ In a rather similar way, Plutarch establishes that the quality of art depends on the extent to which it attains ‘likeness’ (ὁμοιότης) to the original.⁸¹

Also in another passage (already discussed in the previous section), μίμησις and ὁμοεῖδεια are associated terms. It says that ‘close adherence’ or ‘likeness’ (ὁμοιότης) to the original text is said to be born by μίμησις (the birth metaphor is motivated by the preceding narrative on the ugly farmer, whose wife gives birth to beautiful children after having observed beautiful images):

[...] μιμήσει ὁμοιότης τίκεται.⁸²

[...] likeness is born through imitation.

The concept of ‘likeness’ (ὁμοιότης) is also prominent in the opening lines of the treatise *On Imitation*, though it is not explicitly associated with either μίμησις or ζῆλος:

Ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ τοῦ ἀναγινώσκοντος ὑπὸ τῆς συνεχοῦς παρατηρήσεως τὴν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ χαρακτηῖρος ἐφέλκεται [...].⁸³

For the soul of the reader attracts likeness of style by continuous study [...].

⁸⁰ Arist. *Rhet.* 1.11, 1371b4-10: ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ μανθάνειν τε ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν, καὶ τὰ τοιάδε ἀνάγκη ἡδέα εἶναι οἷον τό τε μιμούμενον, ὥσπερ γραφικὴ καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιία καὶ ποιητικὴ, καὶ πᾶν ὃ ἂν εὔμιμητόν ᾖ, καὶ ἡ μὴ ἡδὺ αὐτὸ τὸ μιμητόν· οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ χαίρει, ἀλλὰ συλλογισμὸς ἔστιν ὅτι τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο, ὥστε μανθάνειν τι συμβαίνει (‘and since learning and admiring are pleasant, all things connected with them must also be pleasant; for instance, a work of imitation, such as painting, sculpture, poetry, and all that is well imitated, even if the object of imitation is not pleasant; for it is not this that causes pleasure or the reverse, but the inference that the imitation and the object imitated are identical, so that the result is that we learn something’) (tr. Freese 1926). A scholion to a sentence within this passage from Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* contains a reference to Dionysius. More on this in section 3.3.3.

⁸¹ Plut. *Quomodo adul.* 18a: γεγραμμένην σαύραν ἢ πίθηκον ἢ Θερσίτου πρόσωπον ἰδόντες ἡδόμεθα καὶ θαυμάζομεν οὐχ ὡς καλὸν ἀλλ’ ὡς ὅμοιον. Οὐσίᾳ μὲν γὰρ οὐ δύναται καλὸν γενέσθαι τὸ αἰσχρόν· ἡ δὲ μίμησις, ἂν τε περὶ φαῦλον ἂν τε περὶ χρηστὸν ἐφίκεται τῆς ὁμοιότητος, ἐπαινέται (‘when we see a lizard or an ape or the face of Thersites in a picture, we are pleased with it and admire it, not as a beautiful thing, but as a likeness. For by its essential nature the ugly cannot become beautiful; but the imitation, be it concerned with what is base or with what is good, if only it attain to the likeness, is commended’) (tr. Babbitt 1927).

⁸² Dion. Hal. *Imit.* 1.3.

⁸³ Dion. Hal. *Imit.* 1.2.

A phrase like this, which is a statement on the act of imitation in general, contains elements that belong to both μίμησις and ζῆλος, and hence testifies to the intertwinedness of these concepts. The notion of likeness is, as we have seen, associated with μίμησις, but the language of mental activity reminds us of Dionysius' definition of ζῆλος.⁸⁴ However, unlike this definition, which presents the soul as 'being moved', the soul is active here: it 'attracts' (ἐφέλκεται) likeness to the model of the past, and it even absorbs it (cf. μετοχτεύση, 1.3). Through this enclosure of the stylistic 'character' (χαρακτήρ) of the model within the soul of the imitator, literature of the past can be reincarnated in the present in an original way.

The alternate and flexible use of the language of activeness and passiveness is distinctive for and essential to Dionysius' understanding of the complex of imitation and emulation.⁸⁵ This complex basically comprises an organic unity of opposites: conscientious study and absorption of models versus innate talent; an active 'moulding of the model' and a passive rapture of the soul. As we have already seen, it is the notion of μίμησις (as opposed to its partner ζῆλος) which is associated with the active and creative part of the complex of imitation, and which brings forth uniformity by closely and faithfully following models.

However, another observation about μίμησις should be made. An examination of all occurrences of μίμησις in the rhetorical works of Dionysius teaches that the notion is most suited to designate the vertical, unequal relationship between the great orators of the past and those of the present, although in these cases, we also regularly find ζῆλος.⁸⁶ The notion of ζῆλος, on the other hand, is more apt for contexts in which the horizontal imitative relationship between the well-matched, great orators of the past themselves is at stake, though here μίμησις also occurs now and then.

The following examples should be sufficient to illustrate that the term μίμησις preponderantly denotes the vertical connection between models of the past and imitators of the present. In a passage from *On Lysias*, Dionysius stimulates his readers to imitate Lysias to enhance their skills in the narration of facts:

⁸⁴ Cf. section 2.2.1. More on this definition in section 3.3.1.

⁸⁵ Whitmarsh (2013) pays attention to the language of activeness and passiveness in Dionysius' mimetic theory, as we have seen in section 2.2.1.

⁸⁶ For Dionysius' ideas on ζῆλος, see section 2.2.5.

Πᾶσί τε καὶ παντὸς μάλιστα τοῦτο παρεκελευσάμην ἀσκεῖν τὸ μέρος ἐν τοῖς Λυσίου παραδείγμασι ποιουμένων τὰς γυμνασίας. Κράτιστα γὰρ <ἂν> ἀποδείξαιτο ταύτην τὴν ιδέαν ὁ μάλιστα τοῦτον τὸν ἄνδρα μιμησάμενος.⁸⁷

I should advice all students to practice this part of the speech [i.e. the narration of facts, M.S.] above all in their training from Lysianic examples; for the one who imitates this orator most closely will make the best showing in this kind of oratory.

Here, the term μίμησις also highlights Dionysius' insistence on mimetic technique. In the same treatise, Lysias' composition should be exemplary for a student in rhetoric, who should become a μιμητής:

Τὴν ἀλήθειαν οὖν τις ἐπιτηδεύων καὶ φύσεως μιμητὴς γίνεσθαι βουλόμενος οὐκ ἂν ἀμαρτάνοι τῇ Λυσίου συνθέσει χρώμενος· ἑτέραν γὰρ οὐκ ἂν εὗροι ταύτης ἀληθεστέραν.⁸⁸

Therefore the student of realism and naturalism would not go wrong if he were to follow Lysias in his composition, for he will find no model who is more true to life.

There are more passages in which μίμησις is the proper term to designate the more distant relationship between model of the past and imitator of the present. As we have seen in the previous section, Dionysius, for instance, encourages students of political oratory to 'imitate' (μιμεῖσθαι) some specific literary virtues of Thucydides in his treatise *On Thucydides*.⁸⁹ In *On Imitation*, he argues that it is recommendable to 'imitate' (μιμεῖσθαι) all poets other than Homer as far as they exhibit stylistic excellence (2.1), and he enjoins his readers 'also to imitate Aristotle' (παραληπτέον δὲ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλην εἰς μίμησιν) for different stylistic qualities (4.3). *On Isocrates* 4.4 contains an incentive to 'imitate' (μιμεῖσθαι) the principles of Isocrates, and in *On Thucydides* 25.2, Dionysius declares that the aim of writing this treatise is to assist those who want to 'imitate' (μιμεῖσθαι) Thucydides. Thus, μίμησις tends to refer to the efforts of students who would like to achieve the technical level of the classical Greek literary masters.

⁸⁷ Dion. Hal. *Lys.* 18.5-6.

⁸⁸ Dion. Hal. *Lys.* 8.7.

⁸⁹ Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 55.2.

Only in a minority of cases is the term μίμησις applied with respect to the rather equal, imitative relationship between orators of the past. Demosthenes, for instance, is said to have been imitating the enthymemes of Thucydides (*Pomp.* 3.20) and, in general, all best stylistic aspects of his forerunners (*Din.* 6.4). Philistus is considered both an imitator and emulator of Thucydides in some respects (*Imit.* 3.6), and Isocrates an imitator of Lysias (*Lys.* 2.2). Probably the focus in these cases is on matters of technique.

An explanation for this remarkable distribution of μίμησις may be that the term by definition is confined to denote more distant, unequal imitative connections which are based on the transfer of merely technical skill, whereas ζῆλος is more flexible: it can imply both (rather) equal literary combat and the strong mental aspiration that, in the end, will allow for such an equal combat. Let us now take a closer look at Dionysius' understanding of ζῆλος.

2.2.5 ΖΗΛΟΣ

As we have seen, the meaning of ζῆλος is sometimes difficult to distinguish from that of μίμησις. In section 2.2.3, I discussed the conjunct occurrence of μίμησις and ζῆλος in different passages, and suggested that both terms highlight different aspects of the complex of imitation and emulation. I tried to make plausible that ζῆλος (as opposed to μίμησις) is likely to concern the aspiring engagement with and mental perception and interpretation of models, which is aimed at (the obtainment of) wonder. In this section, we will see that when ζῆλος is used on its own, it refers to the complex of imitation (μίμησις and ζῆλος together), but highlights the mental aspect of it – i.e. aspiration and zealous competition. The following connotations are often evoked by the notion of ζῆλος: 1) (the zealous aspiration that possibly leads to) equality of the relationship between model and imitator, 2) literary-critical jealousy and 3) zeal for what should *not* be imitated.

In the previous section, I already touched upon the fact that the term ζῆλος, unlike μίμησις, frequently turns up in passages concerning a competition between great literary masters of the past who are more or less tied in skill. For instance, in Dionysius' essay *On Demosthenes*, we read that Aeschines, who is inferior to Demosthenes regarding the composition of his works, still tried to emulate his long time rival Demosthenes:

Περὶ δὲ τῆς συνθέσεως τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐδὲν οὔτε μείζον <οὔτ' ἔλαττον εὖρεν αἰσχύνην> ἢ καταγέλωτα φέρων. Καὶ οὐχὶ τοῦτό πω θαυμάζειν <ἄξιον>, ἀλλ' ὅτι καὶ μαρτυρῶν πολλαχῇ τὴν ἀρετὴν τῷ ῥήτορι κατάδηλός ἐστι καὶ ζηλῶν.⁹⁰

But regarding his composition Aeschines is unable to bring any charges, great or small, or any that might expose Demosthenes to censure or to ridicule. Even this is not altogether surprising; what is remarkable is that in many passages he plainly acknowledges Demosthenes' ability in this respect and tries to emulate him.

Here, ζῆλος implies a specific, qualitative difference between model and imitator, which the imitator, who himself is 'a man with a brilliant natural talent for speaking' (ἀνὴρ λαμπροτάτη φύσει περὶ λόγους χρησάμενος, *Dem.* 35.3), should pertinaciously try to overcome. Moreover, ζῆλος also bears a negative connotation here, as it hints at the notorious political and private enmity between Demosthenes and Aeschines.⁹¹

In Dionysius' treatise *On Thucydides*, the difference between model and imitator is not so much qualitative as generic: the greatest of all orators, Demosthenes, is said to have been an emulator not only of Thucydides, but of all who excelled in their own field:⁹²

Ῥητόρων δὲ Δημοσθένης μόνος, ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσοι μέγα τι καὶ λαμπρὸν ἔδοξαν ποιεῖν ἐν λόγοις, οὕτω καὶ Θουκυδίδου ζηλωτὴς ἐγένετο κατὰ πολλὰ [...].⁹³

⁹⁰ Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 35.5 (additions by Aujac).

⁹¹ For the rivalry between Demosthenes and Aeschines, see e.g. Buckler (2000), 114-158.

⁹² On Demosthenes' eclectic emulation of all outstanding authors, cf. also Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 8.2: τοιαύτην δὲ καταλαβὼν τὴν πολιτικὴν λέξιν ὁ Δημοσθένης οὕτω κεκνημένην ποικίλως, καὶ τηλικούτοις ἐπεισελθὼν ἀνδράσιν ἐνὸς μὲν οὐθενὸς ἠξίωσε γενέσθαι ζηλωτὴς οὔτε χαρακτηρὸς οὔτε ἀνδρός, ἡμιέργους τινὰς ἅπαντας οἰόμενος εἶναι καὶ ἀτελεῖς, ἐξ ἁπάντων δ' αὐτῶν ὅσα κράτιστα καὶ χρησιμώτατα ἦν ἐκλεγόμενος ('thus political oratory had gone through a variety of changes when Demosthenes came on the scene. He found himself following in the footsteps of some illustrious men, but refused to make any single orator or any single style his model, for he considered everyone to be incomplete and imperfect. Instead he selected the best and most useful elements from all of them'); *Dem.* 33.3: τοῦτον δὲ ἐνὸς μὲν οὐδενὸς ἀποφηνάμενος οὔτε χαρακτηρὸς οὔτ' ἀνδρὸς ζηλωτὴν γενέσθαι, ἐξ ἁπάντων δὲ τὰ κράτιστα ἐκλεξάμενον κοινὴν καὶ φιλόανθρωπον τὴν ἐρμηνείαν κατεσκευακέναι <καὶ> κατὰ τοῦτο μάλιστα διαφέρειν τῶν ἄλλων ('I showed that he [i.e. Demosthenes, M.S.] pretended to no single style and imitated no single orator, but by selecting the best qualities from all of them developed a style with a universal appeal, which is what chiefly distinguishes him from all other writers').

⁹³ Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 53.1. Demosthenes also deviated from Thucydides: see Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 10.4.

Demosthenes, alone among the orators, just as he emulated all who seemed to him to have achieved greatness and distinction in their field, emulated Thucydides in many ways [...].

More examples include some passages in the *Letter to Pompeius*, where we read that Plato ‘had been vying with the people in the circle of Gorgias’ (ζηλώσας τοὺς περὶ Γοργίαν, 2.2), that Herodotus was an ‘emulator of Homer’ (Ὁμήρου ζηλωτής, 3.11) and Xenophon an ‘emulator of Herodotus’ (Ἡροδότου ζηλωτής, 4.1; cf. 4.2. and *Imit.* 3.4). In his treatise *On Isaeus*, Dionysius presents Isaeus as ‘being an emulator of Lysias’ (Λυσίου [...] ζηλωτὴν ὄντα, 20.5).

Apparently, imitation within the classical Greek Period itself is characterised by ζῆλος rather than μίμησις. In this respect, ζῆλος implies a combat between geniuses who stand out in different aspects of rhetoric or in different literary genres, and who are willing to recognize and benefit from each other’s specific superiority. In the case of Demosthenes and Aeschines, however, this combat is grim in nature.

Dionysius also applies the notion of ζῆλος to designate the imitative relationship between classical Greek models and imitators of the present. The epitome of *On Imitation* provides many examples of recommended ζῆλος within a didactic context.⁹⁴ It is noteworthy that this kind of ζῆλος does not apply to minor authors who can easily be emulated; instead, those ‘emulatable’ are authors like Homer (2.1), Pindar (2.5), Isocrates (5.2), Lycurgus (5.3) and Hyperides (5.6).

We can also infer from other treatises that ζῆλος is certainly not confined to those imitative situations in which model and imitator are contemporaneous and rather evenly matched. Thus, in these cases, the notion of ζῆλος does not indicate a battle between compeers, but instead one between masters and students. That it is almost a foregone conclusion who will win, is not important; what apparently counts, is that such an honourable confrontation inspires the young men to measure up against the experienced literator. In this sense, ζῆλος has to do with mental aspiration rather than with serious combat and actual emulation. This is how the following two passages could be explained:

⁹⁴ Cf. Cizek (1994), 19, who observes with respect to Dionysius’ interpretation of the notion of ζῆλος: ‘Der Übergang von der Übung zum selbständigen Schaffen wird hier impliziert’.

[...] ὅ τι δ' ἂν (ὅμοιον) τῷ κατεσκευασμένῳ καὶ ἐντέχνῳ, ζήλου καὶ σπουδῆς ἐπιτήδειον τυγχάνειν οἶομαι.⁹⁵

[...] only that [prose style, M.S.] which resembles the artistic and skilful kind I regard as fit for serious emulation.

Ταῦτα μὲν δὴ καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια τούτοις καλὰ καὶ ζήλου ἄξια ἡγοῦμαι.⁹⁶

These and similar passages I consider beautiful and worthy of emulation.

In the latter passage, there may well have been an important trigger for Dionysius to use the term ζήλος, for the exemplary passages mentioned here are said to be ‘beautiful’ (καλά). There is a structural and close connection between ζήλος and beauty in Dionysius’ thinking – to which also his definition of ζήλος testifies.

In addition to this use of ζήλος for equal as well as unequal imitative connections, Dionysius often applies the term to refer to a perverse literary-critical attitude. He uses ζήλος to designate the behaviour of those people who, for instance, criticise literary masters out of jealousy:

[...] ἀλλὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσοις πολὺ τὸ φιλαίτιον ἔνεστιν <εἴ τε κατὰ τὸν ζήλον> τῶν ἀρχαίων γινόμενον εἴ τε κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροψίαν τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἡλικίας εἴ τε κατ' ἀμφοτέρω ταῦτα τὰ πάθη κοινὰ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ὄντα φύσεως.⁹⁷

[...] but on account of all those others who take great delight in finding fault, whether because they envy the writers of old or because they despise their own contemporaries, or for both these reasons, which are common human failings.

In his *Letter to Pompeius*, Dionysius reproaches Plato for his ‘envious stance’ (ζηλοτυπία) towards Homer, just as Longinus compares Plato’s attitude towards Homer with the overconfidence of a ‘young antagonist’ (ἀνταγωνιστὴς νέος) who duels with ‘someone whose reputation has already been established’ (ἤδη τεθνασμένον):⁹⁸

⁹⁵ Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 26.7.

⁹⁶ Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 48.2.

⁹⁷ Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 2.1.

⁹⁸ Longin. *Subl.* 13.4: καὶ οὐδ' ἂν ἐπακμάσαι μοι δοκεῖ τηλικαῦτά τινα τοῖς τῆς φιλοσοφίας δόγμασι καὶ εἰς ποιητικὰς ὕλας πολλαχοῦ συνεμβῆναι καὶ φράσεις, εἰ μὴ περὶ πρωτείων νῆ Δία παντὶ θυμῷ πρὸς Ὅμηρον,

[...] ἦν γάρ, ἦν ἐν τῇ Πλάτωνος φύσει, πολλὰς ἀρετὰς ἐχούσῃ, τὸ φιλότιμον. Ἐδήλωσε δὲ τοῦτο μάλιστα διὰ τῆς πρὸς Ὅμηρον ζηλοτυπίας, ὃν ἐκ τῆς κατασκευαζομένης ὑπ' αὐτοῦ πολιτείας ἐκβάλλει [...].⁹⁹

For there was indeed in Plato's nature, for all its virtues, a measure of jealousy. He showed this especially in his envious stance towards Homer, whom he expels from his imaginary commonwealth [...].

The entire first chapter of the *Letter to Pompeius* deals with the contrast between fair, respectful criticism and envious attacks. Apparently, the healthy mental aspiration which is often referred to by the term ζῆλος can also easily turn into its opposite, and induce craze, envy as well as blunt and unfair judgements.

In some passages, ζῆλος does not evoke jealousy, but a silly appreciation for what should evidently be avoided. In *On the Ancient Orators*, Dionysius' criticism is aimed at those people who have a 'craze' (ζῆλος) for a silly rhetorical style (which, fortunately, will not last long):

Καὶ οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι, τηλικαύτης μεταβολῆς ἐν τούτῳ τῷ βραχεῖ χρόνῳ γεγεννημένης, εἰ μηκέτι χωρήσει προσωτέρῳ μιᾶς γενεᾶς ὁ ζῆλος ἐκεῖνος τῶν ἀνοήτων λόγων· τὸ γὰρ ἐκ παντὸς εἰς ἐλάχιστον συναχθὲν ῥάδιον ἐξ ὀλίγου μηδὲ εἶναι.¹⁰⁰

And since this great revolution has taken place in so short a time, I should not be surprised if that craze for a silly style of oratory fails to survive another single generation; for what has been reduced from omnipotence to insignificance can soon easily be wiped out altogether.

The treatise *On Demosthenes* provides two other striking examples of wrongly oriented ζῆλος. The first pillories Isocrates for having emulated the immature figures of Gorgias:

ὥς ἀνταγωνιστὴς νέος πρὸς ἤδη τεθουμασμένον ('so many of these qualities would never have flourished among Plato's philosophic tenets, nor would he have entered so often into the subjects and language of poetry, had he not striven, with heart and soul, to contest the prize with Homer, like a young antagonist with someone whose reputation has already been established').

⁹⁹ Dion. Hal. *Pomp.* 1.13.

¹⁰⁰ Dion. Hal. *Orat. Vett.* 3.3.

Ἀμαρτάνει δὲ ἐν οἷς ὠραΐζεται ποτε, τοὺς Γοργίου νεαροὺς σχηματισμοὺς ζηλοῦσα [...].¹⁰¹

And sometimes the style fails when it makes a display, trying to emulate the immature figures of Gorgias.

The second contains a rhetorical question, in which ζῆλος pertains to something that nobody who is endowed with common sense would ever pursue:

[...] (τίς γὰρ ἂν γένοιτο πικρᾶς καὶ περιέργου ζῆλος ὀνομασίας;) [...].¹⁰²

[...] for surely nobody would want to emulate a harsh and laboured vocabulary?

The fact that astute judgement is a *conditio sine qua non* for sound ζῆλος, is also clear from a passage from *On Thucydides* 55.3 (already discussed in section 2.2.3), which contains the warning not to emulate Thucydides' literary specimens indiscriminately.

Apparently, for Dionysius, ζῆλος is more prone to a negative connotation, or more apt for negative contexts, than μίμησις.¹⁰³ Let us now see how Quintilian conceives of the terms *imitatio* and *aemulatio*.

2.3 QUINTILIAN'S USE OF MIMETIC TERMINOLOGY

Quintilian treats the subject of imitation systematically in *Institutio* 10.2 (see section 4.3), but the entirety of this work is imbued with (often very brief) references to imitation. Especially the reading lists of Greek and Latin literature, to be found in 10.1, testify to Quintilian's belief in the indispensability of literary models, and underscore the importance of imitation (*imitatio*) and emulation (*aemulatio*) of these models. It is striking that Quintilian does not allow for much ambiguity concerning the meaning of the concepts of *imitatio* and *aemulatio*:

¹⁰¹ Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 4.4.

¹⁰² Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 35.6.

¹⁰³ Note, however, that in the preceding sentence the verb 'imitate' (μιμεῖσθαι) also applies to 'compositional specimens' (κατασκευαί) which should be avoided. Thus, the notion of μίμησις is also incidentally connected with negative objects of imitation.

in several passages he differentiates more clearly between them than Dionysius does between μίμησις and ζῆλος.¹⁰⁴

The present section is intended to shed light on Quintilian's use of mimetic idiom, and as such offers the preliminary terminological tools for the discussion in chapter 4, which is devoted to Quintilian's reading lists of Greek and Latin literature, and tries to explain how the critical judgements he passes there – though highly indebted to Dionysius' – reflect an imitative approach and use of (classical Greek) literature which is strongly coloured by his own rhetorical agenda. Quintilian's understanding and use of the concepts of *imitatio* (2.3.1) and *aemulatio* (2.3.2) will now be discussed successively.

2.3.1 *IMITATIO*

What does *imitatio* mean to Quintilian, what connotations does the term bear and in what ways is it attested? In the *Institutio*, *imitatio* does not only cover the imitation of (the stylistic characteristics of) one author by another; also the representation of reality or real life-phenomena (for example, the cosmos, human character traits, behaviour, ways of speaking, emotions) – either within or outside literature – can be the object of *imitatio*.¹⁰⁵ The focus of this section is on *imitatio* in an intertextual sense.

Immediately after presenting his reading lists of Greek and Latin literature (10.1), Quintilian opens the second chapter of book 10 by observing that imitation of the authors recommended involves the movement of the soul towards 'the model of all virtues' (*exemplum virtutum omnium*):

¹⁰⁴ Therefore, the structure of this section differs from the previous section dedicated to Dionysius' ideas on imitation.

¹⁰⁵ For the literary imitation of reality, see e.g. Quint. 5.12.22: *igitur et ille quem instituimus adulescens quam maxime potest componat se ad imitationem veritatis* ('so let the young man whom we are educating prepare himself, as far as he can, to imitate real life'). For imitation of the cosmic order by the lyre, see 1.10.12: *mundum ipsum ratione esse compositum, quam postea sit lyra imitata* ('that the world itself was constructed on the principle which the lyre later imitated'). For imitation of emotions, see e.g. 6.2.26: *nam et luctus et irae et indignationis aliquando etiam ridicula fuerit imitatio* ('the mere imitation of grief or anger or indignation may in fact sometimes be ridiculous'). Cf. also 11.3.61-62, 11.3.156. For the imitation of character and behaviour, see e.g. 9.1.30: *morum ac vitae imitatio* ('representation of character and life'). Cf. also 9.1.45; 9.2.58. For the imitation of a way of speaking, see e.g. 11.3.165: *mollior nonnumquam cum reprehensione diversae partis imitatio* ('a more effeminate manner may sometimes be right for the critical portrayal of an adversary').

*Ex his ceterisque lectione dignis auctoribus et verborum sumenda copia est et varietas figurarum et componendi ratio, tum ad exemplum virtutum omnium mens derigenda.*¹⁰⁶

It is from these and other authors worth reading that our stock of words must be drawn, as well as the variety of our figures, and our system of composition, and our mind must be guided towards the model of all virtues.

Whereas Dionysius applies the language of mental movement to describe the stage of ζῆλος, Quintilian connects it with *imitatio*.¹⁰⁷ This, I think, is not a deliberate transposition; it is more likely that Quintilian draws from a similar discourse of imitation. It is also possible that he, at the beginning of the chapter, refers to a general concept of imitation and emulation together by mentioning only the term *imitatio*. However, this would be quite exceptional, for Quintilian tends to make a clear distinction between *imitatio* and *aemulatio*.

The following survey concentrates on Quintilian's use of the notion of *imitatio*. It will be argued that *imitatio* 1) designates the faithful, artificial repetition of a model's features, and 2) often occurs in passages in which the substantial inequality of the relationship between model and imitator – the latter often operating in a didactic context – is salient.

Imitatio, we learn, is an important component of technical skill, and comprises the compliance (cf. the verb *sequi*) with fundamental rules:

*Neque enim dubitari potest quin artis pars magna contineatur imitatione. [...] Sic litterarum ductus, ut scribendi fiat usus, pueri secuntur, sic musici vocem docentium, pictores opera priorum, rustici probatam experimento culturam in exemplum intuentur, omnis denique disciplinae initia ad propositum sibi praescriptum formari videmus.*¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶ Quint. 10.2.1. Cf. Quint. 1.8.5, which is about the very start of reading literature (cf. *lectio inciperet*): *et sublimitate heroi carminis animus adsurgat et ex magnitudine rerum spiritum ducat et optimis inbuatur* ('and let the mind be uplifted by the sublimity of the heroic poems, and inspired and filled with the highest principles by the greatness of their theme').

¹⁰⁷ In 10.2.5, where Quintilian probably discusses and justifies *aemulatio*, the language of mental activity returns: *an illi rudes sola mentis natura ducti sunt in hoc, ut tam multa generarent: nos ad quaerendum non eo ipso concitemur, quod certe scimus invenisse eos qui quaesierunt?* ('if those primitives were led by the sheer nature of their spirit to create so many things, are we not to be stimulated in our search if only because we know for sure that they who sought, found?').

¹⁰⁸ Quint. 10.2.1-2.

It cannot be doubted that a large part of art consists of imitation. [...] Children follow the outlines of letters so as to become accustomed to writing; singers find their model in their teacher's voice, painters in the works of their predecessors, and farmers in methods of cultivation which have been tested by experience. In a word, we see the rudiments of every branch of learning shaped by standards prescribed for it.

Apparently, Quintilian uses the term *imitatio* to refer to an artificial approach of models, which themselves give shape (cf. *formare*) to all kinds of results of imitative practice. He categorises *imitatio* explicitly as *ars*:

*Facultas orandi consummatur natura arte exercitatione, cui partem quartam adiciunt quidam imitationis, quam nos arti subicimus.*¹⁰⁹

The faculty of speech is brought to perfection by nature, art, and practice; some add a fourth factor, imitation, but I include this under art.

Quintilian often applies the notion of *imitatio* with respect to didactic situations, arguing that the life of young boys should be devoted to the imitation of the language of their nanny (1.1.5), teacher (2.3.1, 2.4.12) and fellow pupils (1.2.29, 2.3.10). Thus, *imitatio* has to do with the meticulous and artful repetition of all kinds of approved language in which children are immersed. Its quintessential principle seems to be 'uniformity' or 'likeness' (*similitudo*) to the model, which, however, proves to be infeasible:

*Adde quod plerumque facilius est plus facere quam idem: tantam enim difficultatem habet similitudo ut ne ipsa quidem natura in hoc ita evaluerit, ut non res quae simillimae quaeque pares maxime videantur utique discrimine aliquo discernantur.*¹¹⁰

Furthermore, it is generally easier to improve on something than simply to repeat it. Total similarity is so difficult to achieve that even nature has failed to prevent things which seem to match and resemble each other most closely from being always distinguishable in *some* respect.

By inference, where *imitatio* or 'doing the same' (*idem facere*) runs up against its limits, *aemulatio* (cf. *plus facere*), which is considered easier, should take over.

¹⁰⁹ Quint. 3.5.1.

¹¹⁰ Quint. 10.2.10.

As Quintilian conceives of *imitatio* as an activity of artistic skill, so does Dionysius conceive of μίμησις as an activity of ‘moulding the model’. Yet, there is a manifest difference between their views. As I hope to have made clear, Dionysius’ idea of ‘moulding the model’ is far away from the mantra of ‘doing the same’ (*idem facere*) or ‘being formed’ (*formari*) by the model; instead, it refers to giving expression to the model by using a personal and original style. Hence, Dionysius’ conception of μίμησις is less mechanical and, one could safely say, more autarkic and positive than Quintilian’s understanding of *imitatio*, which merely involves an instructive copying.¹¹¹

This being said, it may seem puzzling that the term *imitatio* in Quintilian can also imply that the imitator attains not only the model’s technical level, but also his power in speech. For example, when Quintilian reports that Calvus was an ‘imitator of the Attic orators’ (*imitator Atticorum*, 10.1.115), and that Cicero ‘devoted himself to the imitation of the Greeks’ (*ad imitationem Graecorum contulisset*, 10.1.108), it is obvious that their imitation was not just built on artificial pillars, since both Calvus and Cicero are praised for their stylistic force (*vehementia*) (10.1.110, 115). This force in speech is overtly separated by Quintilian from the realm of *imitatio*:

[...] *et cum iis felicissime cessit imitatio, verbis atque numeris sunt non multum differentes, vim dicendi atque inventionis non adsecuntur [...]*.¹¹²

Even when their imitation is most successful, though they may not be very different from the model in vocabulary or rhythm, they do not attain its power of speech or invention [...].

It follows that force belongs to *aemulatio*.¹¹³ Hence, when Quintilian refers to great authors as ‘imitators’, the idea of *aemulatio* resonates with the term *imitatio*.¹¹⁴

Another passage in Quintilian also shows us that force in speech cannot be the result of *imitatio*. Discussing the need of making additions to what has been written before,

¹¹¹ Note that Quintilian’s understanding of *imitatio* is very close to one of the two kinds of μίμησις discerned by Dionysius: artificial μίμησις.

¹¹² Quint. 10.2.16.

¹¹³ Pliny, however, links ‘force’ with *imitatio*. More on this in section 5.5.

¹¹⁴ In the *Institutio*, there are more examples of great authors who are said to have been imitators. See e.g. 8.3.20 (Horace ‘imitated’ (*imitatus est*) an expression of Vergil); 8.6.72 (Cicero ‘imitated’ (*imitatus*) an expression of Pindar).

Quintilian argues that ‘all imitation is artificial’ (*omnis imitatio ficta est*), whereas the literary models themselves have their own ‘nature and real force’ (*natura et vera vis*) (which, of course, should also be characteristic of every new composition):

*Namque iis quae in exemplum adsumimus subest natura et vera vis, contra omnis imitatio ficta est et ad alienum propositum commodatur.*¹¹⁵

[...] the models we choose have their own nature and real force, whereas all imitation is artificial and adapted to another’s purpose.¹¹⁶

This passage reminds us of the distinction that Dionysius makes between artificial and natural imitation.¹¹⁷ There is, however, a crucial difference. Whereas Dionysius regards artificial and natural imitation as two subcategories or aspects of μίμησις, Quintilian radically removes the virtues of ‘nature and real force’ (*natura et vera vis*) from what can be counted among and captured by *imitatio*. Hence, he suggests a connection between these virtues and the concept of *aemulatio*, which in this passage is referred to by the verbs ‘add’ (*adicere*, 10.2.9), ‘compete’ (*contendere*, 10.2.9) and ‘improve’ (*plus facere*, 10.2.10).

Finally, that a forceful style can hardly be seen as the fruit of *imitatio*, is also demonstrated by Quintilian’s claim that the second-rank historian Philistus was an ‘imitator of Thucydides’ (*imitator Thucydidi*), but did not achieve his force – he was ‘much weaker’ (*multo infirmior*).¹¹⁸ When stylistic force by inference has to do with *aemulatio*, what else belongs to the realm of *aemulatio*?

2.3.2 AEMULATIO

Let us start with the remarkable observation that the term *aemulatio* (and derivatives) is, despite Quintilian’s insistence on competition, much less frequently attested than *imitatio* throughout the whole *Institutio*: only 17 times (versus 97 times *imitatio* and derivatives). In this section, it is posited that the intended audience of the work explains not only the relative underrepresentation of the notion of *aemulatio*, but also the rather clear distinction between

¹¹⁵ Quint. 10.2.11.

¹¹⁶ As Peterson (1891), *ad loc.* observes, *alienum propositum* means: the purpose of the imitator, not of the author of the original.

¹¹⁷ See section 2.2.2.

¹¹⁸ Quint. 10.1.74.

imitatio and *aemulatio*. Furthermore, this section argues that *aemulatio* comprises 1) the victory-oriented battle with models, and 2) the crucial addition of something personal and new to what already exists.

As we have already seen, *imitatio* is a notion often applied to denote the practice of artificial repetition of models in divergent didactic contexts. Schoolboys, as well as novices in rhetoric who are concerned with the acquisition of technical skill, dedicate themselves to what Quintilian names *imitatio*: the creation of likeness. Their teachers, but of course also these students themselves, form the intended readership of Quintilian's *Institutio*, which is devoted to the orator's education from cradle to law court. This explains Quintilian's striking attention to matters of imitative skill.

Whereas Quintilian is of the opinion that *imitatio* merely belongs to (different types of) students or to orators specifically interested in matters of technique, he considers mature orators, who fall largely outside his scope, to be concerned with *aemulatio*:

*Namque et consummati iam patroni veteribus aemulantur et eos iuvenum ad optima tendentium imitatur ac sequitur industria.*¹¹⁹

The mature advocates rival the ancients, and the efforts of the promising and aspiring young imitate and follow them.

A similar statement can be found in the first book:

*Sed sicut firmiores in litteris profectus alit aemulatio, ita incipientibus atque adhuc teneris condiscipulorum quam praeceptoris iucundior hoc ipso quod facilius imitatio est.*¹²⁰

But, while rivalry nurtures literary progress when it is more firmly established, beginners and the very young find imitation of their fellow pupils more agreeable than imitation of their masters, because it is easier.

That the reading lists of Greek and Latin literature are still imbued with a strong sense of competition, and that the *idea*, not the actual occurrence of the term *aemulatio* is crucial there,

¹¹⁹ Quint. 10.1.122.

¹²⁰ Quint. 1.2.26. Cf. 1.2.29: *utile igitur habere quos imitari primum, mox vincere velis* ('it is useful to have people whom you would like first to imitate and soon to surpass').

is not so much because Quintilian incites his students to emulate (*aemulari*) the models recommended; rather, he describes the connection between consummate Greeks and Romans in terms of emulation.

In the *Institutio*, there are many examples of experienced orators who are motivated by *aemulatio*; for instance, Gorgias was an ‘emulator’ (*aemulus*) of Corax and Tisias (3.1.9), Athenaeus ‘seems to have been an emulator’ (*aemulus videtur fuisse*) of Hermagoras (3.1.16), Stesichorus could have rivalled (*aemulari*) Homer if he had controlled himself (10.1.62), Cicero was an emulator of Plato (10.1.123) and Hortensius of Cicero (11.3.8).

This connection between *aemulatio* and rhetorical maturity is rather in line with Dionysius’ tendency to use the term ζῆλος for the horizontal imitative relationship between classical masters themselves. However, as we have seen, Dionysius also does not hesitate to urge his students to be motivated by ζῆλος, which, to his taste, can likewise be a *road* towards the acquisition of mature literary mastery. This explains why Dionysius can recommend ζῆλος with respect to Homer (*Imit.* 2.1), whereas Quintilian poses that ‘it takes a great mind, I will not say to rival, for that is impossible, but to follow his [i.e. Homer’s, M.S.] virtues’ (*ut magni sit viri virtutes eius non aemulatione, quod fieri non potest, sed intellectu sequi*).¹²¹

Aemulatio is quite a loaded term in Quintilian, and occurs only once in a deprecatory context.¹²² The term *aemulatio* is not defined by Quintilian. However, is it obvious that he does give a description of *aemulatio* (cf. the verb *superasse*) as opposed (cf. *vero*) to *imitatio* in the last paragraphs of 10.2. Here, he conceives of *aemulatio* in terms of ‘add’ (*adicere*), ‘supply’ (*supplere*) and ‘prune’ (*circumcidere*):

*Haec si perviderimus, tum vere imitabimur. Qui vero etiam propria his bona adiecerit, ut suppleat quae deerant, circumcidat si quid redundabit, is erit quem quaerimus perfectus orator: quem nunc consummari potissimum oporteat, cum tanto plura exempla bene dicendi supersunt quam illis qui adhuc summi sunt contigerunt. Nam erit haec quoque laus eorum, ut priores superasse, posteros docuisse dicantur.*¹²³

¹²¹ Quint. 10.1.50.

¹²² Quint. 10.2.17: *[qui] praecisis conclusionibus obscuri Sallustium atque Thucydiden superant; tristes ac ieiuni Pollionem aemulantur* (‘writers whose amputated sentences make them obscure are going one better than Sallust or Thucydides; the dreary and jejune are rivals of Pollio’).

¹²³ Quint. 10.2.27-28.

If we thoroughly grasp all this [e.g. the propriety with which the great men handle circumstances and persons, their strategy, their arrangement, the way in which is everything is aimed at victory, M.S.], we shall be ‘imitators’ in the true sense of the word. But it is the man who also adds his own good qualities to these, making good the deficiencies and cutting out any superfluities, who will be the perfect orator we are seeking; and it would be particularly appropriate that he should come to perfection in our time, when there are so many models of good oratory to be found than were available to those who were the greatest masters in the past. These masters will acquire another glory too: that of being said to have surpassed their predecessors and taught their successors.

This passage reveals that for Quintilian, *aemulatio* is the crucial completion of *imitatio* in the second stage of an orator’s career; it involves the addition of one’s ‘own good qualities’ (*propria bona*) to a perspicuous understanding of things of rather technical nature, which belong to the field of *imitatio*. Moreover, the passage makes clear that *aemulatio* concerns a winnable battle with the excellent Greek and Latin models of the past, and that it is the actual victory rather than the battle itself which is his concern. Quintilian’s conceptualisation of *aemulatio* as a battle is in line with his insistence on literary force, which can only be achieved by *aemulatio*.

Earlier in the same chapter, there is a similar distinction between *imitatio* and a connected concept, which is easily recognizable as *aemulatio*. Quintilian notices, as we have seen, that ‘nothing does grow by imitation alone’ (*nihil [...] crescit sola imitatione*), and argues that ‘imitation on its own is not sufficient’ (*imitatio per se ipsa non sufficit*). In short, there is something complementary.¹²⁴ What Quintilian means by this, is to ‘discover something new which did not exist before’ (*reperiri aliquid [...] quod ante non fuerit*, 10.2.5), to ‘dig out other things’ (*eruendas alias*, 10.2.6), to ‘add to previous achievements’ (*prioribus adicere*, 10.2.9), to ‘compete’ (*contendere*, 10.2.9), and to ‘improve’ (*plus facere*, 10.2.10).¹²⁵

The term *aemulatio* is often used in the case of strongly competitive situations, in which the combatants are well matched, or at each other’s heels. Already in the educational setting of a school, young boys, who are devoted to *imitatio*, should develop a keen sense for

¹²⁴ Quint. 10.2.8, 4.

¹²⁵ As Peterson (1891), *ad loc.* observes, Quintilian follows Cicero in his figurative use of *eruendas*; cf. Cic. *De Or.* 2.146.

aemulatio ‘when they compete with each other by asking one another all sorts of little questions’ (*cum positis invicem cuiusque generis quaestiunculis aemulantur*).¹²⁶

Metaphors derived from the battefield, gladiator fights, running races and other competitive situations abound in the *Institutio*, and can appear either with or without references to the concept of *aemulatio*. Metaphors of strife in Quintilian’s Greek and Latin canons will be examined in sections 4.9.3 and 4.9.6. Especially in the Latin reading list, in which the trial of strength with Greece plays a central role, there is a great density of metaphors of strife. However, Quintilian also draws up the Greeks in order of battle. For instance, he presents Stesichorus, who is an *aemulus* of Homer, as involved in a running race with this unrivalled master of epic poetry:

[...] *si tenuisset modum videtur aemulari proximus Homerum potuisse* [...].¹²⁷

[...] and, if he [i.e. Stesichorus, M.S.] had exercised restraint, he might have been Homer’s nearest rival [...].

In general, we can say that whereas *imitatio* aims at likeness to the model and relates to the repetition of things already invented by others, *aemulatio* is a polarising term, based on the idea of *difference* with the model, and concerned with things to be invented by ourselves. For Quintilian, the notions, however contrasting, complement each other; for we can only really surpass our models when we have come as close as possible.

2.4 CONCLUSION

There is an evident and complementary connection between imitation and emulation for Dionysius and Quintilian, but they conceive of this connection in different ways. For Dionysius, μίμησις and ζῆλος go hand in hand during the process of imitation in whatever stage of the orator’s career. When used separately, μίμησις and ζῆλος refer to the complex of imitation and emulation together (in other words: they imply their missing partner). For Quintilian, *imitatio* and *aemulatio* are not co-existing, but successive and often easily distinguishable stages, covering different periods of the orator’s life.

As it comes to the valuation of μίμησις and *imitatio*, Dionysius and Quintilian share the idea that these notions pertain to a technical-creative device, suited for imitative

¹²⁶ Quint. 1.3.11.

¹²⁷ Quint. 10.1.62.

relationships in which model and imitator are not evenly matched. However, Dionysius and Quintilian also differ substantially. The former is of the opinion that μίμησις involves an original re-expression of the model; the latter, by contrast, frames *imitatio* in pejorative terms of basic repetition and copying for merely didactic purposes. In short, Dionysius thinks μίμησις and ζῆλος are complementary and essentially of equal value, while Quintilian pictures *imitatio* and *aemulatio* as complementary, but unequal in value.

To Dionysius, ζῆλος is defined as an activity of the soul in response to the contemplation of beauty. The term is often connotated with mental perception, interpretation and wonder, and implies an aspiring imitative approach of former literature. The notion of ζῆλος is frequently used in the case of ancient orators who are evenly matched, or, less often, in the case of students who may well eventually attain the level of their models. It is also striking that ζῆλος tends to appear in passages concerning literary-critical jealousy, overconfidence or zeal for what should *not* be the object of imitative production.

As for Quintilian, *aemulatio* consists of the highly recommended rivalry with the model. It is a pregnant, loaded term, which is intrinsically associated with the idea of changing, completing and surpassing the model by means of one's own *propria bona*. *Aemulatio*, which demands originality, can easily be distinguished from *imitatio*, which is more passive and servile in character (it is a process of 'being formed' (*formari*)). In Quintilian, *aemulatio* is only once negatively charged by the context.

I suggest that the discrepancy between Dionysius' and Quintilian's conception of μίμησις/*imitatio* and ζῆλος/*aemulatio* is related to their cultural stance towards the literary heritage of classical Greece. As a Greek in Rome who is concerned with the composition of Greek texts, Dionysius approves of μίμησις as a procedure of faithfully re-expressing the texts of venerable Greek predecessors, in such a way that the beauty and grandeur of these masterpieces is evoked and revived in an original stylistic idiom. For Quintilian, who addresses Latin teachers and students, *imitatio* of Greek models is useful only as a preparatory exercise, the fruits of which should always be 'translated' into the Latin language.

The idea of competition with Greek masterpieces is certainly present in Dionysius. Just as the painter Zeuxis tried to create perfect beauty by imitating what was imperfect (see section 1.1-3), the orator should ideally compete with different Greek models and make his work even better, thanks to theirs. At the same time, however, Dionysius seems to be rather reluctant in using the term ζῆλος to designate the relation between model of the past and imitator of the present, and often outlines situations in which ζῆλος is abject and degenerates into jealousy. This is, I suggest, because he is fully aware of the differences between ancient

Greece and modern Rome – differences which apparently do not always allow for sound ζῆλος, nor for a literary match. Thus, both idealism and realism seem to guide Dionysius in his ideas on ζῆλος.

By contrast, the Roman teacher Quintilian is not very concerned with a *revival* of classical Greece. His rhetorical agenda consists of bringing Latin literature on a par with Greek literature, and the whole reading list of Latin literature is imbued with the aspiration of competing with and conquering Greece. As a result, *aemulatio* is such a loaded and pregnant term for him – more than for Dionysius.

